A Malebranche Quote for Consideration

[zippy2006]

(No need to respond if you've already purchased a ticket out of this aptly named Reddit-town.)

In terms of the knowledge/belief, the primary distinction is that which is arrived at by only natural means, and that which is arrived at by means of divine revelation.

I think I agree with most everything you say in this post, including your reservations about whether the division is complete or watertight. I think it is interesting to ponder the ways that the water gets in. As you say, revelation can inform philosophy, especially moral philosophy. I think philosophy also informs theology (as well as every other discipline), especially when that theology is weighted in favor of the propositional. The other interesting question is whether there is a correlation between faith and intellect (nous). Obviously some, like Gregory of Nyssa, would hold that there is.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Yes, that seems right to me. Good analysis.

That was only for the opening ...

I assume you are asking about delineating "differences between forms of government." Generally speaking Aristotle will move between induction and deduction. We know that he studied and analyzed actual regimes that existed in his own day as well as prior to him. He inevitably brought his biological science into the social sphere, studying human relations in a similar way that he studied animal relations. He obviously goes on to begin chapter 2 by arguing about the natural way that a society grows or develops, beginning with relationships of dependence.

No, I'm not asking about government in particular here, even though for Aristotle, that is the overall context that he thinks he is delineating.

What I really want to hone in on is the actual logical method Aristotle uses when he is attempting ascertain and discern the "observed" nature of both slaves and masters. It's not really clear, I think, that he's using induction for this operation in method; no, I think he's defaulting to one of deduction, particularly where he recognized that both slaves and masters are "people," but then goes on to delineate that we can discern that one is not the same as the other and by what he thinks are "natural" inferences.

So, that's merely preliminary before moving on to what Aristotle has to say in Book 1.

This is interesting to me. I think it is well known that Aristotle spoke and wrote about induction. The IEP article seems to give a good overview of Aristotle's inductive reasoning, including the way that Aristotle's deductive/inductive distinction is different from the current deductive/inductive distinction. Regarding induction, I generally hold to the view of the school to which Groarke belongs (see the book review from my previous post). Note that Groarke specifically says that we must go back behind the modern tradition, which is exactly what PH denies. This is not an uncommon opinion, and many prominent recent philosophers have been Aristotelians or else strongly indebted to Aristotle (Fine, Anscombe, Foot, Nussbaum, Adler, Whitehead, Hare, Austine, MacIntyre, to name just a few).

If you like I can literally send you a long thesis on the study of "experience," the prerequisite of induction, as analyzed in Aristotle and the Thomistic appropriation of Aristotle.

I appreciate the sources, and I may look at them later. Keep in mind that I already have a number of sources describing Aristotle's thought, so it's not like I'm coming at this without my own sources for reference. Also keep in mind that my point about how strengths and weaknesses in everyone's respective philosophy can be extracted out and that where Philosophical Hermeneuticists are concerned, they've already incorporated what they perceive are the strong points in Aristotle's ancient view on "natural philosophy," so it's not as if Philosophical Hermeneuticists are somehow ignoring Aristotle. No, it's an amalgamated appraisal and synthesis of everything that has come before it, replacing Aristotle along with Direct Realism.

As for Groarke, I can't see how his thesis will displace the other appraisals of Aristotle we already have had for the last 450 years since Francis Bacon. For me it's kind of like someone coming along and saying, "Hey, 2PhiloVoid! You need to let go of Jesus and go back to Moses ..." I know this analogy I'm giving isn't exact, but some aspects of what Groarke is proposing sort of sound this way from a "face value" level. Anyway, I don't want to get into this right now. I'm trying to focus on Aristotle's praxis as he delineates "the natural slave."

 

[zippy2006]

What I really want to hone in on is the actual logical method Aristotle uses when he is attempting ascertain and discern the "observed" nature of both slaves and masters. It's not really clear, I think, that he's using induction for this operation in method; no, I think he's defaulting to one of deduction, particularly where he recognized that both slaves and masters are "people," but then goes on to delineate that we can discern that one is not the same as the other and by what he thinks are "natural" inferences.

