The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism

[public hermit]

The following abridged version is from 1000wordphilosophy.com. For the full 1000 words see link at the bottom.

"In philosophy of mind, physicalism is the view that mental states, like beliefs, feelings and desires, are nothing over and above the physical states of the brain: we don’t have souls or any non-physical features, and so all facts about our minds are, at bottom, physical facts. Physicalism is the theory of mind that many argue is most consistent with a scientific understanding of the universe.

But imagine this:

Mary is a brilliant super-scientist who has never left her black-and-white room, in which she has never seen colors. She has complete physical knowledge, that is, scientific knowledge expressible in physical and functional terms, about human color vision from books and black-and-white television. So, she knows every physical fact about human color vision.

One day, however, she leaves the room and sees a red tomato (she knows that tomatoes are red). She exclaims “This is what it is like to see red! This is what people experience when they see red!”

Now, we have an argument against physicalism, known as the knowledge argument: Mary apparently learns a new fact about human color experience. But she already knew all the physical facts before she left her room. So, what she learns must be a non-physical fact. Since there are non-physical facts, physicalism is false.

Let’s consider four of the most prominent responses to this argument.

1. The Ability Hypothesis
According to the ability hypothesis, Mary does learn something when she sees red, however, what she learns is not a new fact, but it is know-how; she just acquires new cognitive abilities. Knowing what it is like to have a certain experience, on this view, consists in the possession of the abilities to recognize, imagine, and remember the relevant experience. If what Mary learns is just know-how, which doesn’t involve a new truth, then her pre-release knowledge can still be complete.

A problem with the ability hypothesis, however, is that Mary does seem to learn a new truth when she sees red, beyond mere know-how. When she says “This is what people experience when they see red!” she states a true belief, which she didn’t have before seeing a red tomato.

2. The Acquaintance Hypothesis
A similar response is that Mary doesn’t learn a new truth but she gains nonfactual acquaintance knowledge.

Suppose I ask you whether you know Oprah, and, as an answer, you give me some facts about her. But, then, I say “No, what I am asking is do you know her?” I am asking whether you know her personally. According to the acquaintance hypothesis, Mary comes to know what it is like to see red in this sense of “know.” To know what it is like to experience a mental state is just to experience that mental state. Then, of course, Mary cannot know what it is like to see red before she leaves the room, but this doesn’t mean that there were some facts that she didn’t know. It is possible to know all the facts about Oprah without knowing her personally, and it is possible to know all the facts about the red seeing experience without actually having that experience.

The acquaintance hypothesis, however, like the ability hypothesis, denies that Mary learns a new truth, so the above objection to the ability hypothesis can be raised against it also.

3. The Phenomenal Concept Strategy
According to this view, Mary’s new knowledge is about the physical facts that she already knows about. First-personal knowledge of experiences involves phenomenal concepts, concepts that directly denote subjective experiences, and phenomenal concepts can only be acquired by subjective experience.

When Mary sees red, she says, “This is what it is like to see red.” Let’s say physicalism is true and the experiential redness Mary is talking about is actually a physical property of the brain. Let’s call this physical property “R.” So, what Mary says is equivalent to this: “R is what it is like to see red.” “This” in her remark expresses a phenomenal concept. So, what Mary learns upon seeing red is not a new truth, but a new way of apprehending a physical truth that she already knew. By analogy, this is just like “Superman can fly” expressing the same fact as “Clark Kent can fly."

The main difficulty with the phenomenal concept strategy is to explain the nature of phenomenal concepts in completely physical terms, given that phenomenal concepts seem to involve subjective experiences from the first-person perspective.

4. The No Learning Objection
Some physicalists argue that the intuition that Mary learns something new upon seeing red is prima facie powerful only because we lack adequate understanding of what complete physical knowledge would be. According to them, even if we cannot see how, Mary would be able to deduce whatever fact is expressed by “this is what it is like to see red” from physical knowledge.

However, many physicalists disagree. They maintain that Mary learns something when she sees red for the first time and that, even though this is not a new truth, it is something new (either know-how or acquaintance knowledge or a phenomenal concept) that is not deducible from her physical knowledge.

