Dzeremi,
It would be helpful to me to know more about this part:
What more would you like to know? I listed the source in the post, so you can find much more there.
In the Dioscorian construct, at no point did Christ actually have two natures.
Whoa...what? The
Dioscorian construct? Surely you mean the Eutychian construct, since it's his confession before Ephesus II that we have been discussing, and your as yet unsourced quote about Christ always having had two natures (as this is what you reference again below).
Before the incarnation, Christ could not have had two natures, although I know that Eutyches claimed this (I sympathize with your view that this was sloppy). And after the incarnation, Dioscorus denied that Christ had two natures.
Sigh. I thought we had made more progress than this. HH St. Dioscorus refused to confess two natures
after the union, as this is improper, but not that Christ had two natures period. If I recall correctly, at some other point in this thread you yourself produced something from Dioscorus at Chalcedon that said exactly that, that Flavian was condemned (in Dioscorus' view) for saying that Christ was
in two natures after the union, rather than being
from two natures which were united with/through/at the union (the human and the divine, which He retains perfectly without confusion or mixture in our Christology). Please, friend...for your sake...these relatively minute linguistic differences ('from' vs. 'to', 'after' vs. 'through', etc.) really do make a difference when it comes to understanding our Christology.
Merely using the phrase "two natures" in the course of theology was not banned by Dioscorus, but in practice to say that Christ had two natures was banned, except for the "sloppy" wording about it that you mentioned.
Again, what is objected to is saying that He is
in two natures
after the union, not that He is composed of two natures -- the humanity and the divinity. We are
miaphysites, not
monophysites. We believe in the particular natures wholly and completely, we just do not separate them after the union. For us, the Word is
in one incarnate nature (
from two), not one simple nature missing either the divinity or the humanity for any reason (which was Eutyches' accursed position by saying foolishness like that Jesus' divinity absorbed His humanity).
By deposing the Pat. of Constantinople, the council imposed Dioscorus' belief on the whole church at a time when neither the Pope of Rome nor Patriarch of Constantinople accepted it. According to the presentation by St Mina's Church that I presented, it was intended as an Ecumenical council. Thus, it was answering a doctrinal question on this matter.
Again, it may have been intended as one, but it was not accepted as one. (Though it was technically still 'on the books' until Chalcedon overturned it, I don't think anyone would seriously consider a council that was not upheld for even three years -- not to mention to have sparked as much controversy as Ephesus II did -- to have succeeded in being considered ecumenical by any stretch of the imagination.)
Thank you for including this. I have the book in question, but do not read it often but for reference. Reading it there in context, what we see is Eutyches' confused readings of the fathers, saying that they said "from two natures before the union", when they did not say that. I have some of those same writings, and in fact was reading St. Cyril's "On the Unity of Christ" earlier today while reading and thinking about this thread. In his writings, the great saint says that we confess one nature after the incarnation, as the incarnation has united the two natures in an inseparable unity, but I do not recall anything like "from two natures before the union". Though I suppose it is a question of when you consider the union to be affected. I could see someone saying "from two natures before the union" if they mean, as we do, that the union drives out the division between the two (this is, after all, from St. Severus), but not if they mean that therefore St. Mary must've preexisted, given Christ some kind of non-human flesh (as it would have to be, as humans do not preexist), etc. The problem is in simply saying "from two natures before the union" and not explaining further so as to clarify that you do
not in fact mean that Christ preexisted in human flesh. That is sloppy, as Eutyches was known to be. So I'm glad to see now what you were referring to, even if it wasn't at Ephesus II.
I read on one Coptic site that Dioscorus condemned Eutyches but then accepted him at some point, but then the Coptic Church excommunicated Eutyches. I wish I had more precise information on that.
Eutyches was accepted back to communion at Ephesus II, chaired by HH St. Dioscorus, so I suppose in that way you could say he was accepted (but again, not by Dioscorus alone, but by the assembled bishops). He was later cast out of the Church by HH St. Dioscorus as well, as recorded in the Ethiopian synaxarium (posted earlier) and other sources.
Thanks for clarifying! This was my suspicion.
Glad to be of help.
In my own view, it's tragic that even though OOs and EOs don't follow Eutyches in his confused christology, the churches divided over what I see as sloppy language, since in my view normal language could express that something is in one whole nature or in two natures at once.
