Determinism, Compatibilism, Libertarian Free Will

looking_for_answers_ said:

Causality is not linked to naturalism. Even fully supernatural things still have to be either caused, or uncaused.

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How do you know this?

YouAreAwesome said:

if God is love, then He will not predetermine some to burn eternally. The idea is completely contradictory.

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100% agreed

YouAreAwesome said:

But if the will is free to the extent that it can be judged

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Would would a "free" will be judgeable? If it's free from causality, then it was not caused by any underlying rules.

That aside, the problem I find (and I suspect the reason that libertarian free will is overwhelmingly not believed in by philosophers) is that frequently the arguments in support of it do little to respond fully to incompatibilist's arguments:
Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

For reference, "iff" means "if and only if"

QUOTE ///

1. Any agent, x, performs an any act, a, of her own free will iff x has control over a.
2. x has control over a only if x is the ultimate source of a.
3. If x is the ultimate source of a, then some condition, b, necessary for a, originates with x.
4. If any condition, b, originates with x, then there are no conditions sufficient for b independent of x.
5. If determinism is true, then the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future.
6. If the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future, then for any condition, b, necessary for any action, a, performed by any agent, x, there are conditions independent of x (in x's remote past, before x's birth) that are sufficient for b.
7. If, for any condition, b, necessary for any action, a, performed by any agent, x, there are conditions independent of x that are sufficient for b, then no agent, x, is the ultimate source of any action, a. (This follows from C and D.)
8. If determinism is true, then no agent, x, is the ultimate source of any action, a. (This follows from E, F, and G.)
9. Therefore, if determinism is true, then no agent, x, performs any action, a, of her own free will. (This follows from A, B, and H.)

[...] let us simplify the above argument as follows:

1. A person acts of her own free will only if she is its ultimate source (A-B).
2. If determinism is true, no one is the ultimate source of her actions (C-H).
3. Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will (I).

END QUOTE ///

And the argument that something can be "non-determined but not random but we have no idea how or what that even means or how it would be different from randomness or how something can cause itself without time-travel" (??? that's called a paradox!!!) or why that would even be considered freedom... this all makes no sense to me at all

looking_for_answers_ said:

100% agreed



Would would a "free" will be judgeable? If it's free from causality, then it was not caused by any underlying rules.

That aside, the problem I find (and I suspect the reason that libertarian free will is overwhelmingly not believed in by philosophers) is that frequently the arguments in support of it do little to respond fully to incompatibilist's arguments:
Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

For reference, "iff" means "if and only if"

QUOTE ///

1. Any agent, x, performs an any act, a, of her own free will iff x has control over a.
2. x has control over a only if x is the ultimate source of a.
3. If x is the ultimate source of a, then some condition, b, necessary for a, originates with x.
4. If any condition, b, originates with x, then there are no conditions sufficient for b independent of x.
5. If determinism is true, then the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future.
6. If the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future, then for any condition, b, necessary for any action, a, performed by any agent, x, there are conditions independent of x (in x's remote past, before x's birth) that are sufficient for b.
7. If, for any condition, b, necessary for any action, a, performed by any agent, x, there are conditions independent of x that are sufficient for b, then no agent, x, is the ultimate source of any action, a. (This follows from C and D.)
8. If determinism is true, then no agent, x, is the ultimate source of any action, a. (This follows from E, F, and G.)
9. Therefore, if determinism is true, then no agent, x, performs any action, a, of her own free will. (This follows from A, B, and H.)

[...] let us simplify the above argument as follows:

1. A person acts of her own free will only if she is its ultimate source (A-B).
2. If determinism is true, no one is the ultimate source of her actions (C-H).
3. Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will (I).

