Physicalism Refuted

[Resha Caner]

I'm not defining the word circularly.

Well, it still seems that way to me given how you use the word physical within your explanation of what physical is.

Regardless, if you rephrased your position to avoid that problem, I think you only introduce another problem - you would simply end up defining (or assuming) that all things are physical. I suppose you can do that, but assumptions are not explanations.

I still maintain that calling all things physical makes the word useless. If there is such a non-physical thing as you define it, we will never know and hence the definition of the non-physical is useless. Therefore, if there is nothing to distinguish the physical from something else we know about, that word is also useless.

As such, it intrigues me that you want to hold on to the word as you use it.

 

[sandwiches]

I don't mind your nit-picking. The sooner we can put aside details like this, the better. So, yes, we should clarify the example to say light has no rest mass. As further nit-picking, though, most physicists seem to avoid using "mass" and "light" in the same sentence. Rather, they usually refer to momentum.

But this does nothing to establish light as physical. You'll need to be clear where you stand on exclusivity before we have anything to talk about.

As a preliminary, I agree your original answer was correct. A candle is physical. I didn't mean to imply that I've trapped you or any such thing. I'm just trying to demonstrate some consequences that would result if we could agree on characteristics of the non-physical. If you want to use some term like "massless" or "without rest mass" in order to be clear on your position regarding light, fine. As I thought we had agreed, such things are just a matter of semantics and I find it a bit clumsy to avoid the term "non-physical" when that's a key idea for this thread.

If, however, you're still maintaining that the physical does entail some exclusive property, we have a problem. No one has explained to me why that must be.

Regardless, it seems you got quite a bit out of my last post:
1) The interactions mean non-physical can come from physical and vice-versa.
2) Our detection of something we interpret as physical may actually come via a non-physical media and vice-versa.
3) There is an interesting layering or circularity in the candle example. The physical produces a non-physical media which interacts with a second physical object to produce a second manifestation of the non-physical which we can interpret as evidence of a physical object. As far as it being the same light all the way from the candle to the mirror to our eye, we don't know that. Some of it might be, but we don't know if one of the photons from the candle was absorbed by the mirror and caused a different photon to be released by the mirror (i.e. some kind of flourescent effect).
4) Even if we agree on a characteristic of the non-physical, its interaction with the physical creates some difficulties in trying to separate out exactly what is physical and what is non-physical. Are you familiar with Design of Experiments (DOE)?

We can wrestle this a while longer if you wish, but I'm not sure if I can be any clearer. If we're not managing to understand each other I'm concerned that going at this too long will only tangle the conversation further rather than untangle it. It might be better to see if adding further aspects of the non-physical would help more.

The thing is, I pretty much agree with everything you've said because we agreed on a definition for non-physical for the sake of argument, that the non-physical is that which has no mass. I don't think that's what physical is, but I agreed to this to simply see where this would take the conversation. But what I don't get is why you seem to persistent that there has to be something called "non-physical." If we agree that physical means "blue," then everything that's not blue is non-physical by definition. So? Why does it matter what things are LABELED?

What do you think will be gained if we can agree on a definition of what is physical and what isn't? To be blunt, do you believe that because we've agreed that non-physical stuff exists, as we originally defined it for this argument (mass/non-mass,) somehow makes the possibility of the perceived mind-body problem or spirits more real, for instance?

 

[Resha Caner]

What do you think will be gained if we can agree on a definition of what is physical and what isn't? To be blunt, do you believe that because we've agreed that non-physical stuff exists, as we originally defined it for this argument (mass/non-mass,) somehow makes the possibility of the perceived mind-body problem or spirits more real, for instance?

I understand why you might think that, but no, I wouldn't say it makes the possibility more real. Whatever is, is. I'm just hoping it will help clarify.

If we're using a useless term (physical), then I have no idea what it is that you are denying when you deny the existence of the non-physical. It doesn't help to switch to terms like "spirit" or "mind." What is it you're denying when you deny the existence of the spiritual, or the transcendence of the mind? I honestly have no idea.