Yes, sure. What gets me is that we all agree on the nature
s that He is composed of -- neither we OO or you EO are saying that one or the other does not exist -- so even to say it is a debate over natures is perhaps not as precise as it could be. I would say it is more about our different received traditions regarding how we have been taught to think about the incarnation. And even then, we both see the incarnation as unifying, but I guess the question is do we conceive of that unity as "driving out division" (to paraphrase Severus), or are the two natures still somehow to be considered separately
as natures because He does some things that are appropriate to humanity and some that are appropriate to divinity? This is not a problem for us, as I have written before, since in the Alexandrian and wider OO traditions, whether it is a thing that is appropriate to divinity or to humanity, the point that is stressed is that
the one Christ is doing it, making therefore everything that He does a manifestation of the unity of the natures into the one incarnate nature. Whereas it seems like for EO you guys say "well, He does X, which is characteristic of humanity, and so a manifestation of His human nature" or something like that, making everything He does therefore a manifestation also of the unity, but in addition of the manifestation of this or that nature, depending on the action in question. So there is a difference there, but it takes some time to fully apprehend. I think both are ultimately internally consistent, but not the same.
Dioscorus would accept neither that Christ has two natures nor is in two natures after the union.
Again, do you mean Eutyches?
And again, the question is not just saying "two natures" without any context, but whether it is through or after the incarnation.
Perhaps you are not aware, but HH St. Dioscorus accompanied St. Cyril, who was his chief mentor, to the Council of Ephesus in 431. To imagine that he would thereafter violate the cornerstone of Christology accepted there or otherwise go against HH St. Cyril's Christology, which is the Christology Dioscorus himself learned from the person who is credited with it, will really require some extraordinary evidence. And frankly, there is none. Please do not slander HH St. Dioscorus anymore in this thread or on this board by saying unproved things that are wrong about him and cast him as heretic in league with Eutyches, even after the evidence has been presented (including from his own trial at Chalcedon) that shows that this is not the case at all. I am asking you nicely. You do not have to agree with St. Dioscorus on any matter, but I will not tolerate any further attempt to link him to Eutychianism, which is patently false and unacceptable (and anyway, you have not supported with any evidence).
This is a really interesting issue you brought up, how Cyril's anathema said:
IV. If anyone shall divide between two persons or subsistences those expressions (φωνάς) which are contained in the Evangelical and Apostolical writings, or which have been said concerning Christ by the Saints, or by himself, and shall apply some to him as to a man separate from the Word of God, and shall apply others to the only Word of God the Father, on the ground that they are fit to be applied to God: let him be anathema.
It's interesting because people were accusing of John Antiochene of doing this and Cyril replied by openly defending John Antiochene on that very account. Neither John nor the Tome said that Jesus was a man separate from God, but both John, the Tome, and St Cyril in his defense of John all divided certain expressions between
Jesus as man or Jesus as God.
Okay...now we are reaching things that are really hard for me to understand. Because the anathema says, clear as day, that expressions may not be divided between the natures on the grounds that some are fit to be applied to God, and yet you are saying that St. Cyril did just that in his defense of John? Or am I misreading you? What do you mean? Where did he do that, and was is the full context? I read the short excerpt you posted earlier from the defense, but there was no context there, and even the excerpt appeared to be edited. Can you point me to somewhere online that I can read the full defense? I find it hard to believe that St. Cyril would somehow violate his own anathemas in the process of defending someone or for any reason. This cannot be right. I am forced to consider that it is as I have said from the beginning: that none of us -- no one in the EO or OO church, as far as I know -- has any problem saying that He does some things as appropriate to humanity, and some things as appropriate to divinity. This is not the same as attributing those things themselves to the
nature(s). Here, I'll say it right now: Jesus is a man, and so He ate, because that is characteristic of man (i.e., because He was a man, He ate as man does). Jesus is God, and so He walked upon water, because such miracles are characteristic of God (i.e., because He is God, He preformed miracles as God does). They are manifestations of His humanity and divinity, respectively. There. I have affirmed both natures which make up the one nature of the word of God without dividing them, because I have placed emphasis first and foremost on the fact that Christ is doing these things, instead of saying that the natures do them, as the Tome does. And I am not even fit to pronounce St. Cyril's holy name! It's simply not that hard to do...
