How can omniscience & omnipotence be compatible with free will?

[Cieza]

If it isn't a negation of free will to not be able to go back and change your decision, would you say that what prevents it from being a negation of free will is the fact that you're free so long as you're able to choose something once?

It's a free will decision if you can freely choose A or B. Very simple.

Think of the last choice you made. Did you make it freely? Could you have freely chosen the other choice?

 

[Received]

The presuppositions were
1) Omniscience (God knows everything including choices which haven't yet been made)
2) Omnipotence (God can do anything)
3) Free will (Pete can make an unimpeded free will choice between A & B)

If 1 & 2 are true, then 3 cannot be true
If 3 is true, then 1 & 2 cannot be true

This is yet to be seen given that foreknowledge means knowledge before the fact that Pete will choose something freely. It's not the other way around, where foreknowledge is somehow "already present" (which even assumes that God experiences time linearly like we do) and therefore causes Pete's actions. Knowledge, no matter if it's foreknowledge or not, is entirely dependent on what it records. Whether we're recording an act after it happened or fore-recording it, the act must still happen logically first (not necessarily chronologically), which means that freedom is still intact, given that free acts need to occur logically prior to any possibility of these acts being recorded, including through foreknowledge.

 

[Cieza]

This is yet to be seen given that foreknowledge means knowledge before the fact that Pete will choose something freely. It's not the other way around, where foreknowledge is somehow "already present" (which even assumes that God experiences time linearly like we do) and therefore causes Pete's actions. Knowledge, no matter if it's foreknowledge or not, is entirely dependent on what it records. Whether we're recording an act after it happened or fore-recording it, the act must still happen logically first (not necessarily chronologically), which means that freedom is still intact, given that free acts need to occur logically prior to any possibility of these acts being recorded, including through foreknowledge.

The problem with this and most of your other comments is if God is both omniscient & omnipotent, he could in theory let Pete know what Pete will choose prior to Pete making the choice. Pete could then freely choose something in conflict with what God knows. Therefore, God's foreknowledge would be compromised. Since I agree with your assertions about what foreknowledge is, it can therefore be concluded that God cannot have foreknowledge and cannot have knowledge of events which are yet to occur. If he can, then it would be physiologically impossible for him to inform a free will agent of his/her future choices - meaning that God wouldn't be omnipotent.

 

[Received]

The problem with this and most of your other comments is if God is both omniscient & omnipotent, he could in theory let Pete know what Pete will choose prior to Pete making the choice. Pete could then freely choose something in conflict with what God knows. Therefore, God's foreknowledge would be compromised. Since I agree with your assertions about what foreknowledge is, it can therefore be concluded that God cannot have foreknowledge and cannot have knowledge of events which are yet to occur. If he can, then it would be physiologically impossible for him to inform a free will agent of his/her future choices - meaning that God wouldn't be omnipotent.

Oh okay, I get you. The old Matrix problem. I agree that it's theoretically possible that God could let Pete know what he'll choose, which would cause problems. But I don't think that compromises foreknowledge at all, given that foreknowing something that wouldn't be because the agent would choose otherwise if he knew isn't knowledge at all. Knowledge only records what has been; likewise, foreknowledge only records what will be. If God tells an agent what his action will be, and this very act of telling changes what will be, then what would have been predicted without telling wasn't really predicted with telling, and the act of telling the agent of a predicted future is itself part of the knowledge that results in the agent's true choice in the future.

These are very complicated problems. It's your fault for making them so difficult.

However, we should ask ourselves: even if there are exceptions to a rule, does the rule fail to be a rule? I don't think these incredibly special situations involving foreknowledge disprove foreknowledge except in these special situations (assuming, of course, that they're disproven).

 

[Cieza]

Oh okay, I get you. The old Matrix problem. I agree that it's theoretically possible that God could let Pete know what he'll choose, which would cause problems. But I don't think that compromises foreknowledge at all, given that foreknowing something that wouldn't be because the agent would choose otherwise if he knew isn't knowledge at all.

