Free will and determinism

[Fervent]

I didn't omit it. You said there was something outside the process that affects it somehow. You told me (eventually, after 3 days) that it was 'meaning'. So the something outside the process that changes some physical matter inside the process is 'meaning'.

I told you right from the beginning, because meaning=semantic content. And your original description included it by way of symbols. You have now finally omitted it entirely, which leaves your description of the process incomplete.

But you said that it couldn't be detected, so we have to examine the effects. So what does it change? Where does it change it? How does it do this?

Again, I'm not going to get into metaphysics when we can simply stick to phenomenology and epistemics. Your description is woefully incomplete for capturing the phenomena we experience, where meaning is essential to our experience.

 

[Fervent]

You said some matter was physically changed. That's not metaphysics. That's...physics.

Nope, it's metaphysics. Because we could be talking about panpsychism, hylomorphism, or a number of possibilities beyond simple physicalism. The point is, the phenomenal process clearly includes an element that a physical description of the process cannot provide.

Whenever you are ready.

The fact that you've admitted that you must omit meaning from the process is as good as a concession of my epistemic argument based on the phenomena as we experience it.

 

[Bradskii]

I told you right from the beginning, because meaning=semantic content. And your original description included it by way of symbols. You have now finally omitted it entirely, which leaves your description of the process incomplete.

The semantic content you were puzzled about was the physical aspects that were part of the input. Electrical signals (I even explained about proteins and electrical potentials in the cell) and sound waves are the usual culprits. The answer you gave was for what was outside the system that can't be detected. The electrical and chemical changes within the system that are caused by inputting the symbology can be detected. That's been included. So we are talking about two entirely different things. One detectable inside the system and one undetectable outside of it. The answer you gave was meaning. Outside and undetectable.

Now we're waiting for the details on what effects it has...and seriously, you'll need some neurobiology.

 

[Fervent]

The semantic content you were puzzled about was the physical aspects that were part of the input. Electrical signals (I even explained about proteins and electrical potentials in the cell) and sound waves are the usual culprits. The answer you gave was for what was outside the system that can't be detected. The electrical and chemical changes within the system that are caused by inputting the symbology can be detected. That's been included. So we are talking about two entirely different things. One detectable inside the system and one undetectable outside of it. The answer you gave was meaning. Outside and undetectable.

No, the semantic content was the meaning of the words and how the abstract symbolic content causes a physical reaction in your brain. It's literally how the meaning of the words I am putting on the screen gets translated into electrical signals for you to respond to. Which you say isn't part of the process, which leaves a massive hole in your description. So does semantic content lead to electrical signals, or is meaning not part of the process?

 

[Bradskii]

No, the semantic content was the meaning of the words and how the abstract symbolic content causes a physical reaction in your brain. It's literally how the meaning of the words I am putting on the screen gets translated into electrical signals for you to respond to. Which you say isn't part of the process, which leaves a massive hole in your description. So does semantic content lead to electrical signals, or is meaning not part of the process?

Every part of what we think about is found within the neurological system. They are represented by electrical, chemical, biological and physical means. You said that there's something outside the system that has an effect within the system. But it can't be detected.

So what are the physical effects?

And by the way, this isn't going to go away. You've made a statement and are refusing to back it up. I don't like that. It took literally 3 days to get a one word answer out of you. Now you have to explain that answer. And quite honestly, I don't care how long it takes you to give it. Or retract it.

 

[Hans Blaster]

... it's this sort of thread which serves as a perfect example of why I lean toward the study of physics and not metaphysics.

Has someone hacked your account? Have you been taken over by a bodysnatcher?

Has my brain started rewriting some of you non-existent people who don't exist in my vat?

The effort. The banter. The futility.

Agreed.

 

[Fervent]

Every part of what we think about is found within the neurological system. They are represented by electrical, chemical, biological and physical means. You said that there's something outside the system that has an effect within the system. But it can't be detected.

Ignoring what I have said is a bad look for you.

So what are the physical effects?

symbols->electrical signals...what physical attribute of the symbols leads to those electrical signals?

And by the way, this isn't going to go away. You've made a statement and are refusing to back it up. I don't like that. It took literally 3 days to get a one word answer out of you. Now you have to explain that answer. And quite honestly, I don't care how long it takes you to give it. Or retract it.

