An Epistemological Look at the Resurrection

[Fervent]

If you want to call any stopping point “dogmatic,” then you have not really criticized my view in particular, you have just described the human condition. Every finite reasoner either runs into regress, or stops somewhere. You say you are happy to accept that as dogmatic in your own case. Fine. Then the word “dogmatic” has stopped doing any real work against hinges.

Again, my issue with the "hinge" concept is the linguistic projection of certainty it creates, not the reality that makes it appear necessary,

Where we actually disagree is on what we do with that fact. Your move is to pick an axiom “only a fool would deny” and treat that as the special, non-arbitrary place to stop. The hinge move is different. It does not baptize a favorite thesis as self-evident. It describes what already stands fast in our practice: external world, other minds, basic memory, the use of modus ponens, and so on. These are not chosen dogmas; they are the inherited background without which you could not even state your regress argument.

Yes, though I'm not "baptizing a favorite thesis as self-evident" but recognition that any "hinge" must in fact be self-evident in order to sustain the weight of the system built upon it. The sole impediment to such an axiom is our capacity for understanding, and the fool denies it because in making such a denial he is admitting that he has not yet contemplated it in a way that he understands.

Pyrrhonian skepticism does not escape this. The moment you “grant MP,” use ordinary language, trust your own memory of the discussion, or follow a rule, you are relying on hinge-like certainties. You can claim to grant only MP, but your actual cognitive life rides on a much thicker bedrock.

There's no "hinge-like certainty" in treating the exercise like a game, and if we refuse to grant the skeptic MP then we leave no options for avoiding their skepticism. So the skeptic's game-like approach combined with the dialectic irrefutability leaves any move to "certainty" unable to avoid getting onto the wheel.

As for “word play”: every position in this area lives or dies by how it uses words like “know,” “reason,” “axiom,” and “self-evident.” The hinge approach is not smuggling in a solution by redefining them, it is doing the opposite: making their actual use explicit. If you say “only a fool would deny my axiom,” that is also a linguistic move; you are just not owning up to the background grammar that makes it feel compelling.

Reducing the issue to a linguistic one does nothing but impose a sense of certainty where none is appropriate, especially if you're operating on an empirical concept framework as analytics tend to. We do not define these concepts, we find the right words to express concepts that are already present. So the linguistic turn does nothing but end up turning the whole thing into word games rather than engaging with the concepts themselves.

So, hinge talk is not a shell game to avoid dogmatism. It is intellectual bookkeeping: putting the stopping points on the table instead of pretending they are not there. You can still argue about which propositions function as hinges, or whether my description of our practice is accurate. But simply repeating “dogmatic shell game” does not touch the structural point we both already accept: the space of reasons has a floor, and you are standing on it too.

You call it "intellectual bookkeeping" but the illicit move is the one from semantics to metaphysics in asserting that such an approach gives rise to certainties. The skeptic's challenge is left unassailed by the hinge approach, because it attempts to address it through dissolution when the only way to dismiss it is with a proper solution.

 

[Maria Billingsley]

Introduction: My Background and Purpose


I come from a Christian background, though I no longer identify as a Christian. I spent 35 years actively involved in the church, during which time I taught classes on Christian apologetics with theological questions. This means I'm not approaching Christianity as an outsider who's never understood its claims, I know the arguments intimately. I've defended them, taught them, and lived within that framework for most of my life.

I studied philosophy at Geneva College, a Christian institution where faith and reason were treated as partners in the search for truth. After graduating in 1981, I continued studying philosophy for over 45 years, with particular intensity during the last 20+ years of my retirement. I'm now 75, and I've spent this time focusing on three interconnected areas:


Epistemology (how we know what we know), approached through the lens of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy, especially his final work, On Certainty. Wittgenstein's insights about language, meaning, and the foundations of knowledge have shaped much of what I've written.


