The Fact/Value Distinction

[Tree of Life]

Traditionally important in philosophy, but somewhat fuzzy isn't it?

"Stealing is wrong" is a value. But if it's true then it's also a fact.

"The book is on the table" is a fact. Yet it implies a value - namely: you ought to believe that the book is on the table.

So what exactly is the distinction between a fact and a value?

 

[Eyes wide Open]

So what exactly is the distinction between a fact and a value?

The distinction is that a fact is something exists in your physical reality (if it doesn't then the presentation of information regarding that fact is key) A value is a presentation of information implying something is of worth as an instruction via information. The factual part applies to that when you can bring the presentation of information into your physical reality, and 'know' its true, thus proving it to be true and of fact. So if a value (as a presentation of information implying a worth) cannot be brought in your physical reality as an applied understanding then it remains non factual, and is only a proposition or theory.

So to apply to your examples

"Stealing is wrong" is a value. But if it's true then it's also a fact".

You've presented that information as implying it is of worth. I can bring that into my physical reality and assess whether it is of fact. I may also deem that the value is dependant on the conditions in which it is applied and not always factual.

"The book is on the table" is a fact. Yet it implies a value - namely: you ought to believe that the book is on the table".

The book is in the table is a fact, it's in my physical reality, I can see it, pick it up, read it, etc. But it has no intrinsic value unless you suggest it has, or that I think it has, and that I can test that in my physical reality, otherwise it's just a book on a table, fact. You've suggested that the belief that the book is on the table is of value, but I would argue that the belief is not of value because you don't need to believe it, you know it. Also in a court of law if you had to prove the book was on the table the premise would be on 'how did you know the book was on the table', not 'why did you believe the book was on the table'. The belief would be of no value because fact is knowing, and that is the value. Knowing is the value in that instance, but you could suggest that a belief was formed from that knowing.

That all may be a little fuzzy!!!! But I did try.

 

[Tree of Life]

The distinction is that a fact is something exists in your physical reality (if it doesn't then the presentation of information regarding that fact is key) A value is a presentation of information implying something is of worth as an instruction via information. The factual part applies to that when you can bring the presentation of information into your physical reality, and 'know' its true, thus proving it to be true and of fact. So if a value (as a presentation of information implying a worth) cannot be brought in your physical reality as an applied understanding then it remains non factual, and is only a proposition or theory.

I'm not sure what you mean here. Are you saying that facts are empirical?

You've presented that information as implying it is of worth. I can bring that into my physical reality and assess whether it is of fact. I may also deem that the value is dependant on the conditions in which it is applied and not always factual.

If proposition x is true, then it is a fact. Yes?

The book is in the table is a fact, it's in my physical reality, I can see it, pick it up, read it, etc. But it has no intrinsic value unless you suggest it has, or that I think it has, and that I can test that in my physical reality, otherwise it's just a book on a table, fact. You've suggested that the belief that the book is on the table is of value, but I would argue that the belief is not of value because you don't need to believe it, you know it.

Knowledge is a type of belief. Not all beliefs are knowledge but all knowledge is belief.

What I'm saying is that all assertions of fact imply the ethical demand to believe them. Otherwise they would not be asserted.

That all may be a little fuzzy!!!! But I did try.

Thanks for your contribution.

 

[Eyes wide Open]

I'm not sure what you mean here. Are you saying that facts are empirical?

Yep pretty much.

If proposition x is true, then it is a fact. Yes?

Your proposition in this instance was the book is on the table, it was true and factual because the book existed in reality, it was on the table. Your proposition about theft being wrong is subject to variable conditions and so its truth cannot be assessed as is, although in a general sense I'd agree it was true.

Knowledge is a type of belief. Not all beliefs are knowledge but all knowledge is belief.

It may be down to semantics, but I'd say knowledge can form a belief, it's the basis for it, but it's not a belief based on non-knowledge, but then I'd ask why the belief based on non-knowledge was formed.

What I'm saying is that all assertions of fact imply the ethical demand to believe them. Otherwise they would not be asserted.

In relation to your thread, you asserted that the book was on the table, the factual component (as explained) was the seeing and picking up of the book etc, thus the demand for belief was self evident, I don't think ethics even apply.

 

[Tree of Life]

Yep pretty much.

This would seem to define away many things we generally consider to be facts. Mathematic truths, laws of logic, historical events, etc... I think your definition is a bit anemic.

Your proposition in this instance was the book is on the table, it was true and factual because the book existed in reality, it was on the table. Your proposition about theft being wrong is subject to variable conditions and so its truth cannot be assessed as is, although in a general sense I'd agree it was true.

I'm referring to my ethical proposition. IF "stealing is wrong" is true then it is also a fact. All ethical truths are facts.

It may be down to semantics, but I'd say knowledge can form a belief, it's the basis for it, but it's not a belief based on non-knowledge, but then I'd ask why the belief based on non-knowledge was formed.

It's generally understood that knowledge is justified, true belief. Hence all knowledge is also belief. If you know something you also believe it and you cannot know something unless you believe that it's true.

In relation to your thread, you asserted that the book was on the table, the factual component (as explained) was the seeing and picking up of the book etc, thus the demand for belief was self evident, I don't think ethics even apply.

You don't think there's an ethical demand to believe the facts?

 

[Eyes wide Open]

This would seem to define away many things we generally consider to be facts. Mathematic truths, laws of logic, historical events, etc... I think your definition is a bit anemic.

