Part I
E.g., while I basically agree with you here, I am not happy with the wording "properties [...](co)exist". Triangles aren´t objects, quadriliterality isn´t an object, properties aren´t objects. All of them are abstract concepts. Thus, when we make statements like the above, we need to keep in mind that we are talking about and remain fully within our own abstractions.
Now, it may be useful - for purposes of brevity or whatever - to say "a concept exists", yet: we must not forget that we are not talking about "the world outside", and that "existing" is used in a different meaning than when talking about "the world outside".
But if we're not saying anything at all about the outside world, then how do you think it is that we can know anything about it or refer to it? If the outside world doesn't have properties like spatial extension, relations, etc. that we can conceptualize in abstraction, then it seems we're trapped within the confines of our own minds. Bear in mind that I'm not saying that properties are concrete objects in their own right, but neither does their existence entirely consist in our subjective abstractions.
Again, for clarification: Even a trilateral triangle doesn´t "exist", anyway. A triangle isn´t an object, it´s an abstraction.
Thus, in a world without humans who make such abstractions, there wouldn´t be any such abstractions.
While I believe you are correct that there wouldn't be any abstractions, I don't think that, e.g., triangularity would completely cease to exist, outright. We know that in this world, where there are humans, there are objects that exhibit spatial extension which we are able to conceptualize and, thus, refer to linguistically, and I see no reason why we should say that triangularity isn't or might not be exemplified in some object. Now, in a world without human or human-like minds (just in case there might be ETs), there wouldn't be any triangularity abstractions, but I see no reason to say that what we abstractly conceptualize as triangularity might not inhere to some object, so that were some human-like mind to come along, it might abstractly cognize it according to the conceptual content of triangularity.
Yes, sure. We are no more making statements about objects, we are making statements about the way we conceptualize.
However, when we say e.g. "X exists possibly/necessarily" we make it sound like we are making a statement about X or about its existence while, in fact, the possibility or necessity is not a property of the object or its existence but a property created by our thinking, our logic, our conceptualization.
The modals possibly and necessarily do not ascribe properties to concrete objects; this is true. But neither do they (always) describe our thought processes. The way I see it, concrete objects that exist out in the world have ontological parts. These are not parts like the components of, e.g., a computer, which can be separated out into individual concrete objects. Rather, they are more like
aspects of singular concrete individuals which we are able to cognize in different ways. Relevant to the present discussion are the ontological parts of
quiddity and
haecceity. Quiddity is a term that refers to the
whatness aspect of the object. When we define a term, we are describing its quiddity. Haecceity, on the other hand, is the
thatness aspect of the object. It is an ontological part that gives an object its individual particularity.
So, for example, if there were two triangular objects sitting in front of me, triangularity would be the communicable quiddity of both, since it would include the definition of what the objects are (insofar as they're triangular). By contrast, the haecceity of the triangle sitting to my right would be the incommunicable particularity of that individual triangular object, and the same would go for the one on my left.
I think that (sometimes, at least) when we say that
possibly or
necessarily something or other is the case, we're talking about quidditative principles abstracted from their concrete, particular existences and considered by themselves as potentially being concretely realized in some way or other. But, I would say, we can't so talk about them (i.e. as potentially being concretely realized in this or that way) unless they have a sort of less-than-concrete existence in themselves. So, while individual concrete objects cannot exist without both quiddities and haecceities, their quiddities, nevertheless, have a sort of existence in themselves, anterior to their contraction to concrete particulars, and these are what we're talking about when we make (some) modal claims.
Well, I still don´t see "impossibly/necessarily" and "possibly" being in the same ballpark.
The truthmaker for "this assumption is necessary for us to make" would be the fact that the assumption to the contrary would render our thinking structure (basically: our axioms, our definitions and/or logic) dysfunctional. The same goes for "this assumption is impossible for us to make".
Point: We are making statements about our concepts and abstractions, not about the world, and for obvious reasons the "truthmakers" for such statements are somewhat self-referential.
But this would make all possible worlds only those worlds in which human-like minds exist. Consequently, any counterfactual statement of the form If there were no human-like minds, then... would describe an impossible world. It would be like saying if there were square circles, then... or if the law of non-contradiction were false, then... But surely it makes sense to talk of there not being any human-like minds. After all, in the early part of our universe's history there were no human-like minds, and physicists seem to have no difficulty talking about what the universe was like back then. Nor do they seem to have any great difficulty speculating about what the universe will be like in the far off distant future; whether there will be any human-like minds in that future seems irrelevant.
The point is that human-like minds have every appearance of being contingent. They may either exist or not. There seems to be no difficulty describing worlds (or parts of worlds, like the past or future) where they do (or might) not exist.
As far as "it´s possible..." is concerned: This is merely stating that neither the assumption nor the assumption to the contrary would threaten our thinking structures. It´s inconclusive, in that it´s what´s left when we can´t conclusively exclude either R or -R because neither is threatening our thinking structures.