So you think that natural inferences cannot be inductive? I'm not sure why you think that. You may be mixing Hume with Aristotle. Aristotle is going to observe humans, both slaves and masters, and then produce arguments on the basis, and in favor, of his understanding of them. Same for most philosophers, actually. If you pick a paragraph from any philosopher and start asking questions about whether induction or deduction is occurring you can create false dilemmas. Authentic reasoning is always going to involve both induction (movement from the particular to the universal) and deduction (inferences based on at least one universal or categorical premise).

And if you are going to disagree with Aristotle you will be faced with your own dilemma: "inductive or deductive." How do you know human nature? How do you understand the nature of human beings? Do you disagree with Aristotle via inductive or deductive arguments?

For example, if we take one of Aristotle principles, "Every community is established with a view to some good," we can nitpick about how he arrived at such a universal principle. But unless one is a pure skeptic who does not believe in argument and knowledge, the principle must be treated as a knowledge claim that deserves consideration, just as his own principle claims deserve consideration. For Aristotle that principle is going to reduce to his psychological and ethical works, but for politics it is largely functioning as a premise.

I appreciate the sources, and I may look at them later. Keep in mind that I already have a number of sources describing Aristotle's thought, so it's not like I'm coming at this without my own sources for reference.

And you're welcome to bring some of those sources to bear on your points.

As for Groarke, I can't see how his thesis will displace the other appraisals of Aristotle we already have had for the last 450 years since Francis Bacon.

I do. The moderns were notoriously dismissive of Aristotle, mostly because he was tied up with late scholasticism. I don't know of Aristotelian scholars who think those appraisals are worth much. The paper quoted above, "The Nature and Origin of Ideas," is a good example of how far the era of Bacon was deviating from Aristotle, and how their novel ideas turned out to be less robust than was hoped, to say the least.

For me it's kind of like someone coming along and saying, "Hey, 2PhiloVoid! You need to let go of Jesus and go back to Moses ..." I know this analogy I'm giving isn't exact, but some aspects of what Groarke is proposing sort of sound this way from a "face value" level.

For me it's kind of like someone coming along and saying, "Hey Zippy! You need to let go of Jesus and update yourself with Immanuel Kant and religion within pure reason." I don't think newer is always better, and what are needed here are concrete arguments. If you think Aristotle's arguments against slavery show up his weak spots, then I expect that you will be able to explain why you think this. If you want a peek into a bit of that scholarship, then I would point you to, "Aristotle's Defensible Defense of Slavery," written by the same Aristotelian scholar who wrote the other article, Peter Simpson. He belongs to the same school as Groarke regarding the nature of Aristotle's induction.

The reason I said, "...Or if you don't want to [engage Aristotle on slavery], then fine, whatever," is because slavery represents a presupposition and even taboo in our culture, such that we are prone to believe that "Any argument in favor of slavery must be a bad argument." For that reason one can do an extrinsic dismissal of Aristotle's arguments, "Aristotle argued for slavery, therefore he gave bad arguments (for slavery)." But of course this approach has nothing to do with a serious appraisal of Aristotle's arguments, and that is in many ways the point at issue. We can perform extrinsic dismissals of Aristotle or the pre-moderns on the basis of what Lewis called chronological snobbery, but Templar and I don't accept this as a rational move. Note that it is this same sort of reasoning that justifies PH in his dismissal of, say, Paul where he has decided that Paul is outdated. A cavalier attitude towards ancient thinkers is the basic reason why no one takes religions seriously anymore, and for this reason I press people to try to actually engage ancient thought rather than simply dismiss it.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

So you think that natural inferences cannot be inductive? I'm not sure why you think that. You may be mixing Hume with Aristotle.

Stop poisoning the well, Zippy! Please. Nowhere did I say anything indicating that I think natural inferences cannot be inductive. And no, I'm not mixing Hume with Aristotle. I read some Hume twenty years ago while I was a student, and I'm not prone to "bundling" him with Aristotle.

