Intent

[Resha Caner]

Daniel Dennett has written quite a bit on intentionality. While he tends to focus on the intentional stance treating other things as though they have rational minds and purposes as a shortcut to predicting their behavior, he also discusses the design stance, where we treat things as though they were designed as a shortcut to predicting their behavior. Or for cases where we know they were designed, it is clearly a useful shortcut to use this knowledge of design rather than try to predict the behavior of, say, an alarm clock by taking it apart and working out the physics of its innards (the physical stance).

The sorts of entities so far discussed in relation to design-stance predictions have been artifacts, but the design stance also works well when it comes to living things and their parts. For example, even without any understanding of the biology and chemistry underlying anatomy we can nonetheless predict that a heart will pump blood throughout the body of a living thing. The adoption of the design stance supports this prediction; that is what hearts are supposed to do (i.e., what nature has "designed" them to do).

A thermostat doesn't want or intend to regulate its temperature any more than a human body wants to regulate its temperature through the mechanisms of homeostasis. But it can be a shortcut to describe things in such terms to avoid having to directly refer to and derive the resultant behavior of the complex physiological and biochemical mechanisms that produce it.

So I'm amenable to this, but it's important to keep in mind that it is a shortcut of sorts, an act of pretend that we regard these things 'as though' they have design or intent.

I'm fine with this as a means to an end, but that doesn't really address the question I asked. As @durangodawood indicated, instead it leads one away from the answer.

As you posed it, the method suffers from an extrapolation fallacy (at least that's what I call it). The same thing happens a lot in moral arguments. Someone wants to convince me they've developed the perfect system for moral decision making (such as utilitarianism, objectivism, or some such nonsense). They "prove" their system by using it to show that killing a person in order to steal their Nikes is wrong. What they're counting on is that we both "obviously" accept such an action as wrong, and then expect that since we agree on one moral point, and since their system decides that moral point, they can extrapolate to insisting I accept all moral decisions as made by their system.

Don't work that way.

In this case, you're counting on an "obviously hearts don't have intent" agreement that I have not conceded.

 

[essentialsaltes]

I'm fine with this as a means to an end, but that doesn't really address the question I asked.

"Do you see a difference in the chemical reactions that result from a volcanic eruption versus those that occur to sustain a living cell apart from simple categorical distinctions?"

No.

In this case, you're counting on an "obviously hearts don't have intent" agreement that I have not conceded.

Hearts function, so they have a function, and to that extent they have a purpose in the biology of an animal.

 

[durangodawood]

Lots of innocent word switching that can "smuggle in" all sorts of baggage.

I mean, when we equivocate between "function" and "purpose", well, allasudden we've imported notions of an intending, future-conscious mind.

 

[Resha Caner]

"Do you see a difference in the chemical reactions that result from a volcanic eruption versus those that occur to sustain a living cell apart from simple categorical distinctions?"

No.

OK. Thanks. You may not have much interest in what follows from here.

Hearts function, so they have a function, and to that extent they have a purpose in the biology of an animal.

It seems there is the potential to miss something important here. The squirrel/acorn example works a little better to demonstrate.

As hearts have a purpose for animals, so acorns have a purpose for trees. Trees will not continue unless they produce acorns. When a squirrel eats an acorn, it violates this purpose. Does the tree show intent by trying to circumvent squirrels eating their acorns?

I realize evolution can be used in an attempt to support the "no" answer. Trees produce more acorns than they need so that some will survive - the squirrels can't eat them all. But it's not that the tree intended to produce more acorns. It simply is. The tree mutated. Those that produced a lot of acorns survived. Those that didn't, didn't.

But there's the rub - randomness. The tree could have produced a tougher shell that the squirrel can't crack. It could have created a bad taste the squirrels don't like. etcetera, etcetera. There are multiple viable options. Why this one vs. that one? It may be randomness, but it may not. Concluding it is randomness and going no further risks missing a possibly fascinating aspect of how trees produce acorns.

 

[Resha Caner]

Lots of innocent word switching that can "smuggle in" all sorts of baggage.

