A Real Man Is...

[Crandaddy]

Part I

I disagree, though: I do not want to be included in this "we". This is not my understanding of morality that I naturally have.
I think we should be very careful with assumptions that our own understanding is "commonsense".

Well, we needn't be consciously aware that this is what we're doing; in fact, most people aren't, I would say. But it does seem to me that this is essential to the content of a moral belief, even if it is held subconsciously. I just don't see how we could omit it from a belief and still call that belief a moral belief (i.e. I don't see how we could preserve its ought content). As I see it, if we eliminate the ought in its full-blooded, objective sense, then we eliminate morality. I just don't see any way that we could preserve it. I don't think that a subjective ought-feeling is quite the same thing as an ought. As I see it, the ought-feeling just is; it doesn't carry the normativity of the full-blooded ought. For there to be a true, normatively-imposing ought, it seems to me there has to be something (or at least the belief that there is something) external to the subjective self that exerts a normative influence upon the self's behaviors.

1. Ok, so would you agree that we can put the "like/dislike" thing to rest? That´s what I initially took issue with, you are conceding that it was a sloppy way of wording one of the options of the dichotomy, and you have explained what you mean in a way that a. is better understandable and b. doesn´t give me the feeling of an association fallacy.

Sounds good to me.

2. Can´t speak for variant, but I think that even prior to your question he has made pretty clear that he doesn´t believe there to be an objective morality of the sort you are postulating in #1.
variant aside for a moment: I certainly don´t. I find that a far fetched and actually absurd idea that is contrary to what I would assume to be commonsense.

I suspected as much, but I just wanted to make sure. We might be surprised.

The part I believe in (i.e. that we experience "ought"-feelings, and that these "ought"- feelings are in very rare instances almost universal, and in other instances vary greatly even not only from culture to culture, but from individual to individual) doesn´t seem to be in dispute. What would need substantiation is your additional idea.
I am looking forward to you making your case for it. Just claiming it to be "commonsense" won´t cut it, though.

Certain abnormal individuals excepted, perhaps, I don't know of any culture that doesn't have any understanding of a moral ought at all, by itself and regardless of its content. Now, as for the content of morality, yes, I certainly agree this will vary, perhaps rather widely in some respects, but still I think that moral obligation tends to assume a general common form wherever it is to be found. It seems that people pretty much everywhere tend to believe, for instance, that benevolence toward others is morally good and that malevolence toward others is morally bad. I believe this attitude is expressed in the golden rule, which enjoys widespread cultural diversity under various forms. It is when we get to what constitutes such benevolence or malevolence that we run into moral disagreements, I would say.

I´ll abstain from commenting on the "like/dislike" thing. If you insist that subjective ought-feelings must be called "likes/dislikes" I will insist that the idea of objective morality must be called the quest for "unconditional obedience". Just so we both feel uncomfortable with the way the other person describes our views.

I don't think that will be necessary. I don't have any particular attachment to these terms. In fact, my use of them led to unnecessary confusion, so I'm also in favor of dropping them.

While when it comes to "is"-propositions we have few problems coming to a universal agreement, we find very few "ought"-propositions that are universally agreed upon. This is not really a valid argument against the existence of an "objective morality" - it just is meant to demonstrate that this assumption can not as easily defended as a matter of "commonsense". When we have e.g. a disagreement concerning a particular object being in a particular place, we simply can solve it by investigating the place. If one of us sees it, he points to it and shows it to the other. Keyword: Intersubjectivity.

Yes, I think I see your point. There doesn't seem to be a great deal of controversy over the existence of, e.g., the Great Pyramid of Giza, since all that would be required to prove the doubter wrong would be simply to point at it and say, “right there it sits.” On the other hand, that there is a moral imperative that we should not, e.g., consume meat would not be quite as easy to show. There isn't any concrete object we can show to the doubter just by pointing at it, after all.

