School me. What is 'ontology'?

[Tinker Grey]

• What does the term mean?
• What is the correct usage? Examples?

Thanks in advance.

ETA: I'm serious. This isn't a leading question.

 

[Eudaimonist]

Christians might tell you something different, but ontology is another word for metaphysics.

I am not using that word to mean something like "a study of God and/or the supernatural". Metaphysics doesn't have to be mystical. It also doesn't have to be presuppositionalist. (Presuppositionalists often talk as if they own metaphysics, which they don't.)

Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that deals with the deepest issues relating to what it means for something to exist. It is deeper than physics because it is about the conceptual foundations for thinking about things -- the kind of ideas one needs to get straight in one's mind before one can even do science. For example, if one asks "just what does one mean by a thing", that is a metaphysical question. It also touches on issues of categories of being, and causality.

Use the word ontology whenever you wish to speak of a philosophical examination of issues related to being.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Resha Caner]

Simply put, ontology is the study of existence or being ("Do we exist?" "What is the nature of our existence?"). It's a nice word, but in practice it's hard to separate it from other fancy words like epistemology ("How do we know?").

An example of mixing the two together is DesCartes' cogito ergo sum.

[edit] Another ontological problem that philosophers like to noodle around with is substance vs. property. It is related to the question, "How do we define things?" I think of it as trying to separate the adjective from the noun. So, grass exists and it is green, i.e. green grass. But "green" doesn't exist as a "substance." I can't go to the store and buy a green. So, is green a "Form" - a non-substantial idea? And what is grass without green? If I remove all the descriptive words associated with grass, what do I have left? In other words, can I "know" the thing (called the "object" in philosophy) without it's properties? This starts to get at Kant's ding an sich (or the "thing in itself").

 

[Tinker Grey]

Thanks.

I have found that some use the term as if it means something like intrinsic or necessary and, IIRC, circularly, as in "God's existence is ontological."

Is this a proper usage; am I missing something in what they are saying?

In a spate of posts in CWR, it seemed to me as if the term were thrown around as if solved some problem.

I believe I've also seen posts talking about temporal contingency versus ontological contingency. I know what tc is, but oc doesn't even begin to make sense. (Of course, I could be remembering the conversation wrong.)

Thanks again.

 

[Tinker Grey]

OK. After rereading the above responses: it would seem that someone might say "God's existence is ontological" and mean "That existence is property of 'God'".

Maybe?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I think that ontology, as far as I use the term, has to do with what exists and what is the nature of what exists. Early ("pre-socratic") Greek ontologies were included the idea that everything was made from fire, or from water, or from atoms etc. Such ontologies developed throught the Middle Ages via the alchemists and were superseded (for some people at least) by the modern atomic theory and the table of elements in the scientific era. Nowadays fewer educated people believe in the "elements" of wind, fire and water etc, and people ask instead wherether everything is physical or whether there might be non-physical entities such as souls or abstracta.

Phenomenologically speaking (and I hope I have this right) ontology might deal with what properties a domain (such as "the world" or man who is "in-the-world") might have. So Sartre spoke of the world of experience being formed of "instrumental complexes" which is to say that our engagement in reality on an experiential level was fundamentally practical and appearances themselves are influenced by this. Chairs were for something (sitting), spanners for other jobs, etc and perception of "the world" involved and reflected such awarenesses. The difference between phenomenological ontology and traditional ontology is that the former often looked for the hidden "primal nature" or "prima materia" behind the appearances (altough metaphysical idealsim - the idea that all exists in the mind - is an exception), where as phenomenological ontology attempts to describe the appearances themselves. Each is a valid example of an ontology in it's own right, reflecting different approaches to the discipline. I am not saying all are correct, that is another matter.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

OK. After rereading the above responses: it would seem that someone might say "God's existence is ontological" and mean "That existence is property of 'God'".

Maybe?

I do not know what "Gods existence is ontological" is intended to mean.I have not come across the phrase before.

 

[Dark_Lite]

Ontology is indeed the study of being. Recently, I've used the adverb form in the following ways:

"Humans are not ontologically the same as God."
"Are humans not ontologically able to know absolute truth?"

