Faith Makes Life Possible

[Received]

No, one negotiates the critical factor, and the other bypasses it. My chair has its own track record, along with all the other chairs that I have experienced, with which it negotiates and 'earns' my trust. What kind of track record do religions have?

Again, you're using induction, and the acceptance of induction (and uniformity of nature, which induction is applied to) itself bypasses the critical factor. Induction is not something you can prove rationally or empirically; rather, it's the support for rationality and experience, an intuitively mediated faculty.

Religions have as much a track record as science. Neither good nor evil intrinsically until you also comprehend what their particular ends are.

 

[PsychoSarah]

You're critiquing philosophy and also using philosophy.

I know, isn't it fantastically frustrating

 

[variant]

I'm speaking of Tolstoy, who said: "without faith it is impossible to live." He probably didn't mean it in the way I'm meaning it.

I mean that faith, which can be equated with trust (which in turn signifies inclinations of the will, i.e., you can't just "believe" without showing some type of change in your behavior), is needed to move and live for all of our philosophical assumptions which can't (because they're assumptions) be proven. Take the existence of the outer world, other selves, uniformity in nature, induction, etc. All these things are what we would call "common sense," but this doesn't undermine the fact that we can't (and no philosopher so far has) proven these using reason. They're intuitive or instinctual axioms we have about the world, arguably hard wired into us.

What happens if we doubt these? We can't possibly move or live; we're bound in a constant state of skeptical paralysis. Without faith we can't be human. Religious faith is another flavor of a faith that's essentially no different than the daily faith we have in our basic assumptions.

The general rule for what is wrong with your ideas is that you try to equate religious faith with basic trust of fairy safe assumptions.

Having religious faith is simply a different animal than say trusting that rationality is basically productive.

At the heart of your ideas is a false equivalence, or an equivocation and until you realize this problem your discussions with others will be fairly unproductive.

 

[poolerboy0077]

I'm speaking of Tolstoy, who said: "without faith it is impossible to live." He probably didn't mean it in the way I'm meaning it.

I mean that faith, which can be equated with trust (which in turn signifies inclinations of the will, i.e., you can't just "believe" without showing some type of change in your behavior), is needed to move and live for all of our philosophical assumptions which can't (because they're assumptions) be proven. Take the existence of the outer world, other selves, uniformity in nature, induction, etc. All these things are what we would call "common sense," but this doesn't undermine the fact that we can't (and no philosopher so far has) proven these using reason. They're intuitive or instinctual axioms we have about the world, arguably hard wired into us.

What happens if we doubt these? We can't possibly move or live; we're bound in a constant state of skeptical paralysis. Without faith we can't be human. Religious faith is another flavor of a faith that's essentially no different than the daily faith we have in our basic assumptions.

So for you, is "faith" entirely synonymous with "assumption?"

 

[quatona]

I'm speaking of Tolstoy, who said: "without faith it is impossible to live." He probably didn't mean it in the way I'm meaning it.

I mean that faith, which can be equated with trust (which in turn signifies inclinations of the will, i.e., you can't just "believe" without showing some type of change in your behavior), is needed to move and live for all of our philosophical assumptions which can't (because they're assumptions) be proven. Take the existence of the outer world, other selves, uniformity in nature, induction, etc. All these things are what we would call "common sense," but this doesn't undermine the fact that we can't (and no philosopher so far has) proven these using reason. They're intuitive or instinctual axioms we have about the world, arguably hard wired into us.

What happens if we doubt these? We can't possibly move or live; we're bound in a constant state of skeptical paralysis. Without faith we can't be human. Religious faith is another flavor of a faith that's essentially no different than the daily faith we have in our basic assumptions.

It seems to me that you want to establish a definition of "faith" that includes everything that isn´t known with 100% certainty.
And since we necessarily think within a given frame of reference, and this frame of reference can impossibly be proven correct, you want to establish a definition of "faith" that includes all fathomable statements and notions.

To be honest, I find that suspicious. It seems to me that you semantically wipe all the subtle and not so subtle differences in certainty, evidence, necessity between different notions - just so you can make metaphysical beliefs appear to be on equal footing with any other notion. From axiom to the wildest guess and conspiration theory: they are all "faith"-based.

