Hello, Dzheremi!
You asked:
The Constantinople Council under Flavian in 448 deposed Eutyches.
Then you said Eutyches was given a council in November 448 to overturn it. What was it called?
Then in 449 came Ephesus.
Here is what Wikipedia says:
But in neither Dioscorus' nor Eutyches' cases did Christ actually ever have two natures.
You asked:
EOs consider that "He does some things that are appropriate to humanity and some that are appropriate to divinity", and as a result they are able to mentally distinguish which actions are appropriate to either human nature or divine nature.
Some OOs I sense might not understand this, and imagine that since EOs distinguish those actions that implies Christ is two separate beings, but I think that this kind of criticism of EOs has the goal of labeling them Nestorian. In fact, it's common language and the Formula of Union mentions this practice of "dividing expressions".
As you said "I think both are ultimately internally consistent".
At Chalcedon, Dioscorus said: "The reason why Flavian was condemned was plainly this, that he asserted two natures after the incarnation. I have passages from the Fathers, Athanasius, Gregory, Cyril, to the effect that after the incarnation there were not two natures, but one incarnate nature of the Word." http://www.ccel.org/ccel/wace/biodict.html?term=Dioscorus%20(1),%20patriarch%20of%20Alexandria
The book Christ in Christian Tradition By Aloys Grillmeier, raises an interesting question. It narrates a 6th c. dialogue between Hypatius the Chalcedonian metropolitan and Syriac Oriental Orthodox. Hypatius asked:
This is a rational answer: Eutyches was a heretic, he gave a statement of faith at Ephesus II that was accepted as orthodox, and then Dioscorus who was in fact orthodox accepted it, but made a mistake of indiscretion in doing so.
Still, the question remains of why Dioscorus would commit that indiscretion, why would he rehabilitate the Monophysite Eutyches, when in Eutyches' own official statement Eutyches said that he had the right beliefs all along, and when it was known that Eutyches previously denied the dual consubstantiality. Saying that he made an indiscretion and that people make mistakes is a rational answer, it just seems like he would have known better. Dioscorus had announced that Flavian had been wrong to depose Eutyches, but it seems like he should have known that in fact Eutyches had denied the dual consubstantiality when Flavian deposed Eutyches.
On the face of it: Eutyches was a monophysite, taught that the divinity absorbed the human nature, then was accepted at Epehesus II for making an orthodox statement (but being silent and not being questioned otherwise at Ephesus II), then went back to teaching monophysitism afterwards. At no point did Dioscorus openly accept a denial of the consubstantiality or teach absorption of humanity, thus it is hard to find a direct heretical statement by Dioscorus himself (putting aside the controversy over Eutyches' accepted statement "before the incarnation two natures, but only one afterwards" accepted at Ephesus II, which you have rightly called sloppy). Instead, we are just left with a strange series of events where a known monophysite gets reinstated and a Duophysite patriarch gets exiled for deposing him as a Monophysite.
EOs would say that they are not talking about Jesus as a man "separate from" God, and so the anathema does not apply.
Here is where Cyril defended the EOs on this account in detail: In his letter to Acacius, bishop of Melitene, Saint Cyril wrote:
Now compare the bold part to the anathema above.
The only way to reconcile them is by saying that dividing the expressions between two forms does not mean that the two forms are separate persons.
We really need to be flexible in our thinking like Cyril was about the Antiochians in order to grasp and reconcile these kinds of distinctions.
See also the formula of reunion where they recognize that some theologians separate the expressions of Christ between the two natures.
The OO Archbiop Petrosian wrote that the crucified human nature "becomes" [an action] "a divine one."
Elder Porphyrious wrote "Together with Him human nature was resurrected. Now we can be resurrected and live eternally near Him."
http://www.johnsanidopoulos.com/2013/05/elder-porphyrios-and-joy-of-resurrection.html
The Elder does not mean that human nature collectively is a single person.
These abstract expressions are possible.
What do you think about this:
St. Cyril writes in Letter 46
Would you agree that it is helpful be flexible in thinking post-incarnation mainstream dyophysite language like Cyril was?
That is not what the Tome or Cyril mean when saying He suffered in his earthly nature in particular.
Just by me saying that ideas "work" and "cooperate" does not mean that I consider them to be persons.