END QUOTE ///

And the argument that something can be "non-determined but not random but we have no idea how or what that even means or how it would be different from randomness or how something can cause itself without time-travel" (??? that's called a paradox!!!) or why that would even be considered freedom... this all makes no sense to me at all

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You show here how compatibilsm is false. But it's not because there is no libertarian free will. It's because determinism is false. I am an incompatiblist because of arguments such as the one you have presented here. To hold libertarian free will one must reject determinism, and once this is done the argument presented says nothing about free will. B does originate with X. Otherwise judgment is irrational.

looking_for_answers_ said:

And the argument that something can be "non-determined but not random but we have no idea how or what that even means or how it would be different from randomness or how something can cause itself without time-travel" (??? that's called a paradox!!!) or why that would even be considered freedom... this all makes no sense to me at all

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You are struggling with the concept of creation right? That it is possible for two people to create a child with its own freedom. I guess the question is, do you see anything unique about human life to that of the rest of the universe with regard to freedom? If we take determinism to its conclusion there is no difference between a person and a rock. But I see human life as holding something unique with regard to free will. I think the evidence is seen internally every day. This must be our starting assumption and the proof must be very strong to refute such obvious internal evidence. Don't you think?

@looking_for_answers_
One more thing... The kind of freedom a compatibilst must accept is not libertarian. Without libertarian free will judgment is unjustified in my opinion. God offers unconditional safety and love for everyone and each has the opportunity to accept or reject. Under compatibilsm the choice is not properly free imo.

YouAreAwesome said:

You show here how compatibilsm is false. But it's not because there is no libertarian free will. It's because determinism is false. I am an incompatiblist because of arguments such as the one you have presented here. To hold libertarian free will one must reject determinism, and once this is done the argument presented says nothing about free will. B does originate with X. Otherwise judgment is irrational.

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Then read the paragraph after that. I do not understand how I can judge something that has no underlying mechanism or rules. Why on earth would that somehow be MORE responsible? This makes judgment even more irrational.

YouAreAwesome said:

If we take determinism to its conclusion there is no difference between a person and a rock.

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This depends on what you mean by "no difference" but I would completely disagree. Humans have consciousness, which differentiates us from inanimate matter.

YouAreAwesome said:

But I see human life as holding something unique with regard to free will

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Going in circles here but until someone can explain to me how "free will" would look and behave any different from randomness then I do not know what this means.

YouAreAwesome said:

I think the evidence is seen internally every day. This must be our starting assumption and the proof must be very strong to refute such obvious internal evidence. Don't you think?

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Is "free will" the only possible cause for the experience of freedom? Look up the Libet expiriments. The people in question were experiencing freedom of choice, yet the evidence showed that their conscious mind did not receive the neurological signal until their muscles had already been activated. This is at least enough to show that conscious experience of freedom does NOT imply actual freedom. This is the distinction between freedom of the mind (nothing outside of my body is physically forcing my to do X) and freedom of the will. Our minds are capable of feeling free even if they don't find out about our actions until after the fact.

The burden of proof lies with the person claiming the existence of X. If I say purple flying giraffes exist, it's not your burden to prove that they don't. So the burden of proof lies with the people saying "there's this conceptual thing that looks identical in every way to randomness but it's not randomness."

This gets back to the first point. If a universe filled with "free will" is completely indistinguishable from a universe without it, what's the point of "giving" the conscious entities within that universe free will? Going back to the example of the three machines and the human taking the test. I cannot distinguish between the agent with free will and the agents without. So what is the point of free will??? All it seems to do is somehow justify allowing that agent to be tortured for eternity, even though the other agents (who were also fully conscious, just without a free will) get off scott free. Thus free will is a cruel curse! It would have been better for that poor agent to be conscious but not free.

(Pre-empting "but machines can't be conscious..." - do you believe your pets are conscious? Then that is not unique to humans, so there's no good reason a robot can't also be conscious)

I think there are two separate issues here. The first is the question of whether the universe is deterministic or non-deterministic. Quantum mechanics leaves open the possibility that that reality is non-deterministic. Look up bell's inequality as a proof that there is no underlying deterministic mechanism (hidden variables).

The second is the question of free will. Compatiblism holds that free will exists within a deterministic universe. Libertarian free will would require a non-deterministic universe. So it all depends on what exactly we mean by free will.

Another separate issue is that of eternal torture. There is certainly not agreement among Christians on this. Perhaps a better question is are we responsible for our moral actions? That way even if we hypothetically assumed atheism the question of moral responsibility would still be valid.

looking_for_answers_ said:

Then read the paragraph after that. I do not understand how I can judge something that has no underlying mechanism or rules. Why on earth would that somehow be MORE responsible? This makes judgment even more irrational.



