A very, very limited argument for objective morality

[Ripheus27]

That is a good idea, and useful for morality, but I wonder if only emphasising this could be bad.

Granted, emphasizing only one moral principle of any kind would be bad, since such emphasis would leave us not necessarily at a loss when it came to dilemmas, but arguably with an oversimplified approach to a dilemma (maybe, "No matter what, only do X!" or a similar overzealous attitude). For the sake of this thread, I'm just testing a limited counterexample to moral relativism: my complete system of ethical beliefs includes arguments in favor of environmentalism, education, political freedom, etc.

Now also, moreover, if kindness is a virtue, that would make it harder to be virtuously cruel. Perhaps humans have an innate drive towards cruelty. Then it would be a matter of self-command to be kind when that drive kicked in. (If honor motivated relevant violence, a sophisticated moral psychology might involve the supposition that deferring to a sense of honor reflects inner weakness in some way, perhaps emotional weakness in basing one's feelings of being respected on other people's conformity to a standard of honor, which standard might not itself be based on self-command or which is self-deceptively used as a cover for the base motive of cruelty.)

EDIT: Ultimately, no moral theory is going to absolutely rule out situations where atrocities are recommended except for a theory that incorporates, "Don't commit atrocities," into its basic code. That's why almost any religious or political ideology can be used to defend murder. As long as, "Don't murder," is inferred instead of axiomatic, the theoretical possibility remains that a combination of a basic moral premise with premises related to individual circumstances will allow, "Commit murder," to be derived.

 

[Eudaimonist]

It could be that virtues are good in themselves, but I would want to steer clear of people using 'virtue' to justify not caring about their actions and consequences. I fear 'virtue' being used to make the world a worse place.

That would certainly be a bad thing. This is why I tend to dislike the concept of "duty", which all too often sounds like consequences do not matter.

Putting that aside, regarding a virtue as good in itself doesn't mean "not caring about actions and consequences". The end in this case is found within the means. It is a constitutive means.

For instance, if one's ultimate end is a rational life, then the virtue of rationality is a constitutive means to that end. It is not merely an instrumental means -- a mere means to that end -- but constitutes what a rational life is. However, note that rationality is not merely an constitutive means, it is an instrumental means as well. Rationality helps one to survive and flourish in the future.

In any case, what really matters is the vision of one's ultimate end. If that vision is evil, then of course any virtues that constitute that end will be evil as well. The problem isn't constitutive means, but one's concept of the good.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Paradoxum]

Granted, emphasizing only one moral principle of any kind would be bad, since such emphasis would leave us not necessarily at a loss when it came to dilemmas, but arguably with an oversimplified approach to a dilemma (maybe, "No matter what, only do X!" or a similar overzealous attitude). For the sake of this thread, I'm just testing a limited counterexample to moral relativism: my complete system of ethical beliefs includes arguments in favor of environmentalism, education, political freedom, etc.

I am against moral relativism too, I just have a different way of coming at it.

Now also, moreover, if kindness is a virtue, that would make it harder to be virtuously cruel. Perhaps humans have an innate drive towards cruelty. Then it would be a matter of self-command to be kind when that drive kicked in. (If honor motivated relevant violence, a sophisticated moral psychology might involve the supposition that deferring to a sense of honor reflects inner weakness in some way, perhaps emotional weakness in basing one's feelings of being respected on other people's conformity to a standard of honor, which standard might not itself be based on self-command or which is self-deceptively used as a cover for the base motive of cruelty.)

What if something thinks it is kind to torture someone into confessing faith in Christ?

EDIT: Ultimately, no moral theory is going to absolutely rule out situations where atrocities are recommended except for a theory that incorporates, "Don't commit atrocities," into its basic code. That's why almost any religious or political ideology can be used to defend murder. As long as, "Don't murder," is inferred instead of axiomatic, the theoretical possibility remains that a combination of a basic moral premise with premises related to individual circumstances will allow, "Commit murder," to be derived.