There are "crimes against humanity", there are abuses against a person's humanity, "Humanity" collectively is hurt, the person's "humanity" is hurt. These are acceptable expressions found in modern language and doesn't mean that the humanity is a person.
The hot nature of a frying pan heats food. It doesn't mean that the nature is a separate being from the pan.
The Hunterian oration: delivered before the Royal College ...
Honoratus Leigh Thomas, Royal College of Surgeons of England - 1827
Of course, as in all cases of indiscriminate charity, his humanity was but too often abused...
When St John Chrysostom says nature, he does not mean it is a person or hypostasis. Likewise, when Paul says "every nature of beast", he does not mean that either as a person. He means category or collection. "Nature" can also mean something like "essence", as in "the nature of the beast".
So when Chalcedon says "in two natures", it does not mean a person either, because it says "two natures" and "one person" and "one hypostasis". So the reader's task is to read this phrase "in two natures" in agreement and consistent with the concept of "one person" to understand the right meaning. What "natures" can be in only one person? Categories or essences can, as we described above. So in accordance with rules of literature, that is the correct meaning.
My point in saying this was just that there is some major purpose for a council that asserts two categories, sets of properties, and essences - human and divine, which are meanings of "natures" in common speech.
In the case of Dioscorus, things are strange because even though in 449 Eutyches made a "sloppy" allegedly orthodox statement and got reinstated, it doesn't explain why Dioscorus would retroactively disagree with him getting desposed for monophysitism by Flavian in 448, for which he exiled Flavian. Do you see what I mean by retroactive disagreement over monophysitism?
A big tragic problem, Dzheremi, is that this very issue has been a major dividing point between our churches.
At Ephesus II: <<"Can you endure," asked Dioscorus, "to hear of two natures after the incarnation?" "Anathema to him that says it!" was the reply.>>
He doesn't specify "in two natures".
At Ephesus II, Dioscorus and Flavian didn't fight over whether Christ was "in" vs. "has" two natures, it was just Flavian's assertion of two natures after the union. Eutyches' declaration upheld at Ephesus II was "before the uni
The Coptic Orthodox Church Network says of Dioscorus' biography:
"When he saw that Leo, Archbishop of Rome, was teaching that Christ has two natures and two wills after the Union, he took the charge to refute this new belief. [At Chalcedon] They signed the document of the belief that Christ has two distinct and separate natures." http://www.copticchurch.net/synaxarium/1_7.html
(I think the "separate" part is incorrect though, Chalcedon's formula says inseparable.)
The Coptic theologian Tadros Malaty writes, summarizing how he sees Leo's views (a misquote though):
Severus of Antioch wrote:
That is, it looks like a logical contradiction to deny duality while at the same time deny mixing. If two countries unite to form a new country, then in some sense the two countries must remain present (eg. two member states with autonomy), or else they mixed together. If California and Oregon unite to form a new nation, either two states remain autonomously or they mixed so that they have no borders.
Cyril said in his second letter to Succensus:
"We recognise two natures in him[a basic human]; for there is one nature of the soul and another of the body, but we divide them only at a theoretical level".
Here, Cyril does recognize two natures in a person, giving the analogy of soul and body, and in that case he says that there is a theoretical division. And he openly gave this "two natures in man" analogy as an analogy to Christ.
But this is not the same as an example of something that: does not have two natures but only is from two natures with no mixing. To deny that something still has two natures and lacks mixing and is not one or the other from which it's composed seems to me to be likely a contradiction in concepts and terms.
Dzheremi,
What do you think of the Joint Commission's statements about Chalcedon's Creed:
Kindly,
Rakovsky.
You asked:
What was the name of this "completely different council"?Following the timeline of what actually happened (again, from the background material Price and Gaddis' translation of the acts of Chalcedon, 28 and following), it was Eutyches himself who asked for a council to be called after having been condemned by Flavian and company, not Dioscorus. ... Anyway, the Emperor (again, not HH St. Dioscorus) answered Eutyches' request for a council to overturn his condemnation, which he and his supporters were granted in November of 448 (this was not Ephesus II of 449, which Dioscorus chaired, but a completely different council).
What more would you like to know? I listed the source in the post, so you can find much more there.
The Constantinople Council under Flavian in 448 deposed Eutyches.
Then you said Eutyches was given a council in November 448 to overturn it. What was it called?
