The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism

[public hermit]

I don't think such a thing is possible.

David Chalmers argues that a zombie world is logically conceivable. If such a world is conceivable, then it is metaphysically possible. If it is metaphysically possible, then physicalism is false. His argument assumes that if physicalism is true (every physical effect has a physical cause) then the physical world is closed under causation.
Per Wiki:

1. According to physicalism, all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical.
2. Thus, if physicalism is true, a metaphysically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular, conscious experience must exist in such a possible world.
3. In fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this it follows that such a world is metaphysically possible.
4. Therefore, physicalism is false.

One argument against Chalmers is that if two worlds are physically identical (and given causal closure of the physical world), then consciousness will necessarily arise in both worlds. But, that simply assumes physicalism (epiphenomenalism). Another approach is to argue that logical conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility. Whatever the case, both sides are firmly entrenched and the zombie arguments haven't done anything to mitigate that.

Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia
Zombies (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

I don't think such a thing is possible. Basically this is a term that assumes for its meaning the thing it's trying to prove.

They're not intended to be possible, but conceivable, as a prompt to consider the relationship between consciousness and behaviour. Similarly, Searle's Chinese Room argument is a hypothetical way of exploring what is involved in understanding.

To rebut arguments involving philosophical zombies or the Chinese Room, you need to consider why the arguments are flawed, e.g. is conscious experience necessary for human-like behaviour, and if so, why? and does the Chinese Room understand Mandarin, and if so, why is the argument that it doesn't flawed?

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

David Chalmers argues that a zombie world is logically conceivable. If such a world is conceivable, then it is metaphysically possible. If it is metaphysically possible, then physicalism is false. His argument assumes that if physicalism is true (every physical effect has a physical cause) then the physical world is closed under causation.
Per Wiki:

1. According to physicalism, all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical.
2. Thus, if physicalism is true, a metaphysically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular, conscious experience must exist in such a possible world.
3. In fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this it follows that such a world is metaphysically possible.
4. Therefore, physicalism is false.

One argument against Chalmers is that if two worlds are physically identical (and given causal closure of the physical world), then consciousness will necessarily arise in both worlds. But, that simply assumes physicalism (epiphenomenalism). Another approach is to argue that logical conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility. Whatever the case, both sides are firmly entrenched and the zombie arguments haven't done anything to mitigate that.

Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia
Zombies (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Nice summary!

Not sure how 3 is logically conceivable without begging the question; i.e. it's only logically conceivable if physicalism is false.

 

[public hermit]

Not sure how 3 is logically conceivable without begging the question; i.e. it's only logically conceivable if physicalism is false.

I agree. But, logical conceivability allows for some strange possibilities if one is employing modal logic. Again from Chalmers, "For example, it seems conceivable that an object could travel faster than a billion meters per second. This hypothesis is physically and naturally impossible, because it contradicts the laws of physics and the laws of nature. This case may be metaphysically possible, however, since there might well be metaphysically possible worlds with different laws."

And, I would think metaphysical possibility could hinge on whether one is committed to concrete possible worlds (David Lewis) or simply ersatz possible worlds (virtually everybody else). At any rate, Chalmers published a paper on this very issue of conceivability and the move from there to metaphysical possibility, if you're interested.

Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

I agree. But, logical conceivability allows for some strange possibilities if one is employing modal logic. Again from Chalmers, "For example, it seems conceivable that an object could travel faster than a billion meters per second. This hypothesis is physically and naturally impossible, because it contradicts the laws of physics and the laws of nature. This case may be metaphysically possible, however, since there might well be metaphysically possible worlds with different laws."

And, I would think metaphysical possibility could hinge on whether one is committed to concrete possible worlds (David Lewis) or simply ersatz possible worlds (virtually everybody else). At any rate, Chalmers published a paper on this very issue of conceivability and the move from there to metaphysical possibility, if you're interested.

Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?

Thanks for that; these ideas are interesting (when one's in the mood) in that they often trigger intuitive agreement or objection, but the reasoned argument to support the intuition is unclear...