I don't know if that is true. Perhaps the ethical theory just needs more detail. It depends what you consider an atrocity or murderer. If they are justified, then are they such things? Was the bombing of Dresden by the British an atrocity, or justified in the extreme situation. Is it immoral to kill an innocent person to save the world? Is it murder?

 

[Ripheus27]

What if something thinks it is kind to torture someone into confessing faith in Christ?

I think the best thing then might be to show that person how skewed his or her understanding of kindness is. Of course, it doesn't help that words like kind and compassionate and cruel are not perfectly clear.

I don't know if that is true. Perhaps the ethical theory just needs more detail. It depends what you consider an atrocity or murderer. If they are justified, then are they such things? Was the bombing of Dresden by the British an atrocity, or justified in the extreme situation. Is it immoral to kill an innocent person to save the world? Is it murder?

I think people tend to load moral condemnation into the word murder too readily, as if calling something a murder is the same as condemning it. Of course the word has this connotation, but since it takes too long to say, "Deliberate killing of a person who was not engaged in violent activity," and I'm not sure there's a word (in English) for this, I just go with murder to cover it.

But I suppose I was addressing the example of evangelical torture with what I said. So to rephrase my contention: no moral theory can absolutely rule out evangelical torture (not even an atheistic code of conduct) unless, "Don't perpetrate evangelical torture," is an axiom of the theory. (Perhaps an atheist could justify such an action if some mad scientist had programmed a doomsday machine to activate unless someone converted to Christianity under pain and in the machine's presence.)

More broadly, a theory can only prohibit in all circumstances those kinds of actions that satisfy descriptions on a level of the theory that is meant to apply to all circumstances.

 

[quatona]

Moral relativism predicts that there will be no consensus on any moral principles (well, an extreme form of moral relativism would). If there is such consensus on even one principle, then without adjusting the predictive theory, the theory is falsified.

Moral relativism predicts nothing of that sort, at least not that I have ever heard of that.
If this argument would be well-constructed, absolute morality would be blown out of the window at least as much (it predicts that morals are absolute, and if there is dissensus on even one principle, then the theory is falsified).
Btw. you should really make up your mind whether you want to address objectivism vs. subjectivism or relativism vs. absolutism, and you still need to explain how consensus vs. dissensus is in any way relates to this.

 

[quatona]

There are two senses of "independence from belief" at play here. One has to do with something being true apart from our belief; the other has to do with our evidence for that truth.

How exactly is B evidence for A?

 

[Ripheus27]

Moral relativism predicts nothing of that sort, at least not that I have ever heard of that.

Well, here's something from the intro to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article "Moral Epistemology":

Sociological: The best explanation of the depth of moral disagreements and the social diversity that they reflect is one of two things. (a) No moral facts exist to be known, since moral disagreements exemplify merely clashes in moral sensibility rather than differences about matters of fact. (b) Moral knowledge exists, but moral facts are relative to the social group in which moral sensibility is formed with the result that no moral truths are known to hold universally.

If this argument would be well-constructed, absolute morality would be blown out of the window at least as much (it predicts that morals are absolute, and if there is dissensus on even one principle, then the theory is falsified).

I think the argument I'm using is partly abductive, not purely deductive. There is something of inference-to-the-best-explanation to it, at least, as there is to moral relativism as outlined in the above quote from the SEP.

Btw. you should really make up your mind whether you want to address objectivism vs. subjectivism or relativism vs. absolutism, and you still need to explain how consensus vs. dissensus is in any way relates to this.

I don't think I should. All four concepts are in play here. EDIT: as for consensus/dissensus, see below (or an earlier page of the thread).

 

[Ripheus27]

How exactly is B evidence for A?

If most people around you believe that the sky is blue, is that evidence that the sky is blue?

Actually, since I favor epistemic autonomy as much as political or religious or whatever of the same, I don't want to say, of course, that if I see that the sky is one color, and everyone else sees that it's a different one, that means I'm wrong. Everyone else might be lying to me, for instance, or maybe the sky is not really either color in its own right. But the normal way to proceed is to assume that I'm hallucinating if my perceptions disagree with other peoples' so strikingly.

 

[quatona]

If most people around you believe that the sky is blue, is that evidence that the sky is blue?