This depends on what you mean by "no difference" but I would completely disagree. Humans have consciousness, which differentiates us from inanimate matter.


Going in circles here but until someone can explain to me how "free will" would look and behave any different from randomness then I do not know what this means.



Is "free will" the only possible cause for the experience of freedom? Look up the Libet expiriments. The people in question were experiencing freedom of choice, yet the evidence showed that their conscious mind did not receive the neurological signal until their muscles had already been activated. This is at least enough to show that conscious experience of freedom does NOT imply actual freedom. This is the distinction between freedom of the mind (nothing outside of my body is physically forcing my to do X) and freedom of the will. Our minds are capable of feeling free even if they don't find out about our actions until after the fact.

The burden of proof lies with the person claiming the existence of X. If I say purple flying giraffes exist, it's not your burden to prove that they don't. So the burden of proof lies with the people saying "there's this conceptual thing that looks identical in every way to randomness but it's not randomness."

This gets back to the first point. If a universe filled with "free will" is completely indistinguishable from a universe without it, what's the point of "giving" the conscious entities within that universe free will? Going back to the example of the three machines and the human taking the test. I cannot distinguish between the agent with free will and the agents without. So what is the point of free will??? All it seems to do is somehow justify allowing that agent to be tortured for eternity, even though the other agents (who were also fully conscious, just without a free will) get off scott free. Thus free will is a cruel curse! It would have been better for that poor agent to be conscious but not free.

(Pre-empting "but machines can't be conscious..." - do you believe your pets are conscious? Then that is not unique to humans, so there's no good reason a robot can't also be conscious)

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The Libet experiments have too many variables, too many possible factors that weren’t considered—the experiments themselves required no higher order decision making for example; they should not be used for proof either way.

Have you read Chisholm’s Human Freedom and the Self? (https://wmpeople.wm.edu/asset/index/cvance/chisholm). It is only short and deals with free will from the libertarian perspective addressing some points you bring up. If you are committed to compatiblism I’m probably the wrong person to discuss this with because I find compatiblism and Gods omnibenevolence incompatible.

If God, as the Prime Mover, has libertarian free will, then I believe He can bestow this on others. Do you believe God has libertarian free will?

Everybodyknows said:

I think there are two separate issues here. The first is the question of whether the universe is deterministic or non-deterministic. Quantum mechanics leaves open the possibility that that reality is non-deterministic. Look up bell's inequality as a proof that there is no underlying deterministic mechanism (hidden variables).

The second is the question of free will. Compatiblism holds that free will exists within a deterministic universe. Libertarian free will would require a non-deterministic universe. So it all depends on what exactly we mean by free will.

Another separate issue is that of eternal torture. There is certainly not agreement among Christians on this. Perhaps a better question is are we responsible for our moral actions? That way even if we hypothetically assumed atheism the question of moral responsibility would still be valid.

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This is a good point. I don't want to derail the original intent of the thread but yes for me personally the issue is with moral responsibility and eternal torture. I am struggling to find a solid reason for why any individual should be held ultimately responsible, and yes, I admit that I find the thought of eternal torture of even Hitler or any other universally reviled person to be the darkest thing I can think of, but from my personal upbringing I've been taught that not believing in hell was a heresy

YouAreAwesome said:

The Libet experiments have too many variables, too many possible factors that weren’t considered—the experiments themselves required no higher order decision making for example; they should not be used for proof either way.

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My point was just that experience of freedom is not solid evidence of actual freedom.

YouAreAwesome said:

Have you read Chisholm’s Human Freedom and the Self? (https://wmpeople.wm.edu/asset/index/cvance/chisholm). It is only short and deals with free will from the libertarian perspective addressing some points you bring up. If you are committed to compatiblism I’m probably the wrong person to discuss this with because I find compatiblism and Gods omnibenevolence incompatible.

