Intent

[durangodawood]

Sorry, that comment was directed more to Frumious than to you. Your explanation is basically exactly what I described to him as a layman's approach to emergence.

The approach I described is entirely reasonable.

If youd prefer something more like "how emergence works", then I dont think you understand it. Its a broad category, not a distinct process. Each process can be entirely different depending on its domain.

Think of it like the idea "evolution". There's no single evolution process. Cosmic evolution is an entirely different process than, say, biological evolution.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

I realize evolution can be used in an attempt to support the "no" answer. Trees produce more acorns than they need so that some will survive - the squirrels can't eat them all. But it's not that the tree intended to produce more acorns. It simply is. The tree mutated. Those that produced a lot of acorns survived. Those that didn't, didn't.

But there's the rub - randomness. The tree could have produced a tougher shell that the squirrel can't crack. It could have created a bad taste the squirrels don't like. etcetera, etcetera. There are multiple viable options. Why this one vs. that one? It may be randomness, but it may not. Concluding it is randomness and going no further risks missing a possibly fascinating aspect of how trees produce acorns.

In order to survive, some kind of successful strategy must evolve; in oaks it was acorns - other trees have different strategies, including hardened shells, toxic seeds, consumable wrappings around undigestible seeds, and so-on. Many classes of effective strategy with many implementations, and evidence of lineal development and divergence from earlier ancestral forms. That's entirely consistent with, and expected from, evolution, and not easy to explain with equally parsimonious alternatives.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

I know. Hence my addition of the phrase that it is something you don't believe. As explained in your post it is merely a shortcut - you're pretending, acting as though they have rational minds. If that's all you're doing, what does it matter whether the word you use is "nature", "god", or "pencil"?

It's a personification of the process(es) that you think produced the results; for Dennet and us atheists, that is nature, specifically evolution.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Happy accidents are always possible, but it's hard to find something you're not looking for.

IMO, serendipity plays a much larger role in discovery than is appreciated.

This is confusing - serendipity means 'happy accident', so the first sentence implies that serendipity is not particularly significant in discovery, the second sentence implies that it is...

 

[Resha Caner]

This is confusing - serendipity means 'happy accident', so the first sentence implies that serendipity is not particularly significant in discovery, the second sentence implies that it is...

A happy accident is merely a happy accident. Nothing is gained beyond what the external world offers. Serendipity means the benefit is multiplied by recognizing opportunity in the accident.

As the quote from the The Three Princes of Serendip goes, they were "always making discoveries, by accidents and sagacity, of things which they were not in quest of". [emphasis mine]

It's a personification of the process(es) that you think produced the results; for Dennet and us atheists, that is nature, specifically evolution.

I don't understand how you're not getting this. Nature means something to you, and you're assuming I understand what that word means to you. But I don't. I took a few stabs and was rebuffed, so it's time for you to tell me.

Were I to guess, it would be something like, "The total collection of all physical rules," but I don't know that for sure. Sometimes the contextual usage of nature implies a meaning of "apart from human civilization", and other times it implies a meaning of "a property inherent to the object".

Give me a definition. Assuming you mean the first, I have an interesting (to me at least) idea to propose to you.

This is the perennial problem with our categorization of the natural world, a generalisation of the sorites paradox - how can one distinguish separate categories in what are, for all intents and purposes, continua?

My question for some time now has been, why use categories at all if it's continuous? What justifies their use, and what benefit do they bring if they misrepresent?

But that is itself an example of anthropomorphic projection, the intentional stance writ large. An amoeba doesn't have the capacity for thought - a cognitive sense of self, or capacity for planning and forethought; if that level of cognitive capability was possible without a brain, we wouldn't need or have brains.

And my repeated point here is that you've done nothing to establish this opinion of yours. In that regard it's no better an opinion than saying amoebas do demonstrate intent ... but more on that later.

... using a specialised organ (brain) that can map the world and produce an internal model to predict and select future behaviour strategies based on the stored results of previous behaviour (learning, knowledge). Basing behaviour on a representation or abstraction of the world, on dynamic modelling, gives it a level of indirection, or 'aboutness' that is associated with intentionality.