 

[Bungle_Bear]

Nm

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I think if you have a neurological zombie you have instant issues with semantics - why would a zombie claim to be conscious, what would it mean to a zombie to say such and such?

Alternatively, if the semantics are identical to normal human usage, then the very idea of "zombie" fails. Almost absolutely.

Its claim to be conscious would have to be intended. Intended consicously, to have the same semantic sense. Otherwise it would just be lucky babble, like a Monkey at a typewriter writing about Marys Room.

Its modally possible (i.e. imaginable) and such a zombie would be empirically equivalent to a conscious human - but its a unlikely scenario. I mean. The best explanation for philosophy literature is philosophising, not random fluctuations in the multiverse of possibilities.

Its more likely a human wrote this than the tide.

This has to do with entropy. Perhaps? And maybe Quantum Mechanics. IMO, QM particles search for the path of least resistance, which leads to gradual entropy on the macro-scale, and an orderly cosmos describable by physical laws. With no "sudden wierdness" on the macro-scale.

Because humans are far from thermodynamic equilibrium, far from mere dust, like pockets of low entropy, then its explicable that we can type about Shakespeare, philosophy etc. in a non-random manner. Id est: we have minds, intellects, consciousness.

That's the best explanation to us. Which relates back to the idea of paths of least resistance (to an idea), gradual entropy (we observe orderly passage of time) and even the flow of time itself (as transition and change, but a orderly one).

Now, you could be a zombie, to an external observer, but given what we know about the universe, its more likely you're conscious like me. We live in an orderly universe.

And "youre conscious" is the most orderly answer. If I don't presume it, I can hit you without moral wrong. But I get hit back. Now then, there we have a path of resistance for sure! Beware of treating others as zombies, because whatever the case they fight back.

Therefore the normal solution, that you're conscious, too, preserves my thermodynamic disequilibrium. And yours.

Nature more or less forces a move.

This general that were all consicous brings up hints of Descartes evil genius, dream like illusion scenarios, Boltzmann's brains and other "sceptical alternatives" to scientific realism. They're empirically equivalent to the observed world, but they have lower probability when we presume science to be accurate.

Then, tho, we must have some link between brain and consciousness. Because that's where the science takes us. For that link to be there linguistically but not ontiologically (as in a zombie claiming to be consicous) - that would be a sudden weirdness.

An soo sooo sooo unlikely entropic shift on the macroscale. A miracle of sorts. Something bizarre. An idea to be resisted.

Also, the Turing Test is similar. If an AI (artificial intelligence) can fool a human into thinking its humanly intelligent, what would a AC (artificial consciousness) have to do to indicate its humanly conscious....
....IMO, in part of a test, it would have to be able to use the term "consciousness" as fluently as we do.

"I could be a zombie in a chimp suit, just randomly hitting the keys, but its more likely I'm a human in fancy dress..."

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

I think if you have a neurological zombie you have instant issues with semantics - why would a zombie claim to be conscious, what would it mean to a zombie to say such and such?

That's not a problem. A p-zombie says it is conscious as a machine-like response, a result of complex information processing. What it says has no experiential meaning for it because it has no conscious experience, by definition.

Its claim to be conscious would have to be intended. Intended consicously, to have the same semantic sense. Otherwise it would just be lucky babble, like a Monkey at a typewriter writing about Marys Room.

That's a false dichotomy in this case - the p-zombie is configured so that it responds in a human-like way; whether that configuration is a result of intent or accident is irrelevant. IOW, never mind the hows and whys.

Its modally possible (i.e. imaginable) and such a zombie would be empirically equivalent to a conscious human - but its a unlikely scenario.

Whether it's likely or not is irrelevant. I suspect many philosophers think it's no more possible than Searle's Chinese Room, but the question is whether there is a reasoned argument against the idea of a system that is behaviourally indistinguishable from a human but has no conscious experience.

This has to do with entropy. Perhaps? And maybe Quantum Mechanics. IMO, QM particles search for the path of least resistance, which leads to gradual entropy on the macro-scale, and an orderly cosmos describable by physical laws. With no "sudden wierdness" on the macro-scale.