But all this shows, I think, is that our understanding of the objective natural moral law is theoretical rather than empirical. Thus, it is not unlike our understanding of mathematics. Different people have different levels of understanding of mathematics. A university professor of mathematics would have a far greater understanding of it than a child who is learning the fundamentals of simple arithmetic, for example.

Now, this analogy isn't perfect, of course. For one thing, there are proofs for mathematical statements and theorems, whereas there are no such proofs for ethical maxims. But like mathematical statements and theorems, ethical maxims must be considered and analyzed in abstraction; they can't just be pointed at like concrete objects, such as pyramids. And also like them, it seems to me they can be either correct or incorrect, inasmuch as they accurately describe the objective natural moral law. Finally, I would say that ethical maxims are like mathematical statements and theorems insofar as they both require our cognitive faculties to be properly configured so as to apprehend them. In the case of mathematics, our minds have to be configured so as to be able to apprehend such basic mathematical truths as that 1+1=2, and in the case of morality, our minds have to be configured so as to apprehend such basics as that it is morally good to be benevolent toward others and morally bad to be malevolent toward them. Once we grasp the basics (which it seems we are naturally disposed to do), then we can meditate on them and theorize (perhaps correctly, perhaps mistakenly) as to how they should be further developed and applied to specific situations.

Now, I don´t think that it´s really that hard to justifiy these ideas; and even if it were hard to justify them, the fact that pretty much everyone believes in them means that you will rarely face the necessity of justifying them.
This is not the case with your idea of "objective morality". Many people do not believe in there being such, and of those who believe there exists such many disagree on what they prescribe.
Thus, I have problems accepting the analogy.

Well, as I said above, people needn't be consciously aware that they're attributing any objective value to the world when they hold moral beliefs, and regardless of what disagreements there may be, surely there is some significant basic level of moral agreement, as I've indicated previously.

Yes. Of course, you wouldn´t have this problem if you would let go of the idea that your feeling of oughtness points to an "objective morality", and instead would simply stand up for your opinion that certain things should be done or should not be done (and hopefully could give good reasons for your take on it).

But what sort of reasons might I give for a purely subjective opinion? As it so happens, I prefer chocolate ice cream to vanilla. Maybe if I thought long and hard I might be able to come up with some sort of reason for why I hold this preference. Maybe I associate the taste with something else I happen to like (I can't think of any such thing, but I suppose it's a possibility). But while there might be some sort of reason for why I prefer chocolate ice cream to vanilla, I don't know what it might be for there to be a good reason--not in any morally normative sense, at least.

I don't mean to trivialize morality by such talk of ice cream preferences, but if morality is entirely subjective, I don't see how it can amount to anything more than subjective opinion, much like one's preference for ice cream. Moral opinions may be qualitatively different from ice cream preferences; they may be held more passionately than ice cream preferences; but in the final analysis, they're still just subjective opinions, like ice cream preferences. I don't mean to be offensive, but I don't see any way to avoid this conclusion.

Which leads us to another - pragmatic - problem:
No matter how much you assert that there is an objective morality out there, no matter how much you assert that it says what you think it says: These two mere claims don´t help giving your opinion (or "ought"-feelings) any more weight than the opinion of any other person. Not until you can demonstrate both claims to be true.
Thus, while the idea of an objective morality existing might certainly provide you with some comfort, it won´t help you to substantiate your idea and won´t help you convince others.

I'm not out to attempt anything as ambitious as a demonstration of my own moral views in specific detail. In fact, I'm not even out to demonstrate the existence of an objective morality at all, if by “demonstrate” you mean something like a proof of its existence which no reasonable person could possibly deny.

I would be satisfied merely to show that it is reasonable to believe that morality does have an objective basis. In line with this, I might also like to put forward an explication for why I think that a thoroughgoing moral subjectivism, if truly believed (regardless of whether it is in fact true), would preclude the necessary conditions for moral behavior at all (whether good or bad), and perhaps also for why I think the existence of an objective morality implies the existence of God (more on this below).