5. Conclusion
The knowledge argument is one of the most influential arguments against physicalism. Explaining the nature of our subjective knowledge of our experiences in physical terms seems to be very difficult, and, simply put, the knowledge argument says this: if our experiences were physical, then explaining our knowledge of them wouldn’t be this difficult."

Any thoughts relevant to the arguments of this post?

The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism

 

[durangodawood]

Yeah, my current sense is that the experiencing-self is a new sort of thing, not fully explainable by the list of physical facts of its component parts.

The knowledge argument is pretty convincing. But we're overburdening it if we think it compels a soul-from-above theory.

 

[public hermit]

But we're overburdening it if we think it compels a soul-from-above theory.

I agree. I don't think it comes close to anything like that.

 

[durangodawood]

Flat Earth is currently beating Philosophy of Mind 39 to 3.

Depressing.

 

[Halbhh]

The following abridged version is from 1000wordphilosophy.com. For the full 1000 words see link at the bottom.

"In philosophy of mind, physicalism is the view that mental states, like beliefs, feelings and desires, are nothing over and above the physical states of the brain: we don’t have souls or any non-physical features, and so all facts about our minds are, at bottom, physical facts. Physicalism is the theory of mind that many argue is most consistent with a scientific understanding of the universe.

But imagine this:

Mary is a brilliant super-scientist who has never left her black-and-white room, in which she has never seen colors. She has complete physical knowledge, that is, scientific knowledge expressible in physical and functional terms, about human color vision from books and black-and-white television. So, she knows every physical fact about human color vision.

One day, however, she leaves the room and sees a red tomato (she knows that tomatoes are red). She exclaims “This is what it is like to see red! This is what people experience when they see red!”

Now, we have an argument against physicalism, known as the knowledge argument: Mary apparently learns a new fact about human color experience. But she already knew all the physical facts before she left her room. So, what she learns must be a non-physical fact. Since there are non-physical facts, physicalism is false.

Let’s consider four of the most prominent responses to this argument.

1. The Ability Hypothesis
According to the ability hypothesis, Mary does learn something when she sees red, however, what she learns is not a new fact, but it is know-how; she just acquires new cognitive abilities. Knowing what it is like to have a certain experience, on this view, consists in the possession of the abilities to recognize, imagine, and remember the relevant experience. If what Mary learns is just know-how, which doesn’t involve a new truth, then her pre-release knowledge can still be complete.

A problem with the ability hypothesis, however, is that Mary does seem to learn a new truth when she sees red, beyond mere know-how. When she says “This is what people experience when they see red!” she states a true belief, which she didn’t have before seeing a red tomato.

2. The Acquaintance Hypothesis
A similar response is that Mary doesn’t learn a new truth but she gains nonfactual acquaintance knowledge.

Suppose I ask you whether you know Oprah, and, as an answer, you give me some facts about her. But, then, I say “No, what I am asking is do you know her?” I am asking whether you know her personally. According to the acquaintance hypothesis, Mary comes to know what it is like to see red in this sense of “know.” To know what it is like to experience a mental state is just to experience that mental state. Then, of course, Mary cannot know what it is like to see red before she leaves the room, but this doesn’t mean that there were some facts that she didn’t know. It is possible to know all the facts about Oprah without knowing her personally, and it is possible to know all the facts about the red seeing experience without actually having that experience.

The acquaintance hypothesis, however, like the ability hypothesis, denies that Mary learns a new truth, so the above objection to the ability hypothesis can be raised against it also.

3. The Phenomenal Concept Strategy
According to this view, Mary’s new knowledge is about the physical facts that she already knows about. First-personal knowledge of experiences involves phenomenal concepts, concepts that directly denote subjective experiences, and phenomenal concepts can only be acquired by subjective experience.

When Mary sees red, she says, “This is what it is like to see red.” Let’s say physicalism is true and the experiential redness Mary is talking about is actually a physical property of the brain. Let’s call this physical property “R.” So, what Mary says is equivalent to this: “R is what it is like to see red.” “This” in her remark expresses a phenomenal concept. So, what Mary learns upon seeing red is not a new truth, but a new way of apprehending a physical truth that she already knew. By analogy, this is just like “Superman can fly” expressing the same fact as “Clark Kent can fly."