 

[KCfromNC]

I don't mind your nit-picking. The sooner we can put aside details like this, the better. So, yes, we should clarify the example to say light has no rest mass. As further nit-picking, though, most physicists seem to avoid using "mass" and "light" in the same sentence. Rather, they usually refer to momentum.

But this does nothing to establish light as physical. You'll need to be clear where you stand on exclusivity before we have anything to talk about.

I mentioned reasons why light should be considered physical. Any thoughts on those?

Of course, I still have no idea what non-physical would be aside from imaginary, so maybe I'm not the right person to have in the conversation.

 

[Resha Caner]

Of course, I still have no idea what non-physical would be aside from imaginary, so maybe I'm not the right person to have in the conversation.

And so it seems, as I've said before, that the real argument is existence, not the physical.

I mentioned reasons why light should be considered physical. Any thoughts on those?

I guess your version doesn't seem different than those proposed by others. It comes down to a series of identities/tautologies that I don't disagree with. Some examples of what I'm hearing from you guys is:

1) What interacts with things are those things that interact.
2) Things that don't interact are unknown and irrelevant.
3) Things that don't interact are imaginary.

Maybe there are others as well, but I don't disagree with any of those statements. It would be ridiculous for me to disagree. So, if you think I'm trying to claim some logical contradiction like "things that don't interact can interact with things that do interact", then you have a much lower opinion of me than I thought. I mean, I knew your opinion of me was low, but really ...

Anyway. It means I have no idea why you stick so stubbornly to this idea that everything is physical. Is it just because that's a traditional unbeliever's position? It just seems like there is some crucial position for an unbeliever that would have to be conceded to define physical any other way, and we haven't really uncovered what that position is.

 

[quatona]

Personally, I would like to have the opportunity to signify the difference between and object and an occurence/event/development/relation. I am used to call the first "physical" and the latter "not physical", but I would have no major problem with the semantic solution of calling the first "existing" and the latter "non-existing" (or whatever wording allows for that distinction I would like to be able to make and communicate).

 

[KCfromNC]

Anyway. It means I have no idea why you stick so stubbornly to this idea that everything is physical.

Since no one can tell me what this non-physical stuff is even supposed to be, it would be ridiculous for me to claim to believe in it. So I'm left with believing the stuff I can observe and understand (the physical) and leaving the undefined something or other as an open question until we even know what it is we're talking about.

 

[Resha Caner]

Since no one can tell me what this non-physical stuff is even supposed to be, it would be ridiculous for me to claim to believe in it. So I'm left with believing the stuff I can observe and understand (the physical) and leaving the undefined something or other as an open question until we even know what it is we're talking about.

Uh huh. I think you're being a bit unfair. And, to be honest, I don't see anyone really trying that hard. Since neither of us is the OP, we can both say we haven't really made a claim. But, if someone is going to take a physicalist position, they need to define what "physical" is just as much as those taking the dualist position must define what "non-physical" is.

I've been reading some interesting papers on this recently ... all the more interesting in the way they parallel this conversation. It seems that even though all of us appear rather uneducated on the subject of physicalism, we're reinventing conversations from the professional literature in a rather admirable way.

First, there is a PhD thesis by Katalin Balog that does a very good job of dismantling all the dualist arguments. While that is the case, what remains when she is done (as she herself admits) is that even if dualists haven't proven the non-physical, neither have physicalists proven physicalism. Since the non-physical is conceivable, it remains possible.

In line with Balog there is an essay by Quine called On What There Is. It's main purpose is to address a dualist argument that simply by saying "X does not exist" the physicalist admits X. I always thought that argument a bit silly, and Quine does away with it. But even more interesting, he goes on to argue things like: If a physicalist concedes, "That person has blue eyes," and "That house is blue," they have not admitted a metaphysical idea of "blueness." I can see his point, but his argument leaves me dissatisfied. To be honest, I find it a bit disingenuous. It smacks of a position that my opponent can agree with my conclusion (e.g. that a person has blue eyes) without revealing the path that led them to that conclusion such that I am not allowed to criticize them. IOW, it feels a bit like information hiding. Further, if you read Quine's definition of physical (in another essay called Whither Physical Objects) it comes across to me as almost unintelligible.