Aristotle is going to observe humans, both slaves and masters, and then produce arguments on the basis, and in favor, of his understanding of them. Same for most philosophers, actually. If you pick a paragraph from any philosopher and start asking questions about whether induction or deduction is occurring you can create false dilemmas. Authentic reasoning is always going to involve both induction (movement from the particular to the universal) and deduction (inferences based on at least one universal or categorical premise).

And if you are going to disagree with Aristotle you will be faced with your own dilemma: "inductive or deductive." How do you know human nature? How do you understand the nature of human beings? Do you disagree with Aristotle via inductive or deductive arguments?

Zipply, let's not misdirect our readers in thinking that deciding between "inductive or deductive" is the only factor to consider when engaging and deliberating over the nature of the justification of claims of truth or the nature of knowledge.

I think you know better than that, Zippy................................................................

For example, if we take one of Aristotle principles, "Every community is established with a view to some good," we can nitpick about how he arrived at such a universal principle. But unless one is a pure skeptic who does not believe in argument and knowledge, the principle must be treated as a knowledge claim that deserves consideration, just as his own principle claims deserve consideration. For Aristotle that principle is going to reduce to his psychological and ethical works, but for politics it is largely functioning as a premise.


And you're welcome to bring some of those sources to bear on your points.

It won't be just "some" ...

I do. The moderns were notoriously dismissive of Aristotle, mostly because he was tied up with late scholasticism. I don't know of Aristotelian scholars who think those appraisals are worth much. The paper quoted above, "The Nature and Origin of Ideas," is a good example of how far the era of Bacon was deviating from Aristotle, and how their novel ideas turned out to be less robust than was hoped, to say the least.


For me it's kind of like someone coming along and saying, "Hey Zippy! You need to let go of Jesus and update yourself with Immanuel Kant and religion within pure reason." I don't think newer is always better, and what are needed here are concrete arguments. If you think Aristotle's arguments against slavery show up his weak spots, then I expect that you will be able to explain why you think this. If you want a peek into a bit of that scholarship, then I would point you to, "Aristotle's Defensible Defense of Slavery," written by the same Aristotelian scholar who wrote the other article, Peter Simpson. He belongs to the same school as Groarke regarding the nature of Aristotle's induction.

The reason I said, "...Or if you don't want to [engage Aristotle on slavery], then fine, whatever," is because slavery represents a presupposition and even taboo in our culture, such that we are prone to believe that "Any argument in favor of slavery must be a bad argument." For that reason one can do an extrinsic dismissal of Aristotle's arguments, "Aristotle argued for slavery, therefore he gave bad arguments (for slavery)." But of course this approach has nothing to do with a serious appraisal of Aristotle's arguments, and that is in many ways the point at issue. We can perform extrinsic dismissals of Aristotle or the pre-moderns on the basis of what Lewis called chronological snobbery, but Templar and I don't accept this as a rational move. Note that it is this same sort of reasoning that justifies PH in his dismissal of, say, Paul where he has decided that Paul is outdated. A cavalier attitude towards ancient thinkers is the basic reason why no one takes religions seriously anymore, and for this reason I press people to try to actually engage ancient thought rather than simply dismiss it.

Damn it! I've explained myself plenty of times in the past. I get the sense no one is listening and all I see is doubling down and Dunning-Kruger forms of hand-waving among my fellow Christian brethren in order to remain "devoted" to selective aspects of ancient reasoning points that their favorite denominations harbor upon, many of which seem to be represented by failed attempts to argue via extended sorites in order to shore up their favorite denomination's sectarian doctrines and interpretations. No wonder that for almost 40 years I've always felt like I was kept as an outsider by other Christians, and unwelcome. You "fundamentalists" and "traditionalists" seem to go out of your way and take pain-staking measures to make sure that I know my epistemic place.

Trust me, Zippy. You don't want me to bring in my "additional sources"... for they are legion. (And it won't be 'demons' that you'll have to work against.)


... and yes, I will continue to have a "cavalier attitude" towards all thinkers of whatever age: Ancient, Modern or Contemporary. And frankly, I don't care what anyone thinks about it. If the Christian Faith is real, that is, if our Lord and Savior exists and sits on His Holy Throne, and His existence is not merely comprised of our attempted "truth claims" about Him and the qualities of the Reality He has placed us in, ........ then our Faith should survive regardless of the Church's failures or of my skeptical barrage of inquiries about it.