Then in 449 came Ephesus.
Here is what Wikipedia says:
He was accused of heresy by Domnus II of Antioch and Eusebius, bishop of Dorylaeum, at a synod presided over by Flavian at Constantinople in 448. His explanations deemed unsatisfactory, the council deposed him from his priestly office and excommunicated him. In 449, however, at the Second Council of Ephesus convened by Dioscorus of Alexandria who was under the impression that Eutyches had renounced the false belief of Monophysitism, overawed by the presence of a large number of Egyptian monks, not only was Eutyches reinstated to his office, but Eusebius, Domnus and Flavian, his chief opponents, were deposed.
Dioscorus' scheme differed from Eutyches, in that Eutyches I think really was a monophysite. He told Ephesus II that he believed the same thing all along, even though at Ephesus II he accepted the dual consubstantiality."In the Dioscorian construct, at no point did Christ actually have two natures."
Whoa...what? The Dioscorian construct? Surely you mean the Eutychian construct, since it's his confession before Ephesus II that we have been discussing, and your as yet unsourced quote about Christ always having had two natures (as this is what you reference again below).
But in neither Dioscorus' nor Eutyches' cases did Christ actually ever have two natures.
I would like some more details on this, because I've only seen that the Coptic church cast him out, not necessarily when Dioscorus was still in power.Eutyches was accepted back to communion at Ephesus II, chaired by HH St. Dioscorus, so I suppose in that way you could say he was accepted (but again, not by Dioscorus alone, but by the assembled bishops). He was later cast out of the Church by HH St. Dioscorus as well, as recorded in the Ethiopian synaxarium (posted earlier) and other sources.
You asked:
The EO answer is that the natures are not "separate", but rather "united". This is why Chalcedon accepts the hypostatic union, with the two natures united in one person.And even then, we both see the incarnation as unifying, but I guess the question is do we conceive of that unity as "driving out division" (to paraphrase Severus), or are the two natures still somehow to be considered separately as natures because He does some things that are appropriate to humanity and some that are appropriate to divinity?
EOs consider that "He does some things that are appropriate to humanity and some that are appropriate to divinity", and as a result they are able to mentally distinguish which actions are appropriate to either human nature or divine nature.
Some OOs I sense might not understand this, and imagine that since EOs distinguish those actions that implies Christ is two separate beings, but I think that this kind of criticism of EOs has the goal of labeling them Nestorian. In fact, it's common language and the Formula of Union mentions this practice of "dividing expressions".
As you said "I think both are ultimately internally consistent".
I meant Dioscorus, as Fr. Romanides said:"Dioscorus would accept neither that Christ has two natures nor is in two natures after the union."
Again, do you mean Eutyches?
However, Dioscoros simply rejected all talk of two natures after the union. When the imperial representatives asked [at Chalcedon] why Flavian was deposed since he did accept One Nature of the Logos Incarnate, Eustathius of Berytus admitted making a mistake. [ 57 ] Dioscoros, however, claimed that Flavian contradicted himself by accepting two natures after the union. http://www.romanity.org/htm/rom.08.en.st._cyrils_one_physis_or_hypostasis_of_god_the_log.htm#58
At Chalcedon, Dioscorus said: "The reason why Flavian was condemned was plainly this, that he asserted two natures after the incarnation. I have passages from the Fathers, Athanasius, Gregory, Cyril, to the effect that after the incarnation there were not two natures, but one incarnate nature of the Word." http://www.ccel.org/ccel/wace/biodict.html?term=Dioscorus%20(1),%20patriarch%20of%20Alexandria
Perhaps you are not aware, but HH St. Dioscorus accompanied St. Cyril, who was his chief mentor, to the Council of Ephesus in 431. To imagine that he would thereafter violate the cornerstone of Christology accepted there or otherwise go against HH St. Cyril's Christology, which is the Christology Dioscorus himself learned from the person who is credited with it, will really require some extraordinary evidence. And frankly, there is none. Please do not slander HH St. Dioscorus anymore in this thread or on this board by saying unproved things that are wrong about him and cast him as heretic in league with Eutyches, even after the evidence has been presented (including from his own trial at Chalcedon) that shows that this is not the case at all. I am asking you nicely. You do not have to agree with St. Dioscorus on any matter, but I will not tolerate any further attempt to link him to Eutychianism, which is patently false and unacceptable (and anyway, you have not supported with any evidence).
