Free will and determinism

[Tinker Grey]

An axiom can only be taken because it is self-evident,

There's no such thing as "self-evident". There is only experience that has yet to be contradicted.

 

[Bradskii]

I've observed effects with highly probable causes, improbable but possible causes, to no identifiable cause.

So your observations to date have not included anything where you could say 'that was an effect with no cause'. Yeah, me too. Those are my observations exactly. And everyone else's as well.

So...

Following all available observations where no effect has been found without a cause, on the assumption that the world is determinate...etc etc

 

[Fervent]

I'll repeat what I said earlier. What are your current observations?

Asked and answered.

That all effects seem to have causes?

Nope, there have been plenty of things that I have observed that seemed to happen for no reason. At least none I can identify. Want an example? The other day I was sitting in my living room alone and the TV kicked on seemingly without a cause. And this isn't an isolated experience, my car sometimes doesn't start for no apparent reason. Doors open for no apparent reason. Wheels fall off for no apparent reason. Branches fall for no apparent reason. Any one of these observations could be an effect without a cause.

That something must have broken the window even though you don't know what?

I observed a window break. I can't identify any possible cause. So how would my observation of the window breaking be different in the case that there was no cause than of the case in which I simply don't know the cause? What would I observe that would be different?

You can give me an example of any effect that you think didn't have a cause and we'll examine it. Anything at all. You have the whole history of the entire universe to show me something that just might not have had a cause.

Again, you've never had something happen which even after wracking your brain had to throw up your hands and declare "Well, there must be a reason" ? You're using a computer, so I doubt that you've never at least experienced a tech fail that didn't seem to have any reason.

Maybe, at some point in your life, somewhere you came across an effect that you felt for sure had no cause. Tell me what that was. If you don't have one then you have nothing to offer. You always assume cause and effect.

Pragmatically, I assume cause and effect because cause and effect seems to generally be true. It doesn't need to be universally true to be of use to me, and it would be a sampling error to infer that it must be based purely on the cases in which I can more or less positively identify a cause while completely dismissing the ones for which I am stumped for a cause.

This was a direct question regarding free will. And you have no examples of any decisions made without a reason. And the reasons why you made a decision are the antecedent conditions (random decision made without those are not applicable to free will).

Nope, if the decision is the efficient cause itself then it is not antecedent to itself. If my agency is the cause of my decision, there is nothing prior to that agency.

Maybe we didn't need to talk about determinism to get to where we needed.

I'm not sure where you think we've gotten to, since you switched from a decision having a cause to a decision having a prior cause without justifying the shift. And since its not hte same thing, we're in the same place we started.

 

[Fervent]

So your observations to date have not included anything where you could say 'that was an effect with no cause'.

Not what I said, as "no identifiable cause" would have all of the same observable characteristics as "an effect with no cause." So while I can't confirm that I've observed an effect with no cause, it is within the realm of possibility that I have.

Yeah, me too. Those are my observations exactly.

So you've observed things for which you can only assume must have a cause, but have no observable reason to?

And everyone else's as well.

In which case everyone has candidates for a falsifying case of the universal declaration that all effects have causes.

So...

Following all available observations where no effect has been found without a cause, on the assumption that the world is determinate...etc etc

Gonna have to justify "no effect has been found without a cause." Because if your observations and mine agree, there are innumerable candidates for effects without causes that are observationally indistinguishable. Unless you're making a sampling error by ignoring the unknown cases and only considering the cases in which there is an identifiable cause.

 

[Fervent]

There's no such thing as "self-evident". There is only experience that has yet to be contradicted.

Oh? And you know this because...

 

[Tinker Grey]

Oh? And you know this because...

Because it is an experience yet to be contradicted.

 

[Fervent]

Because it is an experience yet to be contradicted.

How does one experience "no such thing as 'self-evident'"?

 

[Tinker Grey]

How does one experience "no such thing as 'self-evident'"?