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Thanks, I will give this a thorough read. I've gotten about halfway through to the point where he addresses the core of my concerns but I still do not see anything that has yet convinced me otherwise; the author still seems settled on the Agent being something indistinguishably different from randomness yet morally responsible.

To clarify: I'm by no means "committed" to compatibilism. If I find an argument convincing enough, or solid, hard evidence that contradicts when I believe, then I have to change my beliefs or I am not being intellectually honest.

I should probably wait until I've finished, but this still doesn't answer the other question of what the point of this "freedom" would be. Even the author concedes that a universe with free will would be indistinguishable from one without it. Yet since God gave this "gift", now the overwhelming majority of the conscious beings within aforementioned universe will now suffer from unending torture.

YouAreAwesome said:

If God, as the Prime Mover, has libertarian free will, then I believe He can bestow this on others. Do you believe God has libertarian free will?

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This is an enitrely separate discussion, and I'm not sure it really applies to God in the same way as to us, as He has the nature of being timeless and causality gets a little... wonky and meaningless when time is no longer a factor. But I am not necessarily convinced that even God has free will in the way we think of it; after all, can He do anything that is less than the Godliest thing to do? You could perhaps arguing that all of the things He is capable of doing are equally holy "before" He does them, and then become the holiest thing when He follows through. The definition of free will here is still quite squishy and hard to pin down, so I'm not convinced that if God created me as a being that experiences time (what with memory being closely if not intimately tied with identity and decision making) and being out of that is how He is considered free, then perhaps no, it would be impossible for him to give me similarly free will. Just like I don't think he can create a married bachelor, a square triangle, or a rock so heavy he can't lift it.

I'll finish reading the paper later, for now I am pre-commited to helping with clearing snow and preparing a delicious Christmas dinner. Thanks for the discussion, and Merry Christmas!

looking_for_answers_ said:

This is a good point. I don't want to derail the original intent of the thread but yes for me personally the issue is with moral responsibility and eternal torture. I am struggling to find a solid reason for why any individual should be held ultimately responsible, and yes, I admit that I find the thought of eternal torture of even Hitler or any other universally reviled person to be the darkest thing I can think of, but from my personal upbringing I've been taught that not believing in hell was a heresy

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We must establish moral responsibility in the first place before we can even discuss fairness of punishment. Under hard determinism we are not responsible for our moral actions in any way so any punishment at all would be technically unfair. You seem to be a Hard Incompatiblist, wherein you feel that free will is incompatible with either determinism or indeterminism. We are not morally responsible for our actions even if there is some randomness involved because we don't control randomness any more than we control determinism. Again it would seem unjust to punish people for their actions even under indeterminism. The only scenarios, as far as I know, under which we are morally responsible are compatiblism or libertarianism. If you can't accept either of those then you can't really even begin to evaluate the fairness of punishments.

Everybodyknows said:

We must establish moral responsibility in the first place before we can even discuss fairness of punishment. Under hard determinism we are not responsible for our moral actions in any way so any punishment at all would be technically unfair. You seem to be a Hard Incompatiblist, wherein you feel that free will is incompatible with either determinism or indeterminism. We are not morally responsible for our actions even if there is some randomness involved because we don't control randomness any more than we control determinism. Again it would seem unjust to punish people for their actions even under indeterminism. The only scenarios, as far as I know, under which we are morally responsible are compatiblism or libertarianism. If you can't accept either of those then you can't really even begin to evaluate the fairness of punishments.

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Indeed, but I'm not an incompatabilist by will (lol), it's just the one that makes the most sense to me. Libertarianism seems to have more holes than a sponge and I don't even agree that it leads to responsibility of the human. Compatabilism feels like arguing semantics. However I'm just an armchair philosopher and have only been really reading/studying/think about this for 8-9 months now. I'm completely open to having my preconceived notions challenged and being wrong.

looking_for_answers_ said:

the Agent being something indistinguishably different from randomness yet morally responsible.

