There could be a heaven or a hell you don't know what you don't know.

[Freodin]

I would think we simply have two Freds. There may indeed be all sorts of resulting problems that need to be sorted out, of course.

However, I don't see how these possible odd scenarios render what I am suggesting implausible.

Would the first Fred look at the second Fred and be able to say "This is me. This is me living."

I don't think so. He would still identify "myself" exclusively with his individual body / brain.

So it would not be "life after death" for Fred... it would be "life for a copy of Fred after death of original Fred".

 

[expos4ever]

Would the first Fred look at the second Fred and be able to say "This is me. This is me living."

I don't think so. He would still identify "myself" exclusively with his individual body / brain.

So it would not be "life after death" for Fred... it would be "life for a copy of Fred after death of original Fred".

True, but, again, the fact that there are some interesting and odd consequences of what I am suggesting does not make what I am suggesting implausible - I see no reason why life beyond the death of my present, decaying body is impossible.

 

[Freodin]

True, but, again, the fact that there are some interesting and odd consequences of what I am suggesting does not make what I am suggesting implausible - I see no reason why life beyond the death of my present, decaying body is impossible.

Well, I would say I showed exactly that... that in a scenario like yours, it is not your life that exists beyond the death of your present, decaying body.

The vast majority of people would not doubt that "life" exists beyond your death. But your life... well, if you still think your scenario is plausible, then please explain how one could say that "your" life was extended by something that you yourself would not identify as "you".

 

[expos4ever]

Well, I would say I showed exactly that... that in a scenario like yours, it is not your life that exists beyond the death of your present, decaying body.

I don't see how. Even if I am "split in two", "I" certainly still exist, if even in two different instantiations. I simply do not see how this special case is any kind of argument against the notion that a person can live on after their body dies. If, in the case you describe, there are two "Freds", so what?

I politely suggest that you may be letting irrelevant - irrelevant in a sense I am about to qualify - philosophical questions obscure the issue.

Here is the point: When Fred says "I would like to live on beyond death", he is simply saying that he as a subject who experiences things wants to continue to experience those things. Fred could probably care less that there is another "copy" of him walking around. In fact "Fred 1" and "Fred 2", while initially identical, will certainly "diverge" as time progresses and, for all intents and purposes, become two distinct individuals.

While it is an interesting philosophical question "Which one is really Fred", it is not relevant to what really matters - the original Fred persists as a "being that experiences", even if there are two of them.

Or, put another way, if someone were to create an identical copy of me right now, would that in any sense diminish my experience of living life? Of course not.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Well, I would say I showed exactly that... that in a scenario like yours, it is not your life that exists beyond the death of your present, decaying body.

The vast majority of people would not doubt that "life" exists beyond your death. But your life... well, if you still think your scenario is plausible, then please explain how one could say that "your" life was extended by something that you yourself would not identify as "you".

This is a tricky identity problem that may have something deep to say about our sense of self. I think it's not so much to do with actual continuity of consciousness - we lose that when we sleep or have a global anaesthetic, but the feeling or sense of (or trust in) continuity of consciousness.

Many people say they'd use a Star-Trek transporter (a destructive scan with identical reconstruction at a remote location) if it was guaranteed reliable. But ask them if they'd use it if the scan was non-destructive, and they had to be painlessly killed at the source end after the scanning process, and they change their minds. Of course, if the 'original' you survived even a second or two after the scanning process finished, you'd no longer be identical to your clone, and could argue you're a unique individual, but it's a fine line...

Something similar applies to the 'uploading to a computer' scenario - as you point out, to the person being uploaded (assuming its not a destructive process), is the entity in the computer really them, or is it more like a cybernetic identical twin? just who is it that survives the death of the original body?

This also seems to apply in the many alternate 'realities' of the 'Many Worlds' interpretation of quantum mechanics; if at every physical interaction, all possibilities are realised in superposition, there will be a vast number of superposed instances of 'you' who've experienced different outcomes of those interactions. And the more differences that separate your and their worldline experiences, the less like you they will be. Less like identical replicas of you than a vast family of ever more distant relations.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

While it is an interesting philosophical question "Which one is really Fred", it is not relevant to what really matters - the original Fred persists as a "being that experiences", even if there are two of them.