The book Christ in Christian Tradition By Aloys Grillmeier, raises an interesting question. It narrates a 6th c. dialogue between Hypatius the Chalcedonian metropolitan and Syriac Oriental Orthodox. Hypatius asked:
"How can you then describe Pat Dioscrous as orthodox even though in 449 at Ephesus with the bishops he declared the heretic Eutyches to be orthodox, but condemned Pat Flavian and the Bishop of Dorylaum? The Syriac report confirms that the teheme Eutyches-Dioscrous formed the main object of the first day's discussion. Agreement prevailed between both parties with regard to the condemnation of Eutyches,.... Nevertheless it was with satisfaction that they established that Hypatius had also condemned the Alexandrian Patriarch [Dioscrous] not on account of his teaching, but on account of his indiscretion in treating questions of faith."
This is a rational answer: Eutyches was a heretic, he gave a statement of faith at Ephesus II that was accepted as orthodox, and then Dioscorus who was in fact orthodox accepted it, but made a mistake of indiscretion in doing so.
Still, the question remains of why Dioscorus would commit that indiscretion, why would he rehabilitate the Monophysite Eutyches, when in Eutyches' own official statement Eutyches said that he had the right beliefs all along, and when it was known that Eutyches previously denied the dual consubstantiality. Saying that he made an indiscretion and that people make mistakes is a rational answer, it just seems like he would have known better. Dioscorus had announced that Flavian had been wrong to depose Eutyches, but it seems like he should have known that in fact Eutyches had denied the dual consubstantiality when Flavian deposed Eutyches.
On the face of it: Eutyches was a monophysite, taught that the divinity absorbed the human nature, then was accepted at Epehesus II for making an orthodox statement (but being silent and not being questioned otherwise at Ephesus II), then went back to teaching monophysitism afterwards. At no point did Dioscorus openly accept a denial of the consubstantiality or teach absorption of humanity, thus it is hard to find a direct heretical statement by Dioscorus himself (putting aside the controversy over Eutyches' accepted statement "before the incarnation two natures, but only one afterwards" accepted at Ephesus II, which you have rightly called sloppy). Instead, we are just left with a strange series of events where a known monophysite gets reinstated and a Duophysite patriarch gets exiled for deposing him as a Monophysite.
The anathema does not say that expressions may not be divided between "natures", it says:Okay...now we are reaching things that are really hard for me to understand. Because the anathema says, clear as day, that expressions may not be divided between the natures on the grounds that some are fit to be applied to God, and yet you are saying that St. Cyril did just that in his defense of John?
"If anyone shall divide between two persons or subsistences those expressions which are contained in the Evangelical and Apostolical writings, or which have been said concerning Christ by the Saints, or by himself, and shall apply some to him as to a man separate from the Word of God, and shall apply others to the only Word of God the Father, on the ground that they are fit to be applied to God: let him be anathema."
EOs would say that they are not talking about Jesus as a man "separate from" God, and so the anathema does not apply.
Here is where Cyril defended the EOs on this account in detail: In his letter to Acacius, bishop of Melitene, Saint Cyril wrote:
This letter is from an OO Bishop's essay: http://www.metroplit-bishoy.org/files/Dialogues/Byzantine/CYRIL2.DOCBut the brethren at Antioch, understanding in simple thoughts only those from which Christ is understood to be, have maintained a difference of natures, because, as I said, divinity and humanity are not the same in natural quality, but proclaimed one Son and Christ and Lord as being truly one; they say His person is one, and in no manner do they separate what has been united.
Neither do they admit the natural division as the author of the wretched inventions [Nestorius] was pleased to think, but they strongly maintain that only the sayings concerning the Lord are separated, not that they say that some of them separately are proper to the son, the Word of God the Father and others are proper to another one again, the one from a woman, but they say that some are proper to His divinity and others are proper to His humanity. For the same one is God and man. But they say that there are others which have been made common in a certain way and, as it were, look towards both, I mean both the divinity and the humanity.
Now compare the bold part to the anathema above.
The only way to reconcile them is by saying that dividing the expressions between two forms does not mean that the two forms are separate persons.
We really need to be flexible in our thinking like Cyril was about the Antiochians in order to grasp and reconcile these kinds of distinctions.