The first sentence is correct usage. But now that I think about it, I'm not sure if the second one is. I think it is, although it would be a use of the word as if it meant "intrinsic." But it is used to describe the nature of (human) existence.

 

[Resha Caner]

I believe I've also seen posts talking about temporal contingency versus ontological contingency. I know what tc is, but oc doesn't even begin to make sense. (Of course, I could be remembering the conversation wrong.)

I'm not totally sure, but I believe "ontological contigency" is the argument that one must know something exists before one can define it. In other words, it does no good to define grass if one is not already convinced that grass exists. The argument is that if one can define something before knowing if it exists, then one can define anything - unicorns, leprechauns, etc - and that does nothing to establish that those things exist. It kind of makes sense at first glance, but I haven't taken the time to think through all the implications.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

I have found that some use the term as if it means something like intrinsic or necessary and, IIRC, circularly, as in "God's existence is ontological."

Is this a proper usage; am I missing something in what they are saying?

Normally I would see it as a good definitional criterion for God, that God is necessary being. IOW, if God exists then everything is contigent upon God for its existence, whereas God in turn is not contigent upon anything else. AV would probably say "God is self-existing." And yes, it is definitely not improper.

The problem is, while it is somewhat important (you can now for instance easily distinguish God from extremely powerful aliens), I don't think it is in and of itself anywhere near successfully defining God. What for example, if metaphysical naturalism happens to be true. Does God exist as a naturalistic entity in a naturalistic world? Often metaphysical naturalism and God are held to be mutually exclusive.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

OK. After rereading the above responses: it would seem that someone might say "God's existence is ontological" and mean "That existence is property of 'God'".

Maybe?

I think it may mean that God is or can be known a priori. The problem, now that we know that God exists, is that we'd still have to find out what precisely God is.

 

[Tinker Grey]

Hmm ... I'm the picture is getting clearer. While my ignorance is probably a major factor in this observation, it would seem that a lot of posts use the term to sound smart.

More clarifications?

Maybe, I'll try to find some of those quotes and see what y'all think.

Thanks.

 

[Resha Caner]

... it would seem that a lot of posts use the term to sound smart.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Maybe "God's existence is ontological" refers to Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God. i.e. "a perfect being, if we can conceive of it, must exist because to exist is more perfect than not to exist".

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Maybe "God's existence is ontological" refers to Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God. i.e. "a perfect being, if we can conceive of it, must exist because to exist is more perfect than not to exist".

May not be too far off. The ontological arguments (not necessarily Anselm's) are considered a priori proofs. Wiki says so too in the first sentence:

An ontological argument for the existence of God attempts the method of a priori proof, which uses intuition and reason alone.​

Ontological argument - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[juvenissun]

Simply put, ontology is the study of existence or being ("Do we exist?" "What is the nature of our existence?"). It's a nice word, but in practice it's hard to separate it from other fancy words like epistemology ("How do we know?").

An example of mixing the two together is DesCartes' cogito ergo sum.

[edit] Another ontological problem that philosophers like to noodle around with is substance vs. property. It is related to the question, "How do we define things?" I think of it as trying to separate the adjective from the noun. So, grass exists and it is green, i.e. green grass. But "green" doesn't exist as a "substance." I can't go to the store and buy a green. So, is green a "Form" - a non-substantial idea? And what is grass without green? If I remove all the descriptive words associated with grass, what do I have left? In other words, can I "know" the thing (called the "object" in philosophy) without it's properties? This starts to get at Kant's ding an sich (or the "thing in itself").

I am a scientist, not philosopher. So, I always wonder about the validity of many classical philosophical arguments. This may not related to the OP, but nevertheless, it might touch the fringe.

The example of green grass illustrates the philosophical thought without a scientific insight. And I guess it is a very common situation in many classical philosophical arguments.

