The Fact/Value Distinction

[Tree of Life]

With instruments, we can.

Actually we can't even see them with instruments. Their existence is purely theoretical though we have all kinds of data to suggest that they're there.

 

[Tree of Life]

I don´t agree with the way you use "value" here. In my use of words, "value" is an abstract that suggests a concrete valuing statement such as "stealing is wrong". The value behind this statement could be something like "individual property".

Any kind of ethical proposition expresses a value or set of values. It's hard to separate the value from the ethical statement. For instance, if the value is "rights to individual property" I might ask: what does that mean? You could answer by saying: "well, it's wrong to take things that don't belong to you." The value and ethical proposition go hand in hand.

I don´t know how "stealing is wrong" could possibly be true or a fact.
We have certain means and methods of discerning the accuracy of descriptive statements (such as "a book is on the table"), none of which seems to allow for discerning the accuracy of a value judgement, though.

IOW: In order to try to convince others that something is *wrong* we have to do additional efforts even if the other persons agrees with the fact that it has happened (usually we have to first convince them of a value, and then show them that the factual action is irreconcilable with the value). This two extra step make the difference.

If by all means you wish to do away with the qualitative, substantial difference between "he did [X]" (that which we´d call a factual statement) and "what he did was wrong" (that which we´d call a valuing statement - the result of imposing a value on a factual observation)

This is fair. It would seem that you're a moral non-realist. In that case a statement like: "stealing is wrong" would be in no way true. It, then, could not be considered a fact. The distinction between facts and values would then be something like: facts are things that are real, values are things that we wish were real.

Well, the "implies" already gives away that you are aware of the difference. Not until you impose a value on the descriptive factual observation you arrive at a prescriptive "ought" statement.

But, methodologically I take issue with the fact that you use two completely different examples from different contexts.
Why didn´t you try to show us how there is no qualitative difference between "The book is on the table" and "it´s wrong (or right - pick your choice) to leave a book on the table"?

I think you've misunderstood me. Let me try to explain what I mean. When you propose a statement of fact (i.e. "the book is on the table" or "earth is the third planet from the sun") you are implying a value. The value that you're implying is "truth". The ethical statement you're implying is: "you ought to believe the facts". You express a statement of fact because you think it ought to be believed and accounted for. So even a "purely" factual statement is laden with value.

 

[quatona]

Any kind of ethical proposition expresses a value or set of values. It's hard to separate the value from the ethical statement. For instance, if the value is "rights to individual property" I might ask: what does that mean? You could answer by saying: "well, it's wrong to take things that don't belong to you." The value and ethical proposition go hand in hand.

Sure, but that they go hand in hand doesn´t mean one is the other.
Plus, the value doesn´t necessarily result in an ethical proposition, e.g. when there are other values that, in your ethical system override the value in question.

This is fair. It would seem that you're a moral non-realist. In that case a statement like: "stealing is wrong" would be in no way true. It, then, could not be considered a fact. The distinction between facts and values would then be something like: facts are things that are real, values are things that we wish were real.

I wouldn´t put it exactly that way, but it´s sufficiently close for the moment.

I think you've misunderstood me. Let me try to explain what I mean. When you propose a statement of fact (i.e. "the book is on the table" or "earth is the third planet from the sun") you are implying a value. The value that you're implying is "truth". The ethical statement you're implying is: "you ought to believe the facts". You express a statement of fact because you think it ought to be believed and accounted for. So even a "purely" factual statement is laden with value.

I think you are making a category error here.
Even if I would agree that every statement is necessarily an appeal to the value of accuracy (which I am not sure I do, but ok), this is - per your definition - a value that all statments appeal to. It´s inherent to any statement, and thus, this assertion is trivial.
Now, there are statements that - besides appealing to the value of accuracy, which all statements necessarily do - appeal to other values, as well.

 

[Tree of Life]

I agree that all statements of fact imply values but I don't think that this assertion is trivial. It goes to demonstrate my point - the distinction between facts and values is not clear. Facts are values and values are facts.

 

[quatona]

I agree that all statements of fact imply values but I don't think that this assertion is trivial.

Neither was your assertion nor did I concede that statements of facts imply values - the point was that statements of fact all appeal to one and the same value (namely accuracy/truth). That´s the part I called trivial.

It goes to demonstrate my point - the distinction between facts and values is not clear. Facts are values and values are facts.

No, it doesn´t.
Firstly, when we talk about value judgements we talk about those statements which (besides appealing to the value accuracy/truth - which all statements necessarily appeal to) appeal to one or more further values. You may or may not agree with this, but this is a clear distinction.
Secondly, even if one thing implies another this doesn´t mean that one thing is the other. So your last statement is jumping to conclusions, even if the implication-part were accurate.
Thirdly, but more on a side-note: I think that implications always follow from at least two statements. Thus "A implies B" is short for "A (and an unnamed C) imply B".

 

[juvenissun]

Actually we can't even see them with instruments. Their existence is purely theoretical though we have all kinds of data to suggest that they're there.

If instruments can not see, then we do not know if it truly exists. Then its existence is not a fact.

I do not know why is the question in the OP a problem. It is not a problem. We can not see love, so it is not a fact, but is a value.

 

[Tree of Life]

If instruments can not see, then we do not know if it truly exists. Then its existence is not a fact.

I do not know why is the question in the OP a problem. It is not a problem. We can not see love, so it is not a fact, but is a value.

How is love not a fact? God's love for us is more real than the created order.

Jeremiah 33:20 - Thus says the Lord: If you can break my covenant with the day and my covenant with the night, so that day and night will not come at their appointed time, then also my covenant with David my servant may be broken...

 

[juvenissun]

How is love not a fact? God's love for us is more real than the created order.

Jeremiah 33:20 - Thus says the Lord: If you can break my covenant with the day and my covenant with the night, so that day and night will not come at their appointed time, then also my covenant with David my servant may be broken...

We have to see the action, and then we say: it is love. No action, no love.