We know what is on board those boats due to intelligence gathering.
@Bradskii asked me for this discussion in another thread so I researched the legal justification and reasoning and put this together, you might enjoy it too.
Legal and Constitutional Grounds for Trump’s 2025 Cartel Designations and Counter-Narcotics Operations
The 2025 designations of the Sinaloa Cartel, CJNG, and related organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) marked a bold escalation in addressing the fentanyl crisis, leveraging executive tools to disrupt transnational threats. These steps, while innovative in application, align with longstanding statutory authorities and reflect a pragmatic response to a public health emergency claiming over 80,000 American lives annually.
- Cartels Align with Statutory Criteria for Terrorist Designations
Under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1189), FTO designations require a foreign organization, engagement in terrorist activity (as defined in INA § 212(a)(3)(B), including acts of violence to intimidate populations or influence governments), and a threat to U.S. nationals or security.
While cartels are primarily profit-driven, their use of extreme violence—such as assassinations and mass killings—to control territories and deter law enforcement qualifies under the broad statutory language, even if not ideologically motivated. This approach builds on historical designations of groups with mixed criminal and insurgent traits, enhancing tools like material support prohibitions (18 U.S.C. § 2339B) to target cartel enablers.
- Executive Order 13224 and IEEPA Enable Complementary Sanctions
Executive Order 13224 (2001) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.) authorize the President to declare emergencies and sanction terrorism-related entities via the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). President Trump's January 20, 2025, Executive Order 14157 directed these designations, building on existing frameworks to freeze assets and isolate cartel finances.
Though cartels were already targetable as transnational criminal organizations under EO 13581 (2011), the FTO/SDGT labels provide additional leverage for international cooperation and prosecutions, without creating entirely new powers.
Presidential Authority Under Article II and Statutory Delegations
Article II vests the President with core powers in foreign affairs and national defense. Trump's executive order instructed the Secretary of State to proceed under delegated authority from Congress via the INA and IEEPA, placing these actions in the strongest category of executive power per Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952). This mirrors uses by prior administrations to address hybrid threats.
Judicial Precedents Affirm Executive Deference in Designations
Courts grant substantial deference to executive judgments on national security threats:
People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State (1999) upheld broad discretion in threat assessments.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010) validated material support laws against violent groups.
Islamic American Relief Agency v. Gonzales (2007) endorsed minimal due process for SDGTs in emergencies.
These cases support applying designations to cartels where violence meets statutory thresholds, with review limited to procedural compliance.
- Legal Framework for Enhanced Interdictions and Operations
The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. § 70501 et seq.) provides jurisdiction over stateless or flagged vessels (with consent) involved in drug trafficking on the high seas. FTO/SDGT status bolsters these efforts by integrating counterterrorism resources, such as intelligence sharing and support under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
The administration's 2025 operations, including targeted strikes on vessels, were justified by a classified DOJ opinion as defensive measures against imminent threats, consistent with Article II authority to protect citizens. Congressional notification under the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq.) was provided, and operations emphasized law enforcement primacy with military assistance limited to support roles under 10 U.S.C. § 124.
International Law Considerations and Defensive Measures
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter preserves the right to self-defense against threats from non-state actors, particularly when host states like Mexico or Venezuela are challenged in controlling them. The administration framed fentanyl trafficking as a severe threat warranting proportionate responses, drawing on the "unwilling or unable" doctrine from post-9/11 precedents. Operations focused on high-seas interdictions complied with the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, prioritizing disruption over escalation.
Addressing Counterarguments
Critics argue cartels lack traditional terrorist ideology or that operations risk overreach. However, statutes focus on violent intent, not motive, allowing flexibility. Proportionality in 2025 actions—limited to trafficking vessels—aligns with precedents like United States v. Nueci-Pena (2013) and United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado (2012), which affirm high-seas jurisdiction for drug enforcement. While debates on self-defense persist, the administration's legal opinions provide a defensible basis amid the fentanyl emergency.
Conclusion
President Trump’s 2025 actions represent a constitutionally grounded and strategically vital adaptation of counterterrorism tools to combat cartel-driven fentanyl flows. By enhancing designations and operations within existing laws, the administration strengthened U.S. security without undue expansion, addressing a crisis that demands decisive leadership.