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I think it is important God is defined as free in a libertarian sense. Otherwise He is not in control of anything but bouncing along with rest of the determinists. I think of it like this: God is not bound to one perfect path but instead perfection entails infinite options that are all perfect. For example, God can create (there are infinitely unique perfect things to create) or remain (as He is already perfect). Heis presented with multiple perfect options and chooses to create. If He had instead remained He would have still been perfect. His actions are not bound to one trajectory. It can be summed up in this way: there can be choices available to God that are equally perfect. If this is true then He can choose in a libertarian sense -- He makes uncaused choices. I would also say that if God is the biblical God then He can change His mind and even experience human-type feelings such as regret (see Open Theism to understand my position on the nature of God). I see this as important because if we reduce God to the Greek conception of what I might phrase hard immutability (rather than how I would describe Him, character immutability) then He is like an impersonal force with no ability to other than what He must do.

If we can establish God as libertarian then it should follow He can create libertarian agents. What are these? Humans are uncaused causers that cause from who they are themselves. The part of us that causes is free. It is not placed in us with a bent that must will this way or that. We, like God, choose how we move. So this is not random, but the beauty of life and freedom.

I'm not sure I've addressed this adequately, can you be quite specific in your criticism? I really like the Chisolm paper even though it's been criticised a lot more recently.

Hope ur Xmas was good, ours was pretty relaxed

YouAreAwesome said:

I think it is important God is defined as free in a libertarian sense.

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To start off, God is a pretty tough case. I still can't start off by saying that God has libertarian free will because I still do not believe that to be well-defined in a useful way.

YouAreAwesome said:

Otherwise He is not in control of anything but bouncing along with rest of the determinists.

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I do not believe that these this follows from denying Him libertarian free will. He still has absolute and total control - there is nothing external forcing Him to do anything. So a compatabilist would not say "He is not in control".

YouAreAwesome said:

I think of it like this: God is not bound to one perfect path but instead perfection entails infinite options that are all perfect. For example, God can create (there are infinitely unique perfect things to create) or remain (as He is already perfect). Heis presented with multiple perfect options and chooses to create.

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Perhaps, but this supposes multiple perfect options, and that God must be forced (heh ) to choose either to create or to remain. I am not convinced of either of these things. Perhaps there is indeed only one perfect option for what God can do. Perhaps He creates and doesn't create simultaneously. Perhaps speculating about this in regards to God is ultimately kind of silly because He is not constrained by time as we are.

YouAreAwesome said:

If He had instead remained He would have still been perfect. His actions are not bound to one trajectory. It can be summed up in this way: there can be choices available to God that are equally perfect. If this is true then He can choose in a libertarian sense -- He makes uncaused choices.

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This gets into one of my main issues with libertarianism which I'll get into later. But there is a lot of semantic kejiggering going on here (as seems to happen everywhere in the free will discussion, lol). But you could easily argue that they are caused by God's nature. My definition of "uncaused" is just that - there is no underlying nature, reason, morality, laws, rationality, etc., behind an event that is truly uncaused. Also, we need to be careful not to conflate decisions with events. They are distinct and I do not believe that decisions are broken down enough to be considered events, but rather collections of events. Aside from the point though.

YouAreAwesome said:

If we can establish God as libertarian then it should follow He can create libertarian agents.

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Not necessarily. There are a lot of things God can't create. A being more powerful, knowledgable, loving, etc., than Himself, off the top of my head. It could even be that, if He is a libertarian agent, that is something that is tied intimately with being God, just as His omnipotence etc. is.

And even if He is a libertarian agent and also can create other libertarian agents, it does not necessarily follow that He did. There are many things that He has clearly chosen not to create us as. We are not beings capabale of experiencing time in more than one way, and He created us only capable of experiencing a measly three dimensions of space. It certainly seems that He gave other supernatural beings such gifts that He withheld from us.

YouAreAwesome said:

I'm not sure I've addressed this adequately, can you be quite specific in your criticism? I really like the Chisolm paper even though it's been criticised a lot more recently.

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Sure. There are a few things.