I've presented an argument and backed it up, you've danced around and refused to give a straight answer to a direct question. If it isn't the meaning of the symbols that leads to the nuerological activity, then what is it?

 

[Bradskii]

symbols->electrical signals...what physical attribute of the symbols leads to those electrical signals?

Photons. Sound waves. This has been explained. And is not relevant to the answer you need to give.

I've presented an argument and backed it up, you've danced around and refused to give a straight answer to a direct question.

You haven't presented an argument. You just made a claim. It took 3 days to get an answer as to what that claim consisted of. Now you need to explain what effects it has. Because you said that it did have effects.

If it isn't the meaning of the symbols that leads to the nuerological activity, then what is it?

You're asking the same question a different way. The meaning of a symbol is represented by the symbol itself and the physical aspects of that symbol leads to changes in the neurological system. It's irrelevant anyway. You have to explain what effects are caused inside the system by something undetectable outside it.

 

[Merrill]

Didn't you notice that my statement was about making decisions, and your question was about the ability to conceptualise? Two things that are not the same. I can imagine a green cow with 6 legs even though we know there's no such creature in the universe. Because I know what cows are, I know what green looks like and adding a couple of legs is no problem. I don't need free will to use my imagination.

Who sent down the bolt of lightning? Someone that's kinda like us, who can do such things, is very powerful but who we can't see.

You're like some others in this thread. You're heading down a dead end. I'll let you go down there as well. It's no problem to me.

We make decisions based on things in our reality, or things we can conceptualize

primitive man can combine two things he has seen in the world to make a new creature (pink cow with 6 legs)

but in a deterministic, materialist universe, how does he come up with an idea of a God he has never seen?

philosophers have been arguing about this since ancient Greece

you are taking the stance that we are all like AI systems of rats being electrocuted in a lab --aka, we cannot do anything save for respond, and those responses can be predicted. We cannot "respond any other way"

I think the universe is a whole lot more complicated than that (and I believe in God). I can't imagine going through life with such a nihilistic outlook

 

[Fervent]

Photons. Sound waves. This has been explained. And is not relevant to the answer you need to give.

An explanation that is sorely lacking, since it in no way explains how meaning is transferred. Which is what you have been asked to explain.

You haven't presented an argument. You just made a claim. It took 3 days to get an answer as to what that claim consisted of. Now you need to explain what effects it has. Because you said that it did have effects.

I have presented an argument, I've re-stated it numerous times over. I've asked direct questions which you have no given any sort of answer to.

You're asking the same question a different way. The meaning of a symbol is represented by the symbol itself and the physical aspects of that symbol leads to changes in the neurological system. It's irrelevant anyway. You have to explain what effects are caused inside the system by something undetectable outside it.

I am asking the same question, because you have failed to provide an answer to the question. Instead, you've basically admitted that it is the meaning of the symbol which is what makes it significant. It's not some physical characteristic of the symbol, but its meaning, that leads to nuerological activity. So we have something that isn't physical, in meaning, leading to a physical response in nuerological activity. You can't have it both ways, omitting meaning from your description while admitting that it plays a role in the process you can't explain. So what physical aspects of the symbol provide its meaning? what is the essential physical attribute that cannot be changed that can be tied to its meaning?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Has someone hacked your account? Have you been taken over by a bodysnatcher?

Has my brain started rewriting some of you non-existent people who don't exist in my vat?

Lol! Nope. It's still the same ol' me that's always been here.

Agreed.

This is why you don't see me bring up the philosophical Brain-In-A-Vat analytic analogy.

However, I will say one thing here: Whether we read Descartes on his 'Evil-Demon God' analogy or we read Hillary Putnam for his famous treatment on the Brain-In-A-Vat analysis, we should realize that both of these guys were only using their respective analogies to explain how they each thought we can 'know' we aren't being deceived by Evil Gods or by Evil Scientists with diabolical vats.

Anyway, onward with our discussion on.................................***cough***............................................"ETHICS."

 

[Fervent]

However, I will say one thing here: Whether we read Descartes on his 'Evil-Demon God' analogy or we read Hillary Putnam for his famous treatment on the Brain-In-A-Vat analysis, we should realize that both of these guys were only using their respective analogies to explain how they each thought we can 'know' we aren't being deceived by Evil Gods or by Evil Scientists with diabolical vats.

So many claim to have escaped the cave and been enlightened.