Green is a property of a substance and is caused by special material in the substance. A grass without green is still a grass, may be a red, or a yellow grass. If you want to buy a green, I can simply pass you a lettuce. That IS green. If I want to argue with energy/material relationship, then I can also say that green IS a form of substance with a unique identity. So, the green grass argument may be a valid philosophical argument 300 years ago, but it should be modified or not used today.

This may not be a proper example. But my point is: if many classical philosophy arguments are analyzed first by modern scientific knowledge, then some of the dilemmas may have been solved. If so, how many real philosophical questions left?

Some ontological questions may also be modified along this thought.

 

[bricklayer]

Onto equates to an accurate awareness of the the true nature of a subject.

The ontological equates to the meta-physical/meta-spacial/meta-temporal.

Ontology is the study of the above.

Example:
Reasoning is the ontological sequencing of ideas.
Human reasoning ontologically sequences a chronological sequence of intellectual perceptions.
God's reasoning ontologically sequences eternally present intellectual conceptions.

 

[Tinker Grey]

I am a scientist, not philosopher. So, I always wonder about the validity of many classical philosophical arguments. This may not related to the OP, but nevertheless, it might touch the fringe.

The example of green grass illustrates the philosophical thought without a scientific insight. And I guess it is a very common situation in many classical philosophical arguments.

Green is a property of a substance and is caused by special material in the substance. A grass without green is still a grass, may be a red, or a yellow grass. If you want to buy a green, I can simply pass you a lettuce. That IS green. If I want to argue with energy/material relationship, then I can also say that green IS a form of substance with a unique identity. So, the green grass argument may be a valid philosophical argument 300 years ago, but it should be modified or not used today.

This may not be a proper example. But my point is: if many classical philosophy arguments are analyzed first by modern scientific knowledge, then some of the dilemmas may have been solved. If so, how many real philosophical questions left?

Some ontological questions may also be modified along this thought.

Hmm. I may actually agree with you about something, juvenis!

The whole famous question of red (and how we experience it, and qualia, etc.) seems strange when we consider wavelength and various configurations chemicals in substances that would reflect red light, etc.

 

[Tinker Grey]

Onto equates to an accurate awareness of the the true nature of a subject.

The ontological equates to the meta-physical/meta-spacial/meta-temporal.

Ontology is the study of the above.

I think I see what you are getting at.

However, the problem come in what is below:

Example:
Reasoning is the ontological sequencing of ideas.

I think the reason I get confused is because people use grammar badly. Forgive me if I'm wrong but the above sentence probably ought to read "Reasoning is the sequencing of ontological ideas." THAT I can make sense of. The placement of the word ontological in the first version of the sentence makes it modify sequencing. I could make up a reason why sequencing might be ontological--maybe--but, it makes little sense on the surface,

Human reasoning ontologically sequences a chronological sequence of intellectual perceptions.

I'm sorry, but this is just gibberish to me. I know what an intellectual perception is, I think. I know what a chronological sequence is. On ontological sequencing, see above. But, what would be the necessity of reordering a series of perceptions by their ontology (nature)? And what would be the nature of existence of an intellectual perception that would be of any interest other than 'I had a perception.'

God's reasoning ontologically sequences eternally present intellectual conceptions.

Utter gibberish.

 

[bricklayer]

I think I see what you are getting at.

However, the problem come in what is below:
I think the reason I get confused is because people use grammar badly. Forgive me if I'm wrong but the above sentence probably ought to read "Reasoning is the sequencing of ontological ideas." THAT I can make sense of. The placement of the word ontological in the first version of the sentence makes it modify sequencing. I could make up a reason why sequencing might be ontological--maybe--but, it makes little sense on the surface,


I'm sorry, but this is just gibberish to me. I know what an intellectual perception is, I think. I know what a chronological sequence is. On ontological sequencing, see above. But, what would be the necessity of reordering a series of perceptions by their ontology (nature)? And what would be the nature of existence of an intellectual perception that would be of any interest other than 'I had a perception.'

Utter gibberish.

Ontologically sequencing ideas involves sequencing ideas apart from their chronological, spatial or material existence. We do it all the time. Some ideas simply follow from other ideas, ontologically.