Or, put another way, if someone were to create an identical copy of me right now, would that in any sense diminish my experience of living life? Of course not.

But if the idea is to artificially extend one's existence beyond the degradation and death of the original body, it does make a difference. Is an identical but healthy copy of the dying Fred really Fred? It seems to me that the only way such questions become moot is if Fred terminally loses consciousness at or before the moment of copying, so Fred is not around to argue that the copy that thinks it's him isn't.

 

[expos4ever]

Something similar applies to the 'uploading to a computer' scenario - as you point out, to the person being uploaded (assuming its not a destructive process), is the entity in the computer really them, or is it more like a cybernetic identical twin? just who is it that survives the death of the original body?

It doesn't matter, at least in respect to the matter of the person "living on" per my previous post.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

It doesn't matter, at least in respect to the matter of the person "living on" per my previous post.

OK. I wonder, if someone offered me the opportunity to have an identical copy made that would live on as I died, whether I'd think, "what's the point? - I'll be dead...", or whether I'd think, "at least something very like me will carry on..."

As you say, it doesn't really matter (except, perhaps to other people).

 

[expos4ever]

But if the idea is to artificially extend one's existence beyond the degradation and death of the original body, it does make a difference. Is an identical but healthy copy of the dying Fred really Fred?

Why does it matter? I do not believe you have really engaged the last part of my post. Why would the existence of a copy of me affect my experience of living life in any way.

I simply do not see how this "copy" question is relevant - it's an interesting question with philosophical and legal, if not other, implications.

But it is entirely irrelevant to the fact that there continues to be a "Fred" who experiences life. If there are two, so much the better (assuming that the original Fred enjoyed being alive)!

 

[Freodin]

I don't see how. Even if I am "split in two", "I" certainly still exist, if even in two different instantiations. I simply do not see how this special case is any kind of argument against the notion that a person can live on after their body dies. If, in the case you describe, there are two "Freds", so what?

This is of course hypothetical, as no one has ever experienced that in any way... but I don't think that you would be "split in two".

As I see it - and this is not irrelevant philosophical, but based on cognitive research - the consciousness is based on the physical reality of the brain. That means that even a brain that is identical as much as you can get it does not produce the same consciousness.

So in this case, it would not be "you" in two different instantiations. It would be "you" and "someone else" who might share the same personality, the same memories, the same way of thinking. But not "you".

FrumiousBandersnatch used the StarTrek teleporter as an example in his post. This is indeed a good way of showing both perspectives... outside and inside.

When Commander Riker gets teleported, for all regards, nothing has changed. It was "Commander Riker" before, and it is "Commander Riker" after. He looks the same, acts the same.

But there was this instance where Riker was "split" in a transporter accident. Suddenly, there are two Rikers. And while both of them believe to be the "real" Riker, they both are distinct persons. They are not a single consciousness within two bodies... they are seperate conscious entities.

Fiction, of course. But based on what we know about how consciousness works.

I politely suggest that you may be letting irrelevant - irrelevant in a sense I am about to qualify - philosophical questions obscure the issue.

Here is the point: When Fred says "I would like to live on beyond death", he is simply saying that he as a subject who experiences things wants to continue to experience those things. Fred could probably care less that there is another "copy" of him walking around. In fact "Fred 1" and "Fred 2", while initially identical, will certainly "diverge" as time progresses and, for all intents and purposes, become two distinct individuals.

Yes. Exactly what I am saying. But this is the problem: "he as a subject who experiences things" does not continue to experience those things. Someone else, who is very very similar to him, almost identical to him, continues to experience these things... Fred does not.

While it is an interesting philosophical question "Which one is really Fred", it is not relevant to what really matters - the original Fred persists as a "being that experiences", even if there are two of them.

Or, put another way, if someone were to create an identical copy of me right now, would that in any sense diminish my experience of living life? Of course not.

No. Making a copy of you would not diminish you. Making a copy of you and then killing the original you... that would diminish you.

 

[expos4ever]

Hi Frumious:

Can you explain your name, please? Just interested. If you want us to keep guessing, that's fine too.

 

[Freodin]

Why does it matter? I do not believe you have really engaged the last part of my post. Why would the existence of a copy of me affect my experience of living life in any way.