As for discussing ethics, difficult to get to until the epistemics have been hashed out first. Can't describe the ethical implications without first identifying how we will distinguish an ethical implication from an unethical one. In the context of this discussion, it seems obvious to me that doing so requires some measure of freedom to make our own choices especially regarding what to believe and what not to believe.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

So many claim to have escaped the cave and been enlightened.

As for discussing ethics, difficult to get to until the epistemics have been hashed out first. Can't describe the ethical implications without first identifying how we will distinguish an ethical implication from an unethical one. In the context of this discussion, it seems obvious to me that doing so requires some measure of freedom to make our own choices especially regarding what to believe and what not to believe.

I mostly agree. But I think that if we have an inkling as to Bradskii's overall contextual relation here, which is the fact that he claims full induction into a Deterministic framework because he read Sapolsky's newest book, then I think you and I can easily enough intuit his overarching epistemic goal in further relation to ethical outcomes.

It might be more practical to simply do things Hulk style. That's what I learned specifically from reading the 3rd Marvel comic book I ever bought as a kid ... And if you've ever read and understood the context of The Incredible Hulk issue #200 (1976), you'd know what I'm insinuating.

 

[Hans Blaster]

Lol! Nope. It's still the same ol' me that's always been here.

Given your reactions to my disdain for metaphysics, it felt more like a sentence *I* would have written. (And probably have in this thread...)

This is why you don't see me bring up the philosophical Brain-In-A-Vat analytic analogy.

I changed my tag in honor of that "discussion".

However, I will say one thing here: Whether we read Descartes on his 'Evil-Demon God' analogy or we read Hillary Putnam for his famous treatment on the Brain-In-A-Vat analysis, we should realize that both of these guys were only using their respective analogies to explain how they each thought we can 'know' we aren't being deceived by Evil Gods or by Evil Scientists with diabolical vats.

Sometimes people take an interesting analogy too far. I am reminded about how most people completely misuse Schrödinger's cat.

Anyway, onward with our discussion on.................................***cough***............................................"ETHICS."

The threads on this board generally come down to two types:

1. Things that aren't actually about ethics or morality.
2. Theological questions, particularly: is this thing a sin.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Given your reactions to my disdain for metaphysics, it felt more like a sentence *I* would have written. (And probably have in this thread...)

Well......................being that we both have an influence from Carl Sagan (and a lot of others not unlike him) in our mental backgrounds, I wouldn't be surprised that you and I do have some overlap, Hans.

I changed my tag in honor of that "discussion".

Ah, I see that now! ....................... Lol! That's sweet.

Sometimes people take an interesting analogy too far. I am reminded about how most people completely misuse Schrödinger's cat.

Yes, you're right about that. There's all sorts of misuse of analogies taking place these days. That's one reason you don't see me refer often, if at all to scientific or philosophical analogies. It's a similar reason as to why you don't see me quote the Bible very often, either. I don't like to leave things open to the possibility of either misinterpretation or misapplication.

The threads on this board generally come down to two types:

1. Things that aren't actually about ethics or morality.
2. Theological questions, particularly: is this thing a sin.

And these instances happen quite frequently, I know.

 

[Fervent]

I mostly agree. But I think that if we have an inkling as to Bradskii's overall contextual relation here, which is the fact that he claims full induction into a Deterministic framework because he read Sapolsky's newest book, then I think you and I can easily enough intuit his overarching epistemic goal in further relation to ethical outcomes.

I suppose so, though it seems to me that approach is putting the cart before the horse. The illusion, it seems to me, is the notion that the conclusion is simply a matter of following the evidence rather than being a foregone conclusion from unjustified metaphysical priors.

It might be more practical to simply do things Hulk style. That's what I learned specifically from reading the 3rd Marvel comic book I ever bought as a kid ... And if you've ever read and understood the context of The Incredible Hulk issue #200 (1976), you'd know what I'm insinuating.

I'm not sure I have the exact context having never read that comic book, though I am suspicious that you may be making a meta-point here from my context of your previous statements within the discussion.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I suppose so, though it seems to me that approach is putting the cart before the horse. The illusion, it seems to me, is the notion that the conclusion is simply a matter of following the evidence rather than being a foregone conclusion from unjustified metaphysical priors.

It might feel like it's putting the cart before the horse, it can be a time saver at the same time; it can also provide more of a power punch when we discern the overall epistemic goals of our interlocutors first.

