I am no modal logician but if nothingness is not a possible world then maybe the necessary being is the formal requirement that in each world the world set must have at least one element.
The necessary being is simply the being that would serve as the truthmaker for every possible true contingent proposition in every possible world. So, it's not just that every possible world must have at least one element of whatever sort, but that this element must have certain properties, for lack of a better term.
The element itself would be necessary. It would be one and the same element that would exist in every possible world. This is why I mention in my OP that I don't think that non-indexical propositions can shift truthmakers. Indexicals are basically words or expressions that can refer to different things in different contexts, e.g. the indexical my in my CF pseudonym is Crandaddy. If I were to assert this proposition, it would be true; if you were to assert it, it would be false.But i supppse we are talking about a necessary element rather than there being at least one element necessarily cf modal fallacy?
The proposition that possibly, there are no physical objects, in the sense that I mean it, is non-indexical, and thus it can't shift reference in different contexts. Since it can't shift reference in different contexts, it seems to me that its truth would be dependent upon one and the same truthmaker in every possible context.
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