How can omniscience & omnipotence be compatible with free will?

[Cieza]

That's what foreknowledge means. It sounds to me like you're essentially saying that foreknowledge can't exist because knowledge can't exist prior to an act. If you're against foreknowledge as a philosophical possibility, that's fine, but this is another subject.

It doesn't matter if you call it a philosophical possibility, a religious belief, a power of God or an element of time. One cannot have infallible foreknowledge of a choice which has yet to be made.

Disagreed. The act of choosing 'A' is already foreknown, which means that God's knowledge of his act as freely chosen is already made. Foreknowledge doesn't mean you're free to choose what you haven't been foreknown to choose, just as knowledge doesn't mean you're free to choose what you've already chosen. If Pete has already chosen 'A' on Wednesday and it's now Friday, it's unintelligible to say that he could still choose 'B'. He could have chosen 'B', but this would have meant that my knowledge of him choosing 'B' would have been such, and God's foreknowledge before the act of him choosing 'B' would have been such.

Let's look at this sequentially:
Day 1: God knows Pete will choose 'A' on day 3 & Pete hasn't yet made his decision
Day 2: Pete can make an unimpeded free will decision between 'A' and 'B'. Meanwhile, the historical record of God knowing on day 1 that Pete will choose A on day 3 cannot change.
Day 3: Pete proceeds to choose B by using his unimpeded free will. Now God's knowledge of day 1 that Pete would choose A on day 3 has been compromised.

This is very simple.

 

[Received]

It doesn't matter if you call it a philosophical possibility, a religious belief, a power of God or an element of time. One cannot have infallible foreknowledge of a choice which has yet to be made.

That's your contention, and that's fine. However, it's a bit odd to be making comments about foreknowledge, using the logistics of foreknowledge, and then claiming the phenomenon can't exist.

Let's look at this sequentially:
Day 1: God knows Pete will choose 'A' on day 3 & Pete hasn't yet made his decision
Day 2: Pete can make an unimpeded free will decision between 'A' and 'B'. Meanwhile, the historical record of God knowing on day 1 that Pete will choose A on day 3 cannot change.
Day 3: Pete proceeds to choose B by using his unimpeded free will. Now God's knowledge of day 1 that Pete would choose A on day 3 has been compromised.

This is very simple.

You haven't made an assertion criticizing mine, but have only restated yours. Again, it's questionable that knowledge can even be compromised, and it isn't a compromise given that had Pete chosen differently, God would have foreknown it differently. Again, if knowledge means that the act I know can't be changed, then foreknowledge means that the act I know can't be changed; therefore, saying that the actor could have acted differently is vacuous. Whether or not we're speaking about knowledge or foreknowledge, you're epistemologically bound to having the act already chosen known and therefore incapable of being chosen otherwise within this actual world of knowledge.

 

[Cieza]

That's your contention, and that's fine. However, it's a bit odd to be making comments about foreknowledge, using the logistics of foreknowledge, and then claiming the phenomenon can't exist.



You haven't made an assertion criticizing mine, but have only restated yours. Again, it's questionable that knowledge can even be compromised, and it isn't a compromise given that had Pete chosen differently, God would have foreknown it differently. Again, if knowledge means that the act I know can't be changed, then foreknowledge means that the act I know can't be changed; therefore, saying that the actor could have acted differently is vacuous. Whether or not we're speaking about knowledge or foreknowledge, you're epistemologically bound to having the act already chosen known and therefore incapable of being chosen otherwise within this actual world of knowledge.

It seems as if you have overlooked the presupposition that Pete has unimpeded free will to choose either A (the one God knows he's going to choose) or B (the one God knows he won't choose).

 

[Received]

I didn't overlook it. I just didn't want to be arguing in a circle.

To answer your post, Pete can't choose anything God doesn't know; at the same time, God can't know anything Pete doesn't choose. Pete is free to choose either one; if he doesn't, then he can't choose otherwise than he already has (according to knowledge) or will (according to foreknowledge).

 

[CTD]

1 Omniscience entails the know-how to create beings with free will.
2 Omnipotence entails the power to create such beings

Perhaps some other adjective would be incompatible. Perhaps 'human'.

 

[Cieza]

I didn't overlook it. I just didn't want to be arguing in a circle.

To answer your post, Pete can't choose anything God doesn't know; at the same time, God can't know anything Pete doesn't choose. Pete is free to choose either one; if he doesn't, then he can't choose otherwise than he already has (according to knowledge) or will (according to foreknowledge).

You are clearly saying that Pete doesn't have unimpeded free will to choose either A (the one God knows he's going to choose) or B (the one God knows he won't choose).

Please remember it is presupposed that Pete is a free will agent who can freely choose between either A or B. Are you saying this is an impossibility?