It's inductive. Show me a black swan. Show me a "self-evident" thing that is not determined through a collection of experiences, and we'll have "self-evident".

In the meantime, calling all things non-self-evident is justified.

 

[Fervent]

It's inductive. Show me a black swan. Show me a "self-evident" thing that is not determined through a collection of experiences, and we'll have "self-evident".

In the meantime, calling all things non-self-evident is justified.

And how do you know that "a collection of experiences" have occurred? How do you know that you weren't created the moment you read this post?

 

[Bradskii]

Asked and answered.

Your answer was that you have no examples of an effect that you know had a cause. My premise will stand unless you find one.

Nope, there have been plenty of things that I have observed that seemed to happen for no reason. At least none I can identify.

I don't want ones that you can't identify. I want ones that you know had no cause. The premise stands until it is refuted.

I observed a window break. I can't identify any possible cause. So how would my observation of the window breaking be different in the case that there was no cause than of the case in which I simply don't know the cause? What would I observe that would be different?

In one case you know the cause. In the other you don't. But I can guarantee you wouldn't say 'hey, the window broke for no reason at all'.

Again, you've never had something happen which even after wracking your brain had to throw up your hands and declare "Well, there must be a reason" ? You're using a computer, so I doubt that you've never at least experienced a tech fail that didn't seem to have any reason.

I've had plenty of things happen for which I didn't know the cause. But none have happened when I knew there wasn't one. Apparently that's never happened to you either.

Pragmatically, I assume cause and effect because cause and effect seems to generally be true.

Me too. Causes have effects until someone points out an example of when that doesn't happen. My premise 'On the assumption that effects have causes...' will stand until then.

Nope, if the decision is the efficient cause itself then it is not antecedent to itself. If my agency is the cause of my decision, there is nothing prior to that agency.

You've already told me that you haven't made a decision without a reason. Your agency is you making the decision. But you made it for a reason. The reason was the cause. Or do you want to go with a decision without a cause. You can use an example if you like.

I'm not sure where you think we've gotten to, since you switched from a decision having a cause to a decision having a prior cause without justifying the shift.

The cause is prior in all cases. If I ask you 'Why are you doing this?' so it's present tense, then the reason you are doing it is in the past. Even if you say 'I want to do it now' or 'I enjoy doing it now' you thought about what you were going to enjoy and then made your decision on it.

It's the way cause and effect works. One comes before the other...

 

[Bradskii]

In which case everyone has candidates for a falsifying case of the universal declaration that all effects have causes.

I'm willing to look at any one for proof.

Gonna have to justify "no effect has been found without a cause." Because if your observations and mine agree, there are innumerable candidates for effects without causes that are observationally indistinguishable.

The declaration stands. I don't care if there are an infinity of effects for which we don't know the case. And there are. And that's not an exaggeration. Unless we examine every event in the universe that has ever happened then we can't claim it as a fact. I'm not. It's an inductive argument. It stands until refuted.

if you can't, then that's really not my problem. It's yours.

 

[Bradskii]

And how do you know that "a collection of experiences" have occurred? How do you know that you weren't created the moment you read this post?

I might point out that 'We don't know that there's never been an effect without a cause' is in the same ball park. I've bent over backwards to change the premise to 'On the assumption that all effects have a cause...' I don't want to add '...and that we weren't all created a few minutes ago, and we're not brains in vats and not players in some spotty teenage aliens computer game...'

 

[Fervent]

Your answer was that you have no examples of an effect that you know had a cause. My premise will stand unless you find one.

If the set of the observations under consideration contain an occurrence for which it cannot be excluded that the premise has been falsified, we cannot use the set of our observations to assume that it hasn't. So unless you can exclude the possibility that observed effects that do not have an identifiable cause are examples of effects without a cause, our current set of observations cannot support the assumption that all effects have causes. Because we have effects for which there is no known cause, and the only reason to believe there is is the inductive inference that you are trying to justify.