Ah, here we go. This I can respect. I don't know if I would say I agree yet, but this is something we can work with. Cogent, specific, and complete. I like this one.

But first I must ask a few clarifications. First, why would you say an amoeba's DNA is not "an internal model to predict and select future behaviour strategies based on the stored results of previous behaviour (learning, knowledge)"? It's a map of some kind. And it does adapt to previous results.

Second, why must it be an organ? For some time one of the aspects of emergence that has intrigued me is that it seems a means of storing information in a collective of like things. If this collective can map the world and respond to it, yet is not an organ, why would that not count? As a corollary, I've also had a long niggling impression that even complex organisms such as humans seem sometimes to not be a single entity, but more a collective of entities. This seems especially true of things like antibodies, where we are host to a groups of cells because of mutual benefit.

Finally, if you're going to lean on the abstract to make your case, that is likely to become the main battleground. Demonstrating amoebas do not abstract will be a difficult thing to do. The only reason I know you can make abstractions is because you can communicate them to me. As such, I think an ability to communicate is a key ingredient here. It is more that we can know which organisms do make abstractions rather than knowing which ones don't.

 

[durangodawood]

....Second, why must it be an organ? For some time one of the aspects of emergence that has intrigued me is that it seems a means of storing information in a collective of like things. If this collective can map the world and respond to it, yet is not an organ, why would that not count?....

Absolutely. Human culture is this sort of emergent "thing" of its own with capacities and characteristics beyond and not reducible to the sum of individual human components.

.....Finally, if you're going to lean on the abstract to make your case, that is likely to become the main battleground. Demonstrating amoebas do not abstract will be a difficult thing to do. The only reason I know you can make abstractions is because you can communicate them to me. As such, I think an ability to communicate is a key ingredient here. It is more that we can know which organisms do make abstractions rather than knowing which ones don't.

I suspect that before long we'll have enough access to the particular workings of the amoeba (and other organisms) nervous system that we'll be able to rule out certain capabilities with high confidence. For now, it just seems likely that amoebas dont have "advanced" capabilities far beyond whats necessary for them to function as they do. Parsimony as a guide, pending further investigation.

 

[SelfSim]

.. using a specialised organ (brain) that can map the world and produce an internal model

I think there's a lot of evidence that modelling is the primary function of the human brain's 'mind' component. (Even though this does reduce and compartmentalise brain functions, 'mind' is distinguished by testing the idea and noticing the results that test produces). Our minds create models of everything they perceive. A mind then attempts to make sense of this, via descriptions using language, which ascribes meaning to the words used in those descriptions.

There is no evidence for an 'internal' or 'external' model. All there is is a model.

... First, why would you say an amoeba's DNA is not "an internal model to predict and select future behaviour strategies based on the stored results of previous behaviour (learning, knowledge)"? It's a map of some kind. And it does adapt to previous results.

One chooses one's model .. its a choice .. that's it.

Second, why must it be an organ? For some time one of the aspects of emergence that has intrigued me is that it seems a means of storing information in a collective of like things. If this collective can map the world and respond to it, yet is not an organ, why would that not count? As a corollary, I've also had a long niggling impression that even complex organisms such as humans seem sometimes to not be a single entity, but more a collective of entities. This seems especially true of things like antibodies, where we are host to a groups of cells because of mutual benefit.

A collection of like-thinking healthy minds are also linked by communication, language and in-common meanings. There it is again .. language then creates that collective's view of reality!

Finally, if you're going to lean on the abstract to make your case, that is likely to become the main battleground. Demonstrating amoebas do not abstract will be a difficult thing to do. The only reason I know you can make abstractions is because you can communicate them to me. As such, I think an ability to communicate is a key ingredient here. It is more that we can know which organisms do make abstractions rather than knowing which ones don't.

I (obviously) agree with this ... but not because you say it .. but because there is abundant objective evidence supporting it!
Its dubious as to whether there is objective evidence that an amoeba can abstract (or not) .. That depends on the model and meaning one chooses for 'amoeba' and 'abstract'.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

A happy accident is merely a happy accident. Nothing is gained beyond what the external world offers. Serendipity means the benefit is multiplied by recognizing opportunity in the accident.