See also the formula of reunion where they recognize that some theologians separate the expressions of Christ between the two natures.
I think language is flexible enough to say things like this. His divinity is risen with himself. Jesus united with God, and with it he raised up his divine nature.But you wouldn't say "His human nature was born", right? Or "His divinity is risen"?
The OO Archbiop Petrosian wrote that the crucified human nature "becomes" [an action] "a divine one."
Elder Porphyrious wrote "Together with Him human nature was resurrected. Now we can be resurrected and live eternally near Him."
http://www.johnsanidopoulos.com/2013/05/elder-porphyrios-and-joy-of-resurrection.html
The Elder does not mean that human nature collectively is a single person.
These abstract expressions are possible.
Sure, he suffered "in" his flesh, hence "in" his humanity. I do not have mental trouble with that phrase, nor do the Coptic writers I cited.It is His humanity which allowed Him to become a sacrifice for us all, so in that sense it would be appropriate to say (and is said) that He suffered according to His humanity, but "in" it?
What do you think about this:
St. Cyril writes in Letter 46
Your excellency very rightly and with complete understanding has expounded the matter concerning the Passion of our Savior, by strongly contending that the only-begotten Son of God in so far as he is known to be and is God DID NOT ENDURE THE SUFFERInGS OF THE BODY IN HIS OWN NATURE, BUT SUFFERED RATHER IN HIS EARTHLY NATURE. For it was necessary and proper to maintain with reference to the one true Son both that he did not suffer in his divinity and that it is affirmed that he suffered in his humanity, for his flesh suffered.
Would you agree that it is helpful be flexible in thinking post-incarnation mainstream dyophysite language like Cyril was?
I agree.As in the humanity was separately experiencing things while the divinity was presumably off somewhere...not present during the crucifixion, because it is not fit that God should die? No, no, no, and a million times no.
That is not what the Tome or Cyril mean when saying He suffered in his earthly nature in particular.
There is an Orthodox saying that God became man so that man could become God. Here we have both ideas of divinity and humanity expressed, working in cooperation with each other.As I wrote in the other thread, is this not in some sense the point of Christianity, or at least in particular the crucifixion and resurrection of our Lord?
Just by me saying that ideas "work" and "cooperate" does not mean that I consider them to be persons.
According to the flexibility of language, I think it's OK to say that humanity is hurt, or a person's humanity is hurt.Fr. Peter Farrington.... "If I fall down, I am hurt. Humanity is not hurt." (I believe that is from his talk on the Orthodox Christology of St. Severus, available free of charge at the bottom of this page; perhaps you will enjoy it, if you wish.)
There are "crimes against humanity", there are abuses against a person's humanity, "Humanity" collectively is hurt, the person's "humanity" is hurt. These are acceptable expressions found in modern language and doesn't mean that the humanity is a person.
The hot nature of a frying pan heats food. It doesn't mean that the nature is a separate being from the pan.
The Hunterian oration: delivered before the Royal College ...
Honoratus Leigh Thomas, Royal College of Surgeons of England - 1827
Of course, as in all cases of indiscriminate charity, his humanity was but too often abused...
I think it's OK to say things like this and like "My soul magnifies the Lord." I think language has real flexibility.So it would be wrong to say "My soul is engaged in prayer"
Yes. This is a good proof that the word nature can be used in different ways, and that each time you must look to context to see it.This use of 'nature' in the homily of St. John Chrysostom (who is a saint, but was not a Copt and as far as I know did not receive his theological education in from Egyptians, and hence cannot be expected to necessarily use terms in conformity with the Alexandrian tradition anyway) is completely different than the use of the term as we have been discussing it. Here is the fuller context, up to the quoted portion:
"Since this heavenly birth cannot be described, neither does His coming amongst us in these days permit of too curious scrutiny. Though I know that a Virgin this day gave birth, and I believe that God was begotten before all time, yet the manner of this generation I have learned to venerate in silence and I accept that this is not to be probed too curiously with wordy speech.
For with God we look not for the order of nature, but rest our faith in the power of Him who works.
What shall I say to you; what shall I tell you? I behold a Mother who has brought forth; I see a Child come to this light by birth. The manner of His conception I cannot comprehend.
Nature here rested, while the Will of God labored. O ineffable grace!"
