Israel-Hamas Thread II

Benaiah468 said:

The misuse of the term genocide carries the risk that we will ultimately become blind to genuine genocides when they occur.

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I’m glad that we can agree then, friend.

If every form of warfare, displacement, or high civilian casualties is immediately labeled as genocide, the distinction between warfare and the deliberate intent to exterminate a people becomes blurred.

When political bodies (such as the UN Human Rights Council) or NGOs apply the term genocide to Israel before the highest court has ruled, the term becomes politicized.

Once allegations have been made, they are difficult to revise, even if the ICJ later comes to a different conclusion. This can be perceived as an instrumentalization of international law to exert pressure on Israel.

Many lawyers urge caution, as the specific intent to destroy (dolus specialis) required for genocide is extremely difficult to prove in court and can often only be substantiated by secret documents or chains of command that NGOs cannot access.

From a formal legal point of view, it is a prejudgment, as only the ICJ (or the ICC against individuals) can determine binding guilt.

A state that intends to commit genocide would not allow its population to grow over decades or open corridors for civilians in the current conflict.

The German government has repeatedly and emphatically rejected the accusation of genocide against Israel. It emphasizes that this accusation is completely unfounded and warns against the political exploitation of the term.

And the US?

It has dismissed South Africa's genocide case against Israel before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as “meritless” with a series of specific legal and diplomatic arguments. They accuse South Africa of relying on one-sided reports that ignore Israel's military necessity and efforts to spare civilians. Although the ICJ ruled in January 2024 that genocide was “plausible” and ordered protective measures, the court did not demand an immediate ceasefire, which can be interpreted as confirmation of Israel's right to continue its operations (in compliance with international law).

International law experts such as Kai Ambos point out that the statistical reality (mortality rate of 3%) and military strategy (combating Hamas) strongly argue against a classic intention to exterminate.

The low mortality rate and population growth in Gaza despite the war are strong indications against the assumption that Israel wants to physically wipe out the Palestinian people.

The existence of the “Gaza Metro” is one of the main reasons why the above-ground destruction of the Gaza Strip is so massive. Israel is not destroying in order to annihilate a people, but to eliminate a military infrastructure that has burrowed deep into private space.

Since Hamas has built its tunnels under civilian infrastructure such as residential buildings, schools, hospitals, and UN facilities, these buildings lose their protected status under certain conditions according to international humanitarian law. When a civilian building is used for military purposes, it becomes a legitimate military target.

The destruction of the surface is militarily necessary to seal the tunnel entrances and neutralize the fighters below. Without destroying the buildings above the tunnels, the war against Hamas cannot be won.

Hamas' use of civilian buildings for military purposes is well documented. According to the Geneva Conventions, civilian objects lose their protection as soon as they are used for military activities such as weapons storage or as combat positions, meaning that Hamas has systematically blurred the line between civilian and military infrastructure.

Hamas does not care one bit about complying with international law. Its strategy systematically removes the distinction between combatants and civilians. It places infrastructure in densely populated areas. While it has built a tunnel system hundreds of kilometers long for its fighters and supplies, there are virtually no public air-raid shelters for the civilian population in the Gaza Strip.

There are numerous reports and evidence that Hamas has tried to prevent civilians from fleeing from northern Gaza to the south. It needs civilians to be present in the combat zone in order to restrict the Israeli army's freedom of movement and increase international pressure on Israel through high civilian casualties. This was done through roadblocks, threats, or, in documented individual cases, by firing on escape routes.

When Hamas actively prevents people from using an escape corridor, it bears primary responsibility for putting them in danger. When a terrorist organization abuses its own population as a human shield and prevents evacuations, civilian casualties are not the result of Israel's intent to destroy, but a tragic consequence of Hamas' tactics.

Regarding the accusation of genocide the Jüdische Allgemeine writes in an essay:

...Interdisciplinary genocide research can provide important findings and observations that can then be used in a trial.

Of course, this requires a sincere intention to actually seek knowledge; a declaration such as the one recently presented by the International Association of Genocide Scholars is not particularly suitable for this purpose. It does not present any arguments, analyze any documents or witness statements, but instead makes an apodictic attribution of guilt.

