A very, very limited argument for objective morality

[Ripheus27]

One line of reasoning used to support moral relativism is the apparent lack of substantial consensus on any concrete moral rules. Technically, of course, even if we could show that there was one rule that most if not every religion or philosophy taught, this fact would be consistent with morality emerging from within the subjectivity of those religions' or philosophies' adherents. But this would be skepticism comparable to Matrixesque global hallucination scenarios, perhaps.

For the sake of this thread, then, my argument is:

1. If most religions/philosophies support moral rule X, then X is objectively valid.
2. Most religions/philosophies support a moral rule enjoining humanity to self-command.
C. Therefore, moral rules of self-command are objectively valid.

(1) is questionable for more reasons than I outlined in the first paragraph of this post, but let's grant it for the moment since (2) might be a much more interesting premise to debate. That Christianity advocates self-discipline is virtually incontestable. But Muslims talk of an "inner jihad," a war with evil drives within the believer; Stoics gave us the adjective stoic; Plato's theory compares a well-governed city to the virtuous soul; even Epicureans did not advocate raw pleasure (at least, not all of them, and not even their namesake, advocated this). Buddhists, Taoists, Kantians, Zoroastrians... I've found self-command as a commandment among all these groups.

To speak from anecdotes (my apologies in advance), I have seen that a man can be self-disciplined and thereby inspire the respect of the seemingly impenitent, even.

So then (C) follows from (1) and (2) by modus ponens.

 

[Eudaimonist]

How do you defend against the logical fallacy Argumentum ad Populum?

It could be that religions/philosophies are mistaken on the issue of self-command.

Isn't the truly important thing how those religions/philosophies justify their advocacy of self-command, and not merely to take a head count?


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Ripheus27]

How do you defend against the logical fallacy Argumentum ad Populum?

An argument from popularity involves a logical fallacy because it uses popularity as an inference rule. My argument collapses this fallacy into a premise instead (the first premise).

You might put it like this: "It is wrong to say that something is true because this thing is widely believed. However, widespread belief does count as evidence for that thing."

Isn't the truly important thing how those religions/philosophies justify their advocacy of self-command, and not merely to take a head count?

If you're a moral intuitionist, then not so much. My idea (here) is that self-command is self-evidently good, that people can perceive moral truths in a way functionally similar to perceiving the color of the sky, and that therefore most people throughout history have perceived the intrinsic good of self-command. They then embellished their perception with claims to divine revelation or complicated arguments, leading to varying lines of support for one principle. (Now in reality, there is a lot of logical convergence between, say, Platonic and Kantian arguments for self-command.)

 

[Gadarene]

One line of reasoning used to support moral relativism is the apparent lack of substantial consensus on any concrete moral rules. Technically, of course, even if we could show that there was one rule that most if not every religion or philosophy taught, this fact would be consistent with morality emerging from within the subjectivity of those religions' or philosophies' adherents. But this would be skepticism comparable to Matrixesque global hallucination scenarios, perhaps.

For the sake of this thread, then, my argument is:

1. If most religions/philosophies support moral rule X, then X is objectively valid.
2. Most religions/philosophies support a moral rule enjoining humanity to self-command.
C. Therefore, moral rules of self-command are objectively valid.

(1) is questionable for more reasons than I outlined in the first paragraph of this post, but let's grant it for the moment since (2) might be a much more interesting premise to debate. That Christianity advocates self-discipline is virtually incontestable. But Muslims talk of an "inner jihad," a war with evil drives within the believer; Stoics gave us the adjective stoic; Plato's theory compares a well-governed city to the virtuous soul; even Epicureans did not advocate raw pleasure (at least, not all of them, and not even their namesake, advocated this). Buddhists, Taoists, Kantians, Zoroastrians... I've found self-command as a commandment among all these groups.

To speak from anecdotes (my apologies in advance), I have seen that a man can be self-disciplined and thereby inspire the respect of the seemingly impenitent, even.

So then (C) follows from (1) and (2) by modus ponens.

Subjective morality doesn't rule out a large degree of commonality of moral behaviour though.

More later.

 

[Ripheus27]

Subjective morality doesn't rule out a large degree of commonality of moral behaviour though.

Man, I've never wanted to cuss so much on this forum, and I don't mean at you, I mean at myself. I used to debate on a philosophy website, and it was important to me that I kept track of the difference between these two differences:

1. Objective versus subjective
2. Absolute versus relative

A subjective morality could be absolute (universally present within subjectivity), while an objective morality could be relative (the same way it's objectively true that my cat is to the right, even though it's objectively true for someone else that the cat is to the left).

