Was Bertrand Russell right about doubt?

[AlexBP]

I've recently finished reading Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy. He spends the first few chapters of the book debating the basic problem of knowledge: can we know that anything exists? He uses the example of a table. We can see the table, feel it, and so forth. But does the table truly exist? His conclusion is that the table probably exists, but that we should not be totally sure it exists. As he says: "It is of course possible that all or any of our beliefs may be mistaken, and therefore all ought to be held with at least some slight element of doubt."

The more I think about it, the less I can figure out how it would be possible to have some slight element of doubt about the existence of tables and other everyday objects. Like everyone else, I live in a world of physical objects and interact with them all the time. When I put my breakfast down on the table, am I not making a vote of confidence for the table's existence? If I had to uphold "a slight element of doubt" concerning the existence of everything, wouldn't that basically stop me from functioning?

Or let's put it another way. Russell claims that he has a slight element of doubt in everything's existence. But presumably he still ate breakfast off a table and did other things involving material objects whose existence he slightly doubted. In that case, how did Russell with his slight element of doubt in everything's existence differ behavior-wise from a person who has no element of doubt in ordinary material things? And if Russell isn't different from a person with no doubts, then in what way can he be considered to actually doubt at all?

Or in short, was Blaise Pascal instead correct when he said that there was probably never a total skeptic who really doubted the existence of every material thing?

 

[keith99]

Much as I think the film is seriously flawed go watch 'The Matrix' and come back and tell me you are sure the table really exists.

Only thing I am sure of is I exist. Cogito ergo sum. But I am not absolutely sure I am human or for that matter that my existance is even material.

I'm going to go with assuming what I see is real, but am I positive? Absolutley not.

And once this post is done am I going to spend any time pondering other possibilities? No.

 

[variant]

I call Russels brand of doubt being upset that we don't experience reality in the absolute.

It's really a particular thing to philosophy. All thought everywhere and all ideas that we are capable of come from experiencing things like tables consistently.

Essentially, if we doubt the consistency of the reality we live every day and what is right in front of us with our senses we probably have to throw out all philosophy and thought.

The utility of such a doubt is questionable until you have a reason for the doubt.

 

[juvenissun]

I've recently finished reading Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy. He spends the first few chapters of the book debating the basic problem of knowledge: can we know that anything exists? He uses the example of a table. We can see the table, feel it, and so forth. But does the table truly exist? His conclusion is that the table probably exists, but that we should not be totally sure it exists. As he says: "It is of course possible that all or any of our beliefs may be mistaken, and therefore all ought to be held with at least some slight element of doubt."

The more I think about it, the less I can figure out how it would be possible to have some slight element of doubt about the existence of tables and other everyday objects. Like everyone else, I live in a world of physical objects and interact with them all the time. When I put my breakfast down on the table, am I not making a vote of confidence for the table's existence? If I had to uphold "a slight element of doubt" concerning the existence of everything, wouldn't that basically stop me from functioning?

Or let's put it another way. Russell claims that he has a slight element of doubt in everything's existence. But presumably he still ate breakfast off a table and did other things involving material objects whose existence he slightly doubted. In that case, how did Russell with his slight element of doubt in everything's existence differ behavior-wise from a person who has no element of doubt in ordinary material things? And if Russell isn't different from a person with no doubts, then in what way can he be considered to actually doubt at all?

Or in short, was Blaise Pascal instead correct when he said that there was probably never a total skeptic who really doubted the existence of every material thing?

There are several possibilities that the table might not exist. For example, if you factor time into the system ...

 

[stiggywiggy]

I've recently finished reading Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy. He spends the first few chapters of the book debating the basic problem of knowledge: can we know that anything exists? He uses the example of a table. We can see the table, feel it, and so forth. But does the table truly exist? His conclusion is that the table probably exists, but that we should not be totally sure it exists.