With that said, having my instrumentalist view of science, I do sympathize with the types of arguments being made against the existence of number. I really like the argument made by Field in Science Without Numbers that numbers provide a "conservative" account of science rather than explaining exactly what is.

All of this leads up to what I consider the masterpiece of this whole discussion - an essay by Markosian called What are Physical Objects? In that essay he expresses my frustration that for all ink spilled on this subject, all the above authors never really define what they think physical is. Rather, they just seem to be playing games with language. Markosian gives 5 definitions of physical:

1) Spatial Location (which is the one Markosian defends)
2) Spatial Extension
3) Physical Theory
4) Sensational
5) Common Perception

The one most "physicalists" (if I can call you that) in this thread have been arguing is a combination of 3 and 4. His rejection of these positions is much the same as mine. #3 is circular and #4 is dependent on the individual.

He gives a long list of objections to #1 and tries to defend them. While it is an admirable job, I'm not sure he succeeds. What I like so much about his essay is the clarity he brings to the subject.

What I have been arguing is probably similar to #5. Markosian's objection to that position is that it is not precise enough, and I would agree. But after thinking about it, I believe it could be rescued by paring it down and integrating with #2.

Finally, with respect to number, I've been wrestling an idea that finally seems to be firming up. It always seemed to me that number must be a property in some sense, but I didn't have a good answer to arguments against that idea. At the same time, I've never liked the Platonist idea that number exists as an object - as a Form. So, briefly, I think what I would say is that number is a property - a property of a set. In that sense, sentences like 1 + 1 = 2 are not statements about numbers, but statements about "thing" in the most general sense. The sentence would be "When a set of 1 thing is added to another set of 1 thing, it becomes a set of 2 things." My reaction to that is: surely someone has thought of that before. But if so, who? I'd like to know. If they have, there must be a problem with that idea that I'm not seeing because current philosophers of mathematics are off in the weeds talking other obtuse ideas about number.

Regardless, if we can satisfacorily move past this preamble, we can start to discuss some examples I have in mind for the non-physical to see what they might produce.

 

[razeontherock]

It seems that you skip out words of a sentence every so often that is needed to clarify what you are talking about.

He speaks fluent cell phone

 

[KCfromNC]

Uh huh. I think you're being a bit unfair. And, to be honest, I don't see anyone really trying that hard. Since neither of us is the OP, we can both say we haven't really made a claim. But, if someone is going to take a physicalist position, they need to define what "physical" is just as much as those taking the dualist position must define what "non-physical" is.

Still doesn't change the fact that it's perfectly reasonable to lack belief in something when I have absolutely no idea what that something is. Unless you're claiming that people don't know what a physical object is, I don't see this objection going anywhere.

First, there is a PhD thesis by Katalin Balog that does a very good job of dismantling all the dualist arguments. While that is the case, what remains when she is done (as she herself admits) is that even if dualists haven't proven the non-physical, neither have physicalists proven physicalism. Since the non-physical is conceivable, it remains possible.

So are unicorns. Doesn't mean that it's reasonable to believe in them or unreasonable not to. Some of us have a higher standard of belief than "not impossible in theory".

Finally, with respect to number, I've been wrestling an idea that finally seems to be firming up. It always seemed to me that number must be a property in some sense, but I didn't have a good answer to arguments against that idea. At the same time, I've never liked the Platonist idea that number exists as an object - as a Form. So, briefly, I think what I would say is that number is a property - a property of a set. In that sense, sentences like 1 + 1 = 2 are not statements about numbers, but statements about "thing" in the most general sense. The sentence would be "When a set of 1 thing is added to another set of 1 thing, it becomes a set of 2 things."

Depends. 1+1 also = 10 things, depending on how you define the operation. It is also 1 or 0 things, again depending on how you define +, and that's not even getting into how you define 1 and 0. That's why I lean towards math being a (formal) language - you can make math work or not in relation to real objects depending on how you define the terms you use. Do parallel lines intersect? Depends. Is a number irrational? Depends. Is the Pythagorean Theorem true? It depends. And so on and so forth. No universal truths there, but lots of useful tools to draw from in various situations if you know what you're doing.