I´m not willing to go there with you. Of course, you have the freedom to define "faith" any way you like - but if this is the definition you want us to use, I for one will insist that the substantial differences are henceforth represented by new words for these categories.

Apparently, when Tolstoi made his statement, he was indeed referring to axioms - assumptions that we can impossibly do without. These axioms are held by everyone - and then there are these extra beliefs that we can do and live without (like religious beliefs, conspiration theories, etc.). Some find them individually helpful, useful and convincing, but they aren´t axiomatic by any means.

Next, I don´t agree with your assertion that our behaviour represents our beliefs (as in: metaphysical truth claims). Personally, I do behave as if the outer world exists, as if it works the way we all observe it working - but I am not at all convinced that this is metaphysically true. I am accepting it as a useful (and often almost unavoidable) assumption - within the frame of reference of what our minds suggest to us (not individually, but collectively), but this doesn´t mean that I believe this very frame of reference to be metaphysically true. FWIW, we could all be brains in vat, we could be characters in a computer game, we could be ideas in a superbrain, I could be the only real person (and everyone else being a product of my imagination) or whatever: picking one of these frames of references over "the world as it appears to us is real" wouldn´t change my behaviour one iota. Whether the natural laws are real laws in a real nature, or virtual natural laws in a virtual nature that I am virtual part of, makes no difference whatsoever when it comes to my behaviour. They are reliable within the frame of reference I am existing in - no matter what this frame actually is (or what I believe it to be).
So, no, my behaviour doesn´t allow any conclusions on what I do or don´t consider metaphysically true.

 

[KCfromNC]

What evidence do you have that your intuition is sound

I have lots of evidence of the opposite, actually.

or that there's a reality that actually exists outside of your head?

Pretty much all objective observation is evidence of that. Whether it is conclusive evidence is another question. And it doesn't rule out non-falsifiable guessing such as being a brain-in-a-vat, but then again is not falsifying an non-falsifiable guess all that noteworthy?

 

[Received]

The general rule for what is wrong with your ideas is that you try to equate religious faith with basic trust of fairy safe assumptions.

Having religious faith is simply a different animal than say trusting that rationality is basically productive.

At the heart of your ideas is a false equivalence, or an equivocation and until you realize this problem your discussions with others will be fairly unproductive.

All you're doing here is saying, "you're equating religious faith with secular faith, but you're wrong because you're equating religious faith with secular faith."

 

[Received]

So for you, is "faith" entirely synonymous with "assumption?"

Faith is synonymous with trust (which implies inclinations of the will, not just believing propositions, although arguably this itself could be an exercise or inclination of the will), which works with our assumptions that take the form of axioms.

 

[Received]

quatona, I just don't get the reasoning behind assuming that I'm the one redefining faith, as if any definition you've run across in religious or secular contexts is ipso facto the definition that's self-evidently the one to use, period.

More later.

 

[variant]

All you're doing here is saying, "you're equating religious faith with secular faith, but you're wrong because you're equating religious faith with secular faith."

No, I am pointing out the obvious equivocation of the two very different ideas.

The following statements:

There is reality outside my brain.

I should trust reason is helpful.

The future will probably have the same physical rules as the past.

I should trust the Christian view of God as true.

Aren't in the same ballpark. And, no amount of mental hopscotch is going to get this line of thinking to hold up.

How we get to these different statements isn't even remotely the same. Yet you want to equivocate them for some reason. That reason is obvious to every one of your detractors.

You want this statement:

I should trust the Christian view of God as true.

To be as valid as this statement:

I should trust reason is helpful.

Sorry. No.

 

[Received]

It seems to me that you want to establish a definition of "faith" that includes everything that isn´t known with 100% certainty.

And since we necessarily think within a given frame of reference, and this frame of reference can impossibly be proven correct, you want to establish a definition of "faith" that includes all fathomable statements and notions.

I don't know any other definition of faith that works with 100% certainty. Actually, you can totally have 100% certainty with my application of faith, but that doesn't say anything at all about the actual odds of something being true.