That makes no sense at all to me. QM particles follow the Schrodinger equation, the increase in entropy is a statistical phenomenon predicated on the Past Hypothesis (a low-entropy boundary condition in the past).

 

[GrowingSmaller]

The First International Convention on Zombie Rights - brought to you in association with Maxwell's Demon:

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Its claim to be conscious would have to be intended. Intended consicously, to have the same semantic sense. Otherwise it would just be lucky babble, like a Monkey at a typewriter writing about Marys Room.

That's a false dichotomy in this case - the p-zombie is configured so that it responds in a human-like way; whether that configuration is a result of intent or accident is irrelevant. IOW, never mind the hows and whys.

But its not human like. If it were, then we would have to dispute the relationship between brain and consciousness. If a p-zombies "c-fibres" fire when its not in fact conscious, then its not human like.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

This has to do with entropy. Perhaps? And maybe Quantum Mechanics. IMO, QM particles search for the path of least resistance, which leads to gradual entropy on the macro-scale, and an orderly cosmos describable by physical laws. With no "sudden wierdness" on the macro-scale.

That makes no sense at all to me. QM particles follow the Schrodinger equation, the increase in entropy is a statistical phenomenon predicated on the Past Hypothesis (a low-entropy boundary condition in the past).

Hey I've gotten hold of someone who knows about QM!

AFAIK on the macro scale the arrow of time is to do with thermodynamic entropy. What I am thinking is that if that emerges from microscale behaviours (or atoms, or partices) then they must follow certain rules too. Like, atoms don't act so as to create macroscale anomalies, because their micro behaviour is regular. If in a gas diffusion experiment, the diffusing gas suddenly wrote the letters of the alphabet, then would be anomalous. An anomaly due to ultimately microscale activities.

So the inference I have is if the macroscale is an orderly progress to entropy, then on the microscale there must be a reflection of this. No sudden collective madness. But a plain old march onwards.

This fits into the zombie scenario, because on the macroscale we have an orderly universe. Constants. Laws. Uniformity of nature. This must IMO stem from microscale events, because these laws etc are part of the nature of the flow of time, and therefore related to entropy and thermodynamics.

A p-zombe would be like those letters in a gas diffusion experiment, a thermodynamic anomaly or miracle so weird, its not that likely at all.

So, part of the argument for "I'm not a zombie, but conscious" comes from physics. A p-zombie would be a breach of uniformity.

Now, brainstorming again, could there be a relationship between p-zombies, humans and wave function collapse?

If consciousness or measurement creates a path for a particle, in that 'taking a reading' make a path 100% likely, and others not so, then maybe that's a reason the wave disappears. So our minds are measurement devices, and zombies are anomalous precisely because our conscious reading creates a perspective from which we relate to the universe. We are 'dipped into' the universe where consciousness occurs, and consciousness collapses the wave, and therefore the normality of the physical universe is assembled, its an artefact of observation, just as the particle when observed behaves more normally.

OTOH a p-zombie would NOT have a "world of lived experience" to relate to, not being conscious.

A p-zombe is a rare case, because we observe from a part of the bell curve (i.e the darker blue area in the bell curve below) from the angle of the possibilities where consciousness occurs, and where consciousness occurs the wave is normalised (leading to the arrow of time, constants etc).

Or, maybe its vice versa. We live in a world where the universe's path is normalised, on average, and emerges form waves upon waves of particles averaging out into a space-time continuum. No need for consciousness to create things, they're normalised anyway.

And this comes hand in hand with physical constants and regularities, and its in that zone only, the "lawful zone", there it becomes possible that evolution, gravity and consciousness etc. occur?

So its like an allusion to the anthropic principle idea. We aren't in a world of p-zombies because appearances depend on ones point of reference, and ours is as conscious entities...and.... as such... were nestled in the zone of uniformity, constants, laws of physics etc. which themselves "urge" us towards everyday conclusions.


Its possible I could fly, but I'm not trying it. Its possible I could be dreaming, but I'm not walking through any walls.