The main difficulty with the phenomenal concept strategy is to explain the nature of phenomenal concepts in completely physical terms, given that phenomenal concepts seem to involve subjective experiences from the first-person perspective.

4. The No Learning Objection
Some physicalists argue that the intuition that Mary learns something new upon seeing red is prima facie powerful only because we lack adequate understanding of what complete physical knowledge would be. According to them, even if we cannot see how, Mary would be able to deduce whatever fact is expressed by “this is what it is like to see red” from physical knowledge.

However, many physicalists disagree. They maintain that Mary learns something when she sees red for the first time and that, even though this is not a new truth, it is something new (either know-how or acquaintance knowledge or a phenomenal concept) that is not deducible from her physical knowledge.

5. Conclusion
The knowledge argument is one of the most influential arguments against physicalism. Explaining the nature of our subjective knowledge of our experiences in physical terms seems to be very difficult, and, simply put, the knowledge argument says this: if our experiences were physical, then explaining our knowledge of them wouldn’t be this difficult."

Any thoughts relevant to the arguments of this post?

The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism

Enjoyed reading this. Some thoughts, which may not even be relevant -- to me it seems not only that always our knowledge of anything is incomplete, but something much more profound: we never could know anything completely, in that the reality we are trying to represent in our minds is representing in a necessarily very partial way, because that reality is astronomical numbers of particles interacting, but were are of course reducing it vastly from what it is, necessarily. Illustration: if our eyes were 100 times the resolution they have, we'd seem a much more intricate and yet even more amazing experiential thing when we looked at something like a red flower. But even then, it would be a vast reduction from what is actually there as we understand by physics. And this is intrinsic to the brain, that it must vastly reduce the actual complexity into something much less (though on the other hand we shouldn't think in my view our representation in our minds is somehow meaningless, because...first, it's experience, and 2nd, the neurons interacting themselves do have a vast level of possibly complexity also, so that they can have complex experience. And then to top all of this off, in quantum mechanics we get the idea that physically we the observer and that flower are affecting each other physically, also. So, life is fun.

 

[public hermit]

Enjoyed reading this. Some thoughts, which may not even be relevant -- to me it seems not only that always our knowledge of anything is incomplete, but something much more profound: we never could know anything completely, in that the reality we are trying to represent in our minds is representing in a necessarily very partial way, because that reality is astronomical numbers of particles interacting, but were are of course reducing it vastly from what it is, necessarily. Illustration: if our eyes were 100 times the resolution they have, we'd seem a much more intricate and yet even more amazing experiential thing when we looked at something like a red flower. But even then, it would be a vast reduction from what is actually there as we understand by physics. And this is intrinsic to the brain, that it must vastly reduce the actual complexity into something much less (though on the other hand we shouldn't think in my view our representation in our minds is somehow meaningless, because...first, it's experience, and 2nd, the neurons interacting themselves do have a vast level of possibly complexity also, so that they can have complex experience. And then to top all of this off, in quantum mechanics we get the idea that physically we the observer and that flower are affecting each other physically, also. So, life is fun.

This is an interesting approach. The Knowledge Argument says that Mary (super-scientist) learned something new when she saw red, something her scientific understanding of human seeing could not have given her. What I hear you saying is, she doesn't actually see all there is (potentially) to see.

Still, is her seeing the color red something new she has learned, something her knowledge of physical properties and such can't deliver to her, even if seeing red is a vast reduction from what is actually there? Keep in mind, the cash value of the thought experiment is that it (supposedly) shows that her experience cannot be reduced to the physical properties of what is being experience. And, I take it, this might still hold true even if her experience of seeing red doesn't take in the whole of what is physically there. Does that make sense?

 

[Halbhh]

Still, is her seeing the color red something new she has learned, something her knowledge of physical properties and such can't deliver to her, even if seeing red is a vast reduction from what is actually there? Keep in mind, the cash value of the thought experiment is that it (supposedly) shows that her experience cannot be reduced to the physical properties of what is being experience.

I think so. Because on the one hand the knowledge ahead of time would be various valuable reductions -- example: suppose one gathered 100% of all current human understanding related in every kind of manner to that flower, including even quantum mechanics, and so on, along with all the rest, the botany, the color theory, and etc., and then let's imagine future knowledge added also, and then a sum total of all that knowledge of all kinds... Ok, this is knowledge about the flower, abstract.

