An argument against (the usual concept of) God

[Ripheus27]

To clarify my intent in this post, I'm arguing against the "maximally excellent"/"ontologically perfect"/etc. concept of God, here, not every concept of a person (or persons) who are transcendent, have at least some creative role in relation to our world, and so on.

Now the argument itself is fairly simple:

(i) If God existed, His existence would be self-evident/axiomatic/have some similar epistemic standing. (To put the point perhaps badly, God's existence would be as "obvious" as the law of non-contradiction. Of course, this law is not obvious to e.g. paraconsistent logicians, so, yeah...)
(ii) God's existence does not have the kind of epistemic standing referred to in (i).
(c) Therefore, God does not exist.
​

What is my reason for claiming (i)? God (as maximally excellent, ontologically perfect, or whatever) is supposed to be the source of all possible reality (even, in an extended sense, the source of Itself--not as a cause, but at least in the same way that A implies A). You would think, then, that God's essence would be present within all possibility in the same way that the law of non-contradiction (allegedly) is. That is, denial of God's existence in relation to any fact would render that fact unintelligible.

Moving on to (ii): but classical theists seem to deny this that God's essence really is the essence of all things. They deny, for instance, that God is present in, say, sin. Sin does not partake of God's essence. (Note that by sin just mean wrongdoing.) But more importantly for present purposes, I don't necessarily represent God at the same time as I represent this or that other thing. However, if the law of non-contradiction is true, then I must represent this law as within all truth, on pain of negating altogether my attempt at alethic representation. Plus the very existence of atheism, or at least the fact that even theists often have recourse to arguments to substantiate their point of view, tells in favor of (ii).

And (c) follows from (i) and (ii) by modus tollens. So... QED

 

[elopez]

(i) If God existed, His existence would be self-evident/axiomatic/have some similar epistemic standing. (To put the point perhaps badly, God's existence would be as "obvious" as the law of non-contradiction. Of course, this law is not obvious to e.g. paraconsistent logicians, so, yeah...)​

I find this statement that God must be self evident just as laws of logic ridiculous. Everyone agrees what the Second Law is. For example, no one would rationally say it means you can be A and ~A at the same time. Yet, not everyone agrees what or who God is. The existence of God is therefore incomparable to laws of logic, and to expect His existence to be as obvious as such would indeed be ridiculous.

God's identity has nothing to do with our reality. It can, however, and as in the Bible God interacts with man in various ways. The essence of God, which is essentially the attributes and characteristics, must be different than laws of logic. For example omniscience is knowledge of all things, yet the law of non - contradiction will never answer or have set out knowledge of all things.

(ii) God's existence does not have the kind of epistemic standing referred to in (i).

Since 1 is false 2 could not follow from it. God's existence does not need the same self evidence as a law of logic.

(c) Therefore, God does not exist.

Since 2 doesn't even follow from 1 as 1 is false the conclusion simply cannot be.
​

 

[brightlights]

The Bible claims that God's existence is self evident and also claims that our perception of reality has been so badly damaged by sin that we cannot see the plain existence of God. The Bible also claims that we suppress the truth of God's existence by sin -- in other words, we push the thought out of our minds by rebelling against him because we do not want him to be God.

 

[Crandaddy]

I don't see why I should accept the first premise. God would have to be a necessary being (so that his mere possibility would entail his actuality), and he would also have to be the ultimate first principle, i.e., the metaphysical foundation (if you will) of all of reality. I think we get both of these “properties” (for lack of a better term) if we say that God is ipsum Esse subsistens, subsistent Being himself. Thus understood, the existing of every single thing that can properly be said to exist derives from him who simply, absolutely IS. But still, I don't see why this fact (if it is a fact) should be on an epistemic par with the law of non-contradiction.

 

[Ripheus27]

I find this statement that God must be self evident just as laws of logic ridiculous. Everyone agrees what the Second Law is. For example, no one would rationally say it means you can be A and ~A at the same time. Yet, not everyone agrees what or who God is. The existence of God is therefore incomparable to laws of logic, and to expect His existence to be as obvious as such would indeed be ridiculous.