 

[Eudaimonist]

An argument from popularity involves a logical fallacy because it uses popularity as an inference rule. My argument collapses this fallacy into a premise instead (the first premise).

You might put it like this: "It is wrong to say that something is true because this thing is widely believed. However, widespread belief does count as evidence for that thing."

Interesting defense. I think you've raised some good points here.

If you're a moral intuitionist, then not so much.

Okay. I'm not a moral intuitionist, but I can see how moral intuitionism would give leverage to the argument.

To people who aren't moral intuitionists, that's what you'll need to support to press your case.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Eudaimonist]

A subjective morality could be absolute (universally present within subjectivity), while an objective morality could be relative (the same way it's objectively true that my cat is to the right, even though it's objectively true for someone else that the cat is to the left).

You, sir, are a breath of fresh air at these boards. I think you are exactly right about this.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[quatona]

One line of reasoning used to support moral relativism is the apparent lack of substantial consensus on any concrete moral rules.

Am I right in assuming that you meant to say "subjective", as a contrast to "objective"?
While, of course, disagreement on moral questions makes a case for there being subjective morality, it doesn´t make a case against objective morality. You are arguing against a poor argument.

Technically, of course, even if we could show that there was one rule that most if not every religion or philosophy taught, this fact would be consistent with morality emerging from within the subjectivity of those religions' or philosophies' adherents. But this would be skepticism comparable to Matrixesque global hallucination scenarios, perhaps.

Not really. It may just due to something we all (or most of us) have in common.
For the sake of this thread, then, my argument is:

1. If most religions/philosophies support moral rule X, then X is objectively valid.
2. Most religions/philosophies support a moral rule enjoining humanity to self-command.
C. Therefore, moral rules of self-command are objectively valid.

I´m afraid I don´t understand what your definition of "objective" is.
Would you mind sharing it?

 

[Paradoxum]

(1) is questionable for more reasons than I outlined in the first paragraph of this post, but let's grant it for the moment since (2) might be a much more interesting premise to debate. That Christianity advocates self-discipline is virtually incontestable. But Muslims talk of an "inner jihad," a war with evil drives within the believer; Stoics gave us the adjective stoic; Plato's theory compares a well-governed city to the virtuous soul; even Epicureans did not advocate raw pleasure (at least, not all of them, and not even their namesake, advocated this). Buddhists, Taoists, Kantians, Zoroastrians... I've found self-command as a commandment among all these groups.

To speak from anecdotes (my apologies in advance), I have seen that a man can be self-disciplined and thereby inspire the respect of the seemingly impenitent, even.

I don't understand what you mean by self-discipline. Do you mean that you stick to your convictions and do what you think is right, even if it is hard?

It would be good if you explained this more, with more examples. Perhaps from Christianity, Buddhism, Utilitarianism, and Kantianism. They seem to represent common worldviews.

ie: Christians say you shouldn't give into temptation, and Act-Utilitarians (some at least) say you should act for the greatest good, even if it harms you?

So then (C) follows from (1) and (2) by modus ponens.

Well I don't agree with (1), and I don't understand (2).

 

[Ripheus27]

Am I right in assuming that you meant to say "subjective", as a contrast to "objective"?

I think I should've either said "absolute morality" instead, or "absolute and objective morality." As for what objectivity is, I want to throw "mind-independence" out there but things get tricky when we talk about objective facts related to subjective states. Maybe "independent on our beliefs" would be better.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

I think you are confusing universality for objectivity, or perhaps you consider them more or less the same?

 

[Ripheus27]

I don't understand what you mean by self-discipline. Do you mean that you stick to your convictions and do what you think is right, even if it is hard?

Think of ordinary lists of virtues: patience, temperance, and courage, for example. Patience is controlling your emotions having to do with the passage of time; temperance is controlling emotions related to addictive forces; courage is controlling fear. Self-command is governing one's inner self so as to keep it free.

It would be good if you explained this more, with more examples. Perhaps from Christianity, Buddhism, Utilitarianism, and Kantianism. They seem to represent common worldviews.

ie: Christians say you shouldn't give into temptation, and Act-Utilitarians (some at least) say you should act for the greatest good, even if it harms you?

Those are good examples, but as for utilitarianism I think I was thinking more of John Stuart Mill's contrast between dignified desires and... I don't remember if he had a category name for undignified ones. With respect to Kant, his entire Doctrine of Virtue revolves around the notion of inner freedom. Buddhism's Middle Way steers between destructive asceticism and overgrown indulgence, so half this Way is about self-mastery. I honestly don't have an example from Taoism that I can genuinely cite at the moment; I read the Tao Te Ching a few times, but the simple-living recommendations in it are the best I can use in this post to support my thesis.