Regardless, if we can satisfacorily move past this preamble, we can start to discuss some examples I have in mind for the non-physical to see what they might produce.

Fair enough, but I'm pretty sure my first question is going to be "how do you know any of this?". As your paragraphs about philosophers not understanding what the physical is shows, thought experiments and deductive logic aren't really useful in this area.

 

[Resha Caner]

If you've got no interest in pursuing this, we can stop. Or maybe someone else is interested in picking up the discussion.

Still doesn't change the fact that it's perfectly reasonable to lack belief in something when I have absolutely no idea what that something is.

Agreed, so let's call this quote #1.

Unless you're claiming that people don't know what a physical object is, I don't see this objection going anywhere.

That's exactly what I'm saying. I don't know why that hasn't been clear. Whatever it is that you believe to be "physical", you have yet to give me a clear definition of it. So, per quote #1 it is perfectly reasonable for me to withhold acceptance of whatever it is you think is "physical."

I was trying to give us a basis to move beyond this point, so pushing it away as merely a philosophical problem is not helpful. You may be satisfied with your idea of "physical," but until you can communicate it to me there is no point in discussing what might be non-physical.

So, I suggested the 5 possibilities from Markosian. From there I left it somewhat open to give you a chance to respond. The lack of response, again, appears to me as a lack of definition. I'm OK with giving my idea of physical ... I gave part of that idea earlier in the discussion with sandwiches. And, you're free to object to my idea. In fact, I expect you will. But it doesn't stop there. If you're going to object, it would be helpful to offer a coherent alternative - and one that doesn't result in an exclusion principle of some sort. If you're not going to do that, as I said many posts ago, we are at an impasse.

So, here is my idea of physical: The physical can be at rest (there is some inertial frame for which its relative velocity is zero). When it is at rest, it has spatial location, spatial extension, and rest mass.

Have at it.

Depends. 1+1 also = 10 things, depending on how you define the operation ...

I am aware of all that, but you misrepresent mathematics. Mathematics is not arbitrary. It is not acceptable to leave things undefined or to make arbitrary, meaningless, or absurd statements.

If I state the mathematical sentence "1+1", that assumes something such as classical arithmetic, the fundamental theorum of arithmetic, etc. That is the beauty of mathematics. I can make very precise statements, and once I do, I commit myself to a necessary outcome. I can't declare classical mathematics, state "1+1=2", and then later decide that I want addition to be defined according to logarithmic arithmetic such that "1+1=1".

So, if you're going to make a coherent definition of physical, commit yourself to the outcome. For example, if that means photons aren't physical, so be it. Don't avoid a definition just because it might have an outcome you don't like.

 

[KCfromNC]

I was trying to give us a basis to move beyond this point, so pushing it away as merely a philosophical problem is not helpful. You may be satisfied with your idea of "physical," but until you can communicate it to me there is no point in discussing what might be non-physical.

This seems like a lot like blaming me for not believing in something you can't even figure out how to describe. I don't have to define X for you to define Y. So if you're interested in promoting your idea of supernatural, have at it. If not, no worries.

So, here is my idea of physical: The physical can be at rest (there is some inertial frame for which its relative velocity is zero). When it is at rest, it has spatial location, spatial extension, and rest mass.

Nope, this disagrees with what we know of quantum mechanics. Like most philosophy of science, it's a century or two behind what science is actually doing.

If I state the mathematical sentence "1+1", that assumes something such as classical arithmetic, the fundamental theorum of arithmetic, etc. That is the beauty of mathematics. I can make very precise statements, and once I do, I commit myself to a necessary outcome. I can't declare classical mathematics, state "1+1=2", and then later decide that I want addition to be defined according to logarithmic arithmetic such that "1+1=1".

I think you're agreeing with me here. Given a certain set of assumptions, math works one way. Start with a different set, and it works in other contradictory way. Just like similar words mean different things in different languages, without knowing what assumptions you're working from math (or communication) doesn't happen.