No, of course it isn´t. It´s evidence that the perception of most people is similar.

Actually, since I favor epistemic autonomy as much as political or religious or whatever of the same, I don't want to say, of course, that if I see that the sky is one color, and everyone else sees that it's a different one, that means I'm wrong. Everyone else might be lying to me, for instance, or maybe the sky is not really either color in its own right. But the normal way to proceed is to assume that I'm hallucinating if my perceptions disagree with other peoples' so strikingly.

Keyword: "perception". There´s a long way from widely spread perception to objectivity.
The sky isn´t blue. The sky looks blue (to most of us).

 

[quatona]

Well, here's something from the intro to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article "Moral Epistemology":

That´s not a prediction. These are possible explanations for observations.
They do not imply anything about contrary observations (should such exist). Your argument is employing a logical fallacy (fallacious reverse conclusion).

I don't think I should. All four concepts are in play here.[/quote]

That may be the case. It does not, however, excuse lumping them all together as you see fit. If these distinct concepts are all in play, you absolutely need to keep them separate, and abstain from concluding from one on the other (as though they were the same).

 

[Paradoxum]

I think the best thing then might be to show that person how skewed his or her understanding of kindness is. Of course, it doesn't help that words like kind and compassionate and cruel are not perfectly clear.

True.

I think people tend to load moral condemnation into the word murder too readily, as if calling something a murder is the same as condemning it. Of course the word has this connotation, but since it takes too long to say, "Deliberate killing of a person who was not engaged in violent activity," and I'm not sure there's a word (in English) for this, I just go with murder to cover it.

I have always considered murder to, by definition, mean unjustified murder. So murder is always wrong. If it isn't murder it is just killing.

But I suppose I was addressing the example of evangelical torture with what I said. So to rephrase my contention: no moral theory can absolutely rule out evangelical torture (not even an atheistic code of conduct) unless, "Don't perpetrate evangelical torture," is an axiom of the theory. (Perhaps an atheist could justify such an action if some mad scientist had programmed a doomsday machine to activate unless someone converted to Christianity under pain and in the machine's presence.)

More broadly, a theory can only prohibit in all circumstances those kinds of actions that satisfy descriptions on a level of the theory that is meant to apply to all circumstances.

But those examples are different. A theist might torture someone to save their soul, but in the mad scientist case, the torture would be to save the world. A person is responsible for their own beliefs and their consequences, but it could be different if the fate of the world rests on them.

They are different moral situations. In extreme circumstances torture might not be ruled out, but if that is true it would be contained within the moral theory. My own moral theory considers such a possibility.

 

[Ripheus27]

No, of course it isn´t. It´s evidence that the perception of most people is similar. Keyword: "perception". There´s a long way from widely spread perception to objectivity. The sky isn´t blue. The sky looks blue (to most of us).

Maybe your standards of evidence are different compared to mine. I know that there is a gap between being objective and being widely perceived, but it doesn't look like that far of a gap to me. As for saying, "The sky is not blue, it just looks like it is to most of us," that's quibbling. This is not a debate about the nature of perception, which would take us into discussions of disjunctivism and naive/direct realism and representationalism and so on, not to mention reflection on pretty much every point brought up in, for instance, the SEP article on color.

That´s not a prediction. These are possible explanations for observations. They do not imply anything about contrary observations (should such exist). Your argument is employing a logical fallacy (fallacious reverse conclusion).

Abductive arguments don't, as far as I know, have to conform to standards of deductive validity. But anyway, the proposition, "Moral facts are relative to the social group in which moral sensibility is formed with the result that no moral truths are known to hold universally," is a conditional (due to the use of the phrase with the result) that can be reworded as follows:

"If moral facts are relative to the social group in which moral sensibility is formed, then no moral truths are known to hold universally."

Used in a simple modus tollens argument, the falsity of this proposition's consequent would imply the falsity of the antecedent. My argument is that there is at least one moral truth known to hold universally ("Self-command is good/obligated"), so QED...