Please explain what happens to God's omniscience (or knowledge of everything) if Pete chooses B after God knew Pete would choose A.

 

[elopez]

Here's something about Christianity that doesn't add up right to me:

Christians have said that God knows everything and can do anything. That means he knows the future or events which have yet to occur. He would therefore know today that a human being (we'll call him Pete) is going to choose 'A' instead of 'B'. However, since Pete has an unimpeded free will decision up until the time he makes his decision of either A or B, Pete could potentially choose B after God knew he was going to choose A. Can someone reconcile this?

Your real contention seems to be with omniscience, not omnipotence. The problem with this argument is that you assume what free will is without giving support or much less defining the idea of free will.

If God foreknew that Pete was going to choose A today, then Pete can do nothing other than choose A when the time comes. Pete cannot choose option B if God foreknows he is going to choose A, though Pete still has free will to choose A. Pete chose A because that was his ultimate desire; he wanted to choose A. Pete was also no forced into choosing A, so he choose it of his own will. In that sense Pete has free will. That is free will as understood according to compatibilism -- the idea of determinism and free will co - existing with one another.

 

[Cieza]

Your real contention seems to be with omniscience, not omnipotence. The problem with this argument is that you assume what free will is without giving support or much less defining the idea of free will.

If God foreknew that Pete was going to choose A today, then Pete can do nothing other than choose A when the time comes.

If true, then Pete could not freely choose between A & B, meaning he does not have an unimpeded free will decision.

Pete cannot choose option B if God foreknows he is going to choose A, though Pete still has free will to choose A.

Now you're saying Pete doesn't have unimpeded free will to choose B. Please remember that it is a presupposition that Pete has free will to choose A (the one God knows he's going to choose) or B (the one God knows he won't choose). If you change the presuppositions, then we're talking about two entirely separate things.

Pete chose A because that was his ultimate desire; he wanted to choose A. Pete was also no forced into choosing A, so he choose it of his own will. In that sense Pete has free will. That is free will as understood according to compatibilism -- the idea of determinism and free will co - existing with one another.

Let's say God informed Pete prior to his choosing 'A' that Pete would choose 'A'. Pete then tries to choose B. If he has free will to choose B, what would happen when he attempts to choose B?

 

[Received]

You are clearly saying that Pete doesn't have unimpeded free will to choose either A (the one God knows he's going to choose) or B (the one God knows he won't choose).

Please remember it is presupposed that Pete is a free will agent who can freely choose between either A or B. Are you saying this is an impossibility?

No, I'm saying that if Pete decides to choose A and does choose A, he can't choose B. With regard to knowledge, if I know you chose A (the event has already passed), then you're not in the least bit any less free because you can't magically go back and choose B. Likewise with foreknowledge, although the epistemic perspective has changed. If I somehow foreknew that Pete would choose B, he would choose B; if I foreknew that Pete would choose A, he would choose A. In either case he is the one who determines my knowledge, and in either case I couldn't foreknow any choice unless he actually chose it.

Please explain what happens to God's omniscience (or knowledge of everything) if Pete chooses B after God knew Pete would choose A.

I am saying this is an epistemic impossibility. You quite simply can't know something that didn't (or won't) happen. I can't say "I knew you would choose B" when you've already chosen A. That wouldn't be knowledge; knowledge entails belief in something that is true.

 

[Cieza]

No, I'm saying that if Pete decides to choose A and does choose A, he can't choose B.

While he cannot go back in time and change his choice from A to B, he had an unimpeded free will choice to choose either A or B prior to his making the choice.

With regard to knowledge, if I know you chose A (the event has already passed), then you're not in the least bit any less free because you can't magically go back and choose B.

You would only know Pete chose A because he had already made his choice. If you knew Pete chose A at a point in time prior to his free will choice between A & B, it remains to be answered what would happen to your knowledge of Pete choosing A if he instead chooses B.

Likewise with foreknowledge, although the epistemic perspective has changed. If I somehow foreknew that Pete would choose B, he would choose B; if I foreknew that Pete would choose A, he would choose A. In either case he is the one who determines my knowledge, and in either case I couldn't foreknow any choice unless he actually chose it.

By that logic, if Pete doesn't make his choice until day 3, you couldn't know what his choice is until day 3. If you did somehow know on day 1, what would happen if you relayed the information of Pete choosing A on day 3 and Pete in turn selects B?

I am saying this is an epistemic impossibility. You quite simply can't know something that didn't (or won't) happen. I can't say "I knew you would choose B" when you've already chosen A. That wouldn't be knowledge; knowledge entails belief in something that is true.

As of day 1, Pete has neither chosen A or B. So on day 1, there is no truth that Pete has chosen A. So given what you're saying, no one can have knowledge on day 1 of a choice Pete makes on day 3. Therefore, it is physiologically impossible for God to have infallible knowledge of a free will agent's unimpeded free will choice prior to the choice being made.