The more than 300-page study by Bar-Ilan University, which does not recognize the facts of genocide, is of a completely different caliber. Anyone who sees it differently is welcome to refute it—that would be science, and in view of the ongoing war, the final word cannot yet be spoken...

Anyone looking at Gaza today should clearly recognize that Israel is concerned with freeing hostages and fighting Hamas, an organization whose declared goal is genocide: not only the destruction of Israel, but also the annihilation of the Jewish people.

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Those responsible for genocide do not provide for its alleged victims, warn them of attacks, or establish escape routes or humanitarian zones.

The former chief executive of Oxfam UK, Halima Begum is taking Oxfam to court, citing anti-Semitism, political pressure, and a hasty “genocide” narrative. The case shines a harsh light on the question of how neutral large NGOs are actually still operating in the Gaza war.

Begum accuses her former organization of serious misconduct. She wants a labor court to determine whether she was the victim of anti-Semitism, racism, and structural pressure. At the heart of the matter is an accusation that goes far beyond an internal personnel dispute: Oxfam acted disproportionately one-sidedly in the context of the Gaza war and attempted to politically anchor the term “genocide” before a solid legal basis existed.

Begum, a British Muslim with Bangladeshi roots, said in an interview that she had been subjected to a veritable campaign within the organization. She said it was particularly problematic that massive internal pressure had been exerted to label the war as “genocide” at an early stage. For an international aid organization, such a classification is not merely a buzzword, but a highly sensitive legal term with significant political consequences.

Anyone who says “genocide” is making the most serious accusation imaginable under international law. This category is bound by clear legal criteria and requires proof of specific intentions. When a humanitarian organization uses this term without solid evidence, it leaves the realm of sober analysis and enters the field of political accusation.

Begum describes a climate in which neutrality was hardly possible. As a Muslim leader, she found it particularly difficult to insist on balance. Her statements suggest that internal dynamics were shaped more by political convictions than by legal caution.

Oxfam has repeatedly been accused in the past of not acting neutrally on Middle East issues. Critics pointed to partnerships with organizations whose officials had links to radical groups. The organization denied having deliberately cooperated with extremist structures, but the debate about political bias is not new.

The current case exacerbates this image. When even the former executive director publicly states that neutrality was hardly tenable internally, it raises fundamental questions. Is an aid organization still humanitarian if it politically preempts central concepts of international law? Or does it risk becoming part of a global narrative battle?

Those who hastily use maximum legal terms without international courts having made corresponding findings risk undermining their own credibility. And those who consider internal criticism of such an approach to be disloyal create a climate that contradicts the claim to diversity and openness.

According to experts, the accusation of “genocide” against Israel had been prepared for years.

The president of the organization NGO Monitor, Dr. Gerald Steinberg, accuses international non-governmental organizations of having worked systematically for decades to level the gravest of all political accusations against Israel. In his view, it was only the Gaza War after October 7 that provided the moment these groups had been waiting for.

Steinberg explains that numerous NGO networks had been discussing for more than twenty years whether to label Israel an alleged “genocidal state.” This choice of words is not just any political term. It is the strongest moral accusation that can be levelled against a state. Those who use it question not only political decisions, but the legitimacy of a country itself.

According to the expert, many of these organizations followed a recurring pattern. Israel was systematically demonized, while the organizations reinforced each other's messages. These were not spontaneous reactions to current events, but narratives built up over the long term.

This is consistent with internal accusations within the aid organization Oxfam. The former head of Oxfam UK accused her own organization of allowing anti-Semitic tendencies and pushing to label the war as genocide without providing sufficient evidence. #5324

Steinberg emphasizes that many NGOs today are no longer just humanitarian actors. With budgets running into the billions, they can have a decisive influence on global public opinion.

From Israel's perspective, the impact of these campaigns is enormous. The accusation of genocide comes at a time when Israel is fighting a defensive war against the terrorist organization Hamas. On October 7, Hamas carried out an unprecedented attack, deliberately murdering, kidnapping, and abusing civilians. Nevertheless, international attention quickly shifted to accusations against Israel.