To be honest, I find that suspicious. It seems to me that you semantically wipe all the subtle and not so subtle differences in certainty, evidence, necessity between different notions - just so you can make metaphysical beliefs appear to be on equal footing with any other notion. From axiom to the wildest guess and conspiration theory: they are all "faith"-based.

I´m not willing to go there with you. Of course, you have the freedom to define "faith" any way you like - but if this is the definition you want us to use, I for one will insist that the substantial differences are henceforth represented by new words for these categories.

I'm not redefining anything, and to accuse a person of doing so without critiquing the definition you have of faith is really unfair. Again, I'm taking this definition from philosopher and theologian Dallas Willard, who extracted it from a very careful reading of the Bible, which makes it fair game to apply to all religious contexts in the Western world, arguably; and I'm also taking this definition from human interactions, e.g., "you're not having faith in my abilities."

Apparently, when Tolstoi made his statement, he was indeed referring to axioms - assumptions that we can impossibly do without. These axioms are held by everyone - and then there are these extra beliefs that we can do and live without (like religious beliefs, conspiration theories, etc.). Some find them individually helpful, useful and convincing, but they aren´t axiomatic by any means.

Right. Well, maybe God is somehow axiomatic (i.e., we have some basic relationship with God even though conceptually he might not have any part in anything), but that's not at all my point in posting the OP, and that's another discussion entirely.

Next, I don´t agree with your assertion that our behaviour represents our beliefs (as in: metaphysical truth claims). Personally, I do behave as if the outer world exists, as if it works the way we all observe it working - but I am not at all convinced that this is metaphysically true. I am accepting it as a useful (and often almost unavoidable) assumption - within the frame of reference of what our minds suggest to us (not individually, but collectively), but this doesn´t mean that I believe this very frame of reference to be metaphysically true.

I quibble with this. You're accepting even the smallest sliver of a possibility, which makes action possible, without which it would be impossible. I know this is an assertion that we can't really argue about.

 

[quatona]

quatona, I just don't get the reasoning behind assuming that I'm the one redefining faith, as if any definition you've run across in religious or secular contexts is ipso facto the definition that's self-evidently the one to use, period.

Well, the reasoning would be: As far as I know, a definition of "faith" that render literally every statement or notion a statement or notion of "faith" has never been in common use. The reason for words existing is the will to make distinctions. Words that are all inclusive are useless.
Some people call everyone - no matter whether and how they are related - "brother" (and by virtue of the fact that you appeal to - everyone can use the definitions they see fit - there´s nothing wrong with that) , but that doesn´t make the concept "brother" (as in "male sibling") miraculously disappear or disposable.

But just so to avoid an irrelevant discussion (since, of course, I agree that there aren´t "right" or "wrong" definitions or "definitions to use"):
Feel free to reread my previous post by substituting "redefine" with "define" - and my actual points will remain unaffected.

 

[quatona]

Right.

Good, so there is not much point in lumping these assertions of fundamentally different quality together. As I said: If you insist that "faith" be the term for all of them, we will have to account for those differences by using other terms. I suggest "reasoned assertions" vs. "superstition".

Well, maybe God is somehow axiomatic (i.e., we have some basic relationship with God even though conceptually he might not have any part in anything)

"There exists a God" is demonstrably not an axiomatic assumption (and even less would be the religious belief in a particular god concept) - there are people who can do, live and reason without this assumption, quite fine.

but that's not at all my point in posting the OP, and that's another discussion entirely.

Indeed - and a discussion I certainly wouldn´t participate in.

I quibble with this. You're accepting even the smallest sliver of a possibility, which makes action possible, without which it would be impossible. I know this is an assertion that we can't really argue about.

Received, I have not the slightest idea what you are trying to express in this paragraph (and even less how it addresses that which you wrote it in response to), sorry. Would you be willing to reword it for me, please?

 

[poolerboy0077]

Faith is synonymous with trust (which implies inclinations of the will, not just believing propositions, although arguably this itself could be an exercise or inclination of the will), which works with our assumptions that take the form of axioms.