But this is rather my point. Since God's existence is not obvious, since He (on the usual conception of Him) is difficult to define, etc., that tells against Him being the most important of all realities, whatever He is. (I suppose my argument is really against God being the most important thing there is.)

Since 2 doesn't even follow from 1 as 1 is false the conclusion simply cannot be.

(ii) is the second premise in the argument, not an inference from (i).

 

[Ripheus27]

The Bible claims that God's existence is self evident and also claims that our perception of reality has been so badly damaged by sin that we cannot see the plain existence of God. The Bible also claims that we suppress the truth of God's existence by sin -- in other words, we push the thought out of our minds by rebelling against him because we do not want him to be God.

So sin is epistemically more powerful than grace? (This is why the usual Christian conception of sin is terribly misguided.)

 

[brightlights]

So sin is epistemically more powerful than grace? (This is why the usual Christian conception of sin is terribly misguided.)

So long as God withholds saving grace.

 

[elopez]

But this is rather my point. Since God's existence is not obvious, since He (on the usual conception of Him) is difficult to define, etc., that tells against Him being the most important of all realities, whatever He is. (I suppose my argument is really against God being the most important thing there is.)

I thought your point was that God's existence should be as obvious as the Second Law of logic? I mean, that's what you said in your OP, though now you're saying the point is God's existence is not obvious. That is more befuddling than anything.

I still don't agree with the idea that God is not the most important of all realities. The idea that God is not as easy to define as the Second Law only means He is important as mostly of everyone is out to define God or to understand/know Him in some way.

(ii) is the second premise in the argument, not an inference from (i).

Of course (ii) is the second premise, yet you said "And (c) follows from (i) and (ii) by modus tollens." What do you mean "not an inference from (i)" when modes tollens is a valid rule of inference??

 

[Dali]

To clarify my intent in this post, I'm arguing against the "maximally excellent"/"ontologically perfect"/etc. concept of God, here, not every concept of a person (or persons) who are transcendent, have at least some creative role in relation to our world, and so on.

Now the argument itself is fairly simple:

(i) If God existed, His existence would be self-evident/axiomatic/have some similar epistemic standing. (To put the point perhaps badly, God's existence would be as "obvious" as the law of non-contradiction. Of course, this law is not obvious to e.g. paraconsistent logicians, so, yeah...)
(ii) God's existence does not have the kind of epistemic standing referred to in (i).
(c) Therefore, God does not exist.
​

What is my reason for claiming (i)? God (as maximally excellent, ontologically perfect, or whatever) is supposed to be the source of all possible reality (even, in an extended sense, the source of Itself--not as a cause, but at least in the same way that A implies A). You would think, then, that God's essence would be present within all possibility in the same way that the law of non-contradiction (allegedly) is. That is, denial of God's existence in relation to any fact would render that fact unintelligible.

Moving on to (ii): but classical theists seem to deny this that God's essence really is the essence of all things. They deny, for instance, that God is present in, say, sin. Sin does not partake of God's essence. (Note that by sin just mean wrongdoing.) But more importantly for present purposes, I don't necessarily represent God at the same time as I represent this or that other thing. However, if the law of non-contradiction is true, then I must represent this law as within all truth, on pain of negating altogether my attempt at alethic representation. Plus the very existence of atheism, or at least the fact that even theists often have recourse to arguments to substantiate their point of view, tells in favor of (ii).

And (c) follows from (i) and (ii) by modus tollens. So... QED

I am a student of logic and your logic is brilliant here. And, I get your point. So when I disagree with you, I don't want you to feel that your clever analysis was unappreciated.

The problem with your first premise is that you seem to assume that all knowledge is either visceral or deductive. Now, most Christians only use Deductive reasoning (i.e. God is that than which nothing is greater than, therefore... blah blah blah). Their Reliance on deduction makes them susceptible to Rationalism. Knowing God means imagining the most holy thing you can and then trying to force reality to conform to said ideal. Both methods create contradiction after contradiction, but the people that do this aren't measuring their faith by how well it lines up with reality, because reality (they think) is of the devil.