As the quote from the The Three Princes of Serendip goes, they were "always making discoveries, by accidents and sagacity, of things which they were not in quest of". [emphasis mine]

OK; serendipity is discovery by happy accident, so that doesn't really clarify what you said. I note I wasn't the only one to find this confusing. But never mind, it doesn't matter.

I don't understand how you're not getting this. Nature means something to you, and you're assuming I understand what that word means to you. But I don't. I took a few stabs and was rebuffed, so it's time for you to tell me.

Were I to guess, it would be something like, "The total collection of all physical rules,"

That's the idea; nature, as in natural laws and processes rather than supernatural ones. My apologies, I thought this was obvious given the context.

My question for some time now has been, why use categories at all if it's continuous? What justifies their use, and what benefit do they bring if they misrepresent?

Seriously? you don't see why we talk of children, the middle-aged, or elderly; microwaves, X-rays, or green; small, medium, or large; why we chop up continua into convenient conceptual chunks? Yer 'aving a laugh, ain'tcha...

And my repeated point here is that you've done nothing to establish this opinion of yours. In that regard it's no better an opinion than saying amoebas do demonstrate intent ... but more on that later.

I'm not going to go into the wealth of evidence that advanced cognition requires sophisticated information processing capabilities, e.g. a brain. Suffice it to say, amoebas lack brains.

Ah, here we go. This I can respect. I don't know if I would say I agree yet, but this is something we can work with. Cogent, specific, and complete. I like this one.

Condescend much?

First, why would you say an amoeba's DNA is not "an internal model to predict and select future behaviour strategies based on the stored results of previous behaviour (learning, knowledge)"? It's a map of some kind. And it does adapt to previous results.

It's a map of generic or typical environmental contexts to behavioural templates built over evolutionary timescales, rather than a contemporary and dynamic model of the environment, and consequently doesn't allow the flexible modelling and evaluation of potential future strategies.

Second, why must it be an organ? For some time one of the aspects of emergence that has intrigued me is that it seems a means of storing information in a collective of like things. If this collective can map the world and respond to it, yet is not an organ, why would that not count?

It's just an expectation, based on how it's done in Earth biology. One would expect a specialised function like the communication, integration, and sophisticated processing of information, to be performed by a collection of specialised tissues, probably evolved from a simpler communications network connecting sensors to effectors via some coordinating nexus.

As a corollary, I've also had a long niggling impression that even complex organisms such as humans seem sometimes to not be a single entity, but more a collective of entities. This seems especially true of things like antibodies, where we are host to a groups of cells because of mutual benefit.

Antibodies are proteins, but I take your point. The immune system doesn't just seek and destroy pathogens, but actively supports beneficial microbes. For some fascinating and eye-opening information on our intimate relationship with microbes, I recommend Ed Young's book "I Contain Multitudes".

Finally, if you're going to lean on the abstract to make your case, that is likely to become the main battleground. Demonstrating amoebas do not abstract will be a difficult thing to do. The only reason I know you can make abstractions is because you can communicate them to me. As such, I think an ability to communicate is a key ingredient here. It is more that we can know which organisms do make abstractions rather than knowing which ones don't.

Reasonable inference and critical thinking in an evolutionary framework are good guidelines here.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

I think there's a lot of evidence that modelling is the primary function of the human brain's 'mind' component. (Even though this does reduce and compartmentalise brain functions, 'mind' is distinguished by testing the idea and noticing the results that test produces). Our minds create models of everything they perceive. A mind then attempts to make sense of this, via descriptions using language, which ascribes meaning to the words used in those descriptions.

There is no evidence for an 'internal' or 'external' model. All there is is a model.

Yes; I said 'internal' to emphasise that the world we think we see and navigate is a mental construct; the relatively low-resolution data from our senses are used to correct and update this model.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

I suspect that before long we'll have enough access to the particular workings of the amoeba (and other organisms) nervous system that we'll be able to rule out certain capabilities with high confidence.

Being unicellular, amoebae don't have nervous systems, although, like most cells, they do have intracellular transport & signalling networks.