(Is there a non-abstract knowledge? Perhaps by looking at pictures of flowers ahead of time, or smelling ahead of time, etc., but is that kind of thing even in this experiment?)

Ok, abstract stuff.

Or...even with pictures ahead of time, still this conclusion in my view:

Next, she goes out and experiences the flower, and that's more complex than all of that knowledge (I think), in that the flower changes her (the experience changes her). And she is complex, and that change of her is complex.

Now, she's no longer the same person. Even something like how she thinks or how she sings is likely to have been changed. ( The universe has changed )

 

[durangodawood]

This is an interesting approach. The Knowledge Argument says that Mary (super-scientist) learned something new when she saw red, something her scientific understanding of human seeing could not have given her. What I hear you saying is, she doesn't actually see all there is (potentially) to see.

Still, is her seeing the color red something new she has learned, something her knowledge of physical properties and such can't deliver to her, even if seeing red is a vast reduction from what is actually there? Keep in mind, the cash value of the thought experiment is that it (supposedly) shows that her experience cannot be reduced to the physical properties of what is being experience. And, I take it, this might still hold true even if her experience of seeing red doesn't take in the whole of what is physically there. Does that make sense?

I'm not at all sure that facts and experiences belong in the same category. So this "phenomenal concept" idea makes some sense, although I'm not seeing why we couldnt save a few letters and just call it "experience".

Then the objection pops up: The main difficulty with the phenomenal concept strategy is to explain the nature of phenomenal concepts in completely physical terms, given that phenomenal concepts seem to involve subjective experiences from the first-person perspective.

I dont think the difficulty should totally scare us off tho. Why should we assume our current state of knowledge about brain/mind is definitive? Seems like we need a new fallacy: "the argument from assumed mastery", or something.

 

[Halbhh]

I'm not at all sure that facts and experiences belong in the same category. So this "phenomenal concept" idea makes some sense, although I'm not seeing why we couldnt save a few letters and just call it "experience".

Then the objection pops up: The main difficulty with the phenomenal concept strategy is to explain the nature of phenomenal concepts in completely physical terms, given that phenomenal concepts seem to involve subjective experiences from the first-person perspective.

I dont think the difficulty should totally scare us off tho. Why should we assume our current state of knowledge about brain/mind is definitive? Seems like we need a new fallacy: "the argument from assumed mastery", or something.

And there is the 64 million dollar question: is consciousness entirely physical alone? My own speculative guess is no in a sense, there is a component of it I speculate that isn't physical in any manner we currently know (though could be physical (that is under some unknown laws of physics) in some manner that is knowable somehow to some other being, namely God). Well, this may be a distinction without a difference, to me, thinking on it just now -- if there is a component of consciousness from another type of reality than our ordinary physics here we know, then as long as that other component is also governed by its own rules of its own nature, then that's a 'physics' of a kind, even if for instance it was something far out, like from another reality not contained inside this current universe, just to illustrate.

 

[public hermit]

Why should we assume our current state of knowledge about brain/mind is definitive?

So, the assumption is that Mary has complete physical knowledge, "that is, scientific knowledge expressible in physical and functional terms." Presumably this is not our current state of knowledge. Whatever is lacking in our current state of knowledge, Mary knows. Nonetheless, what does that mean? Well, we don't know. As we think about Mary's situation, one of complete physical knowledge, we can't help but think about in terms of our current state of knowledge, which just so happens can't give an account, just yet. So your objection has some force, I think.

What would it mean to give an account of seeing red in completely physical terms? Let's say we had a complete account, in physical terms, of seeing red. Could we take someone born blind, give them the account, and they would then have the experience of seeing red? It's hard to "see" how. The only way to have the experience of seeing red is to experience it.

I'm not sure what this all amounts to, to be honest. Maybe we will never be able to give someone the experience of seeing red by giving them a complete physical account. That doesn't necessarily mean that the experience isn't explicable in physical terms. And yet, there would always be the experience, which is not the explanation. Kind of like Thomas Nagel's What Is It Like To Be A Bat? No matter how much we know about the physical underpinning of any given subjective phenomena, the experience is not identical to the account. What does that mean? Honestly, I'm not sure.