It could compromise the foreknowledge, as Pete would be free to choose something other than what God knows he's going to choose. Therefore, it is physiologically impossible for God to be both omniscient and omnipotent. If he can be both omniscient and omnipotent, then it could be easily explained what would happen if Pete chose 'B' after God foreknew that Pete would choose 'A'.

Knowledge only records what has been; likewise, foreknowledge only records what will be.

How could one have knowledge of events which haven't yet occurred - or rather don't even exist?
How would God get his knowledge of something which doesn't even exist?

 

[StarCannon]

Why not jut ask God? Surely God can tell us just how he experiences time; or what exactly it is that he describes as awareness.
Unless...

 

[elopez]

The presupposition of Pete having an unimpeded free will choice between A & B means prior to his making the choice, there is nothing restricting him from choosing A and there is nothing restricting him from choosing B.

I'm still not sure you are clear on what I'm asking. I'm not asking you to presuppose anything but actually provide support for the notion of free will you're describing. You've simply defined your idea of free will further with again no support, for I could ask essentially the same question I did in my previous post: what support is there to affirm free will means one must opt between two choices?

If Pete has free will to choose A or B at a point in time after God already knows he's going to choose A, then if Pete chooses B, either one of two things happens:
1) God's foreknowledge becomes compromised
2) God's foreknowledge floats with Pete's decision.

If #2 is true, then if it were asked on day 1 if God knows Pete's A/B choice of day 3, then the answer would have to be no.

I do not believe God exercises foreknowledge temporally. I believe God has foreseen everything from eternity. Everything God has foreseen is going to come to pass, so if God foreknows Pete is going to choose A then Pete will choose A. Pete cannot do anything other than choose A as God's foreknowledge is infallible. Pete will not choose B. That much should be accepted if we are going to discuss infallible foreknowledge.

Think of it this way. Let's say prior to Pete making his choice, God writes on a sheet what Pete will choose - A or B - and it's sealed in an envelope, meaning what's written in there cannot change. After making his choice, Pete opens the envelope. If Pete makes an A/B choice every day and this is done every day, we'll eventually see that God gets it right about 50% of the time.

None of what you said here derives from the given definition of free will. Here is the insisting problem I have with this argument. We could say that, but again that's not what foreknowledge is. We are ignorant of the future, and it surely doesn't get revealed to us. So if, and that is a very big if, Pete makes a choice I believe what is written on the paper is what is going to happen. It would always happen. Pete still makes the choice of his own reasoning and motive and does so not coerced. That is what foreknowledge means, and that is how it is compatible with free will. You are therefore giving a hypothetical that dos not even compare to foreknowledge.

Please provide an example.

Take for instance an internal factor. With one who has internal compulsions and strikes another in the face, he probably did not mean to hit the other. The deterministic factor hinders mans free will, however only to an extent.

 

[Christ's_Warrior]

Here's something about Christianity that doesn't add up right to me:

Christians have said that God knows everything and can do anything. That means he knows the future or events which have yet to occur. He would therefore know today that a human being (we'll call him Pete) is going to choose 'A' instead of 'B'. However, since Pete has an unimpeded free will decision up until the time he makes his decision of either A or B, Pete could potentially choose B after God knew he was going to choose A. Can someone reconcile this?

God can see time in the past, present and future. Free will Implies that we can make our own choices and that they are not pre- determined. So how do we reconcile this, easy, just because God knows our actions prior to making them, it does not imply that He caused our actions.

So if we choose A and God knows we were to choose A, there is nothing here that contradicts free will.

 

[Received]

It could compromise the foreknowledge, as Pete would be free to choose something other than what God knows he's going to choose. Therefore, it is physiologically impossible for God to be both omniscient and omnipotent. If he can be both omniscient and omnipotent, then it could be easily explained what would happen if Pete chose 'B' after God foreknew that Pete would choose 'A'.

Actually I'm not even sure this is logically possible -- conditionally knowing an agent's moves, rather than foreknowing them properly. However, there is a view called "middle knowledge" which resolves this difficulty assuming it does exist.