 

[Crandaddy]

Part II

Whatever - what you´d need to do in order to defend your position is:
a. make a case for the idea that an "objective morality" exists,

Again, I'm not out to prove that there's an objective morality. Indeed, I don't even know of any such proof. For evidence, however, I would appeal to psychology. It seems to me that what we're doing (whether consciously or subconsciously) when we hold moral beliefs is we're making objective evaluations. More specifically, we're evaluating ourselves by virtue of our volitional activity against the measure of an ideal standard, which we take to be external to ourselves and normatively imposing upon our behaviors. This ideal standard, I would say, is the ideal form of human personhood--the ideal template, if you will, according to which we are or become actual persons.


In fact, it seems to me that our understanding of an ideal normatively-imposing standard as objectively good is what enables moral behavior at all, whether good or bad. Rather than being bound to acting exclusively upon hedonistic impulses--upon whatever we believe will cause us the greatest pleasure or least displeasure--it is because we are able to understand as good something not identical to our pleasures that we are able to act either morally virtuously (if we choose to pursue that good) or morally viciously (if we understand that good yet choose not to pursue it).

b. make a case for the idea that it prescribes and prohibits what you are claiming,

Very well, I claim that it prescribes that we be generally benevolent toward other persons, sentient creatures, and perhaps the world more generally; and I claim that it prohibits that we be generally malevolent toward other persons, sentient creatures, and perhaps the world more generally.


Perhaps very abnormal individuals excepted, I think pretty much all of us would fall in line with this. It is, of course, very basic and nonspecific, but I think it's really all I need. That is, I don't think I need to claim very specific moral imperatives in order to claim that at some basic level, our minds are configured (if they're functioning properly) so as to be able to apprehend a very basic, (epistemically) inchoate morality. Of course, we go on from there to develop this along more specific lines (if we didn't, we wouldn't be able to put it to any actual use), and I do believe that specific theoretical developments of our basic understanding of morality may be either correct or mistaken (depending on whether or not they accurately describe the ideal human personhood). But really all we need in order to be moral agents is to first grasp the moral fundamentals and then choose to follow them--should we decide to pursue the course of moral virtue, that is.

and finally
c. give a good reason why this "objective morality" should be of any interest or relevance at all. (E.g. even if you could demonstrate that there´s a God, and that this God is the author of "objective morality", and if you could substantiate which moral prescriptions God has given out, you´d still have to convince me to accept them as normative, from my perspective).

Two points...


First the practical:


I'll reiterate once again that I can't prove, strictly speaking, that moral subjectivism is false. However, I fear that, from a pragmatic perspective, the moral subjectivist must bite a rather serious bullet. Bear in mind that “moral subjectivism” implies that morality is not objectively evaluatively grounded in anything external to the rational subject. This is to say that whatever morally evaluative content there may be is entirely contained within the subject. It might be believed to be inherent in certain objects, but such a belief would be nothing more than an illusion on the subjectivist view.


Now, what if one were to really, truly believe that subjectivism is correct? What this would entail, I think, is not only the belief that there is no objective basis for morality, but also the belief that whatever beliefs anyone may have that there is an objective basis for morality are illusory. Such a view would seem to confine whatever moral value there may be entirely within the bounds of subjective feeling, so that the subjectivist would believe that a moral ought can be nothing more than a subjective ought-feeling, perhaps mistakenly projected onto external objects by those still under the spell of the objectivist illusion.


But if the possibility for moral action at all, whether good or bad, requires (as I think it does) at least the belief (whether mistaken or not) that morality is objective, then what we would have with the subjectivist is the elimination of a necessary prerequisite for even the possibility of moral action. He would no longer recognize objective value at all. For him, the only intrinsic goods he would any longer recognize would be those identical to his own subjective pleasures. To be sure, he might still feel the pangs of his conscience, but he would not recognize them to be indicative of any normatively-binding ought beyond himself. For him, such sensations would be nothing more than displeasures to be assuaged by whatever method he believes most expedient. And so, whereas he might choose to go on acting, the subjectivist would no longer be acting (or even have the ability to act) as a moral agent, whereas the objectivist would retain at least the illusion that she might break free of her baser hedonistic passions to pursue higher and nobler courses of action. As I see it, this is what moral subjectivism leads to, and I at least find it to be very undesirable.


