Faith Makes Life Possible

[Received]

I've always meant by mechanism the thing, not the process, and such has been implicit and even explicit in my thoughts along these lines. Although I can understand how mechanism can be seen as part of the process, I guess.

 

[variant]

Doesn't matter how. I agree there's a how, a process by which we become convinced. But it's still: same mechanism (faith, confidence), different applications (floor/secular belief, idea of God/religious belief).

No, being "convinced" is a conclusion (an idea) which you are left with at the end of some process.

How you reach that conclusion is very significant when comparing conclusions.

So no, the mechanism is not the same. Having "trust" or "faith" is just how you feel (confident in this case) about some idea, so the WHY is probably the more important part than your feelings.

I've always meant by mechanism the thing, not the process, and such has been implicit and even explicit in my thoughts along these lines. Although I can understand how mechanism can be seen as part of the process, I guess.

Mechanisms are processes, so that clears up some issues, but I don't think this is the root of our argument as I was taking your idea of "mechanism" to be metaphorical.

 

[Received]

No, being "convinced" is a conclusion (an idea) which you are left with at the end of some process.

How you reach that conclusion is very significant when comparing conclusions.

So no, the mechanism is not the same. Having "trust" or "faith" is just how you feel (confident in this case) about some idea, so the WHY is probably the more important part than your feelings.

I don't see how reaching a conclusion is pertinent here. Our whole discussion has boiled down to the stuff below: what a mechanism is, whether it's different with religious faith or secular faith, etc. So let's focus on that.

Mechanisms are processes, so that clears up some issues, but I don't think this is the root of our argument as I was taking your idea of "mechanism" to be metaphorical.

Well, now we're at a bit of a confusing disagreement. Faith is definitely a "process", in that it's something that's active; but as an action it's still a thing, much like "movement" is a noun or thing but also an action. I intended mechanism to be the thing, which is one of its definitions; you intended it otherwise. That said, I fail to see how faith as an action thing makes any difference with the bigger problem: this action thing (mechanism) still needs to be applied to one idea or another. Let's try this.

You have X: faith as a mechanism in the sense of an action.

You have Y: the application of faith in the sense of the action's referent, what it refers to in terms of an idea or representational belief.

How are you configuring X and Y here? I'm saying they're two separate things, albeit they're linked in any instance of faith (it's impossible to have faith without a referent to which it aims). So X =/= Y. You?

Another way: "I have faith in X" can be broken down to faith as a process, and X in which it's believed.

 

[variant]

I don't see how reaching a conclusion is pertinent here. Our whole discussion has boiled down to the stuff below: what a mechanism is, whether it's different with religious faith or secular faith, etc. So let's focus on that.

The faiths (confidences) are conclusions that are reached, so they are different if they are reached via a radically different method.

How are you configuring X and Y here? I'm saying they're two separate things, albeit they're linked in any instance of faith (it's impossible to have faith without a referent to which it aims). So X =/= Y. You?

Faith action and faith idea/belief are slightly different but related ideas.

 

[Received]

The faiths (confidences) are conclusions that are reached, so they are different if they are reached via a radically different method.

So you're saying faith connotes the cognitive content of something? I don't think, nor have I held on this thread (appealing to scripture, etc., as well as personal life, e.g., relationships), that faith is cognitive. Saying faith is a "conclusion" makes it sound exclusively cognitive. It's more with inclinations of the will, although these inclinations always involve thoughts or beliefs. Its synonyms, trust and confidence, aren't cognitive, although they might be extrinsically connected to cognitive stuff.

So there's faith, the non-cognitive action potential, and the referent or idea it's related to. Same stuff we're talking about.

 

[variant]

So you're saying faith connotes the cognitive content of something? I don't think, nor have I held on this thread (appealing to scripture, etc., as well as personal life, e.g., relationships), that faith is cognitive. Saying faith is a "conclusion" makes it sound exclusively cognitive.
It's more with inclinations of the will, although these inclinations always involve thoughts or beliefs. Its synonyms, trust and confidence, aren't cognitive, although they might be extrinsically connected to cognitive stuff.

So there's faith, the non-cognitive action potential, and the referent or idea it's related to. Same stuff we're talking about.

Trust and confidence I find to be the end point of some mental process as well. They are thoughts/ideas/feelings we act upon.