And Paul did the same thing in Romans 1:
Rom. 1 about:
His Son, who was
born of a descendant of David according to the flesh,
4who was
declared the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead, according to the Spirit of holiness, Jesus Christ our Lord,
The action of being born in flesh is associated with Jesus as descendant of David (a human)
And the action of being raised is associated with him as God.
Yes. You see I do not have any problem with this. This is essentially the same as what I just wrote. But you wouldn't say "His human nature was born", right? Or "His divinity is risen"? Of course not! Because they don't act separately, because they are not separated, and natures do not act. Christ is born. Christ is risen. (Alithos anesti!
)
These are both actions that Paul is dividing between Jesus as God and Jesus as man.
I do not read them that way, and I do not think they must be read that way.
Neither the Tome nor Paul nor Cyril's defense of John for doing this ever say that Jesus is two "separate" "persons" or "hypostases"(subsistences) as banned by St. Cyril in that anathema.
True, but the language of the Tome is such that at some points, previously discussed, it treats the natures as separate experiencers or receivers of different actions. That is wrong.
It seems OK to me to say that Jesus physically ate according to his humanity, since we say that he suffered in the flesh. He died according to his human nature, not in his immortal divine nature.
Ate according to His humanity, yes. Definitely. Again, some things are according to humanity, and some things are according to divinity, but as it is the one Christ who is doing everything He does, it is wrong therefore to say that He ate in His humanity, in the same way that the Tome says "each nature performs the functions proper to it", or whatever the exact wording is. Natures do not work this way. Speaking of...
I notice that the Coptic Heritage website says:
http://www.copticheritage.org/studies/meghalo
The wording here is sloppy. It is His humanity which allowed Him to become a sacrifice for us all, so in that sense it would be appropriate to say (and is said) that He suffered
according to His humanity, but "in" it? As in the humanity was separately experiencing things while the divinity was presumably off somewhere...not present during the crucifixion, because it is not fit that God should die? No, no, no, and a million times no. As I wrote in the other thread, is this not in some sense
the point of Christianity, or at least in particular the crucifixion and resurrection of our Lord? Of course it is not fit that God should be crucified, and yet it happened, as it is likewise unfit for man to resurrect from the dead, and yet that happened, too. So the entire event, taken as a whole, testifies to Jesus' humanity and divinity. And so to focus on one to the exclusion of the other due to concerns of what is proper to God...God decides what is proper to God, and we all testify that He willingly gave up His life for us according to His own will, so it is wrong then to say "but this can't happen because He's God" -- rather, it happened
because He is God, and this is what is most befits Him according to His own plan and the economy of salvation which He has brought to bear in His own good time. This is why Christ's crucifixion is not the same the crucifixion of any man, and God as we experience Him in Christianity is not the same as the gods that other religions worship. We have in our faith the true God, the creator and sustainer of all that is and all that will ever be, who comes to us on earth, blesses our nature in Himself by becoming incarnate in the womb of the all-holy Virgin Theotokos, and in confirmation of the scriptures dies and rises again so that we may have eternal life. Did He 'need' to do any of that, in the sense that man has certain 'needs' befitting his limitations as man? No. Or, rather, I should not presume to say such a thing, because God's ways are not my ways. The point is that this is what He did, 'unbefitting' as it is to some. Read again St. Athanasius' masterful work on the incarnation if you should have any doubts. I think also the holy Athanasius makes that same point much more eloquently than I ever could (that God did these things for very specific reasons, even though the Jews and pagans will not believe it). We are to respect God's prerogatives as God.
In one of the Coptic fraction prayers to the Son, we say that "(He) loved us and because of His love He wanted to save us from eternal damnation; but since death was in the way of our salvation, He longed to go through it because of His love for us." This is really it. It is late now and there is much that could be written on this topic, but since I am away from my books for the foreseeable future, I would rather recommend to you a book by a Coptic author named Daniel Fanous called "Taught By God: Making Sense of the Difficult Sayings of Jesus". It was published a few years ago by the Orthodox Research Institute in Massachusetts, which as far as I can tell is an EO publisher somehow connected to SVS, so I'm assuming that it is okay for you to read (i.e., that they would not publish anything that goes against their own faith and church). As I recall, this book goes into detail regarding the crucifixion in its later chapters, and really unpacks the Coptic view of how to look at the crucifixion relative to Christ's nature(s).