I don't want ones that you can't identify. I want ones that you know had no cause. The premise stands until it is refuted.

No, it doesn't. Because the premise is based on a move from a set of observations in which we cannot exclude the possibility that it is already falsified, to the conclusion that it is true. If we cannot exclude the possibility that it is false within our data set, then we cannot use our data set to justify assuming it is a true premise.

In one case you know the cause. In the other you don't. But I can guarantee you wouldn't say 'hey, the window broke for no reason at all'.

Whether I would say that or not isn't an issue, the issue is that there is no observable difference in the two cases so we cannot exclude that we have observed the falsification of the premise. So how would our observations differ between simply not knowing what the cause is and there not existing a cause, such that we can appeal to what we have observed to exclude the possibility that our premise is already falsified.

I've had plenty of things happen for which I didn't know the cause. But none have happened when I knew there wasn't one. Apparently that's never happened to you either.

We don't have to know that there isn't one in order for what we have observed to have falsified our premise. Which is why I keep repeating the question, because you're trying to use a set of observations which contain examples which have no conceivable observable difference from the falsifier. If we can't exclude the idea our data set contains a white swan, then we can't conclude that all swans are black based on our data set even on a provisional basis. So I'll ask, yet again, how our observations of an effect without a cause would differ from our observations of effects without identifiable causes? How would one appear different from the other to our senses?

Me too. Causes have effects until someone points out an example of when that doesn't happen. My premise 'On the assumption that effects have causes...' will stand until then.

That's not how universals work, because if we can't exclude the possibility that what we already have observed falsifies our premise our observations cannot be used to justify the premise. So unless you can explain what observations we can use to differentiate between an unidentified cause and a non-existent one, your premise doesn't get off the ground. Because we have observations that are entirely consistent with effects without causes, even if we cannot positively state that they in fact do not have a cause. So how do we exclude them as falsifying your premise?

You've already told me that you haven't made a decision without a reason. Your agency is you making the decision. But y
ou made it for a reason. The reason was the cause. Or do you want to go with a decision without a cause. You can use an example if you like

You're spinning here with sophistry.

The cause is prior in all cases. If I ask you 'Why are you doing this?' so it's present tense, then the reason you are doing it is in the past. Even if you say 'I want to do it now' or 'I enjoy doing it now' you thought about what you were going to enjoy and then made your decision on it.

Oh? How do you know the cause is "prior", and not concurrent? And what do you mean by "prior," exactly?

 

[Bradskii]

Because we have effects for which there is no known cause...

Then your job, should you wish to take it, is to prove there was no cause.

No, it doesn't. Because the premise is based on a move from a set of observations in which we cannot exclude the possibility that it is already falsified, to the conclusion that it is true.

No, to the conclusion that unless there is evidence to the contrary...it stands. Feel free to find that evidence.

Whether I would say that or not isn't an issue...

It is. You always assume a cause. If you assume there wasn't in some case, then let's hear about it.

So I'll ask, yet again, how our observations of an effect without a cause would differ from our observations of effects without identifiable causes? How would one appear different from the other to our senses?

There will be no provable cause. Your observations will rule out literally everything.

That's not how universals work, because if we can't exclude the possibility that what we already have observed falsifies our premise our observations cannot be used to justify the premise.

Hence the rider: 'On the assumption...' If you don't want to accept that...then don't. You can call it day and thanks for playing.

Oh? How do you know the cause is "prior", and not concurrent? And what do you mean by "prior," exactly?

It's cause and effect. The one is prior to the other. It's the way things work. Throw the brick, break the window. If you think a reason can be concurrent then give me an example. We'll investigate it together. And the meaning of prior..? Oh, c'mon now...

 

[Fervent]

I'm willing to look at any one for proof.