I'm not sure I have the exact context having never read that comic book, though I am suspicious that you may be making a meta-point here from my context of your previous statements within the discussion.

You're right. I am making a meta-point, and that is this: a significant aspect of Bradskii's epistemic goal here involves validating Robert Sapolsky's ethical statements via Determinism, so those ethical considerations within his goal should be a part of your overall analysis from the get go as well. This isn't to say that I think you've been wrong in anything you've been concentrating on in this thread. No, I've quite enjoyed seeing you move through and beyond the conceptual processes in the interface between psychology and philosophy.

However, maybe we want to concentrate on the possibility that even IF Determinism were to be true, that this possible state wouldn't by necessity infer that culpability for a host of crimes, sins, or other social infringements and/or deviations should somehow become further protected?

Moreover, even IF Determinism were to be true, and it could be seen that Determinants are directly influential in human behavior and pushing us to put into affect more empathic applications for the psychological plight of victimizers, it shouldn't be seen to do so in an asymmetric way where we would avoid, unjustifiably, also assuming, with equal application, that enforcers of ethics (or of the law) weren't subject to Determinants that are directly influential in their human behavior and compelling them to hold victimizers and other caustic deviants accountable.

Or something like this.................................. again, what I'm saying here has something to do with the citing of epistemic goals that is a part of the process of analyzing claims of knowledge and the nature of their justification [(ala Ralph Baergen, Contemporary Epistemology, (1995)].

I could say more. It would be the Hulk-like thing to do, especially where insidious, complicated, maybe even socialistic, psychological philosophies are of concern.

 

[Fervent]

It might feel like it's putting the cart before the horse, it can be a time saver at the same time; it can also provide more of a power punch when we discern the overall epistemic goals of our interlocutors first.

I can see how that might be, though I'm not sure that's an accomplishable goal given the unequal footing and arbitrarily reduced epistemic threshold that the gap between his position and my own. The epistemic loops required to support his position makes it rather difficult for me to understand how one could in all honestly hold to such a belief which makes it rather difficult for me to see the through-line.

You're right. I am making a meta-point, and that is this: a significant aspect of Bradskii's epistemic goal here is involves validating Sapolsky's ethical statements via Determinism, so those ethical considerations within his goal should be a part of your overall analysis from the get go as well. This isn't to say that I think you've been wrong in anything you've been concentrating on in this thread. No, I've quite enjoyed seeing you move through and beyond the conceptual processes in the interface between psychology and philosophy.

However, maybe we want to concentrate on the possibility that even IF Determinism were to be true, that this possible state wouldn't by necessity infer that culpability for a host of crimes, sins, or other social infringements and/or deviations should somehow become further protected?

Moreover, even IF Determinism were to be true, and it could be seen that Determinants are directly influential in human behavior and pushing us to put into affect more empathic applications for the psychological plight of victimizers, it shouldn't be seen to do so in an asymmetric way where we would avoid, unjustifiably, also assuming, with equal application, that enforcers of ethics (or of the law) weren't subject to Determinants that are directly influential in their human behavior and compelling them to hold victimizers and other caustic deviants accountable.

That's certainly an area that would be ripe for discussion, and while it is something I have considered touching on the conceptual nature of such a discussion and the extent to which cognitive dissonance is evident within the materialist position makes me question my ability to successfully draw out those implications. Though in a way, I believe I've touched on it at least tangentially in pointing out that if determinants are directly causal in human behavior then they must also be directly causal in human beliefs about behavior, leading to the absurd conclusion that Bradskii's belief that free will is an illusion and my belief that it is not are nothing more than the result of the particular determinants within our physical beings and not a result of analysis of evidence/strength of arguements. It would follow from that that any notion of the utility of belief in free will would be rendered empty, since the beliefs themselves would be a product of determinants...though if I understand you correctly the viscious chain of absolution in both accountability for our beliefs and behaviors is precisely what you are getting at here. So while I agree with your analysis, I'm not sure it is within my ability to get that across in a discussion and would be afraid that it would lead to even more opportunities of escape.

Or something like this.................................. again, what I'm saying here has something to do with the citing of epistemic goals that is a part of the process of analyzing claims of knowledge and the nature of their justification [(ala Ralph Baergen, Contemporary Epistemology, (1995)].