But when I say that, e.g., it's possible for a book on the floor to sit on my desk I seem to be saying something stronger than simply that it doesn't threaten my thinking structures to imagine such a book sitting on my desk. I mean something more like, it is not opposed to the nature of such a book to sit upon my desk. To be sure, it does not threaten our thinking structures either to imagine the book sitting on my desk or not, but this is not primarily what we're talking about. I would say that it is only subsequently and upon introspective analysis of our own relations to modal statements that we come to realize their bearing upon our thinking structures.
Thanks for the clarification!
Now, would that be your premise or your conclusion?
Personally I don´t see how it is the latter since I haven´t understood how you manage to argue or demonstrate how our concepts and abstractions
- exist independently of our minds and
- exist in the absence of a physical world.
I believe the passage you're quoting is simply an attempt to summarize my syllogism in my original post. There I lay out all of my premises, inferences, and my conclusion point-by-point.
So what would e.g. "triangularity" be a property of if there were no physical world and no beings conceptualizing and abstracting?
It wouldn't be a property
of anything, since in order for it to be a property
of something it would have to inhere in some particular individual object. Now, as for what it
would be, I'm not sure that I could offer a satisfying answer. In fact, I'm still trying to figure out just what such a thing would be, myself. (This is why I intentionally left open whether the truthmaker(s) of our modal claims is (are) one or many. I'm inclined to say that there is only one such truthmaker and that we discursively analyze it piece-by-piece according to different modal claims, but I'm not entirely sure about this.) Still, however, I think it would be
something. That is, I think it would have some sort of less-than-concrete existence even if there were no concrete particulars in which it would (or could) inhere.
As both of us seem to have agreed upon above (correct me if I am wrong), as soon as we get to meta-statements (statements about statements) we enter the realm of self-introspection rather than description of "the world". We are talking about "necessary assumptions", "impossible assumptions" (and the inconclusive "possible assumptions), and when we do that we are referring to our thinking structures.
No, I would say that we're still talking about facts in the world. More specifically, when we make such meta-statements, we're talking about the facts of proposition tokens (particular utterances, basically); whether these come from ourselves or from someone else doesn't matter.
In order for to the statement "those things might exist" there would at least a mind have to exist to make that statement and to apply its thinking structures.
Correct, a mind would have to exist for the statement to exist, and it would have to think, as you say.
I can´t seem to follow you here. When you talk about statements, statements about statements, thinking, logic, abstractions etc. you are factually presupposing a mind to produce them. It seems to me that the assumption that there might be no mind to make them (and that they exist somewhere out there as independent entities) is violating the premise.
For there to be any of the things you list, there have to be minds to make/use/entertain them. However, these things must also have conceptual content to work with, and this content can't be entirely exhausted by our own subjective conceptions if it is to succeed in describing the world at all.
It strikes me as odd that you start by carefully differenciating between the world, statements about the world, and statements about statements about the world, and later introduce the idea that neither the world nor a mind making statements may exist.
So we're clear, I'm saying that the world
of particular, individual, concrete objects might not exist (not the entire world, outright), and I include therein minds of the sort you and I have.
Yes: my thinking structure neither allows me to conclusively exclude either of the assumptions: "they exist" or "they don´t exist".
But I think your ability to do this derives from your abstract analysis of the relevant conceptual content. You examine your conceptual content of Bradford pear tree in abstraction and determine that it may or may not exist in some particular individual. It's not that you can conceive of the world being either way (i.e. with or without Bradford pear trees) and project this onto the world, but rather that the world
actually can be either way and you're able to see it.
I was trying to say that - despite our semantics which suggest that "possible" is the actual concept and "impossible" is its negation - "impossibly" and "necessary" are the actual concepts (and antagonists) of our meta-epistemological method, and "possibly" is the term for the inconclusive left-overs.
Well, it seems to me that we can reconstruct the concepts impossible and necessary out of no other positive content than possible. Thus, impossible can be reconstructed as not-possible and necessary can be reconstructed as not-possibly-not. Assuming that these reconstructions are semantically equivalent to what they presume to reconstruct and that no positive content can come exclusively from negations, it would seem that possible is the fundamental (or at least more fundamental) concept.
It seems to me that this doesn´t do justice to our methodology. Our meta-epistemological methodology is exclusive. "It´s possible that Bradford trees exist" or "It´s possible that Bradford trees don´t exist" (both of which are saying the same, btw.) are concessions of "failure" in that respect.
I think what you're saying here (correct me if I'm wrong) is that necessary and impossible are our opposite meta-epistemological extremes, and that possibly and possibly-not are just different (but semantically equivalent) ways of describing what occupies the middle ground.
Assuming (as I have not been until now) that these words describe our meta-epistemological methodology, I would still say that possible is the fundamental concept and that it means, basically, conceivable. What is possibly-not the case is conceivable but conceivably replaceable by some other conception. What is necessary is conceivable but not conceivably replaceable. And finally, what is impossible is not coherently conceivable at all. So, that is necessary which is conceivable, but whose replacement amounts to incoherent nonsense (i.e. is impossible).