Please note the clause I added emphasis to. This whole homily is describing the mystery of Christ's birth from St. Mary, whereby "nature rested" in the sense of the "order of nature" which did not apply to Christ's birth (as He was born of a virgin, unlike the natural way by which all others have been born). Christ's birth was instead according to the will of God, not of the flesh.
So this is not talking about one nature or two natures of Christ, but the natural order of the world and how every naturally existing living thing and person except Christ comes into being.
When St John Chrysostom says nature, he does not mean it is a person or hypostasis. Likewise, when Paul says "every nature of beast", he does not mean that either as a person. He means category or collection. "Nature" can also mean something like "essence", as in "the nature of the beast".
So when Chalcedon says "in two natures", it does not mean a person either, because it says "two natures" and "one person" and "one hypostasis". So the reader's task is to read this phrase "in two natures" in agreement and consistent with the concept of "one person" to understand the right meaning. What "natures" can be in only one person? Categories or essences can, as we described above. So in accordance with rules of literature, that is the correct meaning.
Opposition to monophysitism is a reason for casting out Monophysites like Eutyches who denied the consubstantiality and believed in the post-incarnation divine nature only. The Council of Chalcedon's belief in two natures and two essences achieved that purpose. However, I understand the problem it makes for those who have semantic difficulty accepting two natures post-incarnation."One reason it's necessary is because there were people like Eutyches who, when pressured, would accept dual consubstantiality, but still would not actually accept that Christ still had a human nature and a divine nature, like I sense that OOs basically do. This can be shown by how he said at Ephesus II that he always had the right beliefs, even though his idea was that the human nature got dissolved like vinegar, according to the Coptic site I cited."
Isn't this a reason more for the casting out of Eutyches rather than those such as Dioscorus who were willing to and did cast him out for his heresy even after having accepted him back under what they could not have known at the time were false pretenses? (e.g., Dioscorus himself)
My point in saying this was just that there is some major purpose for a council that asserts two categories, sets of properties, and essences - human and divine, which are meanings of "natures" in common speech.
In the case of Dioscorus, things are strange because even though in 449 Eutyches made a "sloppy" allegedly orthodox statement and got reinstated, it doesn't explain why Dioscorus would retroactively disagree with him getting desposed for monophysitism by Flavian in 448, for which he exiled Flavian. Do you see what I mean by retroactive disagreement over monophysitism?
In Eutyches' case, Flavian was the accuser of Eutyches. So what does that say about Dioscorus' decision to depose Flavian for deposing Eutyches? I read about Ephesus II that Dioscorus reasoned that this was one reason why Flavian should be deposed, ie. since Flavian wrongly deposed Eutyches.From where I am sitting, Eutyches eventually proved his accusers true and Dioscorus eventually proved his accusers false, both according to what they actually did.
Accepting the main faith statement of the Council means the "Chalcedonian Creed", which says Christ is in one person, two natures, two essences. It is not a denial of Cyril's one nature, and Cyril's writings were collectively accepted. There is not a real requirement in Orthodoxy to accept every single canon or decision of a Council, whatever people might say, because there are in fact many canons that aren't accepted or observed from the 7 councils."I think it helps to say, I think they do not necessarily demand acceptance of the Tome. In practice churches just have to accept the main faith statement of the Council."
Isn't this just six of one, half a dozen of the other? I would assume the faith statement includes proclaiming the Tome as Orthodox, and the necessity of saying "in two natures", neither of which we will do (I know there are several places in the acts of the council where the accused are told "if you do not say in two natures, you will be deposed").
The fact that you use "exist" in the present tense, speaking of two natures, and saying "He has both natures" are statements by you that I agree with. The ease and common sense way that you put those phrases reflect to me that Christ does in fact, as a matter of common, normal speech, "have two natures."That is not true. The two natures exist by the simple fact that humanity and divinity, which our Lord is composed of, are not the same nature. They're different natures, and we do not confuse them by mixture, separation, dissolving, or any other way. So our Lord is from two natures by virtue of the fact that He is of humanity ('has his human nature', if you will) according to St. Mary His mother, and of divinity ('has his divine will') from God the Father. By Christ's existence in the flesh He has both natures. We just do not say He is 'in' two natures because again our understanding of the incarnation does not permit it without destroying the unity of the incarnation in the first place, so it's not possible.
A big tragic problem, Dzheremi, is that this very issue has been a major dividing point between our churches.