It's just that as a matter of grammar I am showing that it is fine to attribute one action to one nature of something and another action to another nature, and this phraseology is perfectly fine and does not in any way imply that the thing is in two.
It depends on how you are doing the attributing, though. Again, to say "He does some things according to humanity and some according to divinity" is perfectly acceptable. But to say "His divinity" or "His humanity" does/receives/experiences this or that thereby makes the nature itself the agent, and natures simply do not act on their own. That's not something that happens. Since you've mentioned Fr. Peter Farrington before, I think I'll quote him on this one, since he is apparently a source from which you get OO doctrine (and from what I have seen, a very good one): "If I fall down, I am hurt.
Humanity is not hurt." (I believe that is from his talk on the Orthodox Christology of St. Severus, available free of charge at the bottom of
this page; perhaps you will enjoy it, if you wish.)
The soothing nature of Coptic music calms me, the clean nature of a sacred spring refreshes me, the loving nature of my relationship with my brother fills me with love too, the loving nature of God fills and helps the world heal. All of these expressions are fine, and do not imply that these natures are themselves beings simply because in abstract language they act or cause results.
Yes, but what all of these are missing, and what I had hoped that you would pick up by now, is that we are speaking of Christ, a
person. And so those actions that the person does are to be attributed to Him, not separate natures. It would be more akin to saying something like: When I pray, I seek to be completely engaged in prayer. Though I remain of course in my physical body, which is located in physical space, engaged in physical action (prostrations, chant, etc.), I seek to also through the prayer to awaken my soul and be illumined and purified by Christ my God and all of the saints who have pleased God since the beginning who pray with me and intercede on my behalf. So the human and the spiritual are together, but they are never separated. The physical actions are not extra adornments to accompany the prayer, they are indeed part of it. So it would be wrong to say "My soul is engaged in prayer" if by that I meant that because my body as a physical object cannot pray absent my soul's intention (it could certainly perform the physical motions involved in prayer, but that is not praying), it is somehow not present. Of course it is present. Wherever I go, there it is. I am my body and my soul, and the two cannot be separated within me. To attempt to do so would not even make sense. Nor does the presence of both make me into 'two people', of course. I am one person, and everything I do is something that I am doing, not just my soul or body are doing in accordance with what is appropriate for one or the other. My body is not eating, my soul is not praying, etc. --
I am eating,
I am praying, etc.
Sure. I don't see that as in conflict with "whether or not this act or that act is appropriate to humanity or divinity." As yourself said: "We recognize and always have recognized that He did some things as appropriate to divinity and some things as appropriate to divinity".
Good.
I understand that Copts don't say that one nature or the other acted. But it's not because they don't use the idea of a nature experiencing something, but because they don't use the idea of individual natures after the union.
Things are experienced
according to their nature (I am a man, so I experience things that are unique to being a man), but the natures themselves do not experience things, no (my manliness as a 'nature' doesn't experience anything, because manliness has no capability of experiencing anything, because it is a concept and not a person).
Natures do undergo things in Coptic expressions too, because that's just part of language:
In the example above, "nature" is used to mean set of characteristics. That's the normal meaning of "nature", and reflects why it's OK to say Jesus had two natures or sets of characteristics.
St. Paul American Coptic Orthodox Church
"Nature here rested, while the Will of God labored. O ineffable grace!"
https://www.facebook.com/StPaulOC/posts/862732093770751:0
This use of 'nature' in the homily of St. John Chrysostom (who is a saint, but was not a Copt and as far as I know did not receive his theological education in from Egyptians, and hence cannot be expected to necessarily use terms in conformity with the Alexandrian tradition anyway) is completely different than the use of the term as we have been discussing it. Here is the fuller context, up to the quoted portion:
"Since this heavenly birth cannot be described, neither does His coming amongst us in these days permit of too curious scrutiny. Though I know that a Virgin this day gave birth, and I believe that God was begotten before all time, yet the manner of this generation I have learned to venerate in silence and I accept that this is not to be probed too curiously with wordy speech.