Near-Death Experiences (NDEs), which led to my recent book From Testimony to Knowledge: Evaluating Near-Death Experiences (available on Amazon). In that work, I developed a rigorous framework for evaluating testimonial evidence and applied it to one of the most contested areas of human experience. The framework I use, JTB+U (Justified True Belief plus Understanding) with three epistemic guardrails, applies universally to any knowledge claim based on testimony.


Wittgenstein's later philosophy, particularly his concept of "hinges," those bedrock certainties that make justification possible rather than requiring justification themselves. Understanding what genuinely functions as a hinge versus what merely claims hinge-status to avoid scrutiny turns out to be crucial for evaluating religious claims.

My Current Project

I'm now working on a second book that examines the evidence for the bodily resurrection of Christ. I'll be sharing my analysis of the testimonial evidence in this forum, applying the same rigorous standards I used for evaluating near-death reports. My approach will focus on what the historical evidence can and cannot support, examined through clear epistemic standards that apply to any historical claim.

My Intentions


I want to be transparent about my approach: I have no desire to engage in polemics or personal attacks. I'm not here to mock anyone's faith or treat sincere belief with contempt. I recognize that for many of you, Christianity isn't just an intellectual position, it's central to your identity, your community, and your understanding of reality. I take that seriously.

That said, I also recognize that some may find my arguments offensive simply because of their conclusions. This isn't my intention, but it's an unavoidable risk when examining claims that matter deeply to people. I can only promise to be as fair, clear, and rigorous as possible. Good arguments should stand or fall on their own merits, not on whether they make us comfortable.


If my analysis is flawed, I want to know. If I've misunderstood the evidence or applied standards inconsistently, I'm genuinely interested in correction. But if the evidence truly is as weak as I believe it to be, that's something we should be willing to acknowledge, even if it's uncomfortable.

Why Philosophy Matters

Before I present my epistemological framework, let me address something important: philosophy is inescapable. Whether you love it or hate it, you're already doing it.


Every time you evaluate a political claim, make a moral judgment, defend a religious belief, assess scientific evidence, argue for God's existence, or even decide how to raise your children, you're engaged in philosophy. You're making assumptions about what counts as evidence, what makes reasoning valid, how we distinguish truth from error, and what standards we should use to evaluate claims.

Even if you say "I hate philosophy" or "I just believe what the Bible says," you're making philosophical moves. You're claiming that some approaches to truth are better than others, that certain sources are more reliable than others, that some methods of reasoning should be trusted while others shouldn't. Those are philosophical positions.


The question isn't whether to do philosophy, we're all doing it already, whether we realize it or not. The question is whether to do it well or poorly, clearly or confusedly, consistently or arbitrarily.

What Good Philosophy Does


I agree with many people's assessment that much philosophy isn't worth the paper it's written on. Academic philosophy can become self-indulgent, unnecessarily obscure, and disconnected from the questions people actually care about. But that doesn't mean all philosophy is worthless, it means we need to distinguish good philosophy from bad.

Good philosophy does several things:

1. It clarifies concepts. When people argue past each other, it's often because they're using the same words to mean different things. Philosophy helps us see those differences and speak more precisely.


2. It examines assumptions. We all operate with unexamined beliefs, about what counts as evidence, what makes something true, how we should evaluate testimony. Philosophy brings those assumptions into the light where they can be tested.

3. It checks consistency. We often hold beliefs that contradict each other without realizing it. Philosophy reveals those contradictions and asks us to resolve them.

4. It evaluates arguments. Not all reasoning is equal. Some arguments are strong; others only appear strong until examined. Philosophy provides tools for telling the difference.

5. It distinguishes knowledge from conviction. We can feel absolutely certain about things that turn out to be wrong. Philosophy helps us understand when our certainty is justified and when it's just... certainty.


This last point, distinguishing knowledge from conviction, will be one of my central points. Because one of the deepest confusions in religious epistemology is treating strong conviction as if it were the same thing as knowledge.