At Ephesus II: <<"Can you endure," asked Dioscorus, "to hear of two natures after the incarnation?" "Anathema to him that says it!" was the reply.>>
He doesn't specify "in two natures".
At Ephesus II, Dioscorus and Flavian didn't fight over whether Christ was "in" vs. "has" two natures, it was just Flavian's assertion of two natures after the union. Eutyches' declaration upheld at Ephesus II was "before the uni
The Coptic Orthodox Church Network says of Dioscorus' biography:
"When he saw that Leo, Archbishop of Rome, was teaching that Christ has two natures and two wills after the Union, he took the charge to refute this new belief. [At Chalcedon] They signed the document of the belief that Christ has two distinct and separate natures." http://www.copticchurch.net/synaxarium/1_7.html
(I think the "separate" part is incorrect though, Chalcedon's formula says inseparable.)
The Coptic theologian Tadros Malaty writes, summarizing how he sees Leo's views (a misquote though):
<<Leo wrote in his tome:” Christ really has two natures, He is both God and man, the one performs the miracles and the other accepts sufferings.” This teaching does not affirm Christ’s personal unity, but regards the natures as two persons.>>
http://www.saint-mary.net/books/14-4 Christology.pdfSeverus of Antioch wrote:
http://www.zeitun-eg.org/Coptic_interpretations_of_the_Fourth_Ecumenical_Council_(Chalcedon).pdfWhen we anathematise those who say Emmanuel has two natures after the union, and speak of the activities and properties of these, we are not saying this as subjecting to anathema the fact of, or naming, natures, or activities, or properties, but speaking of two natures after the union, and because consequent ly those natures...are divided completely and in everything
Yes, I was looking for an analogy or other way to test whether it's true or not that two things unite as one without mixing such that they are no longer two in any sense.You are right what the liturgy says, but that "does not mean that not affirming two natures after the union [doesn't] impl[y] mixture". I suppose that the liturgy could have a contradiction between implication and a counterassertion. To help me answer that, could say if besides the assertions made on christology, what two things are analogously united such that in no way do they remain two and also are not mixed or dissolved?
Analogously?
That is, it looks like a logical contradiction to deny duality while at the same time deny mixing. If two countries unite to form a new country, then in some sense the two countries must remain present (eg. two member states with autonomy), or else they mixed together. If California and Oregon unite to form a new nation, either two states remain autonomously or they mixed so that they have no borders.
Cyril said in his second letter to Succensus:
"We recognise two natures in him[a basic human]; for there is one nature of the soul and another of the body, but we divide them only at a theoretical level".
Here, Cyril does recognize two natures in a person, giving the analogy of soul and body, and in that case he says that there is a theoretical division. And he openly gave this "two natures in man" analogy as an analogy to Christ.
But this is not the same as an example of something that: does not have two natures but only is from two natures with no mixing. To deny that something still has two natures and lacks mixing and is not one or the other from which it's composed seems to me to be likely a contradiction in concepts and terms.
Dzheremi,
What do you think of the Joint Commission's statements about Chalcedon's Creed:
The Council of Chalcedon (451), we realize, can only be understood as reaffirming the decisions of Ephesus (431), and best understood in the light of the later Council of Constantinople (553). All councils, we have recognized, have to be seen as stages in an integral development and no council or event should be studied in isolation.
https://orthodoxjointcommission.wordpress.com/2013/12/15/aarhus-1964/
The Oriental Orthodox agree that the Orthodox are justified in their use of the two-natures formula, since they acknowledge that the distinction is “in thought alone” (th qewria monh). Cyril interpreted correctly this use in his letter to John of Antioch and his letters to Acacius of Melitene (PG 77, 184-201), to Eulogius (PG 77, 224-228) and to Succensus (PG 77, 228-245).
8. Both families accept the first three Ecumenical Councils, which form our common heritage. In relation to the four later Councils of the Orthodox Church, the Orthodox state that for them the above points 1-7 are the teachings also of the four later Councils of the Orthodox Church, while the Oriental Orthodox consider this statement of the Orthodox as their interpretation. With this understanding, the Oriental Orthodox respond to it positively.
https://orthodoxjointcommission.wordpress.com/2013/12/14/second-agreed-statement-1990/
Kindly,
Rakovsky.
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