For with God we look not for the order of nature, but rest our faith in the power of Him who works.
What shall I say to you; what shall I tell you? I behold a Mother who has brought forth; I see a Child come to this light by birth. The manner of His conception I cannot comprehend.
Nature here rested, while the Will of God labored. O ineffable grace!"
Please note the clause I added emphasis to. This whole homily is describing the mystery of Christ's birth from St. Mary, whereby "nature rested" in the sense of the "order of nature" which did not apply to Christ's birth (as He was born of a virgin, unlike the natural way by which all others have been born). Christ's birth was instead according to the will of God, not of the flesh.
So this is not talking about one nature or two natures of Christ, but the natural order of the world and how every naturally existing living thing and person except Christ comes into being.
One reason it's necessary is because there were people like Eutyches who, when pressured, would accept dual consubstantiality, but still would not actually accept that Christ still had a human nature and a divine nature, like I sense that OOs basically do. This can be shown by how he said at Ephesus II that he always had the right beliefs, even though his idea was that the human nature got dissolved like vinegar, according to the Coptic site I cited.
Isn't this a reason more for the casting out of Eutyches rather than those such as Dioscorus who were willing to and did cast him out for his heresy even after having accepted him back under what they could not have known at the time were false pretenses? (e.g., Dioscorus himself)
From where I am sitting, Eutyches eventually proved his accusers true and Dioscorus eventually proved his accusers false, both according to what they actually did.
I think it helps to say, I think they do not necessarily demand acceptance of the Tome. In practice churches just have to accept the main faith statement of the Council.
Isn't this just six of one, half a dozen of the other? I would assume the faith statement includes proclaiming the Tome as Orthodox, and the necessity of saying "in two natures", neither of which we will do (I know there are several places in the acts of the council where the accused are told "if you do not say in two natures, you will be deposed").
What I meant was he said IF Eutyches is heretic......., putting that hypothetically with "if". He did not denounce him as heretical in that phrase.
True. It is meant to show, in contradiction of his accusers ideas, that his concern was with the faith, and not with Eutyches as a person.
Can you show when exactly Dioscorus himsely decided definitively to excommunicate him?
I do not know the exact year, but it is sometime after his condemnation at Chalcedon, so it had to have been during the four year period of exile that followed that before he died.
If Eutyches' statement at Ephesus II was OK, it was not wrong for Dioscorus to reinstate him, I agree. But my question was also why Dioscorus would not just reinstate him, but punish Flavian for deposing Eutyches if in fact Eutyches had been wrong during his initial deposal by Flavian? Remember, the reconciliation should still have been in effect. Flavian hadn't deposed Dioscorus, only the agreed-on heretic Eutyches, the deposal of which caused his punishment by Dioscorus.
I presented a little background on the council before, but there's a bit more to the political context that I had hoped to leave out (because I don't want to open up talking about your St. Leo in a bad way to show that politics played a factor in both sides' actions): HH St. Dioscorus chaired the council that found Eutyches' statement acceptable, which of course involved overturning what Flavian et al. had done. The enmity between Dioscorus and certain people close to Flavian was known. Some of the people who originally accused Eutyches were apparently upset with Dioscorus and in effect used the charges of heresy against the monk (which were well founded) as a way of getting to Dioscorus, so it was appropriate that Dioscorus act against Flavian's party (sort of similar to how Chalcedonians treat Dioscorus' striking of Leo from the diptych as proof of his heresy without keeping in mind or realizing that this was a reaction on the part of Dioscorus to Leo's earlier decision to do so to Dioscorus). Dioscorus by basically all accounts inherited his predecessor's zeal for Orthodoxy, but not his refinement. The spirit of reconciliation that characterized St. Cyril's dealing with John of Antioch was not present in either Dioscorus
or Leo (though from what I've read, it seems like Flavian at first tried to deal more moderately with Eutyches, until it became clear that there really was a problem there that needed to be dealt with).
But there was a misunderstanding between them about natures. It's hard to be sure that these were exactly two totally different traditions, Alexandrian v. Greek, because of the reconciliation. There were people from both cultures who agreed with the opposite "side". There were pro-Dioscorus patriachs. Juvenaly switched sides.
