New belief among teenagers. What do you think?

[Fervent]

I thought that was the mistake you were making.

Not at all, recognizing the reality of universals doesn't entail denying the reality of individuals.

In your appinion only. Maybe the mistake you are making is to confuse universals with aggregates

Nope, now you're trying to get into mereology which is an entirely different topic. Your insistence that it's all just a matter of opinion renders the whole idea of a Christian faith void of any meaning, because it only means whatever some individual thinks it means so it lacks all true meaning.

Of course they do. They refer to real observable similarities between entities

You seem to miss the crux of my criticism, which is that whatever "observable similarities" you are using for your taxonomy might be very different from the ones I select unless we are dealing with a real referent in our taxonomical classifications. If all they are is a name, then they only exist within our subjective understanding and so any conveyance between you and I is going to be accidental overlap because there is no real referent to provide semantic significance. It is only if there is some real universal referent that we are recognizing that such things become communicable, so the fact that taxonomies are semantically coherent undermines the notion that they are simply convenient names that only exist in complete abstraction.

 

[BCP1928]

Not at all, recognizing the reality of universals doesn't entail denying the reality of individuals.

Nope, now you're trying to get into mereology which is an entirely different topic.

Is the set of all sets a member of itself?

Your insistence that it's all just a matter of opinion renders the whole idea of a Christian faith void of any meaning, because it only means whatever some individual thinks it means so it lacks all true meaning.

You seem to miss the crux of my criticism, which is that whatever "observable similarities" you are using for your taxonomy might be very different from the ones I select unless we are dealing with a real referent in our taxonomical classifications.

That's why we talk to each other about them, and sometimes it's confusing.

If all they are is a name, then they only exist within our subjective understanding and so any conveyance between you and I is going to be accidental overlap because there is no real referent to provide semantic significance. It is only if there is some real universal referent that we are recognizing that such things become communicable, so the fact that taxonomies are semantically coherent undermines the notion that they are simply convenient names that only exist in complete abstraction.

Where do you get this "complete abstraction" notion? That universals are objectively real or they exist in complete isolation from real referents?

 

[Tinker Grey]

overlap because there is no real referent to provide semantic significance. It is only if there is some real universal referent that we are recognizing that such things become communicable,

To the extent there is overlap, there is communication.

That's how communication between people of different cultures occurs. You find some commonality and work from there.

 

[Fervent]

To the extent there is overlap, there is communication.

The issue is when we're talking about taxonomies the "overlap" is entirely abstract, and we end up with semantic issues like the "quus/quadition" problem regarding semantic indeterminancy.

That's how communication between people of different cultures occurs. You find some commonality and work from there.

Without a real common referrent, there is no meaningful exchange.

 

[Fervent]

Is the set of all sets a member of itself?

Your question is a distraction.

That's why we talk to each other about them, and sometimes it's confusing.

If there is no objective meaning to it, then any communication is rendered moot. We're just spitballing nonsense and may as well be talking about imaginary entities.

Where do you get this "complete abstraction" notion? That universals are objectively real or they exist in complete isolation from real referents?

To claim that universals are simply names is to render them total abstractions which can only exist within an individual's mind. It's not a solution to the question of universals so much as it is an attempt to pretend it doesn't exist, but that renders any taxonomy empty of genuine meaning because there is nothing the name refers to in reality.

 

[Tinker Grey]

The issue is when we're talking about taxonomies the "overlap" is entirely abstract, and we end up with semantic issues like the "quus/quadition" problem regarding semantic indeterminancy.

Without a real common referrent, there is no meaningful exchange.

What does it matter if the overlap is abstract? If two interlocutors agree on what they are talking about, there is a real common referent regardless if it is objective or absolute?.

If you and I agree, what is that to a third party. If a third party enters "the chat", we renegotiate our terms.

 

[Tinker Grey]

888

If there is no objective meaning to it, then any communication is rendered moot.

No it's not. If you and I agree, then we can continue with our conversation. Agreement is all that is required for understanding and communication.

 

[Fervent]

888
No it's not. If you and I agree, then we can continue with our conversation. Agreement is all that is required for understanding and communication.

What are we supposed to be agreeing on, exactly? If there is no real referent to our words and the names we give things, then how can we determine if agreement exists or if we're just using the same sounds for radically different concepts?

 

[Tinker Grey]

What are we supposed to be agreeing on, exactly?

Whatever terms we are using to have our conversation.

 

[Fervent]

What does it matter if the overlap is abstract?

Because I have no idea what you are conceiving of if there is simply an abstract concept at play with no real referent. So how does overlap occur? What is supposed to be overlapping?

If two interlocutors agree on what they are talking about, there is a real common referent regardless if it is objective or absolute?.

Do names not imply identity relationships that are objective?

If you and I agree, what is that to a third party. If a third party enters "the chat", we renegotiate our terms.

You seem to be unfamiliar with the indeterminancy issue I raised. Or at least you've left it completely unaddressed.

 

[Fervent]

Whatever terms we are using to have our conversation.

and how are such terms supposed to relate to reality, if not expressing a real identity?

 

[Tinker Grey]

and how are such terms supposed to relate to reality

However we agree they relate to reality. (It's almost as if you've had a conversation with someone from another culture.)

 

[Fervent]

However we agree they relate to reality. (It's almost as if you've had a conversation with someone from another culture.)

Uh huh. If there is simply an agreed upon relationship and no actual substantive relationship between words and reality, how are we conveying anything meaningful at all? If there is no genuine referrent when I say "dog", then how do you recognize that there is agreement on what it is we are talking about? If names don't imply identity, then what distinguishes them from nonsense noises?

 

[Tinker Grey]

If there is simply an agreed upon relationship and no actual substantive relationship between words and reality

If we agree, then there is a substantive relationship between us. That's enough.

 

[Tinker Grey]

Do names not imply identity relationships that are objective?

(missed this.) No. It just implies commonality

 

[Fervent]

If we agree, then there is a substantive relationship between us. That's enough.

If we are not refering to real objects, then the only agreement possible between us is that we are making the same sounds. Whether or not you are talking about the same thing as I am requires us to have a common referent, not simply agree about what sounds we are making. We cannot sensibly talk about things without a dstinct referent. If we're not agreeing about what real entities we are referring to, then what exactly are we supposed to be coming to agreement on?

 

[Fervent]

(missed this.) No. It just implies commonality

What sort of commonality? What's the shared space?

 

[Tinker Grey]

What sort of commonality? What's the shared space?

The one between your ears.

How is this a problem for you? If you and I agree to some terms, we agree. That's it. There's nothing mystical. We agree. And until a third person "enters the chat" we are good. When the third-person enters the chat, we renegotiate our terms.

This is not complicated. If we agree, we agree.

If we wish to impose our views on a wider society, then we have to earn the buy-in of the wider society. We can't ever appeal to some absolute that all must agree to.

Surely, your observations of all societies and all interactions between diverse societies affirms this.

You might wish otherwise, but reality doesn't support this. All of various societies interactions are ones of negotiation.

 

[BCP1928]

What are we supposed to be agreeing on, exactly? If there is no real referent to our words and the names we give things, then how can we determine if agreement exists or if we're just using the same sounds for radically different concepts?

We can always point to things.

 

[Fervent]

The one between your ears.

How are you supposed to have gotten in there? Last time I checked, we don't share that space.

We can always point to things.

This undermines nominalism, rather than supporting it. Ostensive definition connects words to concrete objects so when we point at things we are identifying an identity relationship between the object and the word we are using. So all we're doing is clarifying the real referent.