So philosophical anomalies (we're dreaming, I'm a zombie etc.) may be akin to thermodynamic anomalies. And these potential anomalies are the intellectual counterpart of physics mysteries, like quantum waves, the multiverse of possibilities etc. where maybe I could in fact be dreaming after all. Some kind of structural connection between unfalsifiable ideas, and them there physical components of reality.

zombies ...... normalities .............zombies
miracles........lawful zone...........miracles
philosophy.......science...............philosophy
untestable.....observables..........untestable

So also there is a parallel between normality and abnormality, and potential directions in genetic evolution. Shift away from "normal analysis" (science, uniformity of nature, the red line zone) is dependent on environmental pressures, just like new observables can lead to a change(s) in theory too. So a shift in ones epistemic logic towards scepticism, changing interpretation of data, may lead to a shift from science to philosophy.

So, "climate chance" from scientific realism to philosophical scepticism, is a parallel of biological processes...

These are more random thoughts tho, brainstorming.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Hey I've gotten hold of someone who knows about QM!

AFAIK on the macro scale the arrow of time is to do with thermodynamic entropy. What I am thinking is that if that emerges from microscale behaviours (or atoms, or partices) then they must follow certain rules too. Like, atoms don't act so as to create macroscale anomalies, because their micro behaviour is regular. If in a gas diffusion experiment, the diffusing gas suddenly wrote the letters of the alphabet, then would be anomalous. An anomaly due to ultimately microscale activities.

So the inference I have is if the macroscale is an orderly progress to entropy, then on the microscale there must be a reflection of this. No sudden collective madness. But a plain old march onwards.

This fits into the zombie scenario, because on the macroscale we have an orderly universe. Constants. Laws. Uniformity of nature. This must IMO stem from microscale events, because these laws etc are part of the nature of the flow of time, and therefore related to entropy and thermodynamics.

A p-zombe would be like those letters in a gas diffusion experiment, a thermodynamic anomaly or miracle so weird, its not that likely at all.

So, part of the argument for "I'm not a zombie, but conscious" comes from physics. A p-zombie would be a breach of uniformity.

Now, brainstorming again, could there be a relationship between p-zombies, humans and wave function collapse?

If consciousness or measurement creates a path for a particle, in that 'taking a reading' make a path 100% likely, and others not so, then maybe that's a reason the wave disappears. So our minds are measurement devices, and zombies are anomalous precisely because our conscious reading creates a perspective from which we relate to the universe. We are 'dipped into' the universe where consciousness occurs, and consciousness collapses the wave, and therefore the normality of the physical universe is assembled, its an artefact of observation, just as the particle when observed behaves more normally.

OTOH a p-zombie would NOT have a "world of lived experience" to relate to, not being conscious.

A p-zombe is a rare case, because we observe from a part of the bell curve (i.e the darker blue area in the bell curve below) from the angle of the possibilities where consciousness occurs, and where consciousness occurs the wave is normalised (leading to the arrow of time, constants etc).

Or, maybe its vice versa. We live in a world where the universe's path is normalised, on average, and emerges form waves upon waves of particles averaging out into a space-time continuum. No need for consciousness to create things, they're normalised anyway.

And this comes hand in hand with physical constants and regularities, and its in that zone only, the "lawful zone", there it becomes possible that evolution, gravity and consciousness etc. occur?

So its like an allusion to the anthropic principle idea. We aren't in a world of p-zombies because appearances depend on ones point of reference, and ours is as conscious entities...and.... as such... were nestled in the zone of uniformity, constants, laws of physics etc. which themselves "urge" us towards everyday conclusions.


Its possible I could fly, but I'm not trying it. Its possible I could be dreaming, but I'm not walking through any walls.

So philosophical anomalies (we're dreaming, I'm a zombie etc.) may be akin to thermodynamic anomalies. And these potential anomalies are the intellectual counterpart of physics mysteries, like quantum waves, the multiverse of possibilities etc. where maybe I could in fact be dreaming after all. Some kind of structural connection between unfalsifiable ideas, and them there physical components of reality.

zombies ...... normalities .............zombies
miracles........lawful zone...........miracles
philosophy.......science...............philosophy
untestable.....observables..........untestable

So also there is a parallel between normality and abnormality, and potential directions in genetic evolution. Shift away from "normal analysis" (science, uniformity of nature, the red line zone) is dependent on environmental pressures, just like new observables can lead to a change(s) in theory too. So a shift in ones epistemic logic towards scepticism, changing interpretation of data, may lead to a shift from science to philosophy.

