Determinism, Compatibilism, Libertarian Free Will

[Halbhh]

@Halbhh
I hope you don't think all those verses with the firstborn son in Exodus and Numbers are about them killing children on the altar! That's not the case!

.

Certainly not! I'd hope no one would reach that conclusion from reading my post #55 (and I don't blame you for not reading through, because all of us, me too, have done that not-reading-through -- I can only say to you it's really worth reading through #55, and that you and I agree on a lot, so it won't waste your time even if you feel really sure about your current reading of predestination)

We were discussing what is happening in Jeremiah chapter 7 -- which is only idol worship, as you'll definitely see reading that chapter carefully. Really. With 5 verses pointed to idol worship, including verse 31, it's a 100% certainty verse 31 is about sacrificing children to idols.

Please see #55 (or let me know if it was too verbose).

If you think the note I wrote in #55 about the 'high places' isn't right, then research it independently please, and find out.

 

[looking_for_answers_]

Why would you think causality alone is responsible for our choices? This thinking seems to bypass that our will (our essence, our soul, our spirit) exists, doesn't it?

No, why would it? Causality is not linked to naturalism. Even fully supernatural things still have to be either caused, or uncaused. So even if my soul is responsible for some part of my will, my soul is either doing that based on other causes, or it is doing so randomly (without cause)

 

[YouAreAwesome]

No, why would it? Causality is not linked to naturalism. Even fully supernatural things still have to be either caused, or uncaused. So even if my soul is responsible for some part of my will, my soul is either doing that based on other causes, or it is doing so randomly (without cause)

I don't see the need for the dichotomy. To be clear, I understand freedom of will to mean the ability to choose between options even if everything leading up to the choice was caused, and after the fact it implies we could have done otherwise. Our "will" chooses freely if it is not constrained to one option. Is this not somewhere in between your options? It's not purely random because we force the outcome with our will.

 

[looking_for_answers_]

I don't see the need for the dichotomy. To be clear, I understand freedom of will to mean the ability to choose between options even if everything leading up to the choice was caused, and after the fact it implies we could have done otherwise. Our "will" chooses freely if it is not constrained to one option. Is this not somewhere in between your options? It's not purely random because we force the outcome with our will.

Because internally, your will is indeed constrained to one outcome. It doesn't feel that way consciously, but after the decision has been made, if you had perfect knowledge of the system, you could trace back the decision and see which neural pathways ended up in the agent choosing chocolate ice cream over vanilla.

And again, the soul is the same, just without "neural pathways". It's decision-making process is obviously going to use some different mechanism, but the same thought expiriment still applies

 

[YouAreAwesome]

Because internally, your will is indeed constrained to one outcome. It doesn't feel that way consciously, but after the decision has been made, if you had perfect knowledge of the system, you could trace back the decision and see which neural pathways ended up in the agent choosing chocolate ice cream over vanilla.

And again, the soul is the same, just without "neural pathways". It's decision-making process is obviously going to use some different mechanism, but the same thought expiriment still applies

No. That’s the point. The opposite would be true. We could trace the choice back causally and then move forwards again and see that alternative paths could have been taken at the very point the choice is made. The will chooses and the will, from my perspective, can not be replicated with AI. Yes we are born with certain propensities but these can be modified if we so choose by exercising our will. We can alter the future despite the causes leading to our current state.

 

[looking_for_answers_]

No. That’s the point. The opposite would be true. We could trace the choice back causally and then move forwards again and see that alternative paths could have been taken at the very point the choice is made. The will chooses and the will, from my perspective, can not be replicated with AI. Yes we are born with certain propensities but these can be modified if we so choose by exercising our will. We can alter the future despite the causes leading to our current state.

Let's imagine one particle hitting another. At the moment of "collision", assuming no quantum randomness is afoot, how many paths can that particle end up taking? Exactly one.

Given some state and some "rules" (physics in this case), any system can only ever have a specific result from a specific set of inputs.

If I were to observe the neurons of a person choosing chocolate ice cream, I would see that due to their current brain state (the weights & connections of the neurons, produced by DNA and memory/past events), that they would have always chosen chocolate given the same inputs (emotional state, location, relative costs of the flavors, etc).

