A Concession & A Question

[juvenissun]

We have millennia of examples of finding answers to questions which were for a time unanswered, so it's at least a reasonable working assumption that future unknowns might be answered in similar ways.

We have no evidence or reason to have faith in gods.

They're two totally different problems.

How do you know what you said is not a very short-sighted view?
You only see those few questions we answered, but blind on those we probably would never find the answers.

For example, is the UFO a science problem or a faith problem?

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

Seems like you're assuming naturalism isn't true (i.e. there must be more than the physical workings of the brain there) to prove that naturalism isn't true. Round and round you go, but it doesn't mean anything.

Yes, it seems to me as though naturalism can't be true. Except by magic. Literally, your position being just as "magical" as my own.

Same problem with this approach. What's the difference between a system and a perfect working copy of that system. It's like saying there's only one true Honda Civic and the rest are simply a "sophisticated simulacrum". Doesn't make any sense unless you assume there's some magic at work in one of the cars which we can't reproduce. But again you're just assuming your conclusion which proves nothing.

Are you honestly saying that a human being with sentience is no different in terms of his consciousness than a perfectly imitative machine in which everything is black?

Please. That proves NOTHING.

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

Different configurations of matter. We don't know specifically how close you need to be to a human brain to get consciousness, but it's pretty obvious that changing or removing parts from it changes or stops consciousness so there's obviously a physical component to the process.

So, the way you get a slope instead of a steep incline is you reconfigure the matter. The way you get a convex or a concave surface is matter configuration. I just do not understand how doing the same with brain-stuff should get you any way further than instantiating more brain-stuff in different patterns. Instantiating consciousness goes one step above. That step just has to be supernatural, I see no way around it.

On the other hand, there's not even a concept of how a non-physical component of consciousness would work, much less what it actually is. I don't have to add that there's absolutely no evidence for any of this undefined non-physical stuff interacting with consciousness.

Again, if you necessarily have to assume it it must exist.....

Given these facts, it's reasonable to continue investigating the known physical component of consciousness. At the same time, until someone can come up with something to investigate on the non-physical side, it's also perfectly reasonable to ignore it, since there's literally nothing to consider.

You can ignore it from the neuroscientific standpoint. But don't even try doing that from the standpoint of philosophy. It doesn't hold LOGICALLY.

Pretending that the non-physical slips in by default if we can't explain physically every single nuance of consciousness is just an argument from ignorance. If you expect to go from "we don't know particular answer X" to "therefore magic is involved in consciousness", you'll have to do a lot more work than just pointing out that humans aren't omniscient and that science doesn't know everything.

No, it is an argument from a necessary assumption. You still haven't explained how one can traverse that last step. One can rearrange matter into different parts. But how can this rearrangement MAGICALLY instantiate consciousness. Does it just do it? How?

Magical thinking I see.

 

[SithDoughnut]

Consciousness.

And no, it wouldn't be sentient, just a very sophisticated simulacrum.

That seems like an arbitrary definition designed to separate the two concepts. If something is a perfect imitation, then there are no differences. A computer that could perfectly imitate sentience would be sentient; it would be able to have an individual subjective experience, and therefore would be no different in that respect to us. I suspect that you're including an implied soul or something similar in the situation, which makes no sense when considering a naturalistic view.

 

[SithDoughnut]

How do you know an unknown is just not known yet, or can not know.

Or, how do you know all unknowns can be known.

We don't, but it's a waste of time to try and guess, so we might as well attempt to know as much as possible.

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

That seems like an arbitrary definition designed to separate the two concepts. If something is a perfect imitation, then there are no differences. A computer that could perfectly imitate sentience would be sentient; it would be able to have an individual subjective experience, and therefore would be no different in that respect to us. I suspect that you're including an implied soul or something similar in the situation, which makes no sense when considering a naturalistic view.

I don't see any reason why in the machine case these things couldn't all happen in the dark, so to speak. But you raise an interesting point of how consciousness comes to be instantiated in a 'system', let's say.

How is this done exactly? Does it magically just "happen" at a certain emergent point? If so, how is this any better an explanatory heuristic than the concept of the soul?

 

[SithDoughnut]

How is this done exactly? Does it magically just "happen" at a certain emergent point? If so, how is this any better an explanatory heuristic than the concept of the soul?