I think it's better to say that until the schism there was a misunderstanding between people rather than two substantively different traditions.
Different philosophical traditions, I suppose, but certainly connecting at some points. It is clear from the earlier conflict with the Antiochians that there were some pretty major differences between them and the Alexandrians, though of course it was not so down to the individual level (there were also a minority of Armenians who did agree with Chalcedon; and of course the whole of the Georgians and Albanians switched from OO to EO at some later date).
It is important to note that it was not Coptic (language) but Greek that was the primary vehicle for dissemination of anti-Chalcedonianism in Egypt. Even our most celebrated Coptic-language author, St. Shenouda the Archimandrite (my baptismal saint, too), had received his education in Greek, though he lived some time before Chalcedon. It was considered completely normal for ethnic Copts to patronize Greek culture, as they had done since the first Greeks came to Egypt and worked as tutors to the children of important royals, hundreds of years before Christ. So even more deep-seeded cultural reasons than the formula of reunion, the Alexandrian (Coptic) Church shares a lot in common with the Greeks and always has. But the philosophical tradition, though in some senses modeled on Greek (and of course expressed in Greek; St. Cyril wrote in Greek, not Coptic), nevertheless had its own emphasis, we could say. It was the aforementioned St. Shenouda who would ultimately free Coptic theology from the use of Greek by developing Coptic into a written idiom suitable for delivering the Copts' already existing theology, but Greek was very much still used in Egypt until long after Chalcedon (and in fact, long after even the Arab conquest, though its use declined sharply at that point, as did the use of Coptic by the end of the 8th century, when Arabic was decreed to be the working language of the state, which forced many to give up other languages and adopt Arabic in order to be able to earn a living).
I sympathize with what you are saying in the above paragraph. Your objections about the accursed Armenian thing is correct, and I don't consider it anything hardly essential for EOs.
Thank you. That's good to know.
By analogy, I made a passing comment on OC.net calling Jesus "made" by God, and a certain person we have discussed flipped out, saying I was implying Arianism, until I actually showed the quote by Athanasius explicitly calling Jesus "made" (as in incarnated).
Made as in incarnate...hmmm...alright, then. I could see that, though I can't remember having read it from the saint myself. Maybe you just caught the OC.net person on a bad day.
Another great example is the controversy of "Replacement Theology." I find it very analogous to the EO-OO abstract/etymology debate on "nature". There are mainstream Christians who denounce "Replacement Theology" of some Orthodox writers because they say that the Church does not "replace" Israel, it continues it. Due to my flexible use of language, I am able to see how "Replacement" theology is not in conflict with Israel's continuation. Yet Orthodox writers who agree in substance with each other are on opposite sides of the fence on "Replacement" when in fact the issue between them is very abstract and etymological. I would be glad to share with you my paper on this if you are open to it.
Thank you. Perhaps some other time. I will be taking a break for a little while soon to deal with other issues.
But the Creed "one hypostasis" and "in two natures" is a main statement there. One easy answer would be to just use a simple approach and ask totally dispassionately and without bias and in a flexible way if it's OK as a matter of language to say that a single entity is in two natures. And then we turn to language and find that it is. So at an intellectual level the problem is extremely simple to solve for me, just like the problems of "made" and "replacement" that I mentioned before.
Intellectually, it may be easy, but practically we are not all intellectuals...even functionally, we are not all intellectuals.
And then the next challenge is if we can't mentally deal with such a simple phrase, then do we need to decide about it? It's in an ecumenical council for EOs. Do we need to stick with our ecumenical councils if the statements in them we consider right and reflecting truth? I think the normal answers for EOs and OOs would be Yes. It's hard to imagine EOs or OOs giving up Councils two or three, either, even just over a mere grammar misunderstanding, like if people can't linguistically handle the word "Catholic" in the Nicene creed. Could they? So that's a hard place - being faced with a Council that makes a linguistically acceptable statement for our POV.
So we are between a rock and a hardplace.