As soon as you give some observable characteristic that allows us to distinguish between an effect without a cause, and an effect with an unknown cause I'll attempt to furnish you with one. B

The declaration stands. I don't care if there are an infinity of effects for which we don't know the case. And there are. And that's not an exaggeration.

I agree, which is why I object to making the inductive inference. It cannot be excluded that the premise is already falsified based on what we have already observed, so we cannot take what we have observed and conclude that what we haven't observed will continue to conform. It's not a question of whether what we have observed will hold true in the future, but whether our premise is even true for the set of our observations.

Unless we examine every event in the universe that has ever happened then we can't claim it as a fact.

Agreed

I'm not.

Aren't you, though?

It's an inductive argument.

It's not, though. It's an inference based off of only considering only those observations that confirm the premise, and then either applying the premise to those that cannot be confirmed so that they can be said to conform or simply ignoring them entirely despite the fact that it cannot be excluded that those observations have falsified the premise. Inductive arguments for universals can't be used unless we have no observations that potentially don't conform.

It stands until refuted.

If we had a set of observations without ambiguities as to whether it has already failed, it would be fair to say it stands until refuted. But since our current data set contains observations that don't unambiguously conform we cannot move even provisionally to a universal declaration.

if you can't, then that's really not my problem. It's yours.

If I were the one trying to make an argument, it certainly would be. But "Prove me wrong, you can't" is not an argument.

 

[Bradskii]

As soon as you give some observable characteristic that allows us to distinguish between an effect without a cause, and an effect with an unknown cause I'll attempt to furnish you with one.

I don't want to do your work for you. Not that I could anyway because I know it's a fool's errand. But if you're saying that it can't be done, then my premise will stand.

I agree, which is why I object to making the inductive inference. It cannot be excluded that the premise is already falsified based on what we have already observed...

You can't exclude that it hasn't been falsified because you say you can't falsify it? Friend, that's really not how this works. If you haven't falsified it, it hasn't been falsified. It will stand until you do.

Aren't you, though?

No. It's an inductive argument. I can't prove it's true. You can prove it's false. Although you seem not to know how to do it, because you keep asking me how. That, again, is really not my problem.

It's not, though. It's an inference based off of only considering only those observations that confirm the premise...

No, it's based on the fact that no-one has ever been able to nominate an effect without a cause. And my patience is paper thin at this point. If you have nothing else to add then I'm not going to bother reading the same stuff time and again. I have to say again that I really don't care if you think the world is determinate or not. You're not adding anything to the conversation at this point by constantly saying 'But it isn't!' It's beginning to sound plaintive.

If I were the one trying to make an argument, it certainly would be. But "Prove me wrong, you can't" is not an argument.

It's not a challenge. I'm saying that you can prove me wrong if you want to. You have that option. You are the one saying that you can't.

 

[Fervent]

Then your job, should you wish to take it, is to prove there was no cause.

Not if you're trying to use the set of our observations to make an inferential move to the universal. All I have to do is present a case which you cannot exclude as having falsified your premise, not prove that it actually does. Because if it can't be excluded that our observations have falsified the premise, then we can't use our observations as a justification for the premise.

No, to the conclusion that unless there is evidence to the contrary...it stands. Feel free to find that evidence.

In order for us to infer that it stands, you have to demonstrate that it has actually stood so far. All I have to do is present potential falsifiers in order to conclude that there is insufficient cause within our observations to warrant the inferential move. I don't have to prove it false, I just have to demonstrate that we have insufficient justification for concluding it to be true based on what we have already observed.

It is. You always assume a cause. If you assume there wasn't in some case, then let's hear about it.

So because it's expedient to assume there is a cause, there is a cause in fact? An assumption is not an observation, and if the bulk of our data set involves assuming that there is a cause then we aren't moving from observation to assumptive conclusion, we're moving from assumption to assumptive conclusion. So what are you basing the assumption that there is a cause on, if not the very thing you are claiming to justify?

There will be no provable cause. Your observations will rule out literally everything.

