What happens if someone dies before they became a believer, is it their fault?

[Colo Millz]

For example, a young man just starting college is murdered. He didn't get to live a long life, while someone else becomes a believer in their 40's.

The person in their 40's had more time to accept Jesus, yet the young man didn't. It seems unfair, but what does the Bible say?

Was the young man probably never would have been a believer anyway? Are we sometimes saved not only because we accepted Jesus, but by chance we survived long enough to accept Jesus as our God? Or does this not make any sense?

In the eleventh article we ask: is it necessary to believe explicitly?

Obj. 1: It seems that it is not, for we should not posit any proposition from which an untenable conclusion follows. But, if we claim that explicit belief is necessary for salvation, an untenable conclusion follows. For it is possible for someone to be brought up in the forest or among wolves, and such a one cannot have explicit knowledge of any matter of faith. Thus, there will be a man who will inevitably be damned. But this is untenable. Hence, explicit belief in something does not seem necessary.

Reply Obj. 1: Granted that everyone is bound to believe something explicitly, no untenable conclusion follows even if someone is brought up in the forest or among wild beasts. For it pertains to divine providence to furnish everyone with what is necessary for salvation, provided that on his part there is no hindrance. Thus, if someone so brought up followed the direction of natural reason in seeking good and avoiding evil, we must most certainly hold that God would either reveal to him through internal inspiration what had to be believed, or would send some preacher of the faith to him as he sent Peter to Cornelius (Acts 10:20).

QDeVer.Q14.A11

 

[timothyu]

Adam and Eve were created with sinless and had free will

But free will would eventually allow them to eventually make a self-indulgent choice. It was inevitable, just as telling a child 'hot' means nothing until they come to an understanding.

 

[bling]

Can you demonstrate that anything can happen besides what does happen? Can you demonstrate the actual possibility of other options? Or is that only in our thinking? When God demands that we choose, do we not always only choose the one option? Was God not aware of those decisions before creating, but went ahead and created anyway? Well, then! He INTENDED it to be decided the way it was.

That is the same as asking you can you show all "apparent" free will choices could never have gone a different way?

Otherwise, you need to demonstrate that {actual "chance" can determine outcomes}. The notion is by definition self-contradictory. But your whole construction depends on it.

You are defining justice according to the creature's ability to do what he is commanded to do. Sorry, but the command does not imply the ability to obey— it only implies the responsibility to obey. God is not unjust to create beings who will pay for their rebellion, as intended. He is making use of them for his Glory, to demonstrate his love and mercy to the objects of his mercy—us.

 

[Mark Quayle]

Mark Quayle said:
Can you demonstrate that anything can happen besides what does happen? Can you demonstrate the actual possibility of other options? Or is that only in our thinking? When God demands that we choose, do we not always only choose the one option? Was God not aware of those decisions before creating, but went ahead and created anyway? Well, then! He INTENDED it to be decided the way it was

That is the same as asking you can you show all "apparent" free will choices could never have gone a different way?

CORRECT enough! That's why I asked it. Can you do it? Can you prove that "apparent" free will choices (or any other choice) could have gone a different way? You will say, "of course!", but you can't do it. You will provide some statement you consider axiomatic, but is not, like, "God would not demand what you cannot obey".

Mark Quayle said:
Otherwise, you need to demonstrate that {actual "chance" can determine outcomes}. The notion is by definition self-contradictory. But your whole construction depends on it.

You are defining justice according to the creature's ability to do what he is commanded to do. Sorry, but the command does not imply the ability to obey— it only implies the responsibility to obey. God is not unjust to create beings who will pay for their rebellion, as intended. He is making use of them for his Glory, to demonstrate his love and mercy to the objects of his mercy—us.

Can you demonstrate that actual "chance" can determine outcomes? Or do you first need me to demonstrate how your notion of free will implies chance determining outcomes?

 

[Fervent]

Mark Quayle said:
Can you demonstrate that anything can happen besides what does happen? Can you demonstrate the actual possibility of other options? Or is that only in our thinking? When God demands that we choose, do we not always only choose the one option? Was God not aware of those decisions before creating, but went ahead and created anyway? Well, then! He INTENDED it to be decided the way it was

CORRECT enough! That's why I asked it. Can you do it? Can you prove that "apparent" free will choices (or any other choice) could have gone a different way? You will say, "of course!", but you can't do it. You will provide some statement you consider axiomatic, but is not, like, "God would not demand what you cannot obey".

Mark Quayle said:
Otherwise, you need to demonstrate that {actual "chance" can determine outcomes}. The notion is by definition self-contradictory. But your whole construction depends on it.

You are defining justice according to the creature's ability to do what he is commanded to do. Sorry, but the command does not imply the ability to obey— it only implies the responsibility to obey. God is not unjust to create beings who will pay for their rebellion, as intended. He is making use of them for his Glory, to demonstrate his love and mercy to the objects of his mercy—us.

Can you demonstrate that actual "chance" can determine outcomes? Or do you first need me to demonstrate how your notion of free will implies chance determining outcomes?

You seem to completely miss his objection, which is that you are engaged in a special pleading argument by demanding your opponent meet a standard you yourself cannot.