By the way, in case you might like to know, my argument here is very similar to, and in fact is inspired by, an argument C. S. Lewis makes in The Abolition of Man. As Lewis sees it, men who have been freed of any belief in objectively-binding oughts can no longer be called “good” or “bad” men because, as he sees it, their very humanity will have been destroyed (or abolished, as he puts it), so that they can no longer even be called “men” anymore. I don't know if I go quite that far, but I do think he points out a very serious problem for moral subjectivism. If you'd like to read The Abolition of Man, you can find it here. (My very first link! YAY!!! )


Now the theoretical:


This point won't apply to yourself, since it presumes moral objectivism, which I know you don't accept, but I thought I might offer a very brief presentation anyway.


If we accept that morality is objective, that our properly functioning moral faculties indicate that there really is an objective evaluative standard for our actions, then we're left to speculate as to what such a thing might be. The key thing we should notice, I think, is that it would have to be good--and objectively good, at that. This is to say that this ground for objective morality would have to be, not only desirable, but intrinsically desirable; it would have to be desirable in itself and for what it is.


Now, when we pursue our hedonistic desires--to please ourselves or to avoid or assuage our displeasures--we pursue certain courses of action which we believe will accomplish our goals. We act in certain ways, perhaps make certain things, and the end result (the final cause in Aristotelian terminology) of our behaviors/artifacts is our own satisfaction. The various objects of our hedonistic desires are thus ordered to our volitional wills insofar as they are intended to accomplish our intended satisfaction.


But in the case of morality (presuming, once again, that morality is objective), we encounter goods--intrinsic goods, that is, not instrumental goods to the accomplishment of intrinsic goods--that are not identical to our pleasures. Now, if such things are to be goods at all, they would have to be desirable, and we would have to be able to understand their desirability in order to be able to call them “good.” However, their desirability cannot be completely exhausted by our subjective opinions of them, since if it were, they could no longer be called “good” in an objective sense.


So, if the desirability of moral goods (i.e. the object or objects of moral beliefs and statements) is not exhausted by our subjective opinions, and if to be desirable at all is to be ordered to a volitional will or something analogous to a volitional will, then it follows that moral goods are ordered to a volitional will or something analogous to a volitional will external to ourselves. This is what we theists refer to as the “will of God.”

 

[Eudaimonist]

So, if the desirability of moral goods (i.e. the object or objects of moral beliefs and statements) is not exhausted by our subjective opinions, and if to be desirable at all is to be ordered to a volitional will or something analogous to a volitional will, then it follows that moral goods are ordered to a volitional will or something analogous to a volitional will external to ourselves. This is what we theists refer to as the “will of God.”

I'm in reasonable agreement with you up until this point. I just don't see how this last step is a necessary implication of your argument aside from your desire to give a plug for God.

All one has to say is that a rational person would have non-arbitrary reasons to rank moral goods in a certain way based on some judgment as to their objective desirability. There is no need for an external "Ranker" in order for there to be rankable objective moral goods. All that has to be true is that there are reasons to rank according to one set of priorities instead of another set of priorities. For example, good A advances your personal well-being better than good B, therefore one ranks A over B.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Crandaddy]

All one has to say is that a rational person would have non-arbitrary reasons to rank moral goods in a certain way based on some judgment as to their objective desirability. There is no need for an external "Ranker" in order for there to be rankable objective moral goods. All that has to be true is that there are reasons to rank according to one set of priorities instead of another set of priorities. For example, good A advances your personal well-being better than good B, therefore one ranks A over B.