Not at all. You're treating sentience as if it is some kind of entity separate to organisms. You don't acquire or receive sentience; it's simply a label for things that fit a certain set of criteria. When we ask if something is sentient or not, we're asking if those criteria have been filled. If something is capable of having subjective experiences, and being self-aware of those experiences, it is sentient. In the case of computers, I would guess that as they get more complex, we'll eventually be able to build one capable of self-awareness.

Look at it this way. Imagine that you have been working on two jigsaws. One is complete, and one is missing a few pieces. Is the complete one fundamentally different to the unfinished one? Did the "completeness" happen magically or did you give it to the jigsaw? Of course not, we just use the word "complete" because one jigsaw fits the criteria for being called "complete", while the other one does not. Same thing applies to sentience.

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

Not at all. You're treating sentience as if it is some kind of entity separate to organisms.

No, I think the "thing" which is sentience (ability to sense, or the facthood of having that sense, let's say) doesn't have to be exclusive to organisms.

(Or, if its what you mean that consciousness is separate from being necessarily instantiated in a given entity - I don't mean that either. - Again, not necessarily)

You don't acquire or receive sentience; it's simply a label for things that fit a certain set of criteria.

No, it's not merely a label to fit some criteria such as may be entailed in complexity. It also has to describe the fact of having a sense of self. Thus, there is a discrete, non-arbitrary point at which one passes from non-sentience to sentience. If you avoid this problem you are talking nonsense, or trying to redirect the issue, with all due respect.

When we ask if something is sentient or not, we're asking if those criteria have been filled.

We're asking if the entity in question has a sense of self. Those criteria may all be necessary, but they are not the prime question.

If something is capable of having subjective experiences, and being self-aware of those experiences, it is sentient. In the case of computers, I would guess that as they get more complex, we'll eventually be able to build one capable of self-awareness.

Sure. But the question of sentience still has not been resolved, even were we to get to that point. It is not an explanation, in other words.

Look at it this way. Imagine that you have been working on two jigsaws. One is complete, and one is missing a few pieces. Is the complete one fundamentally different to the unfinished one?

No, but this is a false analogy, in my view. You are limiting yourself to forms of matter. But consciousness is a step above matter. It is not reducible to the jig-saw pieces but goes a step above.

Did the "completeness" happen magically or did you give it to the jigsaw?

Well, from the standpoint of your analogy, both. You gave the neural correlate to the puzzle. But that magically instantiated consciousness.

Of course not, we just use the word "complete" because one jigsaw fits the criteria for being called "complete", while the other one does not. Same thing applies to sentience.

False analogy. We aren't dealing with jigsaw puzzles merely. We are dealing with a jigsaw puzzle + the magical appearance of a hologram hovering over the jigsaw puzzle. In other words, there is an "extra step" you are missing here, which deals with the fact of sentience, not merely the necessary qualities which entail consciousness...

I think I'm done here, its looking crystal clear to me that there really is not much more to say here.

 

[variant]

I would like to make this concession to those materialists on here who would claim that there is no way to prove a "spiritual" or purely non-physical realm in which the mental/intellectual/psychical may be found, or must be found, to exist. I have realized that this probably can't be proven, at least not by conventional armchair philosophical debate.

Sure it can. When physicalist start to dissect and reconstruct "mental" things your argument will dissapear..

What, qualitatively, differentiates a complex non-sentient construct (a computer say) from a complex sentient construct (a human brain, let's say). Since we take for the most part (most of us) for granted that a computer or even blades of grass are not sentient, what proper moves (that is, logical steps) allow us to get to the existence of sentience in any other being? What is that "extra" thing which we find in the organic brain which does not come to fruition in the mechanical processor? How is this explanatory gap overcome, in other words? To me it seems as though one needs to posit consciousness - which is itself unexplainable - or one is simply piling on complexity on complexity without any sight of a (non)arbitrary division into sentient and non-sentient, unless perhaps everything is sentient but "asleep" or that sentience exists incipiently and simply hasn't reached the necessary stage of complexity so as to express itself. In which case one would have to default to something at least akin to pan-psychism, which I'm not sure materialists would like to do.