That may be the case. It does not, however, excuse lumping them all together as you see fit. If these distinct concepts are all in play, you absolutely need to keep them separate, and abstain from concluding from one on the other (as though they were the same).

I'm sure the average reader is smart enough to pay attention to the details of what I'm saying. But if you insist, then as I've already posted earlier in this thread:

You're right that I've confused them to an extent here, which is sad because I usually do a better job of keeping track of the difference. Let's try this out for objective/subjective: "exists when unperceived/doesn't exist when unperceived." Which in ethics, I suppose, means: "is true even if not felt to be so/is not true unless felt to be so."

So I'm alleging, "Self-command is good," to be true for everyone (absolute) and true even if no one thinks, imagines, hopes, feels, or has some other relevant attitude that it's true (objective). Subjectivist ethical theories don't have to be relativistic, but they threaten to become so much more readily than theories holding ethics to be objectively valid inasmuch as the former theories often default to mere feelings to evidence their basic moral claims, and these mere feelings are liable to drastically vary from person to person (think of feelings of disgust, for instance).

Incidentally, defining objectivity in terms of unperceived existence would explain why widespread perception of something is evidence for that thing. This is because it is evidence that something exists in a certain way even when the first person to witness it is no longer witnessing it, but someone else is hereof a witness.

 

[Ripheus27]

But those examples are different. A theist might torture someone to save their soul, but in the mad scientist case, the torture would be to save the world. A person is responsible for their own beliefs and their consequences, but it could be different if the fate of the world rests on them.

They are different moral situations. In extreme circumstances torture might not be ruled out, but if that is true it would be contained within the moral theory. My own moral theory considers such a possibility.

Granted. So by comparison, a theory exalting self-command might inspire someone under some circumstances to torture/kill/etc., but that's not necessarily a weakness of the theory.

 

[quatona]

Maybe your standards of evidence are different compared to mine. I know that there is a gap between being objective and being widely perceived, but it doesn't look like that far of a gap to me. As for saying, "The sky is not blue, it just looks like it is to most of us," that's quibbling. This is not a debate about the nature of perception, which would take us into discussions of disjunctivism and naive/direct realism and representationalism and so on, not to mention reflection on pretty much every point brought up in, for instance, the SEP article on color.



Abductive arguments don't, as far as I know, have to conform to standards of deductive validity. But anyway, the proposition, "Moral facts are relative to the social group in which moral sensibility is formed with the result that no moral truths are known to hold universally," is a conditional (due to the use of the phrase with the result) that can be reworded as follows:

"If moral facts are relative to the social group in which moral sensibility is formed, then no moral truths are known to hold universally."

Used in a simple modus tollens argument, the falsity of this proposition's consequent would imply the falsity of the antecedent. My argument is that there is at least one moral truth known to hold universally ("Self-command is good/obligated"), so QED...



I'm sure the average reader is smart enough to pay attention to the details of what I'm saying. But if you insist, then as I've already posted earlier in this thread:

Well, of course you are free to redefine "objective" as meaning "broadly (or universally) agreed upon".

Now, you have found a way of verbalizing one pretty abstract phrase (which, practically, can be interpreted to mean pretty much anything) that you consider universally accepted ("objective", in your terminology). [I am, btw., not even sure that all philosophies have held and hold this prescript - I am e.g. thinking of philosophies that ascribe different vaue to different ethnic groups to the extent that certain groups are to be subjugated or even extinguished -, but I´ll assume it for the sake of the argument].

Apart from that - if we are to follow your line of reasoning - everything else in morality (particularly the parts that are actually of practical use) are subjective.

The good thing about "universally held truths" is that it´s completely irrelevant whether they may be "objective" or not. There is no discussion about them, anyway. The actual fun starts when people rationalize some weird stances as being "objective" (e.g. by ascribing them to the god of their concept).

 

[Paradoxum]

That would certainly be a bad thing. This is why I tend to dislike the concept of "duty", which all too often sounds like consequences do not matter.

Putting that aside, regarding a virtue as good in itself doesn't mean "not caring about actions and consequences". The end in this case is found within the means. It is a constitutive means.