Our knowledge of God is inductive and therefore non-contradictory. However, that means that our knowledge of God (actual knowledge) is first derived, not from faith, but from experience. Faith is what we do when we assume that God isn't really just a facet of ourselves, that the universe isn't a solipsistic manifestation of our own subconscious desire.

 

[Ripheus27]

I thought your point was that God's existence should be as obvious as the Second Law of logic? I mean, that's what you said in your OP, though now you're saying the point is God's existence is not obvious. That is more befuddling than anything.

My point was much deeper, I now realize. First, I shouldn't have conceded your point about God being difficult to define in comparison to easy defined principles of logic, since I was actually referring in the OP to a very particular definition of God (the Anselmian/similar one). Second, there are many principles with epistemic standing on a par (or close to being on a par) with the law of non-contradiction, to wit:

The law of identity
The law of the excluded middle
The law of physical causality ("Every physical event has a cause")
Ought implies can
Ought implies can be known
a + b = b + a
Whatever is necessary is actual
Whatever is actual is possible
​

And so on and on. Why is, "God exists," not on the same list, though?

I still don't agree with the idea that God is not the most important of all realities. The idea that God is not as easy to define as the Second Law only means He is important as mostly of everyone is out to define God or to understand/know Him in some way.

Let me outline my reasoning in this way: how can something be more important than anything else to me (for instance) if it is overwhelmingly difficult to put my understanding of that thing clearly into practice? If it is almost impossible to straightforwardly connect any course of action feasible for me to this supposedly ultimate thing, if I can (as with the excess of interpretations available in relation to Christian scripture) justify almost anything ("There is a time for everything"!) in relation to this thing, how can that thing serve as a real source of meaningful judgment between value and disvalue?

Of course (ii) is the second premise, yet you said "And (c) follows from (i) and (ii) by modus tollens." What do you mean "not an inference from (i)" when modes tollens is a valid rule of inference??

My argument is of the logical form

If A then B.
Not-B.
Therefore, not-A.
​

Which is modus tollens.

 

[Ripheus27]

Our knowledge of God is inductive and therefore non-contradictory. However, that means that our knowledge of God (actual knowledge) is first derived, not from faith, but from experience. Faith is what we do when we assume that God isn't really just a facet of ourselves, that the universe isn't a solipsistic manifestation of our own subconscious desire.

Keep in mind, then, that I'm only arguing against a certain kind of "rationalistic" God, here. Now mystical experiences (if you are willing to argue from those) suggest God as supreme, but perhaps not in quite the same way as Anselm would perhaps have it.* Or if you're arguing from experience in the sense of appearances of design or something like that in nature, then I'm not confident it's possible to get farther than John Stuart Mill's "limited in power/maybe limited in knowledge/unlimited in goodness" concept of God; but then, I also wouldn't judge such a concept as a bad one.

*Anselm, on my reading of the guy, actually has two distinguishable arguments for God's existence. One is the argument known as "ontological" and based on metaphysical "perfect being" ideation. Another argument, perhaps textually interpenetrating the other (I have no clear recollection right now where Anselm puts it), is based on something like Plato's notion of a Form of the Good--and that is an argument I'm much more sympathetic to, though discussing why would take me far afield from the present topic.

 

[elopez]

My point was much deeper, I now realize. First, I shouldn't have conceded your point about God being difficult to define in comparison to easy defined principles of logic, since I was actually referring in the OP to a very particular definition of God (the Anselmian/similar one).

Unfortunately, that particular definition of God is still not very conclusive. Most Christians think God is omniscient meaning foreknowledge, while others do not. Same goes with a few other attributes. Again, since God is widely defined even within Christendom, His existence simply cannot be self - evident. If it were, we wouldn't have all these varying views on His attributes. So, that still seems like a valid point to conceded indeed.