First, the semantics, mentioned above.
A common instance I see among libertarians is "uncaused, but not random". Okay, but if an event is uncaused, then there is no underlying reason, and there would logically be not following pattern... which is the actual definition of "random": the definition of random
So I get frustrated when arguments rely on these semantics (note: this is a problem I have with the compatabilist and incompatablist camps, too).
Often when libertarians make statements about an agent's event not being caused by anything, they are still arguing as if the agent had some underlying nature. Which is why I think it's better to frame the discussion around "events", and imagine them as atomically as possible. Chisolm, to his credit, makes this distinction in section 10, quoting Locke.

Secondly, this feels strongly to me of an answer in need of a question. We don't really observe "uncaused, but not random" anywhere in the universe. And we still can't provide an actual coherent definition of what the difference is. It seems that it's a result of digging heels in, deciding that "no matter what, ultimate responsibility absolutely must exist! I refuse to budge on this, therefore I reject all other arguments". I am certainly not accusing you or anyone else here of this, but a long time ago I was desperately trying to work out my faith in this and other areas and my pastor had pointed me to William Lane Craig. I recall very specifically listening to his podcast episodes about Sam Harris, searching for any strong argument that could convince me against being "stuck" in determinism. He presented Harris's arguments, and then said "...but that would mean moral responsiblity doesn't exist!" Then they laughed and moved on... I was floored and dismayed. In other times when they talked on the topic, they would make arguments like "then I would believe in free will, only because I was determined to!" To which I would think "well, yes, that is indeed true, but it's not an argument against determinism". Or worst, that our free will was our logic... though logic, along with emotion, rationality, etc. would make an agent's events not "uncaused".

Building on that... Thirdly, I do not think that libertarianism even accomplishes what it sets out to do! You could validly argue that if a nuclear, indivisible self-cause has no other causes (including morality, logic, etc.) then how could it be held to those standards? Thus there is a really good argument that the idea of a self-caused event is still is less responsible because of the fact that it is "free".
I could also argue that I did not choose to have free will. So an argument for partial responsibility from free will is stronger to me than an argument for ultimate responsibility. If I give a child a knife to play with, knowing full well that someone is likely to get hurt, I certainly can't absolve myself of blame on the ride to the ER! I can partially blame the child, but not ultimately. So even if I accepted libertarianism, it would still fail to convince that moral responsibility lies ultimately even with a free agent.

Fourth, following from the third: If libertarianism doesn't imply ultimate moral responsiblitiy, then what the heck does it accomplish? Well, apparently the only difference it makes is it allows any deity to justify my eternal torture. Honestly, I don't want it. Given the test-taking thought experiment I wrote out in previous posts, libertarianism would not make the universe discernably different. So I can still enjoy life, get chills from the Skyrim soundtrack, enjoy pizza with friends, and yes, even genuinely love Jesus without it. With libertarianism, I now how to consider that if the God I believe in could use it to justify sending a non-believer to hell, then I am forced to belive that any other deity would also be justified in sending me to hell for not believing in their existence. Even if I think the odds of that are 0.00...1%, then I'd rather that I had just not been born. The potential upside just ain't worth that gamble. This is an emotional reason, not a logical one, so I admit it's not the strongest. But I'm just being honest.

These are just the starting reasons - and you'll notice that none of them really even address my problems with the logic of libertarianism itself. They are more fundamental than that. If I'm trying to understand moral responsibilty, and libertarianism doesn't even sufficiently convince me that moral responsibility follows the "free will" (as it defines it) then I don't really even need to be concern with it's internal logic. Add to that the fact that I don't even really observe anywhere the supposed effect that libertarianism purports to explain...

I can definitely go further into my problems with the logic of libertarianism if you'd like, and would love to do so. Unfortunately though I am quite low on sleep and am about to drift off so my brain isn't really firing a full capacity lol so I will have to sign off for now lol.

YouAreAwesome said:

Hope ur Xmas was good, ours was pretty relaxed

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It was! Thanks for asking. We had a delightful, cozy, windless snowstorm all morning, and gorgeous clear skies for the sunset.

looking_for_answers_ said:

I do not believe that these this follows from denying Him libertarian free will. He still has absolute and total control - there is nothing external forcing Him to do anything. So a compatabilist would not say "He is not in control".