I simply do not see how this "copy" question is relevant - it's an interesting question with philosophical and legal, if not other, implications.

But it is entirely irrelevant to the fact that there continues to be a "Fred" who experiences life. If there are two, so much the better (assuming that the original Fred enjoyed being alive)!

Why would there need to be a "Fred" who experiences life? Why not a "Dave" or a "Mary"?

 

[expos4ever]

As I see it - and this is not irrelevant philosophical, but based on cognitive research - the consciousness is based on the physical reality of the brain. That means that even a brain that is identical as much as you can get it does not produce the same consciousness.

I agree that consciousness is based on the "physical reality" of the brain. Are you saying that it is impossible to exactly replicate the "physical reality" of your brain?

If so, I still do not see the problem. As I sleep, presumably my brain deteriorates as I slowly age and when I awake, the physical reality" of my brain differs from what it was last night when I put my head on the pillow.

Am I still the same person?

Of course.

 

[expos4ever]

Why would there need to be a "Fred" who experiences life? Why not a "Dave" or a "Mary"?

Again, call that "subject of experience" whatever you want! It simply does not matter. If the government forces me to change my name, how that affect my experience of living?

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Why does it matter? I do not believe you have really engaged the last part of my post. Why would the existence of a copy of me affect my experience of living life in any way.

That's the point though, isn't it? The popular idea proposes that a copy of you made prior to your demise would give you an effective continuity of experience (in this world) beyond the death of your body. We could dispense with any question of your continued experience of life in the original body, by also proposing that the original body would no longer be conscious once the copy was made. It's equivalent to the Star-Trek transporter process. I guess, from your posts, that you wouldn't agree that such a process would artificially extend your life experiences, and that the Star-Trek transporter is not a method of travel you'd be inclined to take?

 

[Freodin]

Again, call that "subject of experience" whatever you want! It simply does not matter. If the government forces me to change my name, how that affect my experience of living?

I don't think you got my point.

In your example, you made a different person. One that is very similar to you, but isn't you. Call them "Fred 1" and "Fred 2" if you want. There are other persons around, not that similar to you.... all the Daves and Pauls and Susans and Marys.

How does it make any difference for "Fred 1" when he dies, and "Fred 2" lives on... or "Fred 1" dies and Dave and Mary live on?

 

[expos4ever]

No. Making a copy of you would not diminish you.

Ok, so then if a copy is made, "I" live on still in the same sense that when I awake, the "I" who wakes up believes itself to be the same "I" that went to sleep. And that would still be true even if a copy of me is made while I am asleep. Again, that is what this is all about - whether a "subject of experience" lives on. If there are two copies, so much the better.

Making a copy of you and then killing the original you... that would diminish you.

Why?

If, in my sleep, I am put to death painlessly, and then a copy re-inserted in my bed, how will this "copy", upon waking, know that anything has happened at all?

 

[Freodin]

I agree that consciousness is based on the "physical reality" of the brain. Are you saying that it is impossible to exactly replicate the "physical reality" of your brain?

If so, I still do not see the problem. As I sleep, presumably my brain deteriorates as I slowly age and when I awake, the physical reality" of my brain differs from what it was last night when I put my head on the pillow.

Am I still the same person?

Of course.

Yes, but you are the same person not because of the identical state of your physical being, but because of the continuity of the state of your physical being. Breaking this continuity would break your "self".

 

[Freodin]

Ok, so then if a copy is made, "I" live on still in the same sense that when I awake, the "I" who wakes up believes itself to be the same "I" that went to sleep. And that would still be true even if a copy of me is made while I am asleep. Again, that is what this is all about - whether a "subject of experience" lives on. If there are two copies, so much the better.


Why?

If, in my sleep, I am put to death painlessly, and then a copy re-inserted in my bed, how will this "copy", upon waking, know that anything has happened at all?

This copy would not know. You would not know either, being dead.

But this copy would not be you.

 

[expos4ever]

Yes, but you are the same person not because of the identical state of your physical being, but because of the continuity of the state of your physical being. Breaking this continuity would break your "self".

I suggest that what makes "me me" is the ensemble of experiences I have - not the particulars of the platform I am instantiated on.

I still do not see how any of this is relevant to what I think people really mean when they talk about "life after death" - the continuation of experience that feels like it is being experienced by the same being.