 

[Resha Caner]

Its dubious as to whether there is objective evidence that an amoeba can abstract (or not).

Agreed, unless we can find a way to communicate with them. Where is Dr. Doolittle when you need him?

...language then creates that collective's view of reality!

Mmm, I'd probably say it expresses a view of reality rather than creates it ... unless you're willing to equate "model" with "language". I might go for that.

As a side note, I am at the extreme in terms of being a visual communicator/learner. I prefer reading (as here on the Internet) to speaking, and I prefer speaking face-to-face (to get body language signals) to a phone. I sometimes struggle to understand what someone is saying if I'm just on the phone with them.

It goes to such an extent that I often don't think in English (or traditional "language" terms), but in a "visual" language that I have to translate for people. My expertise at work (I am an engineer) is in modelling. People ask me how I do it, and I can't explain. Often I can only explain my results by showing them the modelling work I've done ... and I've had a very successful career because of that skill. To brag a little, last year I rescued a multi-million dollar program by modelling something no one else had.

I briefly ventured into modelling biological systems because I had some ideas about alternatives to certain facets of evolution, and initially got some "Hmm, that's interesting" comments from some biologists ... but the work stalled.

One chooses one's model .. its a choice .. that's it.

That could put me over the top ... if you could explain "choice".

Maybe it's related - maybe it's not - but I let Frumious' comments on chaos go even though I would say the result is only determined if the initial conditions are determined (and even then I'm not sure he's right given what I've seen in my nonlinear modelling work). In the moment it seemed a petty thing to say as it negates the role of chaos and shifts the goal posts to randomness. Further, it just makes the discussion an "infinite turtles" game. But, maybe that's where we're headed - to Hofstadter and Godel, Escher, and Bach.

 

[Resha Caner]

That's the idea; nature, as in natural laws and processes rather than supernatural ones. My apologies, I thought this was obvious given the context.

OK. Given you clipped my comment, I'll let it end there.

Seriously?

Seriously.

Condescend much?

There was no intention to condescend. Rather, it was a sincere attempt to communicate that for the first time in this thread you said something that made me reconsider my position - that you were on to something. Whatever.

It's a map of generic or typical environmental contexts to behavioural templates built over evolutionary timescales, rather than a contemporary and dynamic model of the environment, and consequently doesn't allow the flexible modelling and evaluation of potential future strategies.

@SelfSim 's version worked better for me.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

... I let Frumious' comments on chaos go even though I would say the result is only determined if the initial conditions are determined (and even then I'm not sure he's right given what I've seen in my nonlinear modelling work). In the moment it seemed a petty thing to say as it negates the role of chaos and shifts the goal posts to randomness.

I was using the - in my experience - most widely accepted definition of chaos as aperiodic long-term behaviour in a deterministic system that exhibits sensitive dependence on initial conditions; where 'deterministic' means that the system has no random or noisy inputs or parameters. IOW the irregular behaviour arises from the system's inherent nonlinearity, rather than from noisy driving forces.

 

[SelfSim]

Mmm, I'd probably say it expresses a view of reality rather than creates it

I think that's philosophical Realism .. right there. Do you see that also?

... unless you're willing to equate "model" with "language". I might go for that.

I'd equate 'model' with 'mind' because I'm willing to abandon Realism for a view that is testable. It takes a mind to conceive a model .. (there's tonnes of evidence for that .. and not even a test for: 'that a model can exist without a mind to conceive it'.)

Realism, (aka: something exists independent from the mind perceiving it), isn't testable .. it is thus, a miraculous philosophy.

PS: What I'm on about here is that the models we hold for what is 'real' and what isn't, are spontaneously generated by the meanings we assign to the words which we use in language whenever we try to explain what we've perceived (or popped into mind).
... (With the caveat that we don't actually know whether or not some kind of reality exists beyond our minds .. because that's not testable).

As a side note, I am at the extreme in terms of being a visual communicator/learner. I prefer reading (as here on the Internet) to speaking, and I prefer speaking face-to-face (to get body language signals) to a phone. I sometimes struggle to understand what someone is saying if I'm just on the phone with them.