What I'll Be Presenting


Over the coming posts, I'll lay out an epistemological framework that applies universally, to scientific claims, historical events, legal proceedings, and yes, to religious truth claims as well. I'll explain:

• What knowledge is and what it requires (JTB+U)
• The difference between believing you're justified and actually being justified
• How testimony functions as a route to knowledge
• What standards distinguish strong testimony from weak
• Why certain beliefs require justification while others can function as foundational
• How to recognize when circular reasoning is disguised as legitimate support
• How to recognize self-sealing arguments

Only after establishing this framework, and giving everyone a chance to engage with it, question it, and push back on it—will I apply it to Christianity's central historical claim: the resurrection.

My goal is to show my work. I want you to see not just my conclusions but the reasoning that leads to them. If the reasoning is sound and the standards are fair, the conclusions should follow. If either the reasoning or the standards are flawed, that should become clear through honest discussion.

An Invitation

I invite you to engage critically with what I present. Ask questions. Point out where you think I've gone wrong. Offer alternative explanations. Show me where my reasoning breaks down or where I've applied standards inconsistently.

What I ask in return is that we distinguish between two different kinds of responses:


Substantive objections: These engage with the actual argument, they show where reasoning fails, where evidence is misrepresented, where standards are applied unfairly.


Defensive moves: These avoid the argument itself, they question motives, appeal to faith as exemption from scrutiny, redefine terms to escape conclusions, or simply assert that the argument doesn't apply to religious claims.


I'm interested in the first kind of response. The second kind doesn't advance understanding; it just protects belief from examination.

If Christianity's claims are true, they should be able to withstand honest scrutiny. If they can't, we should want to know that. Truth has nothing to fear from careful thinking.

I look forward to the conversation.

Did you ever love your Creator when you believed He existed? I have read your thorough knowledge, your intense research and your commitment to establish and prove your findings, but that aside, did you ever love Him?

 

[Sam266]

Some of the following I've already covered, but it bears repeating. It also adds a little more information.

What Stands Fast: The Hidden Foundation of Knowing

Every act of epistemology has a foundation that is not questioned.

Beneath every knowledge claim lies something we do not question, an inherited background of belief that makes questioning possible at all.

That background is not a single belief but a layered system of foundational beliefs running through life and language. Some of it is lived without words, shown in action alone. When I open a door, I reveal my belief that the door is there. When I set a glass on a table, I reveal the belief that the table will hold. This kind of belief is not usually expressed in statements. It is a way of acting in a generally stable world.

Some of these background beliefs are prelinguistic or nonlinguistic because they can exist apart from language. Others are linguistic, expressed through words themselves. To speak meaningfully already assumes that words keep their sense, that others understand roughly as I do, and that the world provides a shared point of reference. Without that stability, both practical and linguistic, communication would fail and epistemology would have no ground to stand on.

Think of chess. To play, we rely on things we never verify: that the board exists, that the pieces keep their identities, and that the rules remain stable. No one checks these with each move; they stand fast. They form the fixed background of the game, the conditions that give every move meaning.

Yet even here, I could still question or change a rule. What I could not question is that there are objects at all: the board, the pieces, the hands that move them. That there is a world of things is not a rule within the game. It is what makes every rule, in any game, possible.

When I check a thermometer, I do not also doubt the institution of measurement. When I read a map, I do not test the idea that maps correspond to places. When I say I know my name, I am not waiting for further evidence.

These different levels of stability reach from the bodily to the conceptual. Some are rooted in the simple contact between body and world such as gravity, resistance, and motion. Some are sustained by language and social practice such as meaning, promise, and testimony. Others are shaped within specific fields of thought, the standards that define science, law, or mathematics. Each layer supports the next, and together they form the quiet ground where inquiry gets its meaning.

These ordinary acts rest on what stands fast, beliefs so basic and constant that they give knowledge its footing. They are the background that allows language, doubt, and justification to make sense at all. Philosophers following Ludwig Wittgenstein call these fixed points hinges, things that need no proof because they make proof possible. They mark the hidden foundation of knowing.