 

[Received]

While he cannot go back in time and change his choice from A to B, he had an unimpeded free will choice to choose either A or B prior to his making the choice.

Indeed, and I agree with this.

You would only know Pete chose A because he had already made his choice. If you knew Pete chose A at a point in time prior to his free will choice between A & B, it remains to be answered what would happen to your knowledge of Pete choosing A if he instead chooses B.

This assumes that foreknowledge doesn't exist, or that if it does it can be fallible. Let's assume for the moment (for the sake of argument) that it can exist and that, like regular knowledge, it can't compromised.

By that logic, if Pete doesn't make his choice until day 3, you couldn't know what his choice is until day 3. If you did somehow know on day 1, what would happen if you relayed the information of Pete choosing A on day 3 and Pete in turn selects B?

Same as above. For emphasis, you can't speak about a subject that necessarily involves foreknowledge and then act as if foreknowledge is a philosophical impossibility. If you don't believe foreknowledge is even possible, I don't see the point in starting a thread like this.

As of day 1, Pete has neither chosen A or B. So on day 1, there is no truth that Pete has chosen A. So given what you're saying, no one can have knowledge on day 1 of a choice Pete makes on day 3. Therefore, it is physiologically impossible for God to have infallible knowledge of a free will agent's unimpeded free will choice prior to the choice being made.

Physiologically impossible? Do you ascribe (in theory) to the classical (and non-classical) conception of God as metaphysically constituted (i.e., spirit)?

 

[elopez]

If true, then Pete could not freely choose between A & B, meaning he does not have an unimpeded free will decision.

Again, you have not shown what free will is or much less defined it. Without any support for the notion of free will your argument is meaningless.

Now you're saying Pete doesn't have unimpeded free will to choose B. Please remember that it is a presupposition that Pete has free will to choose A (the one God knows he's going to choose) or B (the one God knows he won't choose). If you change the presuppositions, then we're talking about two entirely separate things.

I am saying Pete could not have opted choice B. I am not saying that Pete does not have free will, but that he does just in a different respect than you probably define free will.

Let's say God informed Pete prior to his choosing 'A' that Pete would choose 'A'. Pete then tries to choose B. If he has free will to choose B, what would happen when he attempts to choose B?

We can hypothetically say that but that isn't actually what foreknowledge is about, and you are inquiring about foreknowledge. I think if God informed Pete of his choosing A the consequences may be unclear. On one hand it seems as if Pete could attempt to choose B and show God's knowledge to be in error, while on the other maybe that information would be just another deterministic factor. What do you think?

 

[quatona]

Same as above. For emphasis, you can't speak about a subject that necessarily involves foreknowledge and then act as if foreknowledge is a philosophical impossibility. If you don't believe foreknowledge is even possible, I don't see the point in starting a thread like this.

Actually, I haven´t seen him saying or implying that foreknowledge was impossible. His argument is that foreknowledge of "freewilled" actions was a philosophical (logical) impossibility, and his method was a reductio ad absurdum. Quite a legitimate approach, as far as I can tell.

 

[Cieza]

This assumes that foreknowledge doesn't exist, or that if it does it can be fallible. Let's assume for the moment (for the sake of argument) that it can exist and that, like regular knowledge, it can't compromised.

The presuppositions were
1) Omniscience (God knows everything including choices which haven't yet been made)
2) Omnipotence (God can do anything)
3) Free will (Pete can make an unimpeded free will choice between A & B)

If 1 & 2 are true, then 3 cannot be true
If 3 is true, then 1 & 2 cannot be true
If 1, 2 & 3 are all true, then God's omniscience could likely be compromised, as Pete could potentially choose something in conflict with what God knows he's going to choose.

Same as above. For emphasis, you can't speak about a subject that necessarily involves foreknowledge and then act as if foreknowledge is a philosophical impossibility. If you don't believe foreknowledge is even possible, I don't see the point in starting a thread like this.

I don't believe infallible foreknowledge is possible. However, since I am puzzled as to why others do believe it is possible, I wish to explore how they can come to that conclusion when the simple Pete & his A/B choice shows that omniscience & free will are incompatible.

Physiologically impossible? Do you ascribe (in theory) to the classical (and non-classical) conception of God as metaphysically constituted (i.e., spirit)?

If something has knowledge, then it pertains to the physiological.

 

[Cieza]

Again, you have not shown what free will is or much less defined it. Without any support for the notion of free will your argument is meaningless.

For the purposes of this discussion, "free will" is the ability to make an unimpeded free choice between two different things. Until the time the choice is made, it is still possible that you could choose either one.

I am saying Pete could not have opted choice B. I am not saying that Pete does not have free will, but that he does just in a different respect than you probably define free will.