Since you obviously can't be fair with me, or with PH, I guess I'll just call this sham show for what it is. I tried. I've been trying for a very, very long time to extend courtesy to all fellow Trinitarian Christians. But you know, you fellow Christians make it too damned hard to connect and you make sure to hedge out all of those sticking points that you just don't what to deal with. Well, I don't do that.

And yes, the Earth DOES go round the sun. And science marches on, and has been marching on, beyond Aristotle (and beyond Aquinas), whatever his strengths happened to be. And what's more, it will continue to do so, for both Good and Evil.

 

[zippy2006]

Stop poisoning the well, Zippy! Please. Nowhere did I say anything indicating that I think natural inferences cannot be inductive.

I am trying to unpoison the well, and discover if there are any arguments hiding in these paragraphs you are writing. You said, <<It's not really clear [that he is using induction]; no, I think he's defaulting to one of deduction, particularly where he recognized that both slaves and masters are "people," but then goes on to delineate that we can discern that one is not the same as the other and by what he thinks are "natural" inferences.">>

Now if natural inferences can be inductive, then your claim here doesn't seem to hold together. Do you have an argument for why you think Aristotle is not using induction? If so, what is that argument?

Zipply, let's not misdirect our readers in thinking that deciding between "inductive or deductive" is the only factor to consider when engaging and deliberating over the nature of the justification of claims of truth or the nature of knowledge.

You are the one that keeps raising this strange dichotomy between induction and deduction, not me.

It won't be just "some" ...

Well right now we're at zero. I have provided three publicly-accessible documents from two sources (apart from general philosophical encyclopedias), and I think that is a useful and yet manageable number.

Damn it! I've explained myself plenty of times in the past. I get the sense no one is listening and all I see is doubling down and Dunning-Kruger forms of hand-waving among my fellow Christian brethren in order to remain "devoted" to selective aspects of ancient reasoning points that their favorite denominations harbor upon, many of which seem to be represented by failed attempts to argue via extended sorites in order to shore up their favorite denomination's sectarian doctrines and interpretations. No wonder that for almost 40 years I've always felt like I was kept as an outsider by other Christians, and unwelcome. You "fundamentalists" and "traditionalists" seem to go out of your way and take pain-staking measures to make sure that I know my epistemic place.

Let's see some real arguments here. Enough posturing and playing the victim. You can't just go in circles with non-arguments and non-sources. At some point you have to say something substantial. And as usual, this has nothing to do with denominations. That is yet another genetic fallacy on your part.

Trust me, Zippy. You don't want me to bring in my "additional sources"... for they are legion.

Yes, you keep saying that, and I keep waiting.

I tried.

Did you, though? As alluded to in #122, all you really have to do is explain why you think Aristotle's arguments for slavery are bad arguments. But you haven't done that.

And yes, the Earth DOES go round the sun. And science marches on, and has been marching on, beyond Aristotle (and beyond Aquinas), whatever his strengths happened to be.

Like I said, you've presented zero arguments and zero sources. At this point you seem to have nothing beyond the disdain for the past that Lewis highlighted. Do you actually think you are engaging Aristotle or presenting arguments? Do you actually think you have given anyone a substantial reason to believe you?

then our Faith should survive regardless of the Church's failures or of my skeptical barrage of inquiries about it.

I think our responsibility to the faith includes an intellectual responsibility. If we are going to promote chronological snobbery then we should not be surprised when that promotion leads to others abandoning the faith. The foundational events and documents of Christianity are pretty old, after all. If there is something beyond chronological snobbery at play, I'd love to see it, but I can only ask so many times. I will say that if you ever see me taking a crap on a philosopher you like to read, you can ask me for reasons and I will actually give you some.

(If another reply still yields no arguments then I will bow out of this conversation and wait for another day when everyone's personal situations are more conducive to rational dialogue.)