Who's "we?" If the existence of a concrete table, which can be empirically verified, was a matter of skepticism to Russell, his own existence within a collectivity of alleged minds should surely not be grounds for attempting to ascertain the reality or lack thereof of a table.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I think that if you are onlt 99% sure of a table physically existing, this will not influence your breakfast eating behavior, ony your inner sense of certainty or your verbal report of your slightly skeptical theoretical attitude.

 

[Resha Caner]

The utility of such a doubt is questionable until you have a reason for the doubt.

This thought is a keeper. A very keen observation IMO.

The type of doubt Russell is playing with only shows up in philosophical discussions, never in mundane daily life. And, typically, it's only thrown out as a way to sink other people's ideas when no other argument seems to be working.

 

[underpressure]

If you were always asleep, how would you know that you're just having a dream?

 

[Paradoxum]

You could be dreaming, there could be an evil demon/genius controlling what you perceive, the matrix.

Even cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am) may not be true because it must first be asked what is meant by 'I' and if it is 'I' that is thinking.

 

[keith99]

You could be dreaming, there could be an evil demon/genius controlling what you perceive, the matrix.

Even cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am) may not be true because it must first be asked what is meant by 'I' and if it is 'I' that is thinking.

I disagree regarding cogito ero sum. One need no t ask what I means, the "I" that is thinking does exist. That one does not know what that "I" is is a limitation of how far the statement goes (A limitation I'm sure many ignore).

 

[2PhiloVoid]

You could be dreaming, there could be an evil demon/genius controlling what you perceive, the matrix.

Even cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am) may not be true because it must first be asked what is meant by 'I' and if it is 'I' that is thinking.

Yes, it could first be asked as to what is meant by 'I', but then it is not at all clear as to how well the meaning of 'I' may be ascertained during the procedure of inquiry since the identity, capacity, and reliability of the 'who' or 'what' that is inquiring about the meaning of 'I' is itself subject to the very aspects of the possible meaning embedded within the 'I' that is being sought.

Are you a 'thinking self' that wishes to know that 'thinking selves' are real? Can we establish that you are a 'thinking self' that wishes to know the nature of 'thinking selves'?

 

[Paradoxum]

Yes, it could first be asked as to what is meant by 'I', but then it is not at all clear as to how well the meaning of 'I' may be ascertained during the procedure of inquiry since the identity, capacity, and reliability of the 'who' or 'what' that is inquiring about the meaning of 'I' is itself subject to the very aspects of the possible meaning embedded within the 'I' that is being sought.

Are you a 'thinking self' that wishes to know that 'thinking selves' are real? Can we establish that you are a 'thinking self' that wishes to know the nature of 'thinking selves'?

I'm not sure how this solves the problem. Rather it makes it worse and turns it into a paradox, thereby proving that one can't know that one thinks and therefore exists.

I do disagree though. If I accept that the thoughts that appear to be my own are rational, then I can accept the the conclusion of these thoughts in examining the situation.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I'm not sure how this solves the problem. Rather it makes it worse and turns it into a paradox, thereby proving that one can't know that one thinks and therefore exists.

I do disagree though. If I accept that the thoughts that appear to be my own are rational, then I can accept the the conclusion of these thoughts in examining the situation.

Well, you're right, my statement doesn't solve the problem, and it does rather add additional complexity, which is what I was actually attempting to demonstrate.

I know you disagree, Para, but again, if you accept your own testimony to yourself during the evaluation of a mental concept, and your own thoughts appear to you as rational, how do YOU still 'know' that you are being rational and not actually suffering from schizophrenia in your deliberations toward a conclusion? John Forbes Nash, Jr., a brilliant man and sufferer of schizophrenia, thought he was rational, even when he wasn't on his medication. Could it be that for each of us to identify ourselves as rational, some kind of confirmation beyond the sense of our own rationality is required? If it does not, how do we avoid solipsism in our self affirmed sense of rationality?

(Of course, I am not implying that you have schizophrenia, or that you are being solipsistic in your argument. I'm just being philosophical here...)