 

[public hermit]

Well, this may be a distinction without a difference, to me, thinking on it just now -- if there is a component of consciousness from another type of reality than our ordinary physics here we know, then as long as that other component is also governed by its own rules of its own nature, then that's a 'physics' of a kind, even if for instance it was something far out, like from another reality not contained inside this current universe, just to illustrate.

Let's assume consciousness has a "physics" of its own nature that is not the usual physical physics with which we are accustomed. If this is the case, and if it is somehow discoverable by us, then we will have to start thinking outside the box to find it. I don't know what that means. But, I am thinking someone like Einstein will have to come along with an intuition that takes us in a direction we have heretofore not imagined. I have no doubt that is possible (logically speaking).

 

[public hermit]

I realize that I should have stated at the outset that my purpose in bringing this topic up is not apologetic. I am not trying to make room for some Cartesian dualism. I am truly interested in this topic as a philosopher. I'll admit that I am not convinced by the physicalist/materialist position. But. I will also admit that I am not sure what viable options are left if physicalism is not true, philosophically speaking. Whatever the case, I promise my intention in trying to have these kinds of discussions is not so I can turn around and say, "See, I told you the answer was Jesus!" All this to say...

Please open up the Philosophy Forum.

 

[Tanj]

So, she knows every physical fact about human color vision.

This is false/invalid. There's nothing in physicalism that denies the need for empirical sampling for understanding. The cognitive realization of experiencing light at 620–750 nm wavelengths is just as much a part of the physical world as everything else.

The rest of the post is thus invalidated because of this falsehood.

 

[essentialsaltes]

But imagine this:

Mary is a brilliant super-scientist who has never left her black-and-white room, in which she has never seen colors. She has complete physical knowledge, that is, scientific knowledge expressible in physical and functional terms, about human color vision from books and black-and-white television. So, she knows every physical fact about human color vision.

One day, however, she leaves the room and sees a red tomato (she knows that tomatoes are red). She exclaims

"Yep, that's what my perfect knowledge has led me to expect."

Honestly, the OP presents a rotten argument that begs the question.

 

[public hermit]

"Yep, that's what my perfect knowledge has led me to expect."

Sarcasm? That comes across as a crutch one uses when they are at a loss for a way to meaningfully engage. Or, maybe it comes from one who is simply mean spirited. Whatever the case, it is duly noted.

Honestly, the OP presents a rotten argument that begs the question.

I tend to think the name "Knowledge Argument" is a misnomer. It is a thought exercise. Thought exercises are generated to isolate a particular feature in order to highlight certain intuitions. To use a phrase from Daniel Dennett, it is an "intuition pump." Thought exercises, by and large, are going to be unrealistic due to the fact the features they attempt to isolate are hardly ever so clear in our day-to-day experience. This particular exercise hopes to highlight the intuition that experience of qualia is not wholly explicable by the physical properties behind the experience.

If you hold that the thought exercise begs the question then maybe you agree with The No Learning Objection? Given your response I won't assume you read the whole post. Here is the objection:

"Some physicalists argue that the intuition that Mary learns something new upon seeing red is prima facie powerful only because we lack adequate understanding of what complete physical knowledge would be. According to them, even if we cannot see how, Mary would be able to deduce whatever fact is expressed by “this is what it is like to see red” from physical knowledge.

However, many physicalists disagree. They maintain that Mary learns something when she sees red for the first time and that, even though this is not a new truth, it is something new (either know-how or acquaintance knowledge or a phenomenal concept) that is not deducible from her physical knowledge."

Do you hold that, given a complete physical account, Mary would be able to deduce the experience of seeing red? This is not an uncommon assumption. This is a primary assumption of physicalism, in general. It is like the "God of the gaps" argument that theists will too often promote, except this is the physicalist's version. If you are a physicalist, then chances are you make this very assumption. If you don't assume as much, then how would you frame our experience of qualia?