I mean, when we equivocate between "function" and "purpose", well, allasudden we've imported notions of an intending, future-conscious mind.

I'm sure you'll keep me honest, just as I'm trying to keep people honest on the flipside.

 

[essentialsaltes]

It simply is.

That's the natural world for you.

 

[Resha Caner]

That's the natural world for you.

That's your view of the natural world. Randomness can be modelled, but it is not a physical mechanism.

I let "nature" go the first time because it's use was justified by the context. Still, I would bet Dennett, while willing to say this is 'what nature has "designed" them to do' would be unwilling to say this is 'what god has "designed" them to do', even though, in the epistemological framework he has created they mean the same thing.

As a digression, I get the impression from several scientists of ages past that they are speaking of God in the way Dennett expresses. That is, while Newton and Descartes seem real believers, when someone like Einstein refers to God, it seems a mere device of language. So, if I am correct, it piques my curiosity why scientists are OK with appropriating pantheistic language but not monotheistic language.

 

[essentialsaltes]

That's your view of the natural world. Randomness can be modelled, but it is not a physical mechanism.

No one claims it is. But when something happens... something has to happen. If you drop something on the floor, and you don't know all the angles and velocities and surfaces, the final resting place of the object may as well be random to you, but randomness didn't do anything. Gravity and the other physical forces did something.

Still, I would bet Dennett, while willing to say this is 'what nature has "designed" them to do' would be unwilling to say this is 'what god has "designed" them to do', even though, in the epistemological framework he has created they mean the same thing.

Why do you think nature and god mean the same thing? Neither Dennett nor I would agree.

So, if I am correct, it piques my curiosity why scientists are OK with appropriating pantheistic language but not monotheistic language.

I think Einstein was pretty unusual for his explicit acceptance of Spinoza's god.

 

[Resha Caner]

Why do you think nature and god mean the same thing? Neither Dennett nor I would agree.

I don't. I think you've missed my point, as I said they mean the same thing within Dennett's proposed framework. To attribute a thing's structure to a personified nature you don't believe in is no different than attributing it to a personified god you don't believe in. So what does it matter which word you use?

Wasn't that part of Spinoza's point?

No one claims it is. But when something happens... something has to happen. If you drop something on the floor, and you don't know all the angles and velocities and surfaces, the final resting place of the object may as well be random to you, but randomness didn't do anything. Gravity and the other physical forces did something.

Again, you seem to have missed my point. Positing the object's motion is due to geometry and forces, then using a model of randomness to describe that motion, is different from beginning with a model of randomness and not caring what caused the motion.

 

[essentialsaltes]

I don't. I think you've missed my point, as I said they mean the same thing within Dennett's proposed framework. To attribute a thing's structure to a personified nature you don't believe in

But neither of us is personifying nature. You'll note Dennett's scare-quotes around the word designed. "(i.e., what nature has "designed" them to do)"

Again, you seem to have missed my point. Positing the object's motion is due to geometry and forces, then using a model of randomness to describe that motion, is different from beginning with a model of randomness and not caring what caused the motion.

Nobody starts with a model of randomness; I'm not sure what that even means. Mutations are due to biochemical misfires or radiation or any number of other mutagens. We have studied how increasing or decreasing mutagens affects mutation rates, and what bits of DNA are either vulnerable or resistant to mutation.

 

[Resha Caner]

But neither of us is personifying nature. You'll note Dennett's scare-quotes around the word designed. "(i.e., what nature has "designed" them to do)"

I know. Hence my addition of the phrase that it is something you don't believe. As explained in your post it is merely a shortcut - you're pretending, acting as though they have rational minds. If that's all you're doing, what does it matter whether the word you use is "nature", "god", or "pencil"?

But keep at it. I'm close to saying, "Never mind."

Nobody starts with a model of randomness; I'm not sure what that even means.

Not true. I'm in the middle of extensive fatigue testing, and we argue quite a bit about what statistical model we're going to use to represent the data.

Mutations are due to biochemical misfires or radiation or any number of other mutagens. We have studied how increasing or decreasing mutagens affects mutation rates, and what bits of DNA are either vulnerable or resistant to mutation.