 

[CTD]

I've recently finished reading Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy. He spends the first few chapters of the book debating the basic problem of knowledge: can we know that anything exists? He uses the example of a table. We can see the table, feel it, and so forth. But does the table truly exist? His conclusion is that the table probably exists, but that we should not be totally sure it exists. As he says: "It is of course possible that all or any of our beliefs may be mistaken, and therefore all ought to be held with at least some slight element of doubt."

The more I think about it, the less I can figure out how it would be possible to have some slight element of doubt about the existence of tables and other everyday objects. Like everyone else, I live in a world of physical objects and interact with them all the time. When I put my breakfast down on the table, am I not making a vote of confidence for the table's existence? If I had to uphold "a slight element of doubt" concerning the existence of everything, wouldn't that basically stop me from functioning?

Or let's put it another way. Russell claims that he has a slight element of doubt in everything's existence. But presumably he still ate breakfast off a table and did other things involving material objects whose existence he slightly doubted. In that case, how did Russell with his slight element of doubt in everything's existence differ behavior-wise from a person who has no element of doubt in ordinary material things? And if Russell isn't different from a person with no doubts, then in what way can he be considered to actually doubt at all?

Or in short, was Blaise Pascal instead correct when he said that there was probably never a total skeptic who really doubted the existence of every material thing?

Russell claims to doubt because he dearly desires to doubt, and perhaps every bit as much desires everyone else to doubt.

If Russell genuinely believed things don't exist, he wouldn't tell anyone. You don't communicate with things you don't believe exist.

Russell's type merely defies everyone to convince them to voluntarily confess things they know. We see a lot of that.

This is one of the milder manifestations of you-can't-knowism, just trying to get the infection started that it may grow into more severe forms of the disease.

Even this mildest statement of the dogma you'll ever encounter defeats itself: "You can never know anything absolutely for certain" ...denies its own absolute certainty.

 

[CTD]

Who's "we?"

Bingo!!!

 

[variant]

This thought is a keeper. A very keen observation IMO.

The type of doubt Russell is playing with only shows up in philosophical discussions, never in mundane daily life. And, typically, it's only thrown out as a way to sink other people's ideas when no other argument seems to be working.

I was going further than that to say that even in philosophical discussions it is a self defeating premise.

 

[Resha Caner]

I was going further than that to say that even in philosophical discussions it is a self defeating premise.

Agreed. It is. I suppose it's something that everyone has to wrestle with when they first encounter philosophy. It is always tempting to take an extreme position because it's easier to defend. But I see it as a kind of maturity when people put the "how do you know?" argument aside.

I find discussions of "Why do I accept X and reject Y?" far more interesting.

So how do you handle doubt (or the rejection of doubt)?

 

[AlexBP]

Much as I think the film is seriously flawed go watch 'The Matrix' and come back and tell me you are sure the table really exists.

If you take seriously the possibility that you live in "the Matrix", does that lead to you doing anything different than you would if you didn't take the possibility seriously? If not, then it was sense can you be said to take the possibility seriously?

 

[variant]

So how do you handle doubt (or the rejection of doubt)?

I seek to minimize it. Relying on consistency, predictability, reason and attempted objectivity to be my guide posts.

 

[Received]

If you take seriously the possibility that you live in "the Matrix", does that lead to you doing anything different than you would if you didn't take the possibility seriously? If not, then it was sense can you be said to take the possibility seriously?

My lack of moments of doubt doesn't mean that the target problem for my doubt during such moments isn't still a problem. Russell makes the point in TPOP that we need to trust our instinctual beliefs, which is an appeal to trusting assumptions. I agree with his contention, not because I don't think they're assumptions, but because it doesn't really matter to me if they are. Rationality looks to coherence; premises are by definition assumptions that stretch back, if we push them far enough, to foundational premises on which we base our conclusions about the world. The belief that there is an external world is such a premise, and this premise is part of an instinctual belief. I use Russell's words to reach the conclusion that if we can't prove the world exists, we can't really get anywhere; so we might as well assume that our instinctual beliefs are valid, because we've got to get along in the world.