It is here that epistemology begins, in these arational roots.

At times I'll repeat ideas that need repeating, especially for those who don't normally study epistemology or philosophy.

 

[Sam266]

Did you ever love your Creator when you believed He existed? I have read your thorough knowledge, your intense research and your commitment to establish and prove your findings, but that aside, did you ever love Him?

How does that contribute to this thread? What makes you think I don't love God? I haven't made my beliefs about God known to anyone in here. That said, my concept of God is probably much different from yours. I do believe in an afterlife, that we survive death with our identity intact. I also believe that love is at the core of reality. My book From Testimony to Knowledge explains much of my position. I don't hold to any religious belief system.

 

[Fervent]

Some of the following I've already covered, but it bears repeating. It also adds a little more information.

What Stands Fast: The Hidden Foundation of Knowing

Every act of epistemology has a foundation that is not questioned.

Right off the bat you're just making an assertion.

Beneath every knowledge claim lies something we do not question, an inherited background of belief that makes questioning possible at all.

Yet again denying the reality of skeptical approaches, which require no claim of knowledge.

That background is not a single belief but a layered system of foundational beliefs running through life and language. Some of it is lived without words, shown in action alone. When I open a door, I reveal my belief that the door is there. When I set a glass on a table, I reveal the belief that the table will hold. This kind of belief is not usually expressed in statements. It is a way of acting in a generally stable world.

We'd have to define "belief" in order to evaluate this.

Some of these background beliefs are prelinguistic or nonlinguistic because they can exist apart from language. Others are linguistic, expressed through words themselves. To speak meaningfully already assumes that words keep their sense, that others understand roughly as I do, and that the world provides a shared point of reference. Without that stability, both practical and linguistic, communication would fail and epistemology would have no ground to stand on.

And how do we know that epstemology has any ground to stand on?

Think of chess. To play, we rely on things we never verify: that the board exists, that the pieces keep their identities, and that the rules remain stable. No one checks these with each move; they stand fast. They form the fixed background of the game, the conditions that give every move meaning.

Yet even here, I could still question or change a rule. What I could not question is that there are objects at all: the board, the pieces, the hands that move them. That there is a world of things is not a rule within the game. It is what makes every rule, in any game, possible.

Is it a world of things? Or is it a world of ideas? Seems you're already engaged in dogmatics even before we get to the question of hinges.

When I check a thermometer, I do not also doubt the institution of measurement. When I read a map, I do not test the idea that maps correspond to places. When I say I know my name, I am not waiting for further evidence.

And the question is, what justifies our trust in such inductive leaps?

These different levels of stability reach from the bodily to the conceptual. Some are rooted in the simple contact between body and world such as gravity, resistance, and motion. Some are sustained by language and social practice such as meaning, promise, and testimony. Others are shaped within specific fields of thought, the standards that define science, law, or mathematics. Each layer supports the next, and together they form the quiet ground where inquiry gets its meaning.

We're getting close to a pyrrhonist's approach in treating the whole thing like a game.

These ordinary acts rest on what stands fast, beliefs so basic and constant that they give knowledge its footing. They are the background that allows language, doubt, and justification to make sense at all. Philosophers following Ludwig Wittgenstein call these fixed points hinges, things that need no proof because they make proof possible. They mark the hidden foundation of knowing.

"The hidden foundation of knowing"? Other than a claim of necessity, what is supposed to be special about these hinges that allows us to exempt them from ordinary standards of proof?

It is here that epistemology begins, in these arational roots.

Again, assertion.

At times I'll repeat ideas that need repeating, especially for those who don't normally study epistemology or philosophy.

 

[Sam266]

Since I'll be mentioning Ludwig Wittgenstein from time-to-time, I thought I'd post something about him.