Although I reject the notion that there is a sharp division between conscious and non-conscious systems (I actually think there is a gradient and that the conscious comes out of the nature of the complexity of non-conscious systems), it is immaterial to the discussion because if I accept your view:

Your argument is merely an assertion that physical systems can not produce consciousness. Show me why or there is no reason to have this discussion.

If you knew that your assertion was true you would also know why it is true.

The problem is that you don’t.

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

Sure it can. When physicalist start to dissect and reconstruct "mental" things your argument will dissapear..

That sentence makes no sense whatsoever. That or you're playing with me, in which case I wouldn't be much surprised.

Although I reject the notion that there is a sharp division between conscious and non-conscious systems (I actually think there is a gradient and that the conscious comes out of the nature of the complexity of non-conscious systems)

Do you think space is fundamentally conscious at some "gradient" level?

, it is immaterial to the discussion because if I accept your view:

Your argument is merely an assertion that physical systems can not produce consciousness. Show me why or there is no reason to have this discussion.

Why should "brain" be the only system to instantiate consciousness? Why not "CPU" as well, or "thermostat." Since this is an unanswered question of practical purport, it is also valid.

If you knew that your assertion was true you would also know why it is true.

I do not know for certain, actually (well, in the context of debate at least... I have other sources but I'll put that aside for now...).

I can admit here that a physical system in particular may be tantamount to a triangle whose sides necessarily come up to 180 degrees, and that is for our purposes consciousness. Interestingly, I never thought about it that way. However, I don't see that as the only or most viable alternative. An additional property or entity is the answer I find less susceptible to doubt. Whereas the triangle example is more postulation than anything. After all, even corners are in some sense extended objects, consciousness is not. Or are you willing to state it is an extended geometrical shape?

The problem is that you don’t.

I don't have to.

 

[Redac]

Maybe I missed it earlier (it's late and I only just read through the thread), but what exactly do you mean by a "sense of self" as it relates to sentience, and why would a sufficiently complex computer or machine be lacking it?

 

[SithDoughnut]

No, it's not merely a label to fit some criteria such as may be entailed in complexity. It also has to describe the fact of having a sense of self. Thus, there is a discrete, non-arbitrary point at which one passes from non-sentience to sentience. If you avoid this problem you are talking nonsense, or trying to redirect the issue, with all due respect.

So the answer to your problem of when sentience happens is "the point where an individual has a sense of self". In other words, the criteria of self-consciousness that I mentioned.

As for how a sense of self works physically, I simply don't know enough about the brain to tell you. What I do know is that there is as of yet no reason to assume that it requires something more than a brain.

No, but this is a false analogy, in my view. You are limiting yourself to forms of matter. But consciousness is a step above matter. It is not reducible to the jig-saw pieces but goes a step above.

I'm interested in this assertion, because it was exactly the reason why I made the analogy in the first place. Why assume that consciousness is more than matter? A complete jigsaw is still just a jigsaw.

Well, from the standpoint of your analogy, both. You gave the neural correlate to the puzzle. But that magically instantiated consciousness.

No it didn't. You're still treating consciousness like its a magical separate thing that we acquire somehow. The neural correlate is consciousness, and subsequently sentience.

I think I'm done here, its looking crystal clear to me that there really is not much more to say here.

I gave you the answer to your question, it just wasn't the answer that you wanted me to say. That's not how discussion works. There is no reason to assume that sentience is something different to the biological processes that cause it.

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

There is no reason to assume that sentience is something different to the biological processes that cause it.

Are you saying that the effect is no different than the cause?

 

[variant]

That sentence makes no sense whatsoever. That or you're playing with me, in which case I wouldn't be much surprised.

Sure it does.

When people actually investigateing consciousness, the brain and such start ot unravel the mystery, your argument will dissappear in my opinion.

Do you think space is fundamentally conscious at some "gradient" level?

No, I think that living systems are fundimentally conscious.

Why should "brain" be the only system to instantiate consciousness? Why not "CPU" as well, or "thermostat." Since this is an unanswered question of practical purport, it is also valid.

There is a certian level of single entity complexity that our techonology has simply not reached.

I don't think non-living systems have a sense of self because they have no reason for one.

Where as all living systems do have a sense of self and boundary because it is endemic to being a living organism.

When we start to build artificial systems that reproduce themselves and change with respect to the enviroment we will be well on our way to how life has defined the self.