It goes to such an extent that I often don't think in English (or traditional "language" terms), but in a "visual" language that I have to translate for people. My expertise at work (I am an engineer) is in modelling. People ask me how I do it, and I can't explain. Often I can only explain my results by showing them the modelling work I've done ... and I've had a very successful career because of that skill. To brag a little, last year I rescued a multi-million dollar program by modelling something no one else had.

Interesting .. and there are no issues in any of that for me .. no two minds are exactly alike, and thus we all adopt different mind models to explain our individual thinking styles.

That could put me over the top ... if you could explain "choice".

Nothing too mysterious in it .. one chooses to adopt a given model, or not. You're doing it all the time in this thread .. I can test it and the results demonstrate the evidence for that. For example, from above, philosophical Realism is a model one can choose or not choose, depending on the discussion. I sometimes choose it as a basis too, just for expediency .. eg: its a lot simpler to envisage a rock as existing independently from my toe before I trip over it that to envisage than what I mean by 'rock' is 'an impending face-plant (and pain)'.

Maybe it's related - maybe it's not - but I let Frumious' comments on chaos go even though I would say the result is only determined if the initial conditions are determined (and even then I'm not sure he's right given what I've seen in my nonlinear modelling work). In the moment it seemed a petty thing to say as it negates the role of chaos and shifts the goal posts to randomness. Further, it just makes the discussion an "infinite turtles" game. But, maybe that's where we're headed - to Hofstadter and Godel, Escher, and Bach.

Once again, I think there's a spectrum of 'chaotic systems' with some leaning towards random and some towards deterministic extremes. Also, the scale of purview comes into it (scale would be an attribute of 'system').
Once again, all of that is just a function of which mind model one adopts .. the choice is up to the modelling mind (mathematician or scientist or poet, religious etc).

Adopting a scientific way of thinking (or models) is the worst choice what's more .. except for all the rest!

 

[Resha Caner]

I think that's philosophical Realism .. right there. Do you see that also?

Yes, though I wouldn't head in the direction of Platonic Forms. Rather, it's an acknowledgement that my mind is finite, and, therefore, I must remain open to the possibility that someone's else's model can explain the world better than mine - that someone else's mind may be better than mine.

Even moreso, I need to remain open to the possibility that an infinite mind could exist, and an infinite mind has the potential to explain all to perfection. The final step - if that infinite mind created the world I occupy, it does explain reality to perfection.

As such, if any Form were to exist, it would exist in the mind of the infinite creator. I can't know if my model is the same as the model of the infinite creator unless I am the infinite creator - and I most definitely am not.

Looping round then, I can pretend (per Frumious' intentional stance) that reality is represented by my model for the simple fact that I've got nothing better. And my model includes bowing to the models of better minds - the best of which I know then being the best candidate for the infinite creator.

Way beyond the scope of your question, I know, but that's where my rambling thoughts went.

Nothing too mysterious in it .. one chooses to adopt a given model, or not.

But are those choices determined by your chemistry ... or by the emergent nature of your biological system ... or do you think there is something else to it such that your choices are undetermined? I guess that heads us toward a free will discussion, which I didn't really want to do.

Adopting a scientific way of thinking (or models) is the worst choice what's more .. except for all the rest!

I don't understand what you mean.

 

[SelfSim]

Even moreso, I need to remain open to the possibility that an infinite mind could exist, and an infinite mind has the potential to explain all to perfection. The final step - if that infinite mind created the world I occupy, it does explain reality to perfection.

As such, if any Form were to exist, it would exist in the mind of the infinite creator. I can't know if my model is the same as the model of the infinite creator unless I am the infinite creator - and I most definitely am not.

Looping round then, I can pretend (per Frumious' intentional stance) that reality is represented by my model for the simple fact that I've got nothing better. And my model includes bowing to the models of better minds - the best of which I know then being the best candidate for the infinite creator.

Adopting a scientific way of thinking (or models) is the worst choice what's more .. except for all the rest!

I don't understand what you mean.

It is true that a lot of people think that science "wants to say" something like:
'If theory X is true, then outcome Y is true. The outcome Y is true. Therefore theory X is true'.
.. but that's sometimes because they've misunderstood how science works. (I'm not sure, but I think I can see some of this being the basis of some of your above thinking?).