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Sorry, you missed my point. I was attempting to say that God would no longer be in control of Himself, but just another billiard ball bouncing around in the sea of causes. As a side note I argue from a libertarian perspective that God is not in control because He’s given real responsibility to agents (those who are out of Gods control).

looking_for_answers_ said:

Perhaps, but this supposes multiple perfect options

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Of course, but there are suppositions either way, whether libertarian or not. Even the perfection of God is up for debate.

looking_for_answers_ said:

Perhaps speculating about this in regards to God is ultimately kind of silly because He is not constrained by time as we are.

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Again, debatable. I do not see Him as outside of time (be it in this reality or some other) because anything outside of time doesn’t exist.

looking_for_answers_ said:

My definition of "uncaused" is just that - there is no underlying nature

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So what caused His nature? The chain of causes either must begin somewhere or have continued forever from the past. If it began, it began uncaused in God. If forever, God is the billiard ball bouncing around without proper control over His decisions. God would be determined and His free will would be the illusion that compatiblism promotes as it relies entirely on causes that are not in the control of the agent.

looking_for_answers_ said:

A being more powerful, knowledgable, loving, etc., than Himself, off the top of my head. It could even be that, if He is a libertarian agent, that is something that is tied intimately with being God, just as His omnipotence etc. is

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Fair enough, but I see no reason that He can’t make a person with less libertarian freedom than Himself. Just as He can give us some power, some knowledge etc. it doesn’t have to Omni or nothing.

looking_for_answers_ said:

And even if He is a libertarian agent and also can create other libertarian agents, it does not necessarily follow that He did. There are many things that He has clearly chosen not to create us as. We are not beings capabale of experiencing time in more than one way, and He created us only capable of experiencing a measly three dimensions of space. It certainly seems that He gave other supernatural beings such gifts that He withheld from us

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But He can create us libertarian only if He is libertarian—that is if being libertarian is an improvement to ones being.

A little busy, I’ll reply to the rest later... great discussion I must say

looking_for_answers_ said:

First, the semantics, mentioned above.
A common instance I see among libertarians is "uncaused, but not random". Okay, but if an event is uncaused, then there is no underlying reason, and there would logically be not following pattern... which is the actual definition of "random": the definition of random

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But the same could be applied to an infinite regression of causes. If everything moves because the total sum of its causes then the only cause that matters is the first; but there is no first and so everything that happens is random (occurring without definite aim).

But I want to clarify what the causer is; because I see it differently to Chisolm in one sense. Action is caused by the brain and the brain is caused by the will (they bounce back and forth until the decision is made). The mind and the will/soul/spirit/man interact. This is the decision making process we all go through. We check how we feel about decisions, to see if it feels right. Our will is shaped by our decisions. The more bad decisions the weaker the will. As a baby it is pure. Over time, at one point, we make our first decision. The decision is the first mind to spirit to mind (and so on) interaction. Our soul is then shaped. In that very first instance we are free. It appears random but this is our life, us, we get to choose. Our nature is the causer. Our nature is free. And this is why humankind is not a science. These free choices come from the unstudiable person themselves, the life within them, their nature.

The criticism is that we do not choose our nature, so how is it indistinguishable from determinism? But the nature is unprogrammed. It chooses afresh. So the next criticism is, it must be random! But the person chooses. The person forms their own soul in a sense.

We observe uncaused but not random in our decisions. No one is causing me to write vghjiugvdrghjlokaaaigfds. I decide this. I could delete it. If it were the causes themselves creating this event (with my input only being within this chain rather than adding to it) then, as I’ve said before, my sense of ownership is misguided—but I do feel ownership, I do feel like I’m overseeing the process and directing it, I do find that I can change things—is this internal evidence to be rejected because an equally viable option is available? Compatiblism turns my choices into an illusion; I would believe I am responsible, that my effort counts for something, but in the end I am only doing what I was always going to do with no other option even available. Why should I believe what is counterintuitive to my inner belief?

I also want to add that from an atheistic perspective moral responsibility can be based on a few different things. The person who commits a crime must be held responsible to encourage them and others to not repeat the crime in the future. The criminal must also, at times, be removed from society for the safety of others so there is a need for accountability.