Alright I'll take your definition. You write: "Religious faith is another flavor of a faith that's essentially no different than the daily faith we have in our basic assumptions." I'm not entirely convinced by that equivalency. The assumptions I make of everyday life are grounded to some extent on past experiences. For instance, I assume that when I get on a plane that it is both fueled and will likely get me to my destination. I base this on the probability of these things occurring before and make a prediction on its basis. Religious faith is different in that it applies trust on mere assertion. If the Bible says supernatural thing X, it is to be believed on authority alone, but it is not an authority that has established itself to begin with. If I rely on the assertions of the medical community, I can take it for granted that they know more about medicine than me and that their assertions are likely true, given that we know medicine works (it has a proven track record, even if imperfect). What track record exists for religion? One cannot merely point to "answered prayers" or "miracles" because these are done through selection bias: one sees the hits but not the misses. Many people pray and their prayers do not materialize in the way that they wished while others do -- even when both sets of people pray for deep and important things in their lives, not just trivialities.

 

[Received]

No, I am pointing out the obvious equivocation of the two very different ideas.

The following statements:

There is reality outside my brain.

I should trust reason is helpful.

The future will probably have the same physical rules as the past.

I should trust the Christian view of God as true.

Aren't in the same ballpark. And, no amount of mental hopscotch is going to get this line of thinking to hold up.

How we get to these different statements isn't even remotely the same. Yet you want to equivocate them for some reason. That reason is obvious to every one of your detractors.

You want this statement:

I should trust the Christian view of God as true.

To be as valid as this statement:

I should trust reason is helpful.

Sorry. No.

Same mechanism, different applications. Your appeal to different applications doesn't negate the fact that it's the same mechanism. That's all I'm claiming.

 

[Received]

Well, the reasoning would be: As far as I know, a definition of "faith" that render literally every statement or notion a statement or notion of "faith" has never been in common use. The reason for words existing is the will to make distinctions. Words that are all inclusive are useless.

So? Everything seems simple when you look at things non-philosophically. Most of the words are based on superficial, day-to-day uses, not philosophical ones.

 

[Received]

Good, so there is not much point in lumping these assertions of fundamentally different quality together. As I said: If you insist that "faith" be the term for all of them, we will have to account for those differences by using other terms. I suggest "reasoned assertions" vs. "superstition".

I don't think I was lumping them together, but referring instead to the same mechanism (faith) that secular and religious folks use. And more importantly, if you don't have faith in a secular sense, you can't move because of skeptical paralysis, and therefore you can't live. This idea of faith as movement is much more important to me than the distinction between religious and secular faith.

Received, I have not the slightest idea what you are trying to express in this paragraph (and even less how it addresses that which you wrote it in response to), sorry. Would you be willing to reword it for me, please?

I'm basically saying that, yeah, your action implicates a small sliver of faith, or else you wouldn't be able to act. This is why I said we can't really argue about this point, because we've reached an impasse.

And maybe, as screwy as this sounds, you don't need to talk about what you think is conceptually true or false at all when referring to this conception of faith. After all, I don't need to have any conceptualization of you at all to have faith in you; I just need to experience you as a person, have conversations with you, get to know who you are. Conceptualization is definitely a part of this last bit, but relationships aren't essentially conceptual but phenomenological. So perhaps, in a way, faith here can mean acting as if something were true without having to ascertain intellectually or conceptually whether it is true or not. That's very complicated, but maybe it's the case.

 

[Received]

Alright I'll take your definition. You write: "Religious faith is another flavor of a faith that's essentially no different than the daily faith we have in our basic assumptions." I'm not entirely convinced by that equivalency. The assumptions I make of everyday life are grounded to some extent on past experiences.

Right, but here you're referring to induction -- which you're having faith in.

 

[variant]

Same mechanism, different applications. Your appeal to different applications doesn't negate the fact that it's the same mechanism. That's all I'm claiming.

The mechanisms aren't the same. In fact the arguments for the various positions differ wildly in scope, complexity and foundation.

Your "they are all the same thing" mantra is unsupported and fairly ludicrous.

 

[variant]

So? Everything seems simple when you look at things non-philosophically. Most of the words are based on superficial, day-to-day uses, not philosophical ones.

And if we use day to day thinking to address philosophy you get pretty muddled philosophy.