Why Wittgenstein Matters

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) was an Austrian philosopher whose work reshaped the study of knowledge and meaning. He began as a student of Bertrand Russell in Cambridge, where early analytic philosophy sought to make thought transparent through logic. His first book, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS, argued that the structure of language mirrors the structure of reality. For a time, he believed that philosophy’s task was complete: once we mapped what can be said, all that remained was silence.

Years later he returned to philosophy with a radical insight. Language does not mirror life; it is part of life. Words gain meaning through their use in human activity, not by standing for private or abstract entities. In his later work, especially the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS and ON CERTAINTY, Wittgenstein turned from ideal logical forms to the ordinary ways words function in practice.

This shift changed philosophy itself. It moved the question of knowledge from the search for metaphysical foundations to the study of how meaning, justification, and understanding operate in shared life. To grasp epistemology, Wittgenstein believed, we must first understand language as the medium in which knowing occurs.

Wittgenstein was probably the greatest philosopher since Kant and Hume, but that doesn't mean we should accept every idea he put forth. I disagree with him on the limits of language.

 

[Sam266]

Wittgenstein’s Toolkit

Wittgenstein’s later philosophy gave us a set of tools for seeing how language and knowledge actually work in life. He believed that many philosophical problems arise not from the world itself but from the ways language misleads us. To understand knowing, we must first understand how meaning and justification take shape within language.

The most important tools in his approach are language-games, grammar, forms of life, rule-following, public criteria, and hinges. Each shows how knowledge depends on shared patterns of use rather than on private insight or abstract theory.

Language-games remind us that words acquire meaning only within human activities. To understand a statement is to understand the context in which it operates, whether in science, conversation, or ordinary life.

Grammar is the structure that determines what counts as sense within a given practice. It does not tell us what is true but what can be meaningfully said.

Forms of life are the shared patterns of action and culture that make language possible. They are the background of agreement that gives justification and understanding their force.

Rule-following and public criteria explain how meaning remains public rather than private. To use a word correctly is not to match an inner image but to act in ways others can recognize as right.

Hinges refer to the basic certainties that make inquiry possible. They are not conclusions but conditions, the stable points that allow doubt and justification to function at all.

Around these main instruments Wittgenstein developed several related ideas. Family resemblance describes how concepts overlap without rigid boundaries. Criteria and symptoms help us distinguish between defining features and mere signs. The beetle in a box image shows the limits of private meaning. The river-bed metaphor describes how our foundational beliefs can shift while still guiding thought. Aspect-seeing illustrates how understanding can change through a shift in perspective. And through all of this runs a single method: clarity. Philosophy’s task is to bring words back to their ordinary use so that confusion dissolves and the grammar of sense become visible again.

Wittgenstein’s toolkit does not form a theory but a way of looking. It teaches that knowledge lives in language, and language lives in the shared practices that make the world intelligible to us.

Wittgenstein never offered a theory of knowledge, but his methods reveal the structure within which any theory must work. He showed that belief, justification, and understanding arise within the shared practices of life, where language and action already fit together. The framework I call JTB+U develops this insight. It keeps the classical idea of justified true belief but strengthens it by grounding both justification and belief in these Wittgensteinian conditions of sense, while making explicit the role of understanding that his work leaves implicit.

 

[Sam266]

This won't be easy reading. It takes time to explain an epistemological approach. Once I do explain it, I'll give you my thoughts on the evidence for the resurrection.

 

[Maria Billingsley]

How does that contribute to this thread? What makes you think I don't love God? I haven't made my beliefs about God known to anyone in here. That said, my concept of God is probably much different from yours. I do believe in an afterlife, that we survive death with our identity intact. I also believe that love is at the core of reality. My book From Testimony to Knowledge explains much of my position. I don't hold to any religious belief system.

Any starting point is based on loving Jesus Christ of Nazareth when speaking of Him. This, at the very least tells me where you are comming from.
I'm sorry this makes you uncomfortable but true transparency may be just that, uncomfortable.
Incidently, love is the initial human contribution He is looking for.