Yes, you're right that God's knowledge would be compromised if Pete could choose something other than what God knows. But I've yet to see a compelling argument that hasn't been addressed by me or other posters that proves this. I don't think you've addressed my previous post, just restated your own premise. And I'll be darned if "easily explained" is a criterion for omniscience or omnipotence.

How could one have knowledge of events which haven't yet occurred - or rather don't even exist?
How would God get his knowledge of something which doesn't even exist?

Who knows? Maybe it's because God, having created temporality, is therefore in some sense "outside of it", whether eternal or not, which could grant him a timeless perspective, where all tenses are known to him in some grand present. I think it's a red herring, Cieza, to argue whether a phenomenon is possible in a thread involving God where you take it for granted that God can know the future in the OP.

But let's sum up and simplify by going back to the OP: Pete can't choose anything that isn't foreknown by God (including, in a complicated way, any revelations of God about Pete's future), and everything known and foreknown is recorded or determined by the agent, either after the act (knowledge) or before it (foreknowledge).

 

[Cieza]

Why not jut ask God? Surely God can tell us just how he experiences time; or what exactly it is that he describes as awareness.
Unless...

I would ask God if there were a way to ask a question of someone/something that cannot be observed.

 

[Cieza]

I'm still not sure you are clear on what I'm asking. I'm not asking you to presuppose anything but actually provide support for the notion of free will you're describing. You've simply defined your idea of free will further with again no support, for I could ask essentially the same question I did in my previous post: what support is there to affirm free will means one must opt between two choices?

The paradox exists whether you call it free will or you call it something else. One of these has to be true:
A) Pete either cannot make an unimpeded choice between A or B
B) God cannot be both omniscient & omnipotent.

I do not believe God exercises foreknowledge temporally. I believe God has foreseen everything from eternity. Everything God has foreseen is going to come to pass, so if God foreknows Pete is going to choose A then Pete will choose A.

Then what if God informs Pete that he will choose A. Pete then chooses B. That would compromise God's foreknowledge - whether it is temporal or non-temporal.

Pete cannot do anything other than choose A as God's foreknowledge is infallible. Pete will not choose B.

You are presupposing something which is not part of the original scenario. In my scenario, Pete can make an unimpeded free choice of either A or B.

That much should be accepted if we are going to discuss infallible foreknowledge.

None of what you said here derives from the given definition of free will. Here is the insisting problem I have with this argument. We could say that, but again that's not what foreknowledge is. We are ignorant of the future, and it surely doesn't get revealed to us. So if, and that is a very big if, Pete makes a choice I believe what is written on the paper is what is going to happen. It would always happen. Pete still makes the choice of his own reasoning and motive and does so not coerced. That is what foreknowledge means, and that is how it is compatible with free will. You are therefore giving a hypothetical that dos not even compare to foreknowledge.

If you are right, then it would have to be physiologically impossible for God to inform Pete (or anyone for that matter) of what Pete's choice will be prior to his making it. That means that God must not be omnipotent or cannot do anything.

 

[Cieza]

God can see time in the past, present and future. Free will Implies that we can make our own choices and that they are not pre- determined. So how do we reconcile this, easy, just because God knows our actions prior to making them, it does not imply that He caused our actions.

So if we choose A and God knows we were to choose A, there is nothing here that contradicts free will.

Then what happens if God knows Pete is going to choose A and Pete instead chooses B?

 

[Christ's_Warrior]

Then what happens if God knows Pete is going to choose A and Pete instead chooses B?

God knows that Pete will choose A, therefore Pete will choose A. Although you must understand that God did not cause Pete to choose A, Pete chose it because it was his choice, God did not interfere with the choice even though He knew that Pete would choose it.

If God forcefully made Pete chose B, knowing that Pete would choose A then God is not allowing free will.

If Pete chose B even though God saw that Pete chose A, then we aren't talking about the God in the Judeo-Christian sense of the word.

 

[elopez]

The paradox exists whether you call it free will or you call it something else. One of these has to be true:
A) Pete either cannot make an unimpeded choice between A or B
B) God cannot be both omniscient & omnipotent.