So, "climate chance" from scientific realism to philosophical scepticism, is a parallel of biological processes...

These are more random thoughts tho, brainstorming.

Just no. A p-zombie is a philosophical hypothetical, a what-if?, a thought experiment, a counterfactual intuition pump for a specific philosophical domain. It's not real or intended to be real.

The rest of your stream-of-consciousness is too disjointed & confused for me to comment.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

But its not human like. If it were, then we would have to dispute the relationship between brain and consciousness. If a p-zombies "c-fibres" fire when its not in fact conscious, then its not human like.

One purpose of p-zombies is to dispute the relationship between brain and consciousness.

The behaviour, i.e. all observable aspects, of a p-zombie are identical to a normal human - but it does not have conscious experience or awareness, so there is nothing it is like to be a p-zombie; that is the only respect in which it is not human-like.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

A question to ask, when talking about p-zombies, is what happens when you ask them about their conscious experience, awareness, qualia, etc. (which, by definition, they don't really have). They must respond that they do have those things, and they must be able to describe them as well as any human, in all situations.

Since they can't have a list of the experiential content of all possible situation, they must have an algorithm that can tell them what it is plausibly like to have conscious experience in any given situation; and knowing what it is like to be in a particular situation, is, itself, suspiciously close to a popular definition of consciousness...

 

[public hermit]

Since they can't have a list of the experiential content of all possible situation, they must have an algorithm that can tell them what it is plausibly like to have conscious experience in any given situation; and knowing what it is like to be in a particular situation, is, itself, suspiciously close to a popular definition of consciousness...

You're right, what it is like is something of a definition of consciousness. Hmm. What is the take away if the p-zombies can always give plausible answers to various well-asked questions regarding their (non-existent) conscious experience? A computer that tells me what it is like to have awareness, due to the deliverances of an algorithm, doesn't entail that it has awareness. It's simply operating according to a function. Or, is that the point that consciousness is merely a function?

This brings to mind Nagel's "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" If someone asks a chiropterologist questions about bat experience, and she always answers all the questions plausibly, it still doesn't entail that she knows what it is like to be a bat. Obviously, she is not a bat. But if she can give all the plausible answers, and fully understands the science behind her answers, does that mean she knows the experience?

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

You're right, what it is like is something of a definition of consciousness. Hmm. What is the take away if the p-zombies can always give plausible answers to various well-asked questions regarding their (non-existent) conscious experience? A computer that tells me what it is like to have awareness, due to the deliverances of an algorithm, doesn't entail that it has awareness. It's simply operating according to a function. Or, is that the point that consciousness is merely a function?

The question I ask myself is how could any system show appropriate behaviours and give plausible descriptions of what it is like to experience some situation, emotion, mental state, or quale in any and all situations, without actually experiencing them?

It seems to me that this is implausible and that such a system must be doing what we do, i.e. having conscious experience. I guess this could be called a functionalist or behaviourist approach, but there's no alternative for judging consciousness... I don't currently have a reasoned argument for why I find it implausible, but one aspect is that our own consciousness is not what it seems to be (subjectively) - as Dennett says, it's 'a collection of tricks' that generates the impression of a continuous, unitary, controlling agency that directly experiences the world...

This brings to mind Nagel's "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" If someone asks a chiropterologist questions about bat experience, and she always answers all the questions plausibly, it still doesn't entail that she knows what it is like to be a bat. Obviously, she is not a bat. But if she can give all the plausible answers, and fully understands the science behind her answers, does that mean she knows the experience?

I think the point is that she could tell you everything about what bats are like except what it's like to be a bat, i.e. bat subjective experience. All subjective experience, besides one's own, is inaccessible except via appeal to shared events & experiences through simile and metaphor, i.e. a translation from one individual's subjective experience to an objective description of what it is like, then from that objective description to another individual's subjective interpretation of what that must be like. A lot can be lost in that double translation.