 

[Fervent]

This shift changed philosophy itself. It moved the question of knowledge from the search for metaphysical foundations to the study of how meaning, justification, and understanding operate in shared life. To grasp epistemology, Wittgenstein believed, we must first understand language as the medium in which knowing occurs.

This right here is where the shell game occurs. Because we can't avoid dealing with metaphysical issues when we are dealing with knowledge claims, so the only thing a turn to language does is insulate the metaphysical underpinnings from the possibility of questioning. The hinge concept is little more than a dogmatic turn that shields its metaphysical underpinnings from question by taking them off the board.

 

[Sam266]

Right off the bat you're just making an assertion.

Yet again denying the reality of skeptical approaches, which require no claim of knowledge.

We'd have to define "belief" in order to evaluate this.

And how do we know that epstemology has any ground to stand on?

Is it a world of things? Or is it a world of ideas? Seems you're already engaged in dogmatics even before we get to the question of hinges.

And the question is, what justifies our trust in such inductive leaps?

We're getting close to a pyrrhonist's approach in treating the whole thing like a game.

"The hidden foundation of knowing"? Other than a claim of necessity, what is supposed to be special about these hinges that allows us to exempt them from ordinary standards of proof?

Again, assertion.

I don't normally do this, but you accused me of making assertions, as if my assertions lack a formal logical argument. The argument is there, but you don't seem to see it. The following is the logic that follows from my claims.

Deductive argument for hinges

1. A deductive argument for hinges​

Definitions

• A reason is a belief offered in support of another belief.
• A finite reasoner is a thinker with limited time, memory, and attention.
• A hinge commitment is a commitment that is not held on the basis of further reasons, and that functions as part of the background that makes giving and asking for reasons possible.

Argument

1. For any belief held by a finite reasoner as justified, either
   a. there is an infinite chain of supporting reasons, or
   b. the chain of reasons is circular, or
   c. the chain of reasons terminates in one or more commitments that are not themselves held on the basis of further reasons.
2. A finite reasoner cannot in practice have an infinite chain of supporting reasons for any belief.
3. A purely circular chain of reasons does not confer genuine justification on a belief.
4. Therefore, whenever a finite reasoner holds a belief as justified, the chain of supporting reasons must terminate in one or more commitments that are not themselves held on the basis of further reasons.
5. Commitments that are not held on the basis of further reasons and that function as the background for other reasons are what I call hinge commitments.

Conclusion

1. Therefore, any finite reasoner who engages in giving and asking for reasons must have hinge commitments.

This is a straightforward trilemma style argument. Premise 1 is Agrippa or Carroll; premises 2 and 3 rule out the first two horns for finite agents; the conclusion is that something hinge like is inevitable. The controversial bit is not the validity, it is whether you accept 2 and 3, and whether you accept my definition in 5. But as a deductive support for the claim that there must be some non-inferential background commitments, it is quite clean.

If you're familiar with deductive reasoning, then you should follow the argument. This is not just an assertion, it's logic. I could give you the symbolic notation if you want, but I don't think it will help you. I can also give an inductive argument, but it will make things more complicated at this point.

 

[Fervent]

I don't normally do this, but you accused me of making assertions, as if my assertions lack a formal logical argument. The argument is there, but you don't seem to see it. The following is the logic that follows from my claims.

Deductive argument for hinges

1. A deductive argument for hinges​

Definitions

• A reason is a belief offered in support of another belief.
• A finite reasoner is a thinker with limited time, memory, and attention.
• A hinge commitment is a commitment that is not held on the basis of further reasons, and that functions as part of the background that makes giving and asking for reasons possible.

Argument

1. For any belief held by a finite reasoner as justified, either
   a. there is an infinite chain of supporting reasons, or
   b. the chain of reasons is circular, or
   c. the chain of reasons terminates in one or more commitments that are not themselves held on the basis of further reasons.
2. A finite reasoner cannot in practice have an infinite chain of supporting reasons for any belief.
3. A purely circular chain of reasons does not confer genuine justification on a belief.
4. Therefore, whenever a finite reasoner holds a belief as justified, the chain of supporting reasons must terminate in one or more commitments that are not themselves held on the basis of further reasons.
5. Commitments that are not held on the basis of further reasons and that function as the background for other reasons are what I call hinge commitments.