You're just not getting it. The paradox doesn't exist at all unless you support your definition of free will. No one is calling free will anything else. I may have defined it differently than you, but I still call it free will.

Then what if God informs Pete that he will choose A. Pete then chooses B. That would compromise God's foreknowledge - whether it is temporal or non-temporal.

Yes. if that happened. But we both know that does not happen. Your scenario is irrelevant.

You are presupposing something which is not part of the original scenario. In my scenario, Pete can make an unimpeded free choice of either A or B.

And your original scenario is not part of the doctrine of infallible foreknowledge. As too in my scenario Pete has free will.

If you are right, then it would have to be physiologically impossible for God to inform Pete (or anyone for that matter) of what Pete's choice will be prior to his making it. That means that God must not be omnipotent or cannot do anything.

I disagree in respect to God of course. God could inform Pete of the decision, it is just that He does not.

 

[Cieza]

God knows that Pete will choose A, therefore Pete will choose A.

It was already presupposed that Pete has an unimpeded free will choice between A & B. Are you saying it is impossible for Pete to have an unimpeded free will choice between A & B?

Although you must understand that God did not cause Pete to choose A, Pete chose it because it was his choice, God did not interfere with the choice even though He knew that Pete would choose it.

If God forcefully made Pete chose B, knowing that Pete would choose A then God is not allowing free will.

If Pete chose B even though God saw that Pete chose A, then we aren't talking about the God in the Judeo-Christian sense of the word.

Since we've established that Pete can choose either A or B and prior to this point in time, God already knows which one Pete will choose, then what type of God are we talking about if Pete retains free will to choose B if God has foreknowledge that Pete will choose A?

 

[Cieza]

You're just not getting it. The paradox doesn't exist at all unless you support your definition of free will. No one is calling free will anything else. I may have defined it differently than you, but I still call it free will.

I'm calling it the ability to make an unimpeded free will choice between either A or B. This means that up to the time the choice is made, either A or B could potentially be chosen. If God - or anyone for that matter - has infallible foreknowledge that Pete will choose A instead of B at a point in time prior to Pete making his decision, then Pete would not be able to freely choose B. But since we've established it as a presupposition that Pete can freely choose either A or B, then infallible foreknowledge cannot simultaneously coexist with this type of free will.

Yes. if that happened. But we both know that does not happen. Your scenario is irrelevant.

If God is omnipotent, then it's not irrelevant. An omnipotent & omniscient God could tell Pete prior to his A/B choice what he is going to choose.

And your original scenario is not part of the doctrine of infallible foreknowledge. As too in my scenario Pete has free will.

Precisely! Since infallible foreknowledge & unimpeded free will cannot coexist (or create an unsolvable paradox), then by definition, the original scenario is either a paradox or one of the two presuppositions (free will or infallible foreknowledge) is impossible.

I disagree in respect to God of course. God could inform Pete of the decision, it is just that He does not.

Please enlighten me. What would happen if God did inform Pete what his choice would be (say A) and Pete then instead chooses B?

 

[elopez]

I'm calling it the ability to make an unimpeded free will choice between either A or B. This means that up to the time the choice is made, either A or B could potentially be chosen. If God - or anyone for that matter - has infallible foreknowledge that Pete will choose A instead of B at a point in time prior to Pete making his decision, then Pete would not be able to freely choose B. But since we've established it as a presupposition that Pete can freely choose either A or B, then infallible foreknowledge cannot simultaneously coexist with this type of free will.

Yes. I understand how you are defining free will. I am saying you keep repeating that definition without any support for the definition. You say, "this type of free will," well yes, infallible foreknowledge is not compatible with a libertarian view of free will. That is why among another reason I believe libertarian free will to be false. As I've said I believe in a compatible type of free will which suggests foreknowledge and free will can co - exist.

If God is omnipotent, then it's not irrelevant. An omnipotent & omniscient God could tell Pete prior to his A/B choice what he is going to choose.