Second, there are many principles with epistemic standing on a par (or close to being on a par) with the law of non-contradiction, to wit:

The law of identity
The law of the excluded middle
The law of physical causality ("Every physical event has a cause")
Ought implies can
Ought implies can be known
a + b = b + a
Whatever is necessary is actual
Whatever is actual is possible
​

And so on and on. Why is, "God exists," not on the same list, though?

The question has been answered. Everyone agrees what the law of identity is, while not everyone agrees with what God is.

Let me outline my reasoning in this way: how can something be more important than anything else to me (for instance) if it is overwhelmingly difficult to put my understanding of that thing clearly into practice? If it is almost impossible to straightforwardly connect any course of action feasible for me to this supposedly ultimate thing, if I can (as with the excess of interpretations available in relation to Christian scripture) justify almost anything ("There is a time for everything"!) in relation to this thing, how can that thing serve as a real source of meaningful judgment between value and disvalue?

The fact that you cannot define certain things should be evidence enough that is more important than anything else. That is my reasoning here anyway. We know some things are self - evident, like the laws of logic, but take for example one who has no knowledge of those laws or any form of logic -- they are not self - evident to them. That would be a defect of their knowledge, though. And because we don't know God's essence any proposition about His existence cannot be self -evident. Rather, those truths must be made known to us.

My argument is of the logical form

If A then B.
Not-B.
Therefore, not-A.
​

Which is modus tollens.

Right, and modus tollens is a rule of inference, just as I said. Yet, you said there was no such inference, so, either you're wrong and don't realize it or just mistaken and don't realize it, of which I assume is the latter.

 

[Ripheus27]

Unfortunately, that particular definition of God is still not very conclusive. Most Christians think God is omniscient meaning foreknowledge, while others do not. Same goes with a few other attributes. Again, since God is widely defined even within Christendom, His existence simply cannot be self - evident. If it were, we wouldn't have all these varying views on His attributes. So, that still seems like a valid point to conceded indeed.

I don't know if the Anselmian definition is the one most Christians accept, so whatever disagreement there is about the definition of God in Christianity has little bearing on my argument against the Anselmian one. So, I should not have conceded your point, since my argument is against a precise enough definition of God.

And because we don't know God's essence any proposition about His existence cannot be self -evident. Rather, those truths must be made known to us.

Why aren't propositions about His essence self-evident, though? (And if His essence *is* His existence, as some might claim...)

We might say, "God has only directly revealed Himself to a few people." But this is a horrible thing to say. A truly good God would reveal Himself to everyone, that none would have an excuse to deny Him. So either God does not exist, or He does, and the manner in which He has been universally revealed is not the private Mosesesque fashion the Bible would have it be.

Right, and modus tollens is a rule of inference, just as I said. Yet, you said there was no such inference, so, either you're wrong and don't realize it or just mistaken and don't realize it, of which I assume is the latter.

No, you claimed that (ii) was an inference from (i). I quote:

Since 1 is false 2 could not follow from it.

But I never said that 2 (ii) followed from 1 (i). I said that (c) followed from 1 and 2.

 

[Ana the Ist]

The Bible claims that God's existence is self evident and also claims that our perception of reality has been so badly damaged by sin that we cannot see the plain existence of God. The Bible also claims that we suppress the truth of God's existence by sin -- in other words, we push the thought out of our minds by rebelling against him because we do not want him to be God.

I haven't read every post in this thread, but I'm having trouble understanding the first sentence of your post. My problem is...

If our (mankind's) perception of reality is "so badly damaged by sin that we cannot see the plain existence of god" then how can it be that "god's existence is self-evident"?

You've got two contradictory premises here. 1. Gods existence is self evident. 2. Mankind cannot see (make evident) the existence of god.

Unless I'm misunderstanding one of the two premises, they cannot both possibly be true at the same time. Either god's existence is evident to us...or it isn't.

 

[elopez]

I don't know if the Anselmian definition is the one most Christians accept, so whatever disagreement there is about the definition of God in Christianity has little bearing on my argument against the Anselmian one. So, I should not have conceded your point, since my argument is against a precise enough definition of God.