Suppose we have three neurons A, B, and C:
A
|
v
C -> "I'll have chocolate, please"
^
|
B
If A and B both fire, C will fire. If C fires, it triggers the process for the person's mind to decide "chocolate". If not, they do not decide on that flavor.
For the sake of this being a though expiriment, let's imagine that we have perfect knowledge of this system. I can see that A and B are the only things that affect if C fires.
Let's rewind that person's decision. If we get to the point where A and B are, again, firing, we will, again, see C fire as well, and the person will therefore pick chocolate again.

This is the crux of the issue. Each decision is a combination of some things:
(determined causes + randomness)
It seems most likely to me that randomness does not play into consciousness, but ultimately it's irrelevant. I only include it here because it's a philosophical possibility.

"Free" will would have to look something like this:
(determined causes + randomness + ?)
Because, the determined part of the will is not "free", but neither is a will influenced by randomness.
But no one can define this "?". It can't be the part of the decision that is based on any causal influences (I like chocolate more than vanilla, the chocolate is cheaper, etc) - those fall under "determined causes". But it also can't be any un-caused part of the decision, because that's literally the definition of random: the definition of random

Not only can we not coherently define true "freedom", we don't even see anything that looks like it in nature. After all, even quantum randomness shows a probablistic pattern.

Lastly, I do not see any part of my own decisions that are free from cause. I never feel "forced" to make the decisions I make, but nevertheless, they always, always have causes.

 

[Halbhh]

Given some state and some "rules" (physics in this case), any system can only ever have a specific result from a specific set of inputs.

This is the hypothesis (or belief, often) of 'determinism' in physics. It's the built-in-to-our-way-of-thinking presumption we all want to make because that's how everything works in everyday life in our experience -- things operate according to natural laws generally we experience on the macro level (the scale of anything you can see with the unaided eye generally).

But it turns out that randomness on a quantum level can make a world just like we see, with predictable laws, mechanics (the term for everyday laws of physics on the macro level we are accustomed to seeing in action), since macro systems like a drop of water or a bridge are comglomerations of vast numbers of atoms where the random fluctuations average out to no important macro effect. Usually.

It's good to understand that the ways particles interact (as you were considering) is actually highly investigated by physicists and is called "quantum mechanics".

And you can read up on it extensively in the pretty-good wiki, with plenty of links to other articles that are related. Quantum mechanics - Wikipedia

 

[YouAreAwesome]

Let's imagine one particle hitting another. At the moment of "collision", assuming no quantum randomness is afoot, how many paths can that particle end up taking? Exactly one.

Given some state and some "rules" (physics in this case), any system can only ever have a specific result from a specific set of inputs.

If I were to observe the neurons of a person choosing chocolate ice cream, I would see that due to their current brain state (the weights & connections of the neurons, produced by DNA and memory/past events), that they would have always chosen chocolate given the same inputs (emotional state, location, relative costs of the flavors, etc).

Suppose we have three neurons A, B, and C:
A
|
v
C -> "I'll have chocolate, please"
^
|
B
If A and B both fire, C will fire. If C fires, it triggers the process for the person's mind to decide "chocolate". If not, they do not decide on that flavor.
For the sake of this being a though expiriment, let's imagine that we have perfect knowledge of this system. I can see that A and B are the only things that affect if C fires.
Let's rewind that person's decision. If we get to the point where A and B are, again, firing, we will, again, see C fire as well, and the person will therefore pick chocolate again.

This is the crux of the issue. Each decision is a combination of some things:
(determined causes + randomness)
It seems most likely to me that randomness does not play into consciousness, but ultimately it's irrelevant. I only include it here because it's a philosophical possibility.

"Free" will would have to look something like this:
(determined causes + randomness + ?)
Because, the determined part of the will is not "free", but neither is a will influenced by randomness.
But no one can define this "?". It can't be the part of the decision that is based on any causal influences (I like chocolate more than vanilla, the chocolate is cheaper, etc) - those fall under "determined causes". But it also can't be any un-caused part of the decision, because that's literally the definition of random: the definition of random

Not only can we not coherently define true "freedom", we don't even see anything that looks like it in nature. After all, even quantum randomness shows a probablistic pattern.