With fellow humans that we know, we can usually have a rough idea of what they're probably experiencing because we're physiologically very similar and have probably had similar objective experiences; so, if I tell you I have that feeling like going over a humpback bridge at speed, you'll probably know that it's a queasy sensation if you've also been over hump-back bridge at speed and had that sensation. If you've never been over a humpback bridge, you can only guess at what I mean. If you have a different sensation (thrill?) going over a humpback bridge at speed, you'll misinterpret what I'm talking about.

A bat can't even describe its subjective experience, and we have very few events & experiences in common so we can only take the vaguest guess what it's like to be a bat.

 

[public hermit]

The question I ask myself is how could any system show appropriate behaviours and give plausible descriptions of what it is like to experience some situation, emotion, mental state, or quale in any and all situations, without actually experiencing them?

That's my question, as well. Which goes back to whether or not the whole p-zombie scenario begs the question, simply assuming what it hopes to show.

It seems to me that this is implausible and that such a system must be doing what we do, i.e. having conscious experience. I guess this could be called a functionalist or behaviourist approach, but there's no alternative for judging consciousness... I don't currently have a reasoned argument for why I find it implausible, but one aspect is that our own consciousness is not what it seems to be (subjectively) - as Dennett says, it's 'a collection of tricks' that generates the impression of a continuous, unitary, controlling agency that directly experiences the world...

If I understand it right, the cash value of functionalism is that the role consciousness serves for us can be realized by other entities without them having to have the same structure (physical or otherwise) that we have. In other words, so long as the same function is served. If that is the case, then in terms of function maybe there isn't all that much difference between a conscious person, a p-zombie, and a computer so long as the same inputs result in the same outputs. I suppose Dennett's instrumentalism is a kind of functionalism; although, I'm not sure. Whatever the case, it is a very pragmatic approach to the problem.

 

[Chriliman]

David Chalmers argues that a zombie world is logically conceivable. If such a world is conceivable, then it is metaphysically possible. If it is metaphysically possible, then physicalism is false. His argument assumes that if physicalism is true (every physical effect has a physical cause) then the physical world is closed under causation.
Per Wiki:

1. According to physicalism, all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical.
2. Thus, if physicalism is true, a metaphysically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular, conscious experience must exist in such a possible world.
3. In fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this it follows that such a world is metaphysically possible.
4. Therefore, physicalism is false.

One argument against Chalmers is that if two worlds are physically identical (and given causal closure of the physical world), then consciousness will necessarily arise in both worlds. But, that simply assumes physicalism (epiphenomenalism). Another approach is to argue that logical conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility. Whatever the case, both sides are firmly entrenched and the zombie arguments haven't done anything to mitigate that.

Philosophical zombie - Wikipedia
Zombies (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Correct me if I’m wrong, but isn’t 3 a contradiction in that consciousness is required in order to conceive of a world that has no consciousness?

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Correct me if I’m wrong, but isn’t 3 a contradiction in that consciousness is required in order to conceive of a world that has no consciousness?

The conceived world is physically indistinguishable from ours but lacks the supposedly non-physical property of consciousness, so no - the 'people' of that world are like machines. They would say that they are conscious and can conceive of a world identical to theirs without consciousness, but as they don't actually have consciousness, the world they say they can conceive of would be their own...

The problem (contradiction?) I see is that they have to 'know' what it is like to be conscious - without actually being conscious - so that they can perfectly emulate the behaviours associated with consciousness.

 

[durangodawood]

The conceived world is physically indistinguishable from ours but lacks the supposedly non-physical property of consciousness, so no - the 'people' of that world are like machines. They would say that they are conscious and can conceive of a world identical to theirs without consciousness, but as they don't actually have consciousness, the world they say they can conceive of would be their own...

The problem (contradiction?) I see is that they have to 'know' what it is like to be conscious - without actually being conscious - so that they can perfectly emulate the behaviours associated with consciousness.

Why not e-zombies who are and act like humans in every single way except they in fact cant see a thing?