This is just laughable. So it's ok to assume something is true universally unless literally everything about an event can be examined?

Hence the rider: 'On the assumption...' If you don't want to accept that...then don't. You can call it day and thanks for playing.

Got it, I can begin an argument "On the assumption that God exists..." and then unless you can prove that God doesn't exist my argument succeeds?

It's cause and effect. The one is prior to the other. It's the way things work. Throw the brick, break the window. If you think a reason can be concurrent then give me an example. We'll investigate it together. And the meaning of prior..? Oh, c'mon now...

Considering your track record of "investigation" so far has been "I'm going to assume it's true, and if you can't prove it's false then it holds" I'd rather not bother with this.

 

[Bradskii]

Got it, I can begin an argument "On the assumption that God exists..." and then unless you can prove that God doesn't exist my argument succeeds?

I've used it myself. I don't know why you think it's not valid. On the assumption that it's valid in other areas, of course it will succeed. It's a common means of making an argument. I literally had to check your post count then to see how long you'd been on the forum. I thought you might not know that. But surely you must.

I'd rather not bother with this.

Then I'll ignore 'concurrent reasons' as well. Glad we got the one out of the way.

 

[Fervent]

I don't want to do your work for you. Not that I could anyway because I know it's a fool's errand. But if you're saying that it can't be done, then my premise will stand.

I'm starting to think you have reading comprehension issues, unless you're intentionally misrepresenting what I've said.

You can't exclude that it hasn't been falsified because you say you can't falsify it? Friend, that's really not how this works. If you haven't falsified it, it hasn't been falsified. It will stand until you do.

That's not anywhere close to what I said.

No. It's an inductive argument.

It's a pseudo-inductive argument, as it's neither genuine induction nor an actual argument.

I can't prove it's true.

Then why are you calling it an argument?

You can prove it's false.

How would we distinguish between it having been proved false, and what we have observed based purely on sense-data?

Although you seem not to know how to do it, because you keep asking me how.

No, I don't keep asking you how. I keep asking you what the observable difference would be between it having been proved false and our current observations would be. Which you keep avoiding.

That, again, is really not my problem.

No, it's based on the fact that no-one has ever been able to nominate an effect without a cause.

Any effect for which we do not know the cause is a candidate for an effect without a cause. Of which there are millions upon millions.

And my patience is paper thin at this point.

Cool.

If you have nothing else to add then I'm not going to bother reading the same stuff time and again.

I wouldn't have to repeat myself if you would answer my question, rather than dancing all around it.

I have to say again that I really don't care if you think the world is determinate or not.

And I don't care if you think it is, but if you're going to claim to argue that it is I expect more than just "Well, assuming that it is..." and then demand that it be proven not to be.

You're not adding anything to the conversation at this point by constantly saying 'But it isn't!' It's beginning to sound plaintive.

Maybe not to you

It's not a challenge.

So you're not presenting an argument?

I'm saying that you can prove me wrong if you want to.

The crux of our argument is epistemic, because you don't seem to understand the necessary conditions for inductive inferences to be legitimate. It's not a matter of proving or disproving the assumption, it's a matter of challenging your supposed justification for it. You seem to have absorbed a psuedo-popperian idea about the role of conjecture and falsification which is totally inappropriate for questions of metaphysics(to which cause and effect relations belong). I'm asking you to justify the use of induction.

You have that option. You are the one saying that you can't.

Considering your threshold for falsification is an observation that not only doesn't have a cause but for which a cause is impossible(which is not an appropriate falsificaton threshold), you've effectively set an impossible burden for falsification.

 

[Fervent]

I've used it myself. I don't know why you think it's not valid. On the assumption that it's valid in other areas, of course it will succeed

Perhaps we have different definitions of "succeeds." Because such an argument seems it would only be persuasive to those already convinced of its truth.

It's a common means of making an argument.

Common doesn't mean legitimate.