Lastly, I do not see any part of my own decisions that are free from cause. I never feel "forced" to make the decisions I make, but nevertheless, they always, always have causes.

There are too many unknowns for one to be sure our choices are deterministic. For example, there has been no study showing our choices are formed causally. We are so far from doing such a study that it seems unnecessary to discuss it as though there are causes A and B which cause C. For all we know we might be able to compile the brains signals and expect C yet D occurs. We just don't know. I personally think it is possible that our life-force plays a role but this is as equally speculative as saying it is determined by accessible causes.

 

[looking_for_answers_]

You're missing the point, though. Sure, we will never know all causes of anything. Especially not supernatural things. But that has nothing to do with the argument.

There are too many unknowns for one to be sure our choices are deterministic. For example, there has been no study showing our choices are formed causally.

And even if they aren't, our will is still not "free". Randomness (events without cause, again, read the definition) is not freedom.

We are so far from doing such a study that it seems unnecessary to discuss it as though there are causes A and B which cause C. For all we know we might be able to compile the brains signals and expect C yet D occurs.

All this would show is that we do not yet have perfect knowledge of the system, or that it is random (which is still not freedom - see above). I specified that in this though expiriment, we should imagine that we did have perfect knowledge of the expiriment.

I personally think it is possible that our life-force plays a role but this is as equally speculative as saying it is determined by accessible causes.

This is the purpose of thought expiriments. I don't care what the actual, "accessible" causes are. If an event is caused by a previous event, whether that's "life-force" or not, then it is not free. If it is not caused by any prior events, then it is still not free, it's just random.

 

[YouAreAwesome]

You're missing the point, though. Sure, we will never know all causes of anything. Especially not supernatural things. But that has nothing to do with the argument.



And even if they aren't, our will is still not "free". Randomness (events without cause, again, read the definition) is not freedom.



All this would show is that we do not yet have perfect knowledge of the system, or that it is random (which is still not freedom - see above). I specified that in this though expiriment, we should imagine that we did have perfect knowledge of the expiriment.



This is the purpose of thought expiriments. I don't care what the actual, "accessible" causes are. If an event is caused by a previous event, whether that's "life-force" or not, then it is not free. If it is not caused by any prior events, then it is still not free, it's just random.

But the thought experiment fails because of the reasons I’ve presented. I’ll try again. We have causes A and B, and we also have mechanism “?”. Causes A and B are inputs into ? and the output is C. You are asking how it is possible that ? is free (because it must be a mechanistic sum of causes, or use some kind of quantum randomness — be it probabilistic randomness or entirely random). Yes? I am saying that ? is entirely unknown and is not necessarily a mechanistic operator as you are describing. We don’t know what it is. It might be that (A+B)—>(C or D) in such a way that [(A+B)—>?—>A and (A+B)—>?—>B] is freely chosen. By freely chosen I am trying to show the different option. Rather than determined causes or randomness, to freely choose is to take account of the causes and then choose freely. This freedom to choose need not be mechanistic but something entirely different—something that is yet to be seen except in our personal experience. Our personal experience of freedom points us in the direction to believe that we are in fact free and that ? is not simply a sum of causes + randomness but is the free will.

 

[looking_for_answers_]

It might be that (A+B)—>(C or D) in such a way that [(A+B)—>?—>A and (A+B)—>?—>B] is freely chosen.

By what process could it possibly be "freely chosen"? This is exactly the part I'm trying to find an explanation of.

Does the "?" have underlying rules? I don't care what they are, just whether or not they exist. If they do, you haven't gotten to "?" yet!

something that is yet to be seen except in our personal experience

The only reason we "see" it in our personal experience is because my consciousness encapsulates the logic of the decision process, which is why I don't feel forced. This position is "compatabilism". My will is not forced by external factors (so I don't feel forced), but nevertheless it is determined.

? is not simply a sum of causes + randomness but is the free will.

You're using the word "sum"... go smaller. Get to the level of events that can't be viewed as a combination of smaller events. An atomic, indivisible event. It is either determined, or it is not determined.

 

[YouAreAwesome]

By what process could it possibly be "freely chosen"? This is exactly the part I'm trying to find an explanation of.