You've made a conclusion one way or another when you have faith (belief) or act with trust (act as if something is true), it doesn't matter.

Faith has an object (it must be faith in something), which must be the truth of some idea. So, to have it you must necessarily reach a conclusion that something is correct.

 

[quatona]

Mutual exchange of thoughts, plus a few droppings of superfluous provocative statements. Or not?

Yes, that´s part of the game. In which superfluous provocative appears to be an oxymoron. What, however worries me, is that your provocative statement seems to be at the core of your every argument, and it appears in every discussion in that function. I´d honestly like to see how far your theories go without it. And I suspect that they´d go quite a long way - maybe not the whole nine yards that you´d like them to carry you, but far enough to be an inspiration.

And you have a future implicit in your actions, q. This future either involves a neutral suspension of any belief about a person's behavior being nonsense as you're planning on responding here,

Behaviour? What are you talking about? I referred to arguments.
Plus I didn´t argue for a suspension of anything.
I pointed out an error, and I argued for a discussion about the elephant.
And how is a "neutral suspension" implicit, and in what?

in which case provocative statements you've made would be superfluous (these aren't compatible with such a suspension/neutrality).

Are you talking about intentionally provocative statements, or about statements by which a person happens to feel provocated?
I don´t think intentionally provocative statements are generally superfluous - I have no idea where you pulled that. As for the others: this is not in the power of the sender, so I guess it´s the first. (Then again, I hadn´t even thunk that you use this argument intentionally as a superfluous provocative statement.

Or this future involves the expectation of nonsense by me, making your arguing with me entirely superfluous.

I have no problem with nonsense being around. That´s what we are here for: to sort the nonsense from the sense.

I am afraid I am confused as to the message of this post. Or was it just a long-winded request to not say "nonsense" anymore?

 

[Archaeopteryx]

Doesn't matter how. I agree there's a how, a process by which we become convinced. But it's still: same mechanism (faith, confidence), different applications (floor/secular belief, idea of God/religious belief).

You keep saying that, but honestly, the reasoning for it just doesn't appear to be there in any substantial way, particularly once all the differences are taken into account. The only tenuous similarity is the word that is being used to describe these various beliefs that we hold.

But even granting your argument, which would be generous considering that it seems more like an assertion than an argument, what is to say that the mechanism is actually working when it comes to religious ideas? To borrow from Wittgenstein, perhaps the engine is idling.

 

[Received]

You keep saying that, but honestly, the reasoning for it just doesn't appear to be there in any substantial way, particularly once all the differences are taken into account. The only tenuous similarity is the word that is being used to describe these various beliefs that we hold.

But even granting your argument, which would be generous considering that it seems more like an assertion than an argument, what is to say that the mechanism is actually working when it comes to religious ideas? To borrow from Wittgenstein, perhaps the engine is idling.

It's no more an assertion than saying a knife is a thing which can be applied to surgery or murder and that this thing and application are two different things (given the very grammar of the sentence even) is an assertion. My lack of being able to go any further doesn't in any way imply the limitation of my arguing abilities, given my comparison and explanation have reached their limit. You can only explain a term's definition by defining it, if pushed further defining other terms in the definition of the original term, and connecting any term and its usage to daily life. I've done all three as much as is possible for anyone to do in defining a term in this thread. You can't turn around and say (without being labeled unfair or irrational), "welp, you didn't give a convincing argument" if you're not convinced of the definition I've given. That's not my responsibility. What you can say, being reasonable and fair, is what only bhsmte has said of all my interlocutors on this thread: impasse, man, we agree to disagree.

And the mechanism is working very well with religious ideas. Again, having faith in something in no way indicates the veracity of the thing (or person) you have faith in, which seems to be implicit in your statement. You can see faith in a religious sense by looking at a religious person's behavior and determining the "volume" of his trust/confidence/faith as measured by -- his behavior (including his insistence on his beliefs). Faith always means (in secular and religious contexts) inclinations of the will, which may include cognition, but this is vastly different than saying that faith is a cognitive domain first and anything else second. That faith is a cognitive thing reflects, again, the post-enlightenment understanding of faith, which means "intellectual assent" or, more particularly, an attempted representation of reality (i.e., a belief) -- an understanding not reflected in the Bible or secular uses (e.g., relationships, "I have faith in you," etc.)