Steinberg also criticizes the role of individual medical and humanitarian organizations. Some of their representatives spread serious accusations that later turned out to be false or greatly exaggerated. A particularly striking example was the claim that Israel had bombed a hospital and killed hundreds of people. Later investigations indicated that a misguided rocket from Gaza itself had caused the explosion.

Another key issue is Hamas' use of civilian facilities. This practice presents Israel with a moral and military dilemma.

According to Steinberg, this raises a fundamental question. If organizations knew that aid supplies were being misused and civilian facilities were being used for military purposes, why did they remain silent? This question concerns not only the past, but also the credibility of international institutions.

For Israel, this is not just a matter of criticism, but of its own legitimacy. The accusation of genocide is no ordinary political attack. It targets the moral existence of a state. When such accusations are spread without clear evidence, the damage extends far beyond the current political situation.

Following massive international criticism, UN Secretary-General António Guterres is visibly distancing himself from Francesca Albanese. Her choice of words, her political tone, and her appearance alongside representatives of Hamas and Iran are increasingly putting the United Nations in a difficult position.

Francesca Albanese herself rejects the accusations. She speaks of statements taken out of context and publishes her own videos to put her words into perspective. She says she did not describe Israel as a state as the “common enemy of humanity,” but rather a global system that she holds responsible for structural injustices.

But this is precisely where the problem lies. Anyone who operates in a heated international situation using highly charged language should not be surprised when these words are interpreted politically. A UN mandate requires precision, restraint, and a strict separation between analysis and accusation. Those who instead resort to moral condemnation are abandoning the ground of sober human rights work.

The impression is reinforced that Albanese is acting less as an impartial observer and more as a political actor with a clear agenda. This damages not only her own credibility, but that of the entire Human Rights Council.

For António Guterres, the situation is delicate. On the one hand, he formally defends the independence of the special rapporteurs. On the other hand, he cannot afford politically to be identified with wording that member states consider extreme or one-sided. His distancing himself is therefore also an attempt to limit institutional damage.

It remains to be seen whether the French initiative will be successful. The Human Rights Council decides on mandates, and majorities there are politically complex. But regardless of the outcome, one thing is clear: this debate has made a red line visible.

The UN cannot afford to have key human rights mandates perceived as a platform for political rhetoric. Those who criticize Israel are entitled to do so. But those who choose terms that delegitimize a nation across the board or drive it into total moral condemnation are overstepping the bounds of what is expected of a UN representative.

Guterres' distancing himself is therefore more than a personal demarcation. It is a signal that even within the UN, patience with Albanese's actions is visibly waning.

A political experiment with historic significance begins today in Washington. US President Donald Trump will personally open the first meeting of his newly created Peace Council for Gaza. Representatives from nearly 50 countries will attend, billions of dollars in aid will be pledged, and an international force is on the horizon. But despite this impressive diplomatic backdrop, the crucial question remains unanswered: Who will actually control Gaza when the war finally ends?

The new Peace Council is at the heart of Trump's strategy for reorganizing the Gaza Strip after the war against Hamas. Israel is part of this body, but Palestinian representatives are not. This fact alone shows how much the political landscape has shifted. For Israel, it is clear that a future for Gaza is only possible without Hamas. Any other solution would mean that the terrorist organization would sooner or later rebuild its power and become a threat again.

Trump intends to announce at the meeting that an initial $5 billion will be made available for reconstruction. A significant portion of this will come from the Gulf states, including the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. However, this sum is only a start. Rebuilding a devastated region whose infrastructure has been misused for terrorism for years will cost many times that amount.

But money alone will not solve the problem. The central point of conflict is the disarmament of Hamas. Without its military defeat, no international stabilization force can be deployed. This is precisely where the greatest uncertainty lies. Hamas has so far refused to surrender its weapons. For Israel, it is clear that an international presence is only acceptable if it does not become a protective power for the terrorist organization.

At the same time, several countries are planning to send soldiers to join an international stabilization force. These units are intended to ensure security in the future and prevent terrorist structures from re-emerging. Countries from Europe, Asia, and the Islamic world have signaled their participation. Israel views this development with cautious optimism, but knows from experience that international forces are only effective if their mission is clear and uncompromising.