So, if you're going to make a coherent definition of physical, commit yourself to the outcome. For example, if that means photons aren't physical, so be it. Don't avoid a definition just because it might have an outcome you don't like.

When philosophy goes off on tangents which make us think that light is supernatural, it's pretty obvious it has lost its way. I'm all for thinking deeply about the world around us, but at some point this thinking needs to be grounded in reality.

 

[Resha Caner]

This seems like a lot like blaming me for not believing in something you can't even figure out how to describe.

Hmm. It seems to me you're ignoring most of what I've posted.

We'll try one last example as an analogy of our situation, and if that doesn't work, then I'll give up.

If I were to hand you a one gallon bucket and ask you to explain to me what it means for the bucket to be empty, what would you say?

 

[KCfromNC]

Hmm. It seems to me you're ignoring most of what I've posted.

We'll try one last example as an analogy of our situation, and if that doesn't work, then I'll give up.

If I were to hand you a one gallon bucket and ask you to explain to me what it means for the bucket to be empty, what would you say?

I'd say "Free bucket! Woo!". I guess I don't do leading questions all that well.

What it commonly means is that the bucket is filled with air at the standard temperature and pressure for local atmospheric conditions. Notice how this isn't defined by it being not-something, which is where I guess this question is leading.

 

[Resha Caner]

I'd say "Free bucket! Woo!".

You mean to be empty is to be free?

What it commonly means is that the bucket is filled with air at the standard temperature and pressure for local atmospheric conditions. Notice how this isn't defined by it being not-something, which is where I guess this question is leading.

So I take it this common meaning is different from the first one - the free bucket. What then, is a common meaning? How many different meanings are there for empty? How am I to know which one you mean?

Regardless, the common meaning seems to be that to be empty the bucket must be filled with something. Must this something always be air?

Further, I don't understand how this is "not-something." To me it seems that if the bucket is filled with air, it is not filled with water. But, since the definition cannot be "not-something," then to be filled must mean it is filled with everything.

Therefore, the meaning of an empty bucket is that it contains everything. Have I got it right?

 

[Davian]

You mean to be empty is to be free?



So I take it this common meaning is different from the first one - the free bucket. What then, is a common meaning? How many different meanings are there for empty? How am I to know which one you mean?

Regardless, the common meaning seems to be that to be empty the bucket must be filled with something. Must this something always be air?

Further, I don't understand how this is "not-something." To me it seems that if the bucket is filled with air, it is not filled with water. But, since the definition cannot be "not-something," then to be filled must mean it is filled with everything.

Therefore, the meaning of an empty bucket is that it contains everything. Have I got it right?

I would say... no.

 

[The-Doctor]

Physicalism can I think be easily refuted on the basis of this one analogy:

You have a mirror and objects facing it. The object in the mirror is identical to the object facing the mirror. If it weren't then if you moved the object facing away from the mirror the mirror-image would not move. Motion is the common denominator linking the two things: both the seen and the object so seen. This would be the case even if the mirror were tinged black, and we could not see how the object looked like in truth, and it was our belief it took on proportions which were other than how it existed in-itself. There are just some necessary conditions which apply and I think we can all agree on this minus some extreme skeptics.

Now, assuming this premise, that the thought is identical to the thing so thought about, there are some logical implications here which can't be dispensed with.

First, if on the physicalist side it's assumed that a thought is A (an electrical impulse or what have you) that is to stand for B (a state of affairs in the real world), then what makes A identical to B? What distinguishing characteristics make it so that if B has this quality, same quality must follow in A? In the mirror analogy this is clear enough - A moves along with B, thus we can safely assume on the basis of similarity that A refers to B because A is an identical placeholder for B. They are one and the same. Where on the physicalist side do you have the same necessary and sufficient conditions to establish this identity? Is it various patterns of synapses firing in a certain way? If so, how is it that we may correlate this pattern of firing with objective fact? The answer is we can't. We are stuck with only a given pattern we assume a priori has anything to do with our belief in an external reality.