No not really if you consider my response from my first post below.
The bolded things above are subject to the bracketed things below.

The distinction is that a fact is something exists in your physical reality (if it doesn't then the presentation of information regarding that fact is key)

I'm referring to my ethical proposition. IF "stealing is wrong" is true then it is also a fact. All ethical truths are facts.

A fact applied to a context or condition as previously stated. If I stole from a weathly man upon first pleading with him for charity to feed my kids,( stolen in light of his refusal to give) I would have stolen from him, but in that context I wouldn't deem it wrong, thus your statement about stealing being wrong is subject to conditions and context. IMO.

It's generally understood that knowledge is justified, true belief. Hence all knowledge is also belief. If you know something you also believe it and you cannot know something unless you believe that it's true.

Knowledge is knowledge, its basis is the presentation of information, and whether it is deemed to be factual, which as stated previously, are things that exist in physical reality. This forms the basis of belief, and is the justification.

You don't think there's an ethical demand to believe the facts?

As I said before, in the light of knowledge the demand is self evident, thus a belief is 'formed'.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Traditionally important in philosophy, but somewhat fuzzy isn't it?

"Stealing is wrong" is a value. But if it's true then it's also a fact.

"The book is on the table" is a fact. Yet it implies a value - namely: you ought to believe that the book is on the table.

So what exactly is the distinction between a fact and a value?

I love (and value) chocolate ice cream--that's a fact.

 

[quatona]

Traditionally important in philosophy, but somewhat fuzzy isn't it?

Maybe it´s a somewhat fuzzy, but not as fuzzy as you make it out to be.

"Stealing is wrong" is a value.

I don´t agree with the way you use "value" here. In my use of words, "value" is an abstract that suggests a concrete valuing statement such as "stealing is wrong". The value behind this statement could be something like "individual property".

But if it's true then it's also a fact.

I don´t know how "stealing is wrong" could possibly be true or a fact.
We have certain means and methods of discerning the accuracy of descriptive statements (such as "a book is on the table"), none of which seems to allow for discerning the accuracy of a value judgement, though.

IOW: In order to try to convince others that something is *wrong* we have to do additional efforts even if the other persons agrees with the fact that it has happened (usually we have to first convince them of a value, and then show them that the factual action is irreconcilable with the value). This two extra step make the difference.

If by all means you wish to do away with the qualitative, substantial difference between "he did [X]" (that which we´d call a factual statement) and "what he did was wrong" (that which we´d call a valuing statement - the result of imposing a value on a factual observation)

"The book is on the table" is a fact. Yet it implies a value - namely: you ought to believe that the book is on the table.

Well, the "implies" already gives away that you are aware of the difference. Not until you impose a value on the descriptive factual observation you arrive at a prescriptive "ought" statement.

But, methodologically I take issue with the fact that you use two completely different examples from different contexts.
Why didn´t you try to show us how there is no qualitative difference between "The book is on the table" and "it´s wrong (or right - pick your choice) to leave a book on the table"?

So what exactly is the distinction between a fact and a value?

Since I feel that you haven´t even introduced a *value* yet, but just descriptive statements, value judgements based on unnamed values and prescriptive statements based on unnamed values, I think we need to talk terminology first.

 

[juvenissun]

Traditionally important in philosophy, but somewhat fuzzy isn't it?

"Stealing is wrong" is a value. But if it's true then it's also a fact.

"The book is on the table" is a fact. Yet it implies a value - namely: you ought to believe that the book is on the table.

So what exactly is the distinction between a fact and a value?

One you can see and one you can not see.

 

[bhsmte]

I love (and value) chocolate ice cream--that's a fact.

And how could you demonstrate that statement to be fact?

 

[bhsmte]

One you can see and one you can not see.

How do you demonstrate who can see and who can not see?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

And how could you demonstrate that statement to be fact?

...I would take you with me to Baskin-Robbins, buy each of us a helping of our favorite, respective ice-creams, and then I'd make some grunts and sounds of delight that, although unseemly in public, will tell you that I'm enjoying my chocolate ice-cream. And if after that empirical observation, you still didn't believe me, then we would repeat the process with...more ice-cream.

 

[bhsmte]

...I would take you with me to Baskin-Robbins, buy each of us a helping of our favorite, respective ice-creams, and then I'd make some grunts and sounds of delight that, although unseemly in public, will tell you that I'm enjoying my chocolate ice-cream. And if after that empirical observation, you still didn't believe me, then we would repeat the process with...more ice-cream.

And after I observed with my own eyes, I would likely agree that your claim is in fact correct.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

And after I observed with my own eyes, I would likely agree that your claim is in fact correct.

Sure. And then my 'value' will become your fact.

But what would really be cool is if that fact became your value; maybe you need to taste chocolate ice-cream?

 

[Tree of Life]

One you can see and one you can not see.

That sub-atomic particles exist is generally considered to be a fact and yet we cannot see them.

 

[bhsmte]

Sure. And then my 'value' will become your fact.

But what would really be cool is if that fact became your value; maybe you need to taste chocolate ice-cream?

Love chocolate ice cream, especially if peanut butter is included.

 

[juvenissun]

That sub-atomic particles exist is generally considered to be a fact and yet we cannot see them.

With instruments, we can.

 

[juvenissun]

How do you demonstrate who can see and who can not see?

Somebody can.

 

[bhsmte]

Somebody can.

Who? And how do you know this?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Love chocolate ice cream, especially if peanut butter is included.

I'll pretend you didn't just say that...