I do not know for certain, actually (well, in the context of debate at least... I have other sources but I'll put that aside for now...).

I can admit here that a physical system in particular may be tantamount to a triangle whose sides necessarily come up to 180 degrees, and that is for our purposes consciousness. Interestingly, I never thought about it that way. However, I don't see that as the only or most viable alternative. An additional property or entity is the answer I find less susceptible to doubt. Whereas the triangle example is more postulation than anything. After all, even corners are in some sense extended objects, consciousness is not. Or are you willing to state it is an extended geometrical shape?

"Additional property" seems an unjustified leap. Without a good explaination for why some things are conscious and some things not this is a pointless theoretical discussion.

You have no idea what your "additional property" is or how it works or what sort of thing it is or anything really.

So, your point of view is just an assertion.

I don't have to.

Yes, you do. If you don't understand the why's and how's of consciousness there is no point in having an argument about your assertions about it.

 

[SithDoughnut]

Are you saying that the effect is no different than the cause?

No, I'm saying that the effect is the cause. What you consider to be a cause/effect situation can also be explained just by considering it as a single thing. A wall does not cause a house, it is part of it; likewise, self-awareness does not cause sentience, instead it is a fundamental aspect of it.

The actual causes are something else, that honestly I know next to nothing about.

 

[Davian]

I would like to make this concession to those materialists on here who would claim that there is no way to prove a "spiritual" or purely non-physical realm in which the mental/intellectual/psychical may be found, or must be found, to exist. I have realized that this probably can't be proven, at least not by conventional armchair philosophical debate.

If not proven, then at least a demonstration of how it may be necessary. Not just assertions.

That said, I would like to pose a question which might shed light on why I hold to this realm's existence as a necessary presupposition. And that question is this:

What, qualitatively, differentiates a complex non-sentient construct (a computer say) from a complex sentient construct (a human brain, let's say). Since we take for the most part (most of us) for granted that a computer or even blades of grass are not sentient, what proper moves (that is, logical steps) allow us to get to the existence of sentience in any other being? What is that "extra" thing which we find in the organic brain which does not come to fruition in the mechanical processor? How is this explanatory gap overcome, in other words? To me it seems as though one needs to posit consciousness - which is itself unexplainable

How did you determine that it is unexplainable?

- or one is simply piling on complexity on complexity without any sight of a (non)arbitrary division into sentient and non-sentient, unless perhaps everything is sentient but "asleep" or that sentience exists incipiently and simply hasn't reached the necessary stage of complexity so as to express itself.

I see sentience as a process, not a property as you have used it here. Am I sentient? Or does this self-model created by my brain just think so as a protective mechanism?

In which case one would have to default to something at least akin to pan-psychism, which I'm not sure materialists would like to do.

I am not clear about what you mean by this.

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

The actual causes are something else, that honestly I know next to nothing about.

That to me seems like a cop out. We know a lot about the brain already. Enough anyway for you to say we needn't posit a "magical entity" like consciousness. But now you are pleading ignorance of said causes, which assumes therefore that you, currently, lack the explanatory tools to justify the presence of consciousness.

But how, even if you were a neuroscientist and had all these detailed information, could that give us an inkling as to how these "puzzles pieces" instantiate consciousness? You can explain away and it still would not "explain" how an electrical system passes from merely being an electrical system to an electrical system plus. I just don't see it folks.

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

How did you determine that it is unexplainable?

Put simply, no explanation yet has been offered, and none may be forthcoming given what we know about the brain.

On the other hand, I do have a viable explanation; the soul.

I see sentience as a process, not a property as you have used it here. Am I sentient? Or does this self-model created by my brain just think so as a protective mechanism?

I don't buy that. To say that there is an "illusion" of consciousness is nothing more than a cop-out. Even an illusion has the existence of an illusion. This isn't like a kaneda triangle, as some would like to hokily pass off.

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

Sure it does.

When people actually investigateing consciousness, the brain and such start ot unravel the mystery, your argument will dissappear in my opinion.

I would really like to see evidence of that. Only, it's impossible.

No, I think that living systems are fundimentally conscious.

What separates living systems from non-living systems. Are you a vitalist?

There is a certian level of single entity complexity that our techonology has simply not reached.