I realize that any argument, or thought exercise, that is used against physicalism is not going to be favored by those who embrace physicalism. But, your hasty rejection without engagement is contrary to the long history (over 30 years) and fruitful discussion this particular exercise has enjoyed by both those who embrace physicalism and those who do not.

https://www.iep.utm.edu/know-arg/

 

[Bungle_Bear]

The following abridged version is from 1000wordphilosophy.com. For the full 1000 words see link at the bottom.

"In philosophy of mind, physicalism is the view that mental states, like beliefs, feelings and desires, are nothing over and above the physical states of the brain: we don’t have souls or any non-physical features, and so all facts about our minds are, at bottom, physical facts. Physicalism is the theory of mind that many argue is most consistent with a scientific understanding of the universe.

But imagine this:

Mary is a brilliant super-scientist who has never left her black-and-white room, in which she has never seen colors. She has complete physical knowledge, that is, scientific knowledge expressible in physical and functional terms, about human color vision from books and black-and-white television. So, she knows every physical fact about human color vision.

One day, however, she leaves the room and sees a red tomato (she knows that tomatoes are red). She exclaims “This is what it is like to see red! This is what people experience when they see red!”

Now, we have an argument against physicalism, known as the knowledge argument: Mary apparently learns a new fact about human color experience. But she already knew all the physical facts before she left her room. So, what she learns must be a non-physical fact. Since there are non-physical facts, physicalism is false.

We don't all perceive colour the same, so there cannot be a single physical state for such perception. Mary's "complete physical knowledge" leaves her with a number of possible physical states. Only by experiencing the state that applies to herself can she learn what that state is. It's still a physical fact, but she now knows which of the possible physical facts apply to herself.

 

[public hermit]

We don't all perceive colour the same, so there cannot be a single physical state for such perception. Mary's "complete physical knowledge" leaves her with a number of possible physical states. Only by experiencing the state that applies to herself can she learn what that state is. It's still a physical fact, but she now knows which of the possible physical facts apply to herself.

This is a fascinating observation. I hadn't considered this, but you're right, we don't all perceive colour the same. If Mary is colour-blind, then her experience of perceiving red will be different from mine. And, there is a different physical fact that explains her difference in perception (presumably something in Mary's cognitive equipment).

Even so, if Mary had the requisite knowledge of the physical state appropriate to her, she still wouldn't know the experience prior to having the experience. She would have the appropriate physical knowledge, but not the experience. There is something about her experience that is unique to that experience, no matter how much she knows about the mechanism behind the experience.

 

[durangodawood]

This is false/invalid. There's nothing in physicalism that denies the need for empirical sampling for understanding. The cognitive realization of experiencing light at 620–750 nm wavelengths is just as much a part of the physical world as everything else.

The rest of the post is thus invalidated because of this falsehood.

I think there's something to this.

Perhaps the confusion is that cognitive realization is not a transmissible physical fact.

So when the thought experiment says "she knows every physical fact about human color vision", youre saying she just knows the transmissible ones.... while the cognitive realization of experiencing red is a private physical fact, right?

 

[essentialsaltes]

Sarcasm?

No, just an honest response. If she knows everything there is to know about color, vision, and its effects on the human brain -- not just everything that we now know, but "complete physical knowledge" -- then there is no reason to assume without proof (begging the question) that she would learn anything from her experience.

To use a phrase from Daniel Dennett, it is an "intuition pump."

Dennett thinks it's a lousy one too. (You may detect some sarcasm in Robinson's description of Dennett's views. This comes across as a crutch one uses when they are at a loss for a way to meaningfully engage. Or, maybe it comes from one who is simply mean spirited. Whatever the case, you should duly note it.)

Do you hold that, given a complete physical account, Mary would be able to deduce the experience of seeing red? This is not an uncommon assumption.

It is certainly possible, and the story as usually told does not allow for this possibility. It begs the question, assuming its conclusion is the only possible one without providing any actual argument.

 

[public hermit]

....

It is certainly possible

It is possible, I agree. A lot of things are possible, broadly speaking. As things stand, none of the knowledge we currently have of the physical can provide us with the phenomenal experience we know so intimately. So, at best, it is highly improbable that any future knowledge of the physical mechanisms behind our experience will do this. I honestly don't know what to do with that, except conclude something is missing. Things may change, but as things stand that is the conclusion I come to.