Conclusion

1. Therefore, any finite reasoner who engages in giving and asking for reasons must have hinge commitments.

This is a straightforward trilemma style argument. Premise 1 is Agrippa or Carroll; premises 2 and 3 rule out the first two horns for finite agents; the conclusion is that something hinge like is inevitable. The controversial bit is not the validity, it is whether you accept 2 and 3, and whether you accept my definition in 5. But as a deductive support for the claim that there must be some non-inferential background commitments, it is quite clean.

Again, you're assuming that skeptics simply don't exist. There is no need for a hinge commitment, or even any sort of knowledge belief at all, to engage in skeptical inquiry. The skeptic needs make no commitments at all, all they need is to specify rules to the game that they abide by for the sake of the game. So to make assertions about foundationalism simply fails to take the challenge of skepticism seriously. It is quite possible to remain in a state of suspension as a general principle, to maintain that it is yet to be demonstrated that knowledge of any sort is possible.

 

[Sam266]

Again, you're assuming that skeptics simply don't exist. There is no need for a hinge commitment, or even any sort of knowledge belief at all, to engage in skeptical inquiry. The skeptic needs make no commitments at all, all they need is to specify rules to the game that they abide by for the sake of the game. So to make assertions about foundationalism simply fails to take the challenge of skepticism seriously. It is quite possible to remain in a state of suspension as a general principle, to maintain that it is yet to be demonstrated that knowledge of any sort is possible.

I never asserted that skeptics don't exist, that's just your interpretation. I do say that doubting requires bedrock hinges, because the hinges are like the board and pieces in a chess game. Without the board and pieces there would be no game. Without hinges the game of knowing and doubting wouldn't exist. In fact, without our background reality there would be no language, and thus no propositions to argue with.

 

[Fervent]

I never asserted that skeptics don't exist, that's just your interpretation. I do say that doubting requires bedrock hinges, because the hinges are like the board and pieces in a chess game. Without the board and pieces there would be no game. Without hinges the game of knowing and doubting wouldn't exist. In fact, without our background reality there would be no language, and thus no propositions to argue with.

Again with the linguistic turn, those don't require commitments of any sort. The doubter need only abstain from committing to any position, they don't require a position to defend. So all you are doing in making such assertions is begging the question against the skeptic. The linguistic turn has removed us from the possibility of knowledge, because it can at best lead us to consensus agreement but not any real truth. So we may be justified, and we may have beliefs, but truth is off the table.

 

[Sam266]

Am I allowed to mention that I have a book for sale, or is that something you're not allowed to do?

 

[Sam266]

Again with the linguistic turn, those don't require commitments of any sort. The doubter need only abstain from committing to any position, they don't require a position to defend. So all you are doing in making such assertions is begging the question against the skeptic. The linguistic turn has removed us from the possibility of knowledge, because it can at best lead us to consensus agreement but not any real truth. So we may be justified, and we may have beliefs, but truth is off the table.

Doubts don't happen in a vacuum. You need good reasons for doubting, just as you need good reasons for knowledge claims.

You keep saying the skeptic “need only abstain from committing to any position,” as if doubt were a kind of weightless intellectual free-float. That is not how actual doubting works.

To raise the very objection you are raising, you are already relying on a stack of commitments:

• that your words keep their meanings from one sentence to the next,
• that basic logical moves like “if P then Q” are in order,
• that your memory of what I said two comments ago is roughly reliable,
• that there is another mind here for you to address,
• that there is a public space (this thread) in which claims can be compared.

You do not defend any of that, you simply use it. That is exactly what “hinge” means. You can call it “abstaining from commitments” if you like, but your actual performance gives the game away: your doubting is parasitic on an unargued practical background. Pointing that out is not begging the question against the skeptic; it is describing the conditions that make the skeptical performance intelligible in the first place.