Another open question concerns humanitarian aid. Supplying the population is difficult, not least because Hamas has systematically misused aid supplies for its own purposes for years. Israel has repeatedly pointed out that all aid must be controlled to prevent it from falling into the hands of terrorists again.

The Peace Council thus faces an enormous task. It must not only organize money and coordinate troops. Above all, it must ensure that Gaza does not become a base for terrorism again. For Israel, this is not a theoretical question. It is a question of survival.

Whether this new diplomatic approach will succeed depends on one single condition: that Hamas is finally removed from power. Without this prerequisite, any reconstruction will only be a pause until the next war.

The President of the US announces an international program for Gaza and expects Hamas to surrender its weapons.

According to him, the war is over, even if some tensions remain. However, his clear expectation of Hamas is crucial. The terrorist organization will surrender its weapons, he said. If it fails to do so, it will face harsh consequences.

This statement is of enormous significance from Israel's point of view. Oct 7 and its aftermath have shown that every weapon in the hands of Hamas poses a direct threat to Israeli families. The idea that Hamas could retain its military power and at the same time receive international aid is unacceptable to Israel. Security begins with disarmament.

Trump also presented a financial framework for the future of Gaza. More than seven billion dollars have already been pledged by international partners, and the United States itself wants to contribute another ten billion. This money is intended to help with reconstruction, but it comes with one crucial condition. Without security, there can be no stability. Without disarmament, there can be no peace.

The Board of Peace is to oversee this process. It is an ambitious attempt to reshape the future of the region. Israel is part of this forum, while "Palestinian" representatives have not been invited. This decision highlights a reality that many have long ignored. Peace cannot be negotiated with a terrorist organization that has built its existence on violence.

A possible change is also emerging on the military front. Several countries are planning to provide soldiers for an international stabilization force. Their task will be to maintain order and prevent a relapse into war. However, these plans depend on one crucial condition: Hamas must be disarmed. Without this step, any stabilization will remain an illusion.

For Israel, this phase is of historic significance. For the first time in years, there is a concrete international initiative that openly articulates Jerusalem's central demand. Peace is only possible if terror loses its weapons.

The coming days will show whether the Iranian regime is prepared to limit its ambitions or whether it will continue to push for confrontation. At the same time, it will be decided whether Hamas is prepared to give up its military power or whether it will once again put its own population in danger.

Israel is observing these developments with a clear eye. The experience of recent decades has taught us that words alone offer no protection. Security comes from determination, strength, and the willingness to defend one's own existence.

The next days could therefore decide more than just diplomatic agreements. They could determine the future of an entire region.

An international stabilization force for Gaza is being formed, with billions pledged and soldiers being prepared. At the same time, the possible participation of individual states raises questions about credibility, interests, and the future of the region.

According to the organizers, Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Albania have pledged military contributions. Indonesia promised a particularly large contribution, mentioning at least 8,000 soldiers. Kazakhstan announced additional medical units, while other countries declared their willingness to build infrastructure and security structures.

At the same time, Egypt and Jordan declared their intention to help establish a new "Palestinian" police force. Thousands of applicants have already come forward. This new security structure is intended to take control of the Gaza Strip in the long term and ensure that no new reign of terror emerges.

In addition to the military component, a huge financial package is on the table. The US wants to provide around ten billion dollars. Countries in the Gulf region have announced additional billions in aid. Other countries have offered support in setting up administrative structures, schools, and medical facilities.

At the same time, it was announced on the sidelines of the meeting that Turkey had also signaled its fundamental willingness to participate in the stabilization process. However, this statement has attracted particular attention. Turkey has maintained close political contacts with Hamas for years, whose representatives have been able to appear openly in the country. For Israel and many observers, therefore, it is not only decisive whether a state sends soldiers, but also under what political conditions this happens and whether the clear disarmament of Hamas is actually supported.

This question is not insignificant. It touches on the core of the entire mission. An international force can only be credible if it is fully committed to the goal of ending Hamas' military power and preventing a return to terror.

The disarmament of Hamas remains the decisive benchmark. Without it, there will be no stability. With it, a generation could grow up for the first time that no longer lives under the constant threat of rockets and terror.