But if we can be objectively better or worse personal individuals, then I don't see how we can get away from an external "Ranker," for the simple reason that terms like "better" and "worse" seem to be irreducibly teleological. That is, I don't see how such terms make sense except in the context of some ideal end goal. Since this end goal doesn't terminate within ourselves as some form of our own pleasure, it seemingly must terminate elsewhere.

 

[Gracchus]

But if we can be objectively better or worse personal individuals, then I don't see how we can get away from an external "Ranker," for the simple reason that terms like "better" and "worse" seem to be irreducibly teleological. That is, I don't see how such terms make sense except in the context of some ideal end goal. Since this end goal doesn't terminate within ourselves as some form of our own pleasure, it seemingly must terminate elsewhere.

It "terminates" in the external, social environment. Sociopaths, and other "criminals", either get lynched, (if they are stupid), become capitalists, or get elected to public office.

In the last two cases, they may get a lot of sex, but they probably won't have a lot of children. Too many sociopaths and the society becomes dangerously unstable, and that isn't even good for the sociopaths. Everybody benefits from a stable, peaceful, honest society, and that is what evolution selects for, but those who don't follow the rules, if there aren't too many of them benefit also.

I wonder: If you filled political offices and corporate governing boards with inmates from hospitals for the criminally insane, would you be able to notice a difference?

 

[Eudaimonist]

But if we can be objectively better or worse personal individuals, then I don't see how we can get away from an external "Ranker," for the simple reason that terms like "better" and "worse" seem to be irreducibly teleological. That is, I don't see how such terms make sense except in the context of some ideal end goal. Since this end goal doesn't terminate within ourselves as some form of our own pleasure, it seemingly must terminate elsewhere.

Instead of consciously teleological, the ideal end goal may be biologically teleonomic. Not everything that appears purposeful is necessarily planned by a mind.

The ideal end goal may have to do with our natural function as living human beings, the fulfillment of which is our personal good because that is what actualizes our natural human potentials. To put that another way, we have a natural well-being that is the end goal, and which sets a natural standard by which one may judge people as "better" or "worse" than each other.

So, I don't see how the end goal must be outside of our own natures. It may have to do with a pattern of human functioning that has a teleonomic character.

BTW, I agree with you that pleasure isn't the end goal (I'm not philosophically a hedonist), though I don't see why pleasure can't participate in the end goal as a necessary constituent.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Crandaddy]

It "terminates" in the external, social environment. Sociopaths, and other "criminals", either get lynched, (if they are stupid), become capitalists, or get elected to public office.

In the last two cases, they may get a lot of sex, but they probably won't have a lot of children. Too many sociopaths and the society becomes dangerously unstable, and that isn't even good for the sociopaths. Everybody benefits from a stable, peaceful, honest society, and that is what evolution selects for, but those who don't follow the rules, if there aren't too many of them benefit also.

So, what you're proposing, if I understand correctly, is that the end goal would be the fitness of society as shaped by naturalistic evolution (NE for short). Morally evil individuals would be pernicious to society and would thus be eliminated (or at least would tend to be eliminated if they start to become too numerous).

The problem with such an account, as I see it, is that NE doesn't have real goals. The "goals" of NE are only illusory, and they're only apparent in hindsight. All they tell us is that organisms (and perhaps societies of organisms) with certain characteristics tended to be more fit for survival than those that didn't. Thus, the “goals” of NE turn out to be nothing more than descriptions of which evolutionary products happen to have worked to produce what we see before us. So, I don't think that NE can produce the intrinsic goodness of personal agents, which it seems to me would have to be irreducibly teleologically-ordered to the ideal perfection of personhood if we are to retain any real, objective, and intrinsic, goodness qua personal agents.

To me it seems that what we do when we act in accordance with moral virtue is we recognize as intrinsically good the ideal form of human personhood and choose to pursue its prescribed course toward its ultimate telos, which is the full actualization of the form of human personhood within ourselves as individuals. Thus, if we remove the teleological goal-directedness of the process, I don't see how we can preserve truly objective morality (at least not as I understand it).