Actually, science never needs to say: 'assume theory X is true', or 'if theory X is true', those word formations have no use at all in science. This is because the whole reason we say a theory is true, or not true, is because we have already established that the outcome Y is true, or not true! It's crucial to understand that this is everything the scientist means for example by 'the truth' or 'not-truth' of any theory, by the way.

It's a complete misunderstanding that science is a logical process that starts by assuming its theories are true, that's how logic works. But logic never does anything but find the tautological equivalences of its predicates and postulates, science isn't like that at all!

What science actually does say is:
'I have no idea whether to regard theory X as true, but it predicts Y, so we'll see if Y is true. If it is, we'll say theory X has some usefulness. If we say that with enough different Y, we will start to regard theory X as true, contextually and provisionally'.
See how extremely different that is from saying:
'science wants to say that if theory X is true, then outcome Y will be true'?

In science, the only thing theory X ever does is organize, unify, and convey understanding in relation to a set of observations Y. Then we take theory X and extend it to observation Y' that has not happened yet, but that we regard as sufficiently similar to the existing set of Y that theory X is used to understand, that we expect to understand Y' the same way.
We don't know until we try, but that is how science builds expectations ("intent"?). At no point is it ever necessary to say: 'if theory X is true', because the truth of theory X is already established by the existing set of Y .. there's no: 'if' involved, it's an inference not an assumption.

So, say you're a gold-panner ... you never assume you'll get gold using science, and we never assume say, for eg: the definition of an electron is a good one, we test these things. And on the basis of these tests, we build expectations, and we live and die (literally, sometimes) by those expectations because science is the worst way to form objective expectations .. except for every other way to do it.

A bit of a sweeping all-encompassing post this one (apologies).. but I'm trying to address a lot of issues in the thread as well as those I quote from your post in the above quote. I think its important to distinguish how science builds its expectations .. which differs very much from how logic does it, and also how science deliberately side-steps circular reasoning.

Science's models are a subset of the mind-models I raised earlier .. and once tested, they produce science's model of objective reality.

 

[quatona]

In other words, is there ever a justification for ascribing 'intent' to the cell?

Since you haven´t really given a definition of "intent" to work with or from, maybe this question helps clarifying:
What, in your use of the term, would be the difference between a cell "doing something unintentionally" and a cell "doing something intentionally", and how would you tell these occurences apart?
I guess for me the word "intent" is important for distinguishing results that I intended when acting and results that I did not intend. So, for me, the sentience part seems to be unseparably linked to "intent".

 

[Resha Caner]

I'm not sure, but I think I can see some of this being the basis of some of your above thinking?

I don't think so. I've not tried to restrict myself to a strictly scientific method of thinking, but allowed myself some wide open speculation. That is understandably frustrating for people, but it works for me. It's how I've produced my best ideas. I don't restrict myself to a scientific method until we leave the realm of thought experiment and it comes time to formulate a hypothesis, etc.

I can tell that time has come when people look at me [bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse]-eyed and ask, "Oh? And how would you test that?" Maybe that time has come.

I've indulged open speculation because, throughout this entire thread, I've had the niggling suspicion that other people aren't being all that scientific either. That the entire idea of "intent" has a bit of mysticism about it that people are allowing and trying to wrap in science because, for some reason not yet identified, they want to keep it alive while continuing to hold up science as their touchstone. For some reason they want to be sentient, conscious beings and not chemical machines, so they allow ideas of intent even though they can't fully justify it.

But I can't put my finger on it either.

What science actually does say is:
'I have no idea whether to regard theory X as true, but it predicts Y, so we'll see if Y is true. If it is, we'll say theory X has some usefulness. If we say that with enough different Y, we will start to regard theory X as true, contextually and provisionally'.
See how extremely different that is from saying:
'science wants to say that if theory X is true, then outcome Y will be true'?

For the most part I agree with this section of your post. This is the standard to which scientists try to rise. I'm not sure I get what you're saying in the rest of it, though. It feels much like an attempt at what I expressed above. And in my experience that's not uncommon. It's a sincere attempt to meet the standard, but too often it descends into paying it mere lip service.