I could say more. It would be the Hulk-like thing to do, especially where insidious, complicated, maybe even socialistic, psychological philosophies are of concern.

I'm not sure I follow this part.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I can see how that might be, though I'm not sure that's an accomplishable goal given the unequal footing and arbitrarily reduced epistemic threshold that the gap between his position and my own. The epistemic loops required to support his position makes it rather difficult for me to understand how one could in all honestly hold to such a belief which makes it rather difficult for me to see the through-line.

... like a mirage, one can in all honesty report that they see it from their own perceptual angle, and doing so wouldn't even yet trip the lever for placing us into a moment where we have to decide whether his perceptual angle is justified Internally or Externally. It all then depends on what further claims in connection to the mirage are being presented for further levels of justification in relation to the overall goal.

So, Bradskii, from his own view from within Evolutionary Psychology can claim he perceives such and such a phenomenon. The problem then will be just how the substance of the mirage (if it is a mirage) does, or does not, imply any further epistemological goals and accompanying states of actual justification toward those goals. And you and I can very well give him the credit of being 'honest' in all of that while at the same time not seeing that his claims are indeed justified and true.

That's certainly an area that would be ripe for discussion, and while it is something I have considered touching on the conceptual nature of such a discussion and the extent to which cognitive dissonance is evident within the materialist position makes me question my ability to successfully draw out those implications. Though in a way, I believe I've touched on it at least tangentially in pointing out that if determinants are directly causal in human behavior then they must also be directly causal in human beliefs about behavior, leading to the absurd conclusion that Bradskii's belief that free will is an illusion and my belief that it is not are nothing more than the result of the particular determinants within our physical beings and not a result of analysis of evidence/strength of arguements.

Yeah, I know. That part is frustrating.

It would follow from that that any notion of the utility of belief in free will would be rendered empty, since the beliefs themselves would be a product of determinants...though if I understand you correctly the viscious chain of absolution in both accountability for our beliefs and behaviors is precisely what you are getting at here. So while I agree with your analysis, I'm not sure it is within my ability to get that across in a discussion and would be afraid that it would lead to even more opportunities of escape.

I'm not sure I follow this part.

Well, I wouldn't expect you to follow since I haven't actually provided the next, more politicized element in all of this. For the moment, I'd rather keep this thread focused on its inherent track of evaluating the surface level interface between psychology and philosophy. So, don't worry about. I appreciate all of the input you've offered in this thread so far. ... just remember that in the context of this thread, this is an Ethics issue rather than a solely Epistemological issue.

 

[Fervent]

... like a mirage, one can in all honesty report that they see it from their own perceptual angle, and doing so wouldn't even yet trip the lever for placing us into a moment where we have to decide whether his perceptual angle is justified Internally or Externally. It all then depends on what further claims in connection to the mirage are being presented for further levels of justification in relation to the overall goal.

So, Bradskii, from his own view from within Evolutionary Psychology can claim he perceives such and such a phenomenon. The problem then will be just how the substance of the mirage (if it is a mirage) does, or does not, imply any further epistemological goals and accompanying states of actual justification toward those goals. And you and I can very well give him the credit of being 'honest' in all of that while at the same time not seeing that his claims are indeed justified and true.

Yes, perhaps "in all honesty" was a mistake of phrasing. I don't doubt that he isn't deliberately being dishonest about his perspective. In the current intellectual climate it is all to easy to never bother putting materialist presuppositions to any kind of serious scrutiny and instead just go with the cultural assumptions. I just can't put myself in that perspective because the faults appear so obvious to me I don't understand how one can miss them.

Yeah, I know. That part is frustrating.

Very much so.

Well, I wouldn't expect you to follow since I haven't actually provided the next, more politicized element in all of this. For the moment, I'd rather keep this thread focused on its inherent track of evaluating the surface level interface between psychology and philosophy. So, don't worry about. I appreciate all of the input you've offered in this thread so far. ... just remember that in the context of this thread, this is an Ethics issue rather than a solely Epistemological issue.

Yes, certainly. I suppose it might be more fruitful to explore how someone like Bradskii proposes grounding ethical proposals in a world where our beliefs and behaviors are purely the result of prior states. It seems to me that the belief that there is no free will would automatically render any attempt to establish a foundation for evaluating the ethics of decisions-that-aren't-really-decisions as ridiculous as evaluating the ethics of earthquakes and hurricanes.