Does the "?" have underlying rules? I don't care what they are, just whether or not they exist. If they do, you haven't gotten to "?" yet!



The only reason we "see" it in our personal experience is because my consciousness encapsulates the logic of the decision process, which is why I don't feel forced. This position is "compatabilism". My will is not forced by external factors (so I don't feel forced), but nevertheless it is determined.



You're using the word "sum"... go smaller. Get to the level of events that can't be viewed as a combination of smaller events. An atomic, indivisible event. It is either determined, or it is not determined.

? is unknown. So postulating “processes” is just taking guesses. Here’s one guess. We tried to apply Newtonian physical laws to tiny quantum interactions and they failed. What’s to say the process that occurs in our will is completely different to all other processes we know? What if it follows laws of its own that are distinct to both Newtonian and quantum interactions? What if the will brings effects into existence in an illogical undefined but non-random way that doesn’t rely purely on causes and randomness. So the ? is our uncaused but non-random will. Whether this is true or false is irrelevant. The point is we know very very little about this area of ourselves. Just as we know very little about what creates life. Maybe there’s something in the life-force that brings uncaused but non-random effects into the world.

I read somewhere a good example of one problem with determinism. Imagine there was a math formula that perfectly predicts our every action (which is completely possible in theory under determinism). We then know exactly what we will do. But if we know what we will do, then we can decide to not do it. This is meant to show such a formula is impossible. It is impossible because our actions are not determined but are self-determined. The self or the will is the determining ? that is not necessarily a process or mechanism.

 

[looking_for_answers_]

? is unknown. So postulating “processes” is just taking guesses.

I'm not postulating processes. I'm asking two questions - "What if there IS a process?" and "What if there is NOT a process?" regardless of what the process may or may not be (that is aside the point). The answer to both is "then ? is not actually free".

What’s to say the process that occurs in our will is completely different to all other processes we know? What if it follows laws of its own that are distinct to both Newtonian and quantum interactions?

Also aside from the point. "deterministic or not deterministic" covers all processes known or unknown.
If I say "every animal is either a dog, or it is not a dog", that statement is true regardless of what animals I am aware of, because it's a tautology. Even if I find a new animal I had not yet imagined, it will either be a dog, or not a dog.

Imagine there was a math formula that perfectly predicts our every action (which is completely possible in theory under determinism). We then know exactly what we will do. But if we know what we will do, then we can decide to not do it. This is meant to show such a formula is impossible.

Not quite. The formula is impossible for anything within the formula to be aware of. That doesn't make the formula itself impossible. And for any being outside the formula to predict my action and convey it to me, they are altering the formula and thereby making their prediction meaningless.

 

[YouAreAwesome]

I'm not postulating processes. I'm asking two questions - "What if there IS a process?" and "What if there is NOT a process?" regardless of what the process may or may not be (that is aside the point). The answer to both is "then ? is not actually free".



Also aside from the point. "deterministic or not deterministic" covers all processes known or unknown.
If I say "every animal is either a dog, or it is not a dog", that statement is true regardless of what animals I am aware of, because it's a tautology. Even if I find a new animal I had not yet imagined, it will either be a dog, or not a dog.



Not quite. The formula is impossible for anything within the formula to be aware of. That doesn't make the formula itself impossible. And for any being outside the formula to predict my action and convey it to me, they are altering the formula and thereby making their prediction meaningless.

Am I right in that you believe there is either determinism or randomness when it comes to our free will? Because this seems to be the crux of the matter. And what I have been trying to show is how it is possible there are indeterministic non-random actions caused by the will. Why is this impossible?

 

[looking_for_answers_]

Am I right in that you believe there is either determinism or randomness when it comes to our free will? Because this seems to be the crux of the matter. And what I have been trying to show is how it is possible there are indeterministic non-random actions caused by the will. Why is this impossible?

Because I have found no coherent definition for "freedom" that exemts it from either determinism or non-determinism. The "non-deterministic but not random" explanation, which is libertarian free will, just doesn't make sense to me. Or to 92.3% of surveyed philosophers, out of a total of 3226... Preliminary Survey results | PhilPapers Surveys

it is possible there are indeterministic non-random actions caused by the will.