Yet those known mechanisms are stated to be random with respect to the organism produced by the resulting DNA, correct? And it is intent - the organism's resulting behavior - that we're talking about. If an amoeba comes from amoeba DNA and a human comes from human DNA, and those two different strands - those two different behaviors - are the result of random mutation ...

 

[durangodawood]

I'd like to better understand the paradigm of unbelievers when dealing with life in science....

I think it can be summarized like this:
-Material things, including life, behave according to certain laws of nature.
-There is no intent required, just "the way that things (including biological evolution) work".
-Biological evolution has produced brains which are capable of foresight, and so can have intents of their own.
-Trying to overlay "intent", in the traditional sense of the word, back onto natural forms sounds like a desire for an animist worldview.

-There may be an intending mind behind this whole arrangement, but so far that seems unnecessary and poorly evidenced.

 

[Resha Caner]

I think it can be summarized like this:
-Material things, including life, behave according to certain laws of nature.
-There is no intent required, just "the way that things (including biological evolution) work".
-Biological evolution has produced brains which are capable of foresight, and so can have intents of their own.
-Trying to overlay "intent", in the traditional sense of the word, back onto natural forms sounds like a desire for an animist worldview.

-There may be an intending mind behind this whole arrangement, but so far that seems unnecessary and poorly evidenced.

OK. I didn't start with the opinion I have now, but one of my objections is that language seems to be driving perception here: two different words, therefore binary states - either organisms have intent or they don't. So, when they do we call it 'intent', when they don't we call it a 'mechanism', and we shouldn't confuse the two. But what if it's a spectrum rather than binary? How would we determine that? In the process of answering that, what do we call it?

Connecting back to the OP, those questions probably seem inane unless one accepts emergence. So, do you think organisms ever exhibit emergent behaviors?

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Is your position on emergence ontological or only epistemological? When I listen to the layman talk about emergence it seems to me little more than a placeholder for future knowledge (and thus it seems to be merely an epistemological position). This is because the nature of the coupling between the emergent property and the underlying substrate seems to remain always mysterious by definition. To put this crudely, the emergentist might be thought to say, "The emergent property emerges from the substrate and is qualitatively different from the substrate, but we don't know how any of this really works." What do you make of that?

I disagree. My position is that it's ontological. Emergence isn't something mysterious, it's just the idea when many elements interact, even in very simple ways, they can produce joint behaviours and properties that are very different from those of the elements themselves. I first became interested in it when playing with Conway's Game of Life, a cellular automaton where a static grid of binary (e.g. on/off or alive/dead) cells is iterated according to a few simple rules. The result is patterns of 'alive' cells moving across the static grid and interacting according to emergent rules. If you set up the starting pattern correctly, you can make these patterns interact so that they emulate Game of Life itself, or behave like a universal Turing machine, or a programmable computer. None of this is predictable from the static behaviour of individual cells - they don't move, they just turn on or off according to the state of their immediate neighbours; it's only when all the cells in the grid are processed in turn that these moving patterns appear.

Other popular examples are the shoaling of fish, and the flocking of birds, where complex flock/shoal behaviours emerge without any lead individual, just from the simple rules that the birds or fish follow with respect to their immediate neighbours; none need to be aware of what the flock/shoal is doing. Ant colonies too...

...and if it is intended as an ontological position, then what kind of candidates exist for a future explanation of the reality of emergence itself?

As I understand it, the explanation, such as it is, is that iterating simple rules can give rise to (unexpected) complexity, both in mathematics (e.g. the Mandelbrot set fractal) and the physical world...

I think emergent behaviour is often seen to be surprising, unpredictable, and a little mysterious because, although we can visualise the behaviour of the elements and their interactions with their neighbours, most of us are not cognitively set up to visualise the behaviour of the patterns of interactions between many elements; it's one step beyond our capacity.

 

[essentialsaltes]

Yet those known mechanisms are stated to be random with respect to the organism produced by the resulting DNA, correct?

The cosmic rays do not know or care about organisms. Their energies and velocities follow some distribution, and the effects they have depend on whatever it is they run into.