For instance, if one's ultimate end is a rational life, then the virtue of rationality is a constitutive means to that end. It is not merely an instrumental means -- a mere means to that end -- but constitutes what a rational life is. However, note that rationality is not merely an constitutive means, it is an instrumental means as well. Rationality helps one to survive and flourish in the future.

In any case, what really matters is the vision of one's ultimate end. If that vision is evil, then of course any virtues that constitute that end will be evil as well. The problem isn't constitutive means, but one's concept of the good.


eudaimonia,

Mark

Sorry I didn't reply before. I didn't realise you replied to me. My reply will have to wait till monday though.

 

[Ripheus27]

Well, of course you are free to redefine "objective" as meaning "broadly (or universally) agreed upon".

You *are* reading what I wrote, yes? Don't you see that I define objectivity as existence even when unperceived, not universally agreed-upon existence?

Apart from that - if we are to follow your line of reasoning - everything else in morality (particularly the parts that are actually of practical use) are subjective.

A principle of self-command *can* be applied to practical questions. For example, suppose I want to just go out and sleep with as many people as possible to satisfy some base carnal drive. To be self-commanding, here, would be to refuse promiscuity.

 

[quatona]

You *are* reading what I wrote, yes? Don't you see that I define objectivity as existence even when unperceived, not universally agreed-upon existence?

Yes, yet your assumption rest squarely on broad agreement. I am still not seeing how you get from one to the other.
And don´t make the mistake of comparing this to matters of physicality. The wording "perceived" is putting the cart before the horse.
So where do your objective morals exist, how are they "perceived", and how is the idea that they exist falsifiable?

A principle of self-command *can* be applied to practical questions.

Sure, even a completely tautological statement (e.g. "It´s good to do the right thing") *can* be applied to practical questions.

For example, suppose I want to just go out and sleep with as many people as possible to satisfy some base carnal drive. To be self-commanding, here, would be to refuse promiscuity.

Only if you have determined before that sleeping with many people (or that satisfying your base carnal drives) is bad. When it comes to the stuff you have decided to be good, there is no call for abstaining from them due to the need for "self-command", after all.

 

[Ripheus27]

Yes, yet your assumption rest squarely on broad agreement. I am still not seeing how you get from one to the other.
And don´t make the mistake of comparing this to matters of physicality. The wording "perceived" is putting the cart before the horse.
So where do your objective morals exist, how are they "perceived", and how is the idea that they exist falsifiable?

I didn't say that the idea that they exist is falsifiable, I was comparing my argument to falsification, in this case of moral relativism. As for the other two questions, look at the title of this thread. It says that this is a "very, very limited argument" for a certain conclusion. Unless you're debating the argument within the limited parameters in which it has been presented, don't waste your time.

EDIT: Or, if you'd like to avoid wasting *my* time, read the entire Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Rawls' A Theory of Justice, most or all of Kant's major works (not sure if I've read 'em all but I know most of 'em I've cleared), Susan Neiman and Onora O'Neill's commentaries on Kant (and Allen Wood's and Rawls' too), Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism & The Human Condition & On Revolution, Plato's dialogues, Sartre's Being and Nothingness, the Bhagavad-Gita, the Dhammapada, the Tao Te Ching, Watchmen, and every article you can find on .edu site pages for professors of philosophy. Oh, and at least a third or so of the Tanner Lectures on Human Values. Then I'll stop arguing within the limits I've established for this thread.

Only if you have determined before that sleeping with many people (or that satisfying your base carnal drives) is bad. When it comes to the stuff you have decided to be good, there is no call for abstaining from them due to the need for "self-command", after all.

Self-command means inner power over emotions/drives/etc. The call to self-command only rules out actions based on submission to emotions/drives/etc. When it comes to actions energized by transcendental freedom (in the Kantian sense) alone, another standard has to be called into play. But again, this is a very, very limited case for a certain conclusion that I'm making, here.

 

[Eudaimonist]

Sorry I didn't reply before. I didn't realise you replied to me. My reply will have to wait till monday though.

I look forward to that.


eudaimonia,

Mark