Even though God (or anyone for that matter) knows that Pete will choose 'A', if Pete has free will, he could still choose B - which would compromise God's foreknowledge

We can hypothetically say that but that isn't actually what foreknowledge is about, and you are inquiring about foreknowledge. I think if God informed Pete of his choosing A the consequences may be unclear. On one hand it seems as if Pete could attempt to choose B and show God's knowledge to be in error, while on the other maybe that information would be just another deterministic factor. What do you think?

I think if Pete has an unimpeded free will decision of A or B, it doesn't matter one iota what God (or anyone for that matter) knows he's going to choose. Pete's free will prevails over God's foreknowledge - assuming Pete has the freedom to make an unimpeded free will decision between A or B.

 

[Received]

If I have chosen A at time X, am I still free to go back and choose B at time X, and is this a negation of my freedom if I can't?

 

[elopez]

For the purposes of this discussion, "free will" is the ability to make an unimpeded free choice between two different things. Until the time the choice is made, it is still possible that you could choose either one.

Okay, now having defined free will how do you connect the concept of PAP to the idea of free will? In other words, what support is there to affirm free will means that one poses the ability to do otherwise? To me free will is defined on much more than these simplistic terms you lay out.

Even though God (or anyone for that matter) knows that Pete will choose 'A', if Pete has free will, he could still choose B - which would compromise God's foreknowledge.

Only if you have defined free will as you have. Even being that if God foreknows Pete will choose A and thus cannot choose B, Pete has free will and is held accountable for choosing A. Free will in the sense I believe is the ability to act without any external or internal factors preventing and or forcing one to act. So as God does not force Pete to choose A, he is free. Pete acts voluntarily of his own physical ability. That means that free will also means that one comprehend his reasons and motives for acting and that they would have consequences. So as God's foreknowledge does not conflict with Pete's reasoning to choose A, he is free. Pete chooses A because Pete desires for A to be brought about.

I think if Pete has an unimpeded free will decision of A or B, it doesn't matter one iota what God (or anyone for that matter) knows he's going to choose. Pete's free will prevails over God's foreknowledge - assuming Pete has the freedom to make an unimpeded free will decision between A or B.

I do not believe in this unimpeded free will you advocate. I believe there are things that hinder our will from being completely free, and those things are deterministic factors. Though I believe in a form of free will it is not the complete libertarian kind you describe, but an idea that claims free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive and intertwine with one another.

 

[Cieza]

If I have chosen A at time X, am I still free to go back and choose B at time X, and is this a negation of my freedom if I can't?

Once you have chosen A instead of B - either as your ultimate choice or at a given point in time - you cannot go back and choose B as that same ultimate choice or at that same given point in time.

It would not be a negation of your unimpeded free will decision between A & B if you cannot go back in time and change your decision from A to B.

 

[Received]

If it isn't a negation of free will to not be able to go back and change your decision, would you say that what prevents it from being a negation of free will is the fact that you're free so long as you're able to choose something once?

 

[Cieza]

Okay, now having defined free will how do you connect the concept of PAP to the idea of free will? In other words, what support is there to affirm free will means that one poses the ability to do otherwise? To me free will is defined on much more than these simplistic terms you lay out.

The presupposition of Pete having an unimpeded free will choice between A & B means prior to his making the choice, there is nothing restricting him from choosing A and there is nothing restricting him from choosing B.

Only if you have defined free will as you have. Even being that if God foreknows Pete will choose A and thus cannot choose B, Pete has free will and is held accountable for choosing A.

If Pete has free will to choose A or B at a point in time after God already knows he's going to choose A, then if Pete chooses B, either one of two things happens:
1) God's foreknowledge becomes compromised
2) God's foreknowledge floats with Pete's decision.

If #2 is true, then if it were asked on day 1 if God knows Pete's A/B choice of day 3, then the answer would have to be no.

Free will in the sense I believe is the ability to act without any external or internal factors preventing and or forcing one to act. So as God does not force Pete to choose A, he is free. Pete acts voluntarily of his own physical ability. That means that free will also means that one comprehend his reasons and motives for acting and that they would have consequences. So as God's foreknowledge does not conflict with Pete's reasoning to choose A, he is free. Pete chooses A because Pete desires for A to be brought about.

Think of it this way. Let's say prior to Pete making his choice, God writes on a sheet what Pete will choose - A or B - and it's sealed in an envelope, meaning what's written in there cannot change. After making his choice, Pete opens the envelope. If Pete makes an A/B choice every day and this is done every day, we'll eventually see that God gets it right about 50% of the time.

I do not believe in this unimpeded free will you advocate. I believe there are things that hinder our will from being completely free, and those things are deterministic factors.

Please provide an example.