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I am trying to unpoison the well, and discover if there are any arguments hiding in these paragraphs you are writing. You said, <<It's not really clear [that he is using induction]; no, I think he's defaulting to one of deduction, particularly where he recognized that both slaves and masters are "people," but then goes on to delineate that we can discern that one is not the same as the other and by what he thinks are "natural" inferences.">>

Now if natural inferences can be inductive, then your claim here doesn't seem to hold together. Do you have an argument for why you think Aristotle is not using induction? If so, what is that argument?


You are the one that keeps raising this strange dichotomy between induction and deduction, not me.


Well right now we're at zero. I have provided three publicly-accessible documents from two sources (apart from general philosophical encyclopedias), and I think that is a useful and yet manageable number.


Let's see some real arguments here. Enough posturing and playing the victim. You can't just go in circles with non-arguments and non-sources. At some point you have to say something substantial. And as usual, this has nothing to do with denominations. That is yet another genetic fallacy on your part.


Yes, you keep saying that, and I keep waiting.


Did you, though? As alluded to in #122, all you really have to do is explain why you think Aristotle's arguments for slavery are bad arguments. But you haven't done that.


Like I said, you've presented zero arguments and zero sources. At this point you seem to have nothing beyond the disdain for the past that Lewis highlighted. Do you actually think you are engaging Aristotle or presenting arguments? Do you actually think you have given anyone a substantial reason to believe you?


I think our responsibility to the faith includes an intellectual responsibility. If we are going to promote chronological snobbery then we should not be surprised when that promotion leads to others abandoning the faith. The foundational events and documents of Christianity are pretty old, after all. If there is something beyond chronological snobbery at play, I'd love to see it, but I can only ask so many times. I will say that if you ever see me taking a crap on a philosopher you like to read, you can ask me for reasons and I will actually give you some.

(If another reply still yields no arguments then I will bow out of this conversation and wait for another day when everyone's personal situations are more conducive to rational dialogue.)

You can crap on as many of "my" philosophers (or theologians) as you like, Zippy. ..................... in fact, I've always wanted folks here to take up that challenge and do so. Crap away, good fellow!!!!!!!

As for subscribing to Aristotle, I would never, ever put all of my eggs into one basket. No, instead, I'd rather learn a little bit about the thinking of as many other philosophers, scientists and theologians as possible and.........................see what emerges.

I was going to continue on with an analysis of Aristotle's "Book I," but with all of your subroutining and misdirection and underlying goading I think it's become clear to me that you and I each come at our epistemic goals from different praxes, and we maybe even operate from different paradigms. If this is the case, I think we're just going to talk past each other and aggravate each other in the attempt to have a normal interlocution.

So, screw it.

And if you think that's "bad faith" on my part, so be it. The world will continue to orbit as it has and, as I suspect, will continue to do whether I observe it or not.

 

[zippy2006]

Leveraging a hermeneutical/perspectival approach in favor of anti-Arstotelianism is rather strange, and seems to forget that postmodernism is a reaction to modernism, not premodernism. Of course the missing middle term is arguably (liberal) Protestant polemics, directed against doctrinal Christianity. Although that is a possible middle term, this thread has been more a showcasing of inherited patterns of thinking and prejudicial bias than any kind of reasoned responses. A more serious approach would need to take into consideration the question of whether a hermeneutical/perspectival approach is even compatible with historic, doctrinal Christianity. For this question the opposition to Aristotle is highly pertinent. Those who seek to wed the common forms of moderate postmodernism to Christianity are initially focused on opposition to modernism, but fail to recognize that the roots of the hermeneutical/perspectival approach were directly opposed to historic, doctrinal Christianity. The hamfisted opposition to (a caricature of) Aristotle gives away the game, morphing into a less moderate form of postmodernism which inevitably ends up opposing Christianity for the very same reasons (i.e. both ancient traditions uphold non-perspectival truth claims). PH's pattern of thinking may therefore be more consistent even while at the same time being less conscious and studied. The tensions which Philo has internalized regarding the truth claims of Christianity and his preferred philosophical method do not much bother PH, who is much more comfortable abandoning those truth claims in favor of a similar method.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Leveraging a hermeneutical/perspectival approach in favor of anti-Arstotelianism is rather strange, and seems to forget that postmodernism is a reaction to modernism, not premodernism. Of course the missing middle term is arguably (liberal) Protestant polemics, directed against doctrinal Christianity. Although that is a possible middle term, this thread has been more a showcasing of inherited patterns of thinking and prejudicial bias than any kind of reasoned responses. A more serious approach would need to take into consideration the question of whether a hermeneutical/perspectival approach is even compatible with historic, doctrinal Christianity. For this question the opposition to Aristotle is highly pertinent. Those who seek to wed the common forms of moderate postmodernism to Christianity are initially focused on opposition to modernism, but fail to recognize that the roots of the hermeneutical/perspectival approach were directly opposed to historic, doctrinal Christianity. The hamfisted opposition to (a caricature of) Aristotle gives away the game, morphing into a less moderate form of postmodernism which inevitably ends up opposing Christianity for the very same reasons (i.e. both ancient traditions uphold non-perspectival truth claims). PH's pattern of thinking may therefore be more consistent even while at the same time being less conscious and studied. The tensions which Philo has internalized regarding the truth claims of Christianity and his preferred philosophical method do not much bother PH, who is much more comfortable abandoning those truth claims in favor of a similar method.