Ehh...perhaps. I don't believe that it is all a matter of language, although yet in another way basically everything is. All is know is that when I go to church, I don't hear or observe anything heretical coming from my people or our priests. Even the people with no theological education and just a general hunch of what is right and what isn't (which is most people) are generally correct in that hunch. And, like the use of "Catholic" in the Creed, if you ask them, they will say "Oh...that's easy...we mean this, and not that" (whatever other churches teach about the same word). So it's more important to me that people (especially myself) know what is within the bounds of our tradition, since you really do find all of these uses of language that
can support either position. I recognize that it can. I recognize that we are both working from traditions that developed before the schism. We are just convinced that ours are correct and you are convinced that yours are. And as of today, that is where we stand.
OK. When you said you are OK with talk of two natures I thought you meant the idea of there still being two natures after the union. If there are not two natures after the union anymore, then it's not like at any point there were actually two natures, which would make it pointless to talk about them as two natures.
That is not true. The two natures exist by the simple fact that humanity and divinity, which our Lord is composed of, are not the same nature. They're different natures, and we do not confuse them by mixture, separation, dissolving, or any other way. So our Lord is from two natures by virtue of the fact that He is of humanity ('has his human nature', if you will) according to St. Mary His mother, and of divinity ('has his divine will') from God the Father.
By Christ's existence in the flesh He has both natures. We just do not say He is 'in' two natures because again our understanding of the incarnation does not permit it without destroying the unity of the incarnation in the first place, so it's not possible.
You are right what the liturgy says, but that "does not mean that not affirming two natures after the union [doesn't] impl[y] mixture". I suppose that the liturgy could have a contradiction between implication and a counterassertion. To help me answer that, could say if besides the assertions made on christology, what two things are analogously united such that in no way do they remain two and also are not mixed or dissolved?
Analogously? No, I cannot. Nothing is like the Lord our God who is both divine and human in perfect and inseparable unity by design of His birth. (Though I suppose if you must have an analogy I tried earlier with my point about prayer. It's not really a direct analogy, though, as I can never stand in the place of God...Lord have mercy."If You, O Lord, should count iniquities, who shall stand?")
The example you gave said that we do not "divide" the natures after the union, not that we do not speak of two natures after the union. In the Chalcedonian scheme, the natures are joined, rather than totally divided, yet remain identifiable that they are both there.
You say there remain two as a way to say that they are both there. We say that there is one...as a way to maintain that they are both there. I explained this already in that bit about how for us His every action confirms His unity while for you it also confirms the existence of the two natures as 'separate' -- in the sense of being enumerated separately at least, according to the actions that you say each performs -- within the one hypostasis of Christ.
In the example above, Cyril did speak of "two united natures" in the incarnation and in the present ("there are" vs. "there were"). EOs agree with that statement. If "there are" "two united natures", and not just one united nature, it implies there are still two natures.
No, since the Cyrilian formula is two natures which are united
into one -- again, mia physis tou Theou Logou
sesarkomene (incarnate).
To say "united" is an attribute of the natures. In this scheme, Christ has both natures and they have been united, such that he has "two united natures", not just "one whole united nature". The phrase itself two united natures means that both of the two are present.
Take for example the idea that two lands are united as one. If they remain distinct lands, we say two united lands. Otherwise we say only one united land.
Eh...I'd rather just stick with the witness of the fathers. St. Cyril writes about how to think about unification in "On the Unity of Christ", when he observes "One can not speak of things 'united' when there is only one thing to start with; there must be two or more." (I only have it in pdf, which does not bear a publisher's imprint, but it is on page 77 of my copy.)
So, following that (especially in the context in which he writes only a few sentences later "We say that there is one Son, and that He has one nature even when He is considered as having assumed flesh endowed with a rational soul"), we can say that in our understanding Christ is a union of two natures into one without affirming that He is in two natures after the incarnation. Your earlier assertion that Dioscorus would not have believed that Christ ever had two natures is false. You are not understanding OO Christology to say such a thing, because for us the incarnation itself is the proof that He had two, because He is
composed of two. We just do not say He is 'in' two because with the incarnation the two become one (mia) nature.
I suspect that you are persisting in the Chalcedonian understanding that the natures are preserved distinctly in the actions pertaining to one or the other, but as I hope I have made clear, this is not how we see things at all, and indeed it is not necessary to have such an understanding in order to affirm Christ's divinity and humanity.