What I am saying is that there is disagreement about Anselmian theology. There shouldn't be if God's existence is self evident. Since there is, it seems it is not self evident.

Why aren't propositions about His essence self-evident, though? (And if His essence *is* His existence, as some might claim...)

Not all who would hear the proposition "God exists" or "God's essence is.." would have knowledge of God, His essence, or perhaps what it means to exist. those are propositions that would have to be made known to us, so it would have to be knowledge that is acquired.

We might say, "God has only directly revealed Himself to a few people." But this is a horrible thing to say. A truly good God would reveal Himself to everyone, that none would have an excuse to deny Him. So either God does not exist, or He does, and the manner in which He has been universally revealed is not the private Mosesesque fashion the Bible would have it be.

What support is there for what's in the bold? What part of being 'good' requires God reveal Himself to all? I just don't see the connection.

No, you claimed that (ii) was an inference from (i). I quote:

But I never said that 2 (ii) followed from 1 (i). I said that (c) followed from 1 and 2.

You do know that in order to say that c followed from 1 and 2, that 2 would have to follow 1, correct? In order to reach the conclusions the premises must logically follow. You said that 1 and 2 is modes tollens, which again is a valid inference. That means the premises follow from one another. I thought perhaps you may have understood how logic works, but it appears not.

 

[Ripheus27]

What I am saying is that there is disagreement about Anselmian theology. There shouldn't be if God's existence is self evident. Since there is, it seems it is not self evident.

Then why are you arguing against my assertion, here? Didn't I say from the start that I was arguing against an Anselmian definition of God?

What support is there for what's in the bold? What part of being 'good' requires God reveal Himself to all? I just don't see the connection.

The second clause of the sentence to which the part you emboldened is attached: that clause is the reason I gave for good requiring self-revelation on God's part. Now granted, the sentence in full is open to dispute; but how did you miss the support I gave, within the sentence, for the sentence itself?

You do know that in order to say that c followed from 1 and 2, that 2 would have to follow 1, correct? In order to reach the conclusions the premises must logically follow. You said that 1 and 2 is modes tollens, which again is a valid inference. That means the premises follow from one another. I thought perhaps you may have understood how logic works, but it appears not.

This is not how logic works, sir. Conclusions follow from premises; premises don't follow from each other. In, "Socrates is a man, and all men are mortal," the mortality of all men does not follow from Socrates' manhood.

It seems, sir, that you aren't paying attention to the details of what I'm saying, and those who don't pay attention to details of other people's statements are disrespectful for doing so. You probably should apologize for disrespecting me at this point, in other words.

 

[brightlights]

I haven't read every post in this thread, but I'm having trouble understanding the first sentence of your post. My problem is...

If our (mankind's) perception of reality is "so badly damaged by sin that we cannot see the plain existence of god" then how can it be that "god's existence is self-evident"?

You've got two contradictory premises here. 1. Gods existence is self evident. 2. Mankind cannot see (make evident) the existence of god.

Unless I'm misunderstanding one of the two premises, they cannot both possibly be true at the same time. Either god's existence is evident to us...or it isn't.

Let me try to rephrase.

1. God's existence is self-evident
2. We do not see him more plainly (face to face) because we have been damaged by sin.
3. We suppress knowledge that we do have (referred to in premise 1) by further sin.

 

[brightlights]

Or maybe I'm trying to say that God is there for us to see but our spiritual life has been so damaged that we can't see him. Like a person's eyes becoming damaged and they can no longer see physical reality.

 

[FrenchyBearpaw]

Let me try to rephrase.

1. God's existence is self-evident
2. We do not see him more plainly (face to face) because we have been damaged by sin.
3. We suppress knowledge that we do have (referred to in premise 1) by further sin.

According to you, your god is 5' 11", dark brown hair and brown eyes.

 

[brightlights]

According to you, your god is 5' 11", dark brown hair and brown eyes.

I'm not seeing how this is inconsistent with my other premises.