As such, I don't buy your claim that science never makes assumptions ... at least I think you're claiming that. That's a pretty bold statement - one I don't think I've heard before, and one I don't think needs to be made in order to hold up the quoted section.

 

[durangodawood]

Since you haven´t really given a definition of "intent" to work with or from, maybe this question helps clarifying:
What, in your use of the term, would be the difference between a cell "doing something unintentionally" and a cell "doing something intentionally", and how would you tell these occurences apart?
I guess for me the word "intent" is important for distinguishing results that I intended when acting and results that I did not intend. So, for me, the sentience part seems to be unseparably linked to "intent".

I tried this approach earlier, and was mildly chastised for getting "semantic".

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Thanks for your post.

Sorry, I missed responding to this first time around...

I guess I was under the impression that emergentists were pushing for something more than, say, Conway's Game of Life. Presumably you are using simple examples as analogies for how emergence is thought to work, but when push comes to shove the real question is whether the analogy holds, no?

There are some who think that emergence can be special and mysterious, but I'm not sure what grounds they have for that.

I'm not sure what you mean about analogies and how emergence works; it seems pretty straight-forward - simple interactions between many elements can produce complex behaviours of, or patterns in, the bulk.

... what if we turn to something from the second set, such as consciousness? This is where my initial criticism comes to bear, and also where the real meat of the argument resides. With consciousness we have a qualitative difference that is not explicable in the same way a flock of birds is. It is not demonstrably explicable, and I'm not sure how many emergentists would even claim that it is arguably explicable so much as that it will be explained at some point in the future. Therefore a natural question arises: What reason do we have to combine these two sets under the common header of "emergence"?

The way I see it is that the interactions of the neurons in the brain give rise to complex patterns of activity from which the majority of our observable behaviours are demonstrably emergent. The issue with consciousness is the complication of the subjective vs objective dichotomy. The objective correlates of consciousness suggest that consciousness is just another behaviour produced by the interactions of the neurons in the brain, e.g. messing with those interactions in specific ways affects reported consciousness and its observable correlates in correspondingly specific and repeatable ways.

It seems to me that the subjective viewpoint, where consciousness means that there is something it is like to be that individual when the brain is in that mode of activity, is not directly explicable - an explanation is an objective description that details causes, context, consequences, etc., so ultimately it can only tell us that when the system with these features is active in this specific way (and I can see the specific requirements for consciousness eventually being established in considerable detail) it will have subjective experience, i.e. there will be something it is like to be that system.

We already have some understanding of how some aspects of everyday consciousness are constructed, e.g. which functional areas deal with sense of self, feelings, agency, location, bounds, ownership, etc., and how interference with those parts of the brain affect the relevant aspects, and so-on (a model of colour-processing in the visual system has even correctly predicted that we can experience 'novel' colours that are not found in nature) but I don't see how we can do more than give a detailed functional description of the objective contributions that result in a system having subjective experience.

What inferences are available to us to conclude that the second set is an instance of emergence (and will be explained as such in the future)?

As Hume put it, 'constant conjunction'. I think we'll find that subjective experience is associated with systems that have specific functional features that interact in specific ways.

This counterargument is very much in the way of a "god of the gaps" counterargument. The thrust is that the (poor) argument follows this form: "We were ignorant about phenomenon X in the past; it turned out to be explained by emergence. We are ignorant about phenomenon Y in the present; therefore phenomenon Y is explained by emergence."

The situation appears to be that we have a complex system that gives rise to many demonstrably emergent behaviours, and a particular subset of those behaviours appears to have a feature or property that is inherently inaccessible to the objective viewpoint. Is it likely that this feature or property is emergent, as its objective correlates appear to be?

I will just say that the precise concept of "qualitative difference" is something of a sticking point (hence my scare quotes above). I'm not sure what precisely your understanding of that concept is, but it may become central to the exchange.

When I use it, all I mean is that the emergent behaviour bears no obvious relation to the behaviour of the contributing elements; i.e. it's not just quantitatively different, it's not 'more of the same'.