NOTE: I edited this OP in light of the discusion and added relevant clarifications and explanations. The argument did not change, however.
Hello all, this is probably my favourite argument in apologetics and I'd like it to be discussed here.
It goes like this:
1. If objective moral values exist, then God exists.
2. Objective moral values exist.
3. Therefore God exists.
Objective moral values: moral values (right or wrong) about actions that exist independently of us and our judgment, independently of us being able to discern them or agreeing with them. God is the objective judge of these values and the only viable and consistent explanation for their existence.
God: the personal creator of the universe with these basic characteristics: omnibenevolent, omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent.
A moral value is something subjective, meaning that it can be asserted only by a subject (a person) and not by an object (a rock for instance). Therefore, if someone has an unfallible moral judgment, he is a viable reference point for moral values. God is both a person and morally perfect, therefore he is a viable objective reference point. No one else is morally perfect, therefore, he is the only viable reference point, making him the objective reference for moral values.
One example of an objective moral wrong: Hitler's holocaust. If no objective reference point exist to discern the rightness or wrongness of the holocaust, or any other act for that matter, then it is either morally neutral (neither right nor wrong) or capable of holding two moral nature, depending on the relative/subjective reference point you use (e.g. whoever's opinion that are contradicting). In this case, it could be Hitler, and a Jew who went through a concentration camp.
If God doesn't exist and Christianity is wrong, and if we take the naturalistic perspective as it's competing explanation, then objective moral values can't exist. Why? One could say that they have developped to insure social stability and well-being but that would still make them subjective. It would mean they don't really exist and that we are simply delusional, holding a false perspective of reality.
Ok now, how can we know moral values objectively exist? Well, how can we know anything exists? It is true, the outside world could be just an illusion, depending on our background beliefs and worldview, and so could moral values but we intuitively know they're real. We trust our senses to tell us about the external world and we also trust our cousciousness to tell us that right and wrong really exist.
The existence of objective moral values is a basic premise. That means that like the existence of chairs in the world, we assume they do; we take them for granted.
One thing we recognize and take for granted is the intrinsic worth of a human being. But what gives a human being worth? Again, according to naturalism, how can this be true? It cannot.
When we say "I have rights", what or rather who gives you those rights? Rights, to my knowledge, are rarely given by impersonal concepts such as "nature" and "the universe". So in that perspective, a person claiming ot be a moral relativist has to be ready to admit, when a wrong is commited, even a grave one like the holocaust, that it is acceptable, normal even. Indeed, if God does not exist, but only a cold, indifferent and impersonal universe exists, then what more is to be expected out of life?
Nothing but death. For if we come from nothing, why expect a different destination?
In contrast, when we are outraged by a wrong, it presupposes that things ought to be better... So either we're completely delusional or the world really oughts to be better and the things like evil, suffering and death ought not to exist. That is also why the argument from evil is actually an argument in favor of God's existence.
"Oughting to, or oughting not to" implies a moral obligation to do or not do something. Moral facts, such as I ought not to be tortured for the sheer pleasure of a psychopath, aren't like normal facts, such as the earth is round; moral facts are prescriptive rather than descriptive. However, if we admit that moral facts are more than just mere opinion and as something that transcends us and bounds us all to them, then we must conclude that a prescription implies a prescriber.
Sources I've used:
http://www.shenvi.org/Essays/ObjectiveMoralValues.htm#IV
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/transcript-moral-argument
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-new-atheism-and-five-arguments-for-god#ixzz43NachoCS
http://powertochange.com/blogposts/2012/03/06/i-do-not-like-blue-covers-2/ (I took some stuff from an article from Michael Horner that I have in French version at home but did not find the complete version on the internet yet)
http://www.existence-of-god.com/moral-argument.html
Hello all, this is probably my favourite argument in apologetics and I'd like it to be discussed here.
It goes like this:
1. If objective moral values exist, then God exists.
2. Objective moral values exist.
3. Therefore God exists.
Objective moral values: moral values (right or wrong) about actions that exist independently of us and our judgment, independently of us being able to discern them or agreeing with them. God is the objective judge of these values and the only viable and consistent explanation for their existence.
God: the personal creator of the universe with these basic characteristics: omnibenevolent, omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent.
A moral value is something subjective, meaning that it can be asserted only by a subject (a person) and not by an object (a rock for instance). Therefore, if someone has an unfallible moral judgment, he is a viable reference point for moral values. God is both a person and morally perfect, therefore he is a viable objective reference point. No one else is morally perfect, therefore, he is the only viable reference point, making him the objective reference for moral values.
One example of an objective moral wrong: Hitler's holocaust. If no objective reference point exist to discern the rightness or wrongness of the holocaust, or any other act for that matter, then it is either morally neutral (neither right nor wrong) or capable of holding two moral nature, depending on the relative/subjective reference point you use (e.g. whoever's opinion that are contradicting). In this case, it could be Hitler, and a Jew who went through a concentration camp.
If God doesn't exist and Christianity is wrong, and if we take the naturalistic perspective as it's competing explanation, then objective moral values can't exist. Why? One could say that they have developped to insure social stability and well-being but that would still make them subjective. It would mean they don't really exist and that we are simply delusional, holding a false perspective of reality.
Ok now, how can we know moral values objectively exist? Well, how can we know anything exists? It is true, the outside world could be just an illusion, depending on our background beliefs and worldview, and so could moral values but we intuitively know they're real. We trust our senses to tell us about the external world and we also trust our cousciousness to tell us that right and wrong really exist.
The existence of objective moral values is a basic premise. That means that like the existence of chairs in the world, we assume they do; we take them for granted.
One thing we recognize and take for granted is the intrinsic worth of a human being. But what gives a human being worth? Again, according to naturalism, how can this be true? It cannot.
When we say "I have rights", what or rather who gives you those rights? Rights, to my knowledge, are rarely given by impersonal concepts such as "nature" and "the universe". So in that perspective, a person claiming ot be a moral relativist has to be ready to admit, when a wrong is commited, even a grave one like the holocaust, that it is acceptable, normal even. Indeed, if God does not exist, but only a cold, indifferent and impersonal universe exists, then what more is to be expected out of life?
Nothing but death. For if we come from nothing, why expect a different destination?
In contrast, when we are outraged by a wrong, it presupposes that things ought to be better... So either we're completely delusional or the world really oughts to be better and the things like evil, suffering and death ought not to exist. That is also why the argument from evil is actually an argument in favor of God's existence.
"Oughting to, or oughting not to" implies a moral obligation to do or not do something. Moral facts, such as I ought not to be tortured for the sheer pleasure of a psychopath, aren't like normal facts, such as the earth is round; moral facts are prescriptive rather than descriptive. However, if we admit that moral facts are more than just mere opinion and as something that transcends us and bounds us all to them, then we must conclude that a prescription implies a prescriber.
Sources I've used:
http://www.shenvi.org/Essays/ObjectiveMoralValues.htm#IV
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/transcript-moral-argument
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-new-atheism-and-five-arguments-for-god#ixzz43NachoCS
http://powertochange.com/blogposts/2012/03/06/i-do-not-like-blue-covers-2/ (I took some stuff from an article from Michael Horner that I have in French version at home but did not find the complete version on the internet yet)
http://www.existence-of-god.com/moral-argument.html
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