On the “linguistic turn” point, you have it backwards. Looking at the grammar of “know,” “doubt,” “truth,” and “justified” does not remove the possibility of knowledge, it removes the fantasy that we could talk about “real truth” in total abstraction from our actual practices. When you insist that truth must be something beyond “consensus agreement,” you are already trading on a whole network of meanings you never stop to justify. Again, that is the hinge structure.

And no, truth is not “off the table” in a Wittgensteinian picture. We still distinguish true from false, better supported from worse, reliable routes from unreliable ones. What drops out is the idea of a God’s-eye guarantee that floats free of any human form of life. If that is your standard for “real truth,” then of course nothing will meet it, including your own skeptical theses.

So there are really two options here:

• Either you admit that your own skeptical stance leans on unargued background certainties and you join the hinge conversation about what they are and how they function,
• Or you keep claiming to “abstain from commitments” while in practice relying on exactly the kind of hinges you deny, which is less a philosophical position and more an act.

I've made my point. I'm moving on.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Am I allowed to mention that I have a book for sale, or is that something you're not allowed to do?

The forum rules tend to frown upon soliciting sales here. But I'm all up for finally hearing the way in which you are relating Wittgensteinian conceptual "hinges" to the Resurrection, whether pro or con. Please continue.

 

[jacks]

Am I allowed to mention that I have a book for sale, or is that something you're not allowed to do?

Now you're asking? Would that be From Testimony to Knowledge: Evaluating Near-Death Experiences (available on Amazon), which you have mentioned at least twice?

 

[Sam266]

Language-Games: How Knowing Lives in Use

When Wittgenstein spoke of “language-games,” he was describing how language functions as a network of rule-governed activities within human life. To speak is not to name objects in isolation but to participate in shared practices where words already have meaning and use.

For much of philosophy’s history, language was pictured as a system of labels attached to things. We imagine that each word must point to something, either an external object or an inner experience. This view works well for words like “table” or “tree,” but it collapses when applied to mental terms such as “know,” “believe,” or “understand.” We then begin to treat knowing as if it were a private object of consciousness, something one could point to inside the mind.

Wittgenstein saw this as a deep confusion. There is no subjective “thing” that equates to knowledge. Knowing is not a feeling, image, or mental token. It is an activity situated within language-games, patterns of inquiry, reasoning, testimony, and verification that show how the word “know” is actually used. It is through these uses that knowing acquires its sense.

When I say “I know,” I am not reporting a private condition but taking up a role within a practice. I might be claiming authority over a fact, expressing certainty, or marking the end of doubt. What makes my statement intelligible is the background of rules that tell us when it is appropriate to say “I know.” A physicist, a judge, and a friend each use the same expression, but in very different games, each with its own grammar of evidence and error.

This shift has profound consequences for epistemology. It moves the focus from what knowledge is to how the word “know” functions in our practices of giving and asking for reasons. Knowledge becomes a public performance within a language-game, not a private mental state that stands behind it.

Language-games also explain why justification must be public. The rules of a game only make sense when more than one player can follow them. To say “I know” commits me to criteria that others can, at least in principle, recognize and evaluate. This is what gives epistemology its footing. Meaning and knowledge depend on shared use, not on inner pointing.

In the classical model of justified true belief, each element—truth, belief, justification—was often treated as if it could be analyzed in isolation. Wittgenstein’s idea of language-games shows why that separation fails. Each element is already shaped by the grammar of the practices in which it occurs. The framework I call JTB+U builds on this realization. It retains the classical triad but grounds it in these Wittgensteinian conditions of use and adds understanding as the grasp of how those uses cohere.

Knowledge, then, is not found inside us. It is enacted in our shared forms of speech and life. To understand what it means to know is to understand the grammar of the language-games that give that word its sense.

 

[Sam266]

I have more popcorn.