I've explained why it is irrelevant. Maybe I need to go into further detail. God could, as in, poses the ability to inform Pete of his future choice A, but God will not inform Pete of said desicion. Thus omnipotence is only relevant when it comes to what God is capable of doing, not what God hypothetically could or could not do or what should be done.

Precisely! Since infallible foreknowledge & unimpeded free will cannot coexist (or create an unsolvable paradox), then by definition, the original scenario is either a paradox or one of the two presuppositions (free will or infallible foreknowledge) is impossible.

Libertarian free will and foreknowledge cannot co - exist. That means that either the libertarian idea of free will is wrong and that another idea of free will is compatible, or no idea of free will is compatible and there is no such thing, or libertarian free will is right and foreknowledge is wrong. That is why if you think it is the last that is correct it would depend on you showing how libertarian free will is correct itself.

Please enlighten me. What would happen if God did inform Pete what his choice would be (say A) and Pete then instead chooses B?

Well obviously you don't need to be enlightened because you've already answered this question yourself various times in this thread. I find that there is no solid point in your rhetoric.

 

[Christ's_Warrior]

It was already presupposed that Pete has an unimpeded free will choice between A & B. Are you saying it is impossible for Pete to have an unimpeded free will choice between A & B?

I am saying that God knows Petes choice prior to Pete making it but as you suggest it is an unimpeded choice even though God was fully aware of it.

Since we've established that Pete can choose either A or B and prior to this point in time, God already knows which one Pete will choose, then what type of God are we talking about if Pete retains free will to choose B if God has foreknowledge that Pete will choose A?

I think you are trying to make things more complex than what they truly are. Pete can choose A or B, God knows Pete's choice, so it is impossible for Pete to make any choice other than the one God has foreseen.

An example would be if we were to travel into the future and witness an event, then upon our return we know this event will occur and subject to us not influencing the event, it takes place.

In this scenario we knew what was to occur, but by us sitting back and allowing the events to unfold, we did not influence the outcome and therefore free will was unimpeded. This event was going to take place because we had foresight, but we had no influence on the event occuring although we knew it was going to occur.

If we were to influence the event itself, then this is where free will would be impeded.

 

[Cieza]

Yes. I understand how you are defining free will. I am saying you keep repeating that definition without any support for the definition. You say, "this type of free will," well yes, infallible foreknowledge is not compatible with a libertarian view of free will. That is why among another reason I believe libertarian free will to be false. As I've said I believe in a compatible type of free will which suggests foreknowledge and free will can co - exist.

When I say unimpeded free will choice, I am describing what I experience first hand when I make a choice. If you call it libertarian free will, I'm OK with that.

Why do you recognize "libertarian free will" to be false? When you make a choice, do you not have the freedom to choose either A or B?

I've explained why it is irrelevant. Maybe I need to go into further detail. God could, as in, poses the ability to inform Pete of his future choice A, but God will not inform Pete of said desicion. Thus omnipotence is only relevant when it comes to what God is capable of doing, not what God hypothetically could or could not do or what should be done.

God won't inform Pete of his choice because he would jeopardize his omnipotence by doing so, as Pete could then potentially choose something in conflict with what God knows Pete is going to choose. But this isn't about what God actually does, but about what God is capable of doing. Since the Judeo-Christian God can supposedly do anything, then he could tell Pete what his choice will be prior to Pete making that choice. Therefore, it raises the question which you keep dodging - what would happen if God told Pete what his choice will be and then Pete chooses something different.

Libertarian free will and foreknowledge cannot co - exist. That means that either the libertarian idea of free will is wrong and that another idea of free will is compatible, or no idea of free will is compatible and there is no such thing, or libertarian free will is right and foreknowledge is wrong. That is why if you think it is the last that is correct it would depend on you showing how libertarian free will is correct itself.

I have first hand experience of what you're calling libertarian free will. That is how I know it is correct.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

...what would happen if God told Pete what his choice will be and then Pete chooses something different.

Then god was lying when he told Pete what he would choose, since this god knows what Pete actually chooses.

I have first hand experience of what you're calling libertarian free will. That is how I know it is correct.

And some people who hallucinate have first hand experiences that tell them their hallucinations are correct...