I wonder: If you filled political offices and corporate governing boards with inmates from hospitals for the criminally insane, would you be able to notice a difference?

That's a very good question, actually. They might not be able to cover up their crimes or smooth over their public image quite as well as the criminals we have in power right now. I really believe that's just about the only difference, I'm sorry to say.

Instead of consciously teleological, the ideal end goal may be biologically teleonomic. Not everything that appears purposeful is necessarily planned by a mind.

The ideal end goal may have to do with our natural function as living human beings, the fulfillment of which is our personal good because that is what actualizes our natural human potentials. To put that another way, we have a natural well-being that is the end goal, and which sets a natural standard by which one may judge people as "better" or "worse" than each other.

So, I don't see how the end goal must be outside of our own natures. It may have to do with a pattern of human functioning that has a teleonomic character.

My reply to Gracchus is relevant here as well. It might turn out that our natural moral dispositions are among those characteristics which helped our ancestors to survive, but it seems to me that all this would show is that we tend to be psychologically disposed in certain ways because it just is the case that such psychological dispositions happen to have helped our ancestors to survive. Thus, one individual may “better” exemplify evolutionarily beneficial dispositions than another, but this would be simply to say that he better exhibits certain characteristics that tended to help his ancestors or his species to survive than another individual does. To me this just isn't quite the same thing as saying that he just ought to behave in those prescribed ways.

Put another way, it seems to me that naturalistic evolutionary accounts are fully reducible to is propositions devoid of any ought content (or any moral ought content, at least). To me it seems that a full-blooded, categorically-imperative ought has to derive from a foresighted telos which directs us toward our completion as actual persons. Because we're rational creatures who have the ability to understand our own telos, we can see how we're just supposed to act and how we're just supposed to be, regardless of what evolutionary circumstances happen to have shaped us. As I see it, morality is top-down, rather than bottom-up; it's imposed upon us by a Purpose beyond our own, rather than built up from dispositions that helped our ancestors to survive.

I might also mention, by the way, that morality sometimes directs us to act in ways that don't seem to benefit either ourselves or our species. Thus, it is morally good for us to take pity on the disabled who are unable to adequately care for themselves, regardless of whether such individuals will be of any use to us or to society. It seems to me that a more fitting evolutionary adaptation would have disposed us to shun such useless individuals. That we're disposed (rightly, I would say) to take pity on them and give them aid, despite the burden on ourselves as well as our society, seems quite contrary to what we should expect from naturalistic evolution.

BTW, I agree with you that pleasure isn't the end goal (I'm not philosophically a hedonist), though I don't see why pleasure can't participate in the end goal as a necessary constituent.

Oh, I agree that some form of pleasure would have to be involved. We couldn't call morally virtuous actions and character “good” if they caused us nothing but displeasure or had no affect on our passions at all. But, I would say that we can love moral virtue less than we should, and also that we can recognize and work to improve such defects in our character.

For example, we might know that we should be more charitable, but we might also know that we would much prefer to keep our possessions and use our time for our own enjoyment. Rather than simply force ourselves to begrudgingly obey our duty to be charitable in a Kantian sort of way, I would say that we can--and should--try to mold our character so that we will come to better enjoy such morally virtuous behavior.

As I see it, our innate selfishness and our “natural” antipathy toward moral virtue are not really proper to our true nature at all. Rather, they're defects in our nature. In religious terms, I would say they're distortions, or deformations, of the imago dei within us. The process of our becoming actual persons is thus the process of the imago dei being restored within us, and as we make progress, not only do our behaviors more conform with moral virtue, but our (properly) natural affinity for moral virtue increases as well.



And thank you for the reps, by the way!

 

[Gracchus]

So, what you're proposing, if I understand correctly, is that the end goal would be the fitness of society as shaped by naturalistic evolution (NE for short). Morally evil individuals would be pernicious to society and would thus be eliminated (or at least would tend to be eliminated if they start to become too numerous).