I agree with everything you say here in this sentence. There is nothing here I need to be convinced of. Yet my questions aren't about "actions caused by the will", but about what causes the will itself.
I should clarify that "free will" and the "will" itself aren't quite the same. I absolutely believe in the will, just like I believe in my own consciousness.

So we're back at the questions above - is the will caused by something? Then it's not free. If not, it looks indistinguishable from randomness.

 

[looking_for_answers_]

Am I right in that you believe there is either determinism or randomness when it comes to our free will? Because this seems to be the crux of the matter. And what I have been trying to show is how it is possible there are indeterministic non-random actions caused by the will. Why is this impossible?

Another thing to consider is that self-causation doesn't really solve the problem of ultimate responsibility. Imagine if I came across a time-traveling alien species that went back in time to start their own history. Are they self-caused? Yes. But taking a step back, I can also see that they are still un-caused, and their existence is still random. I can't really hold them morally responsible for existing.

Even aside from that, why does self-causation imply moral responsibility? A self-caused action has no other causes. So if it wasn't caused by morality, rationality, emotion, etc. - why would I be justified in tormenting the consciousness that emerges above it?

And lastly, how would it be distinguishable from the other two options? In order to be a valid third, it must look different, no? Suppose I gave four multiple-choice ethics tests. One to a deterministic, high-tech algorithm that used machine learning to parse and answer the questions, one to a machine that randomly chose answers, one to a machine that used a combination of answers from the other two, and one to a human with free will. Would I be able to see which answers look like "free will"? If the human's answers look indistinguishable from either the deterministic machine's, or the random machine's, then why would I consider free will to be a meaningful thing? It looks identical to things that are not free.

 

[YouAreAwesome]

Another thing to consider is that self-causation doesn't really solve the problem of ultimate responsibility. Imagine if I came across a time-traveling alien species that went back in time to start their own history. Are they self-caused? Yes. But taking a step back, I can also see that they are still un-caused, and their existence is still random. I can't really hold them morally responsible for existing.

Even aside from that, why does self-causation imply moral responsibility? A self-caused action has no other causes. So if it wasn't caused by morality, rationality, emotion, etc. - why would I be justified in tormenting the consciousness that emerges above it?

And lastly, how would it be distinguishable from the other two options? In order to be a valid third, it must look different, no? Suppose I gave four multiple-choice ethics tests. One to a deterministic, high-tech algorithm that used machine learning to parse and answer the questions, one to a machine that randomly chose answers, one to a machine that used a combination of answers from the other two, and one to a human with free will. Would I be able to see which answers look like "free will"? If the human's answers look indistinguishable from either the deterministic machine's, or the random machine's, then why would I consider free will to be a meaningful thing? It looks identical to things that are not free.

The appearance of freedom and freedom itself would still be distinct despite yielding identical answers to the ethical multiple choice quiz. One is programmed to respond while the other responds freely. Just because humans can play computers at tic-tac-toe doesn't mean these are likeminded. But the self-causation<-->moral-responsibility thing is the point of discussion. Self-causation could be misleading however in that the will (as a thing) itself comes from the parents and so is caused. But the choices thereafter are a combination of mind and free will. The responsibility for actions is on the one making choices with regard to humanity.

It seems to me you are asking how a person can be held responsible given we don't create ourselves initially. But do you doubt the possibility for moral capacity to be endowed? Can not the will be created as a free will which commands its own responsibilities?

 

[YouAreAwesome]

the will caused by something? Then it's not free.

I'm not seeing why the will can't be both caused and free. Caused/created by parents. Once created, free to act.

 

[Citizen of the Kingdom]

Everyone has free will and everyone acts in certain ways thru-out the day, even in thought, until death stills the actions. Always we're responding in some way, either good or bad. And always according to our heart condition. Trivia for the day.

 

[YouAreAwesome]

I can't really hold them morally responsible for existing.

But if the will is free to the extent that it can be judged, then the responsibility for existence is redundant right? What mean is, it's not about who's responsible for existing but whether or not the will is free to the extent to which it can be judged.

I also want to add that if God is love, then He will not predetermine some to burn eternally. The idea is completely contradictory.