I disagree, it includes the coming.
Saying "the coming is included" is trivial. Yes, ἐλθεῖν is "included" syntactically as a complementary infinitive (i.e., it "complements" or
completes the main idea). But inclusion is not identity, and it does not change what the clause asserts. δύναται is the
semantic head of the clause. The infinitive (come) does not assert an action. It merely specifies
what action is in view with respect to the main idea (ability).
The clause asserts, "no one
is able to come," not "no one
comes." Those are two different statements. Yet you seem to be confusing them (see "A" and "C" in the logic discussion below). The clause is about
capacity, not
execution.
If I say, "no one can lift 500 lbs unless trained," the sentence includes "lifting," but it does not assert that training
guarantees lifting. It asserts that training is
required for lifting to be
possible. Your view -- that the Father's drawing is effectual in bringing men to Christ -- is a view
I agree with and have argued for, but it is
not entailed by the conditional statement itself. The argument for that view comes from the additional piece of information we are given in the final clause ("and I will raise him up"), because it grammatically attributes the promise of final salvation to the one
enabled to come.
Seems you still leaving room for mans will to seal the deal
How so? Again, I've explicitly argued the contrary. The final clause does not permit that as a possibility.
I disagree, that defeats the need of drawing to Christ
You are smuggling sufficiency into a statement that grammatically and logically only establishes necessity.
Taken as a whole, John 6:44 does establish sufficiency (because no one can come unless drawn,
and the one drawn will be raised). But the
conditional statement itself ("no one can come to me unless drawn"), does not. Your conclusion is correct; how you are arriving at it is not.
Let:
- D = the Father draws a person
- A = the person is able to come to Christ
- C = the person comes to Christ
The conditional statement in John 6:44 states:
-D --> -A
"If the Father does not draw a person, then the person is not able to come."
This is logically equivalent to:
A --> D
"If a person is able to come, then the Father has drawn him."
That is all the conditional gives you. What it
does not say is:
D --> C
"If the Father draws, then the person will come."
You can make that argument (and I would agree with you)
theologically, or,
grammatically and contextually with an appeal to the final clause ("and I will raise him up on the last day"), but you cannot make that case with an appeal to the conditional statement alone. Attempting to do so treats
A and
C as if they are the same statement. (Again,
theologically they may essentially be, but
grammatically they are not, and if we are to take care in arguing an
exegetical case for this view, that argument needs to follow what's actually in the text, without importing content.)
Now that's a contradiction. No disrespect but you seem doubleminded on this matter.
Where is the contradiction? Please don't just assert that without explanation.
It is unclear why you regard my position as "double-minded." There is no inconsistency here. I am making a straightforward grammatical and logical distinction.
My argument is that John 6:44
as a whole teaches effectual grace, but the inherence of sufficiency in the Father's drawing arises from the
final clause,
not from the conditional statement itself.
The conditional clause --
οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐλθεῖν πρὸς με ἐὰν μὴ ὁ πατὴρ ὁ πέμψας με ἑλκύσῃ αὐτόν
"No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him"
-- establishes
necessity, not sufficiency. It states that drawing is
required for coming; it does
not, on its own, assert that drawing
guarantees coming. Logically, it yields only this:
If not drawn --> not able to come.
That tells us what must be true
for coming to occur, not what must follow
from drawing.
The inference of sufficiency (i.e., what must follow from drawing) comes from the final clause:
καὶ ἀναστήσω αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ
"and I will raise him up on the last day."
Grammatically, αὐτὸν refers back to the same individual previously mentioned -- the one drawn and thereby enabled. The text does not introduce a new referent or a narrower subset. As a result, the one drawn is identically the one raised, meaning there is no syntactic room for a category of "drawn-but-not-raised."
That's where the sufficiency comes from,
not the logic of "no one can come to me unless drawn."
Thus, the verse as a whole yields:
- Drawing is necessary for coming (from the conditional).
- Drawing is also sufficient for coming (from the final clause's identification of the drawn one with the raised one).
There is no contradiction here. I'm simply refusing to collapse distinct logical functions into a single clause.