Epistemology

[Eudaimonist]

It is unfortunate that we must rely on axioms, there's something distasteful about it.

Not to me, as long as the axioms are reasonably self-evident in human experience.

If one of my axioms is that there is a world external to my mind that I perceive, this seems fine to me because it accords with my life experience.

If a Stoic were to propose to me that I must axiomatically accept the existence of Zeus as orderer of the cosmos, this would be a problem because it is not even close to self-evident.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Tielec]

When the only other game in town is either solipsism, or irrationality leading to paradox... is having axioms really so bad? Or is the distaste more on the level going from BASIC to C and having to start declaring all your variables?

I've always wanted to be someone who could justify every part of his belief system without resorting to self-evidence.

 

[DataPacRat]

I've always wanted to be someone who could justify every part of his belief system without resorting to self-evidence.

What do you mean by the term 'self-evidence' here?

 

[Tielec]

What do you mean by the term 'self-evidence' here?

Common-sensical, supported by a weight of experiental evidence or unquestionably true for 'obvious' reasons.

To illustrate; if I say that "Suffering is bad, and happiness is good", and someone asks me why, it seems that I have to admit that I think the statement is self-evidently true.

 

[Eudaimonist]

I've always wanted to be someone who could justify every part of his belief system without resorting to self-evidence.

This is impossible.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Tielec]

This is impossible.


eudaimonia,

Mark

So it appears and it leaves a bad taste in my mouth. I wish it was at least theoretically possible.

 

[Received]

Would anyone be interested in talking about why someone should believe one thing, but not another, and perhaps how that applies to any particular belief?

The argument goes that we should believe in things that are true because truth is good, perhaps the highest good. Consequently, the more things we believe that are true, the better off we are.

Not sure I agree with this.

 

[DataPacRat]

The argument goes that we should believe in things that are true because truth is good, perhaps the highest good. Consequently, the more things we believe that are true, the better off we are.

Not sure I agree with this.

In that case, which falsehoods do you think should be believed?

 

[Received]

I'm not going to answer that by appealing to particulars. Let's look at it abstractly and conditionally: if the world is ultimately a bad place, then looking to find truth about it will ultimately lead to to a tragic conclusion. The trick here is that we can't know in a grand metaphysical sense, as revealed through science or arguably even reason, whether the "grand truth of the universe" (i.e., the thing most fundamental to it regarding its relation to our existence) is good or bad; consequently, the value of truth is unknowable.

 

[DataPacRat]

I'm not going to answer that by appealing to particulars. Let's look at it abstractly and conditionally: if the world is ultimately a bad place, then looking to find truth about it will ultimately lead to to a tragic conclusion. The trick here is that we can't know in a grand metaphysical sense, as revealed through science or arguably even reason, whether the "grand truth of the universe" (i.e., the thing most fundamental to it regarding its relation to our existence) is good or bad; consequently, the value of truth is unknowable.

... I'm afraid that I'm not really sure what meaning you're ascribing to many of the terms you just used, and so I'm not really sure what it is you're trying to say.

If I may make a suggestion, you might find "The Simple Truth" by Yudkowsky, at Yudkowsky - The Simple Truth , worth reading.

 

[Received]

Perhaps you could summarize his standing.

As a shorter answer to your previous question, we should believe those falsehoods which result in our happiness.

 

[DataPacRat]

Perhaps you could summarize his standing.

Mm... tricky, but as a first shot: truth is /useful/.

As a shorter answer to your previous question, we should believe those falsehoods which result in our happiness.

Alright, then; given that believing the truth about various aspects of the unvierse allows us to manipulate things in order to make the universe come closer to being what we want it to be, and believing false things makes it difficult-to-impossible to use our knowledge to change things the way we want them to change... what sort of false beliefs can increase your happiness?

 

[Received]

Once again, I'm going to appeal to conditionals to keep the thread from diving into a collection of fact checks.

Let's assume that believing in God makes you more happy overall than not believing in him (which is supported by the psychological research, although may be involve other variables inherent only to religion). Let's assume God doesn't exist.

Let's assume the universe is a happy snappy place, where all evils will be resolved and negated in the next life, where everyone goes to Heb'n and we all party like it's infinity-99. Let's assume this universe doesn't exist.

 

[Received]

Mm... tricky, but as a first shot: truth is /useful/.

Not always. Truth isn't useful in daily situations when Aunt Helen wears a terrible hat and asks you if she looks good. By logical inference, then, truth isn't tantamount to usefulness.

Unless by "useful" you mean "that which can be used," which opens up the question, "used for what purpose?" Something as useful in this sense isn't valuable in itself; that which it's used for may be good or bad.

 

[Received]

In a more refined sense, falsity is useful as hope in distressing situations. Enter Viktor Frankl and his "logotherapy", which was found in the midst of Auschwitz, where those in concentration camps had a will-to-live (a very good thing) if they believed in things that were likely to be false even though they could be true (such is the nature of hope).

 

[DataPacRat]

Once again, I'm going to appeal to conditionals to keep the thread from diving into a collection of fact checks.

You say that like it's a bad thing. If we can't refer to actual facts as the basis for whatever points we're making... then how can we make any headway in figuring out whether anything we're talking about is actually the case or not?

Let's assume that believing in God makes you more happy overall than not believing in him (which is supported by the psychological research, although may be involve other variables inherent only to religion). Let's assume God doesn't exist.

Let's assume the universe is a happy snappy place, where all evils will be resolved and negated in the next life, where everyone goes to Heb'n and we all party like it's infinity-99. Let's assume this universe doesn't exist.

Er... what? I was willing to go along for the sake of argument up until the last point, at which point I'm afraid you lost me.

 

[Received]

Sorry.

 

[DataPacRat]

Not always. Truth isn't useful in daily situations when Aunt Helen wears a terrible hat and asks you if she looks good. By logical inference, then, truth isn't tantamount to usefulness.

/Having/ beliefs that closely correspond to objective reality is an entirely different thing than /sharing/ those beliefs.

Unless by "useful" you mean "that which can be used," which opens up the question, "used for what purpose?" Something as useful in this sense isn't valuable in itself; that which it's used for may be good or bad.

For what purpose? Pick one - or pick several. (You might Google for 'desire utilitarianism' to learn more about purposes in general.)

 

[Received]

Try responding to the first point then.

And I think fact checking would prevent us from the theory I initially presented to your OP. After all, the veracity of all theories is conditional on whether or not it fits a collection of facts, right?

 

[Received]

/Having/ beliefs that closely correspond to objective reality is an entirely different thing than /sharing/ those beliefs.

True, but Aunt Helen sure doesn't know the truth unless I share it.