The problem with such an account, as I see it, is that NE doesn't have real goals. The "goals" of NE are only illusory, and they're only apparent in hindsight. All they tell us is that organisms (and perhaps societies of organisms) with certain characteristics tended to be more fit for survival than those that didn't. Thus, the “goals” of NE turn out to be nothing more than descriptions of which evolutionary products happen to have worked to produce what we see before us. So, I don't think that NE can produce the intrinsic goodness of personal agents, which it seems to me would have to be irreducibly teleologically-ordered to the ideal perfection of personhood if we are to retain any real, objective, and intrinsic, goodness qua personal agents.

That is right. Evolution is not going to produce a stable society unless we direct it. But that would require that we don't put into power people who believe that Magic Sky Daddy is going to save them. It requires a society that understands we are all in this together, and not one where everyone is in it for their own selfish desires, and a society that will not tolerate those who are willing to sacrifice others to fulfill those short-sighted selfish wants. It would require a society that puts principles before profits. It would require a society where hypocrites would have to recognize themselves in the mirror, and so learn to recognize the hypocrisy of others. It require a world where every person is suspect, and the "faithful", who are all to willing to follow, preachers, popes, and politicians are sequestered, at least, where they can't hurt anyone else.

To me it seems that what we do when we act in accordance with moral virtue is we recognize as intrinsically good the ideal form of human personhood and choose to pursue its prescribed course toward its ultimate telos, which is the full actualization of the form of human personhood within ourselves as individuals. Thus, if we remove the teleological goal-directedness of the process, I don't see how we can preserve truly objective morality (at least not as I understand it).

There is no such thing to preserve. It is only when we realize that we have to agree to act for the benefit of the whole society, the whole species, and refuse to tolerate the obvious corruption, and to seek out the clandestine villainy, that any survivable society can emerge. Otherwise we are going to continue to kill ourselves and the rest of the world too.

 

[juvenissun]

That is right. Evolution is not going to produce a stable society unless we direct it. But that would require that we don't put into power people who believe that Magic Sky Daddy is going to save them. It requires a society that understands we are all in this together, and not one where everyone is in it for their own selfish desires, and a society that will not tolerate those who are willing to sacrifice others to fulfill those short-sighted selfish wants. It would require a society that puts principles before profits. It would require a society where hypocrites would have to recognize themselves in the mirror, and so learn to recognize the hypocrisy of others. It require a world where every person is suspect, and the "faithful", who are all to willing to follow, preachers, popes, and politicians are sequestered, at least, where they can't hurt anyone else.

There is no such thing to preserve. It is only when we realize that we have to agree to act for the benefit of the whole society, the whole species, and refuse to tolerate the obvious corruption, and to seek out the clandestine villainy, that any survivable society can emerge. Otherwise we are going to continue to kill ourselves and the rest of the world too.

Since when human society knew what you said? 2000 years ago? 4000 years ago?

And yet you are still calling the society to be aware of that?

Give up. It will never happen. Something must be very wrong.

 

[Crandaddy]

Evolution is not going to produce a stable society unless we direct it.

Do you mean direct the evolution of society, or do you mean direct the biological evolution of the human race? These are very different things, and I'm not entirely sure which you're talking about.

I might go along with the former, but the latter raises a big red flag. Eugenics seems to me a very dark path to tread.

But that would require that we don't put into power people who believe that Magic Sky Daddy is going to save them.

Are you saying that only non-theists should be put into power? I don't see why. Some theists might hold crazy (even dangerous) beliefs, but not all do. Do you think I'm crazy or dangerous just because I'm a theist?

It require a world where every person is suspect, and the "faithful", who are all to willing to follow, preachers, popes, and politicians are sequestered, at least, where they can't hurt anyone else.

To follow simpliciter is not the same as to follow blindly. One may be a follower of some person, religion, ideal, etc. because she sees good reason to do so, not necessarily because she is unable or unwilling to think for herself.