 

[Ripheus27]

I think you are confusing universality for objectivity, or perhaps you consider them more or less the same?

You're right that I've confused them to an extent here, which is sad because I usually do a better job of keeping track of the difference. Let's try this out for objective/subjective: "exists when unperceived/doesn't exist when unperceived." Which in ethics, I suppose, means: "is true even if not felt to be so/is not true unless felt to be so."

So I'm alleging, "Self-command is good," to be true for everyone (absolute) and true even if no one thinks, imagines, hopes, feels, or has some other relevant attitude that it's true (objective). Subjectivist ethical theories don't have to be relativistic, but they threaten to become so much more readily than theories holding ethics to be objectively valid inasmuch as the former theories often default to mere feelings to evidence their basic moral claims, and these mere feelings are liable to drastically vary from person to person (think of feelings of disgust, for instance).

 

[quatona]

I think I should've either said "absolute morality" instead, or "absolute and objective morality." As for what objectivity is, I want to throw "mind-independence" out there but things get tricky when we talk about objective facts related to subjective states. Maybe "independent on our beliefs" would be better.

If you are arguing for something supposedly "independent on our beliefs" I don´t think it is a good idea to make our beliefs an essential part of your argument.

 

[quatona]

So I'm alleging, "Self-command is good," to be true for everyone (absolute) and true even if no one thinks, imagines, hopes, feels, or has some other relevant attitude that it's true (objective).

Is that your premise or your conclusion (or, as it seems to me, both)?

 

[Paradoxum]

Think of ordinary lists of virtues: patience, temperance, and courage, for example. Patience is controlling your emotions having to do with the passage of time; temperance is controlling emotions related to addictive forces; courage is controlling fear. Self-command is governing one's inner self so as to keep it free.

Aren't they a means to doing the right thing (or not doing the wrong thing) rather than a good in themselves. It would make sense for groups with different moral codes to want people to follow those moral codes. This is aided by good character.

I would say that character virtues are different sorts of good from good actions. If you had all those virtues you could still be immoral by 'courageously' killing your daughter for apostasy. What point is there is virtuously doing evil?

Those are good examples, but as for utilitarianism I think I was thinking more of John Stuart Mill's contrast between dignified desires and... I don't remember if he had a category name for undignified ones. With respect to Kant, his entire Doctrine of Virtue revolves around the notion of inner freedom. Buddhism's Middle Way steers between destructive asceticism and overgrown indulgence, so half this Way is about self-mastery. I honestly don't have an example from Taoism that I can genuinely cite at the moment; I read the Tao Te Ching a few times, but the simple-living recommendations in it are the best I can use in this post to support my thesis.

Ah, ok.

 

[Ripheus27]

If you are arguing for something supposedly "independent on our beliefs" I don´t think it is a good idea to make our beliefs an essential part of your argument.

There are two senses of "independence from belief" at play here. One has to do with something being true apart from our belief; the other has to do with our evidence for that truth.

 

[Ripheus27]

Aren't they a means to doing the right thing (or not doing the wrong thing) rather than a good in themselves. It would make sense for groups with different moral codes to want people to follow those moral codes. This is aided by good character.

I would say that character virtues are different sorts of good from good actions. If you had all those virtues you could still be immoral by 'courageously' killing your daughter for apostasy. What point is there is virtuously doing evil?

Kant makes the same point in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, but he also thought (with the Stoics) that virtues have intrinsic value as well. Just because something is good as a means doesn't mean that it's not also good as an end in itself.

My argument, as I said, is very limited. It doesn't convey an idea of what our other obligations might be. It only tells us to train ourselves to have inner emotional power, not what to do with this power.

 

[Ripheus27]

Is that your premise or your conclusion (or, as it seems to me, both)?

You might think of it in terms of falsification. Moral relativism predicts that there will be no consensus on any moral principles (well, an extreme form of moral relativism would). If there is such consensus on even one principle, then without adjusting the predictive theory, the theory is falsified.

 

[Paradoxum]

Kant makes the same point in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, but he also thought (with the Stoics) that virtues have intrinsic value as well. Just because something is good as a means doesn't mean that it's not also good as an end in itself.

That could be true, but I'm sure it is. It could be that virtues are good in themselves, but I would want to steer clear of people using 'virtue' to justify not caring about their actions and consequences. I fear 'virtue' being used to make the world a worse place.

People use 'honour' to defend murder, for example.

My argument, as I said, is very limited. It doesn't convey an idea of what our other obligations might be. It only tells us to train ourselves to have inner emotional power, not what to do with this power.

That is a good idea, and useful for morality, but I wonder if only emphasising this could be bad.