If we don't have certain knowledge that what we think about has anything to do with concrete fact, than all claims about the external world are groundless, but this is not what the physicalist wants to accomplish, I hope. For of course there is an objective world and we do have access to it. That is a metaphysical assumption we all make. So what gives? How can we have knowledge about the external world? My answer: you would need a mental realm to mirror, and not just assume without justification, an outer realm.

Secondly, the way the physicalist attempts to account for identity can only be counter to his belief system. For since thoughts are just as physical as their referents, on his scheme, it follows that the only way a thought can be
conceptualized by the mind is in terms of its necessary and sufficient conditions, mirroring external fact. Since connections in the brain could not be adequate to furnish this analytical support, being of themselves only a type of patterning, bereft of the "meta" mirroring-condition which my analogy presents as a requirement for correlating our response to the outside world, he would in effect have to say that if a thought is "physical" the only meaningful exposition for this statement, is that a thought is of the same mode as the thing thought of which it is about. So, thinking of an elephant immediately conjures a literal elephant in my mind. Otherwise, there is no cross-over, seeing how a mental realm has been dispensed with.

So, physicalists, either you give up on knowledge about the external world or you accept the real possibility that when you think of an elephant, that elephant actually materializes in your own mind.

erm..yes?

 

[KCfromNC]

You mean to be empty is to be free?

No, you gave me a bucket. Woot! I have lots of things I can do with buckets, the more the better. Especially when I don't have to pay for them.

So I take it this common meaning is different from the first one - the free bucket. What then, is a common meaning? How many different meanings are there for empty? How am I to know which one you mean?

What do you mean by meaning here?

In other words, when a philosophy retreats to "maybe words don't mean what they think they mean and if so then my idea might have merit", it has obviously run out of anything positive to say and has to pretend to be deep by avoiding the question. I think we've reached that point.

Regardless, the common meaning seems to be that to be empty the bucket must be filled with something. Must this something always be air?

What do you mean by must in this case? Language isn't proscriptive, it's a tool used by people in various ways. I have no idea if someone will decide to call a bucket which contains water or rocks "empty". Nor am I sure that a discussion of this peculiar use of language does anything to tell me what you mean when you say "non-physical".

Further, I don't understand how this is "not-something." To me it seems that if the bucket is filled with air, it is not filled with water. But, since the definition cannot be "not-something," then to be filled must mean it is filled with everything.

Therefore, the meaning of an empty bucket is that it contains everything. Have I got it right?

No, obviously not. But since I have no idea what you're talking about or how you've come to believe this idea I'm not sure how to correct you.

Best I can tell you're confused by how I defined an empty bucket by saying that bucket holds. You've somehow made the jump from me not listing everything not in the bucket to assuming that because I didn't, it must hold everything. But by saying that it holds only air, my description obviously excludes anything else so I have no idea where your confusion comes from.

So now it's your turn. I give you a non-physical bucket. What is it made of? Be sure to tell us what it is rather than what it isn't, as I did for the contents of your hypothetical bucket.

 

[Resha Caner]

Best I can tell you're confused by how I defined an empty bucket by saying [what] that bucket holds.

I just found several things about your definition curious. First, that it was "common." Where did you come by this "common" definition, what other definitions for "empty" do you use, and how am I to know which one you are using at any given moment? I asked this question in my last post, and it remains unanswered.

You've somehow made the jump from me not listing everything not in the bucket to assuming that because I didn't, it must hold everything. But by saying that it holds only air, my description obviously excludes anything else so I have no idea where your confusion comes from.

The second curious aspect of your definition is that you're running in circles. You want so adamantly to point out that your definition is not based on it being "not something." But now it's obvious that it's not something (i.e. it "excludes anything else"). So, while the definition does not say what it is not, it is obvious what it is not (it is implicit). Is that true of all definitions? Again, I'd like to know why that is.

So now it's your turn. I give you a non-physical bucket. What is it made of?

You tell me. It's your bucket. I've never seen a non-physical bucket, so I can't imagine what it might be made of.

 

[razeontherock]

I've never seen a non-physical bucket, so I can't imagine what it might be made of.

Holes?