Gibberish. What is "single entity complexity" and how would it be any different from "multiple entity complexity" so as to produce consciousness?

I don't think non-living systems have a sense of self because they have no reason for one.

What would be the reason then? Furthermore, what would explain why this reason instantiates consciousness? Magic.

Where as all living systems do have a sense of self and boundary because it is endemic to being a living organism.

More gibberish! And vitalist gibberish at that. WHY is it "endemic" to a living organism? Why not to a robot who has sense-inputs?

When we start to build artificial systems that reproduce themselves and change with respect to the enviroment we will be well on our way to how life has defined the self.

But nowhere near to establishing the why and how of consciousness. This is a doomed project and it is crystal clear as to why. This is because even if one finds the necessary and sufficient conditions for why sentience is instantiated, this is no way proves that those N&S conditions "explain" it since to give an account of this explanation isn't on a par with, "why does water put out fire?" since in the latter case a chemical account may be the explanation, or causality in the case of billiard balls. NOTHING like that exists in the consciousness case. There are only "reasons" magically instantiating said property. No such thing as "contact" in the case of the above examples, which exists as a sort of communion, at least. So, I have just proved that the neuroscientific project fails in crucially explaining consciousness beyond hedging it within "reasons." It doesn't matter today and it won't matter 100 million years in the future with super-intelligent and self-conscious AIs. Consciousness will ALWAYS remain a mystery, like it or not.

"Additional property" seems an unjustified leap. Without a good explaination for why some things are conscious and some things not this is a pointless theoretical discussion.

Well, neuroscience I think is pointless in trying to explain consciousness as well, then. At least by positing a discrete and separate self I am TRYING to give an explanation on a par with any other explanation of phenomena (specifically, "contact" in the differential exchange of matter). But since that's impossible with consciousness, if you leave out the soul hypothesis, you are left with even more magic.

So, it's not an unjustified leap. It's actually the ONLY possible explanation!

You have no idea what your "additional property" is or how it works or what sort of thing it is or anything really.

I don't have to. I REALLY don't. Anymore than why water interacts with fire extinguishes it. Oh sure I can go very minutely explain all the atomic characteristics and how they match up, but that bottoms out after a certain point unless you are willing to accept infinite regress. I'm not, are you?

So, your point of view is just an assertion.

So is yours. Now, the question is, which p.o.v is a more viable one; that is, has more explanatory depth? That consciousness magically instantiates in a "living system" because thats just how living systems are, or because there is a property-bearing entity with consciousness as its attribute: i.e, a soul substance?

Yes, you do. If you don't understand the why's and how's of consciousness there is no point in having an argument about your assertions about it.

If you don't understand the why's and how's of consciousness there is no point in saying that "investigating" the workings of the brain will magically offer a solution....

 

[SithDoughnut]

That to me seems like a cop out. We know a lot about the brain already. Enough anyway for you to say we needn't posit a "magical entity" like consciousness. But now you are pleading ignorance of said causes, which assumes therefore that you, currently, lack the explanatory tools to justify the presence of consciousness.

So I have to know everything about the brain in order to disagree with a specific claim about it?

I can tell you that the actual causes are likely synapses firing in certain parts of the brain. If I could be bothered to look it up, or if you really want me to, I could probably tell you which parts of the brain are used for thoughts relating to sentience. I might even be able to give you a half decent answer on what those parts of the brain do, but that's not going to give you a concrete answer on the causes of sentience. We know a lot about where things happen in the brain, we just don't always know why yet.

But how, even if you were a neuroscientist and had all these detailed information, could that give us an inkling as to how these "puzzles pieces" instantiate consciousness?

Yes, I think so.

You can explain away and it still would not "explain" how an electrical system passes from merely being an electrical system to an electrical system plus. I just don't see it folks.

That's because, in your mind, consciousness is some magical process that can't be as mundane as biological processes, purely because it doesn't seem like a proper answer to you.

It's not an electrical system plus. There is no plus. I don't know why you keep ignoring this. There is no reason to assume that sentience is a separate entity, because there's nothing to lead us to such a conclusion other than the belief that sentience must somehow be more "special" than every other biological process. I assume that you have no issue with digestion being a specific set of biological processes, or respiration being the term for a specific set of chemical reactions in the cell, so why expect sentience to be any different?