Somehow in all of that, I feel "excluded" .... I needed a good laugh today. Thank you, Zippy!

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Leveraging a hermeneutical/perspectival approach in favor of anti-Arstotelianism is rather strange, and seems to forget that postmodernism is a reaction to modernism, not premodernism. Of course the missing middle term is arguably (liberal) Protestant polemics, directed against doctrinal Christianity. Although that is a possible middle term, this thread has been more a showcasing of inherited patterns of thinking and prejudicial bias than any kind of reasoned responses. A more serious approach would need to take into consideration the question of whether a hermeneutical/perspectival approach is even compatible with historic, doctrinal Christianity. For this question the opposition to Aristotle is highly pertinent. Those who seek to wed the common forms of moderate postmodernism to Christianity are initially focused on opposition to modernism, but fail to recognize that the roots of the hermeneutical/perspectival approach were directly opposed to historic, doctrinal Christianity. The hamfisted opposition to (a caricature of) Aristotle gives away the game, morphing into a less moderate form of postmodernism which inevitably ends up opposing Christianity for the very same reasons (i.e. both ancient traditions uphold non-perspectival truth claims). PH's pattern of thinking may therefore be more consistent even while at the same time being less conscious and studied. The tensions which Philo has internalized regarding the truth claims of Christianity and his preferred philosophical method do not much bother PH, who is much more comfortable abandoning those truth claims in favor of a similar method.

So.....................what sort of response did you intend for this to be, Zippy? An accurate one?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Leveraging a hermeneutical/perspectival approach in favor of anti-Arstotelianism is rather strange, and seems to forget that postmodernism is a reaction to modernism, not premodernism. Of course the missing middle term is arguably (liberal) Protestant polemics, directed against doctrinal Christianity. Although that is a possible middle term, this thread has been more a showcasing of inherited patterns of thinking and prejudicial bias than any kind of reasoned responses. A more serious approach would need to take into consideration the question of whether a hermeneutical/perspectival approach is even compatible with historic, doctrinal Christianity. For this question the opposition to Aristotle is highly pertinent. Those who seek to wed the common forms of moderate postmodernism to Christianity are initially focused on opposition to modernism, but fail to recognize that the roots of the hermeneutical/perspectival approach were directly opposed to historic, doctrinal Christianity. The hamfisted opposition to (a caricature of) Aristotle gives away the game, morphing into a less moderate form of postmodernism which inevitably ends up opposing Christianity for the very same reasons (i.e. both ancient traditions uphold non-perspectival truth claims). PH's pattern of thinking may therefore be more consistent even while at the same time being less conscious and studied. The tensions which Philo has internalized regarding the truth claims of Christianity and his preferred philosophical method do not much bother PH, who is much more comfortable abandoning those truth claims in favor of a similar method.

Do you think Zippy was accurate in his assessment here on this, @public hermit?