And it is intent - the organism's resulting behavior - that we're talking about.

Are those supposed to be equivalent?

One such cosmic ray makes a proto-giraffe's neck longer. Is the longer neck (the resulting behavior) the intent? That doesn't sound right. Do you mean the intent to make the neck longer? Nobody intended that. Millions of proto-giraffes were generated with bajillions of different genes and mutations combined in various ways. Some of them survived and passed novel combinations on. But some of them died and didn't. These losing combinations were produced by the exact same process and were just as unintended.

If an amoeba comes from amoeba DNA and a human comes from human DNA, and those two different strands - those two different behaviors - are the result of random mutation ...

As usual, I have no idea what (if anything) you are leading me to. I guess if I were to finish the sentences it would be...

...then the existence of humans and amoebas was contingent on many historical accidents and not a result of necessity.

If things had been different in the past, they would be different now. But nature simply is.

 

[SelfSim]

OK. I didn't start with the opinion I have now, but one of my objections is that language seems to be driving perception here: two different words, therefore binary states - either organisms have intent or they don't. So, when they do we call it 'intent', when they don't we call it a 'mechanism', and we shouldn't confuse the two. But what if it's a spectrum rather than binary? How would we determine that? In the process of answering that, what do we call it?

Everything we do, in trying to make sense of our perceptions, comes down to the meanings we assign in language - no exceptions.

There's no point in 'objecting' to this.

There may be value arising from testing it, however.

Connecting back to the OP, those questions probably seem inane unless one accepts emergence. So, do you think organisms ever exhibit emergent behaviors?

The meaning assigned to 'emergence' is vague. There is also, no particular need to accept or reject it. To do so, leads back around to the 'binary' dilemma you mention above (a false dichotomy argument) and just becomes a vicious circle. So why do that?

How we think about these matters can also be directed towards useful ends such as further research .. which stands completely distinct from seeking some kind of 'truth' about them. (Can you see what I'm saying here?)

 

[Resha Caner]

Are those supposed to be equivalent?

No.

One such cosmic ray makes a proto-giraffe's neck longer. Is the longer neck (the resulting behavior) the intent? That doesn't sound right. Do you mean the intent to make the neck longer?

No. At that point I was only trying to establish one small bit of understanding between us regarding randomness. But I understand why you might interpret what I said that way.

As usual, I have no idea what (if anything) you are leading me to.

Sorry.

But nature simply is.

I have no idea what you mean to convey with the word 'nature'.

 

[SelfSim]

... If things had been different in the past, they would be different now.

Once error prone self-replication becomes observable, retrogressive traceability over geological timeframes, becomes virtually impossible. The conclusion that 'things would be different' is thus not necessarily self-evident.

But nature simply is.

Circularity(?)
.. All depends on the meaning you hold for 'is'.

 

[Resha Caner]

The meaning assigned to 'emergence' is vague.

Sorry. But I think @FrumiousBandersnatch described it pretty well in post #74.

There is also, no particular need to accept or reject it. To do so, leads back around to the 'binary' dilemma you mention above (a false dichotomy argument) and just becomes a vicious circle. So why do that?

Because I think it avoids the dilemma rather than causing it.

How we think about these matters can also be directed towards useful ends such as further research .. which stands completely distinct from seeking some kind of 'truth' about them. (Can you see what I'm saying here?)

With regard to science, I'm basically an instrumentalist, so I don't ever expect it to reveal truth.

 

[SelfSim]

Sorry. But I think @FrumiousBandersnatch described it pretty well in post #74.

.. no need for apologies .. I for one, appreciate the thinking and efforts going on in this thread ..

I also appreciate Frumious' explanation (I even 'liked' it).

Both our responses align from the scientific viewpoint.

Because I think it avoids the dilemma rather than causing it.

Ok .. I'll watch .. I'm interested to see how that unfolds in the dicsussion.

With regard to science, I'm basically an instrumentalist, so I don't ever expect it to reveal truth.

Ok .. however I've found that mostly that any tightly held '-ist' views, usually holds back thinking.