Epistemology

[DataPacRat]

Hello, all;

For the past few years, one of the main areas I have been studying is epistemology: not just the field of philosophy dealing with what is true and false, but more importantly, what techniques are useful in /figuring out/ what is true and false, especially given are finite minds, and the limited experiences and evidence we have available to us. I think I've managed to learn a few things that few people who haven't thought long and hard on the subject have figured out, and which are extremely useful in separating wheat from chaff...

... and, as you can see from the icons up by my username, I disagree with nearly everyone in this forum about the truth of a few rather important propositions.

Would anyone be interested in talking about why someone should believe one thing, but not another, and perhaps how that applies to any particular belief?

 

[wpage]

Saint Paul wrote the best Epistles...

Romans is my favorite.

 

[Tinker Grey]

Hello, all;

For the past few years, one of the main areas I have been studying is epistemology: not just the field of philosophy dealing with what is true and false, but more importantly, what techniques are useful in /figuring out/ what is true and false, especially given are finite minds, and the limited experiences and evidence we have available to us. I think I've managed to learn a few things that few people who haven't thought long and hard on the subject have figured out, and which are extremely useful in separating wheat from chaff...

... and, as you can see from the icons up by my username, I disagree with nearly everyone in this forum about the truth of a few rather important propositions.

Would anyone be interested in talking about why someone should believe one thing, but not another, and perhaps how that applies to any particular belief?

You'll be interested to know that you aren't the only unbeliever in this forum. There are plenty here.

So, what do you think you've learned that you suspect others may not have?

 

[Tinker Grey]

Oh, and what does your avatar signify?

 

[DataPacRat]

You'll be interested to know that you aren't the only unbeliever in this forum. There are plenty here.

That much I knew before I first posted, after browsing through the Physical Sciences subforums.

So, what do you think you've learned that you suspect others may not have?

The art of allowing my level of confidence in a proposition to rise and fall according to the level of evidence, changing my mind without being overly attached to my previous, now-falsified understanding... and the science of knowing precisely /how much/ to change my mind, depending on the nature and strength of the evidence involved. To focus not so much on "beliefs", but on what experiences to expect, what predictions can be made. The consequences of proper application of Bayes' Theorem and Laplace's sunrise equation. And that's probably enough for a first run-through.

Oh, and what does your avatar signify?

It's a bit complicated; I gave a rough translation in thread t7538756 (ie, not "I believe" or "I disbelieve" but "I'm skeptical"), but didn't go into some of the details. One aspect of Bayescraft is measuring combined evidence, resulting in between 0% and 100% confidence. However, via this method, while 99.99999+% confidence can be achieved with a very large number of 9's, actual 100% confidence in anything is impossible, save for tautologies. Similarly, 0.000001-% confidence can be achieved, but not 0%. The wide (and, when looked at logarithmically, infinite) space between 0% and 100%, but not including them, is where Bayescraft can be done - and that space is what the word in my avatar refers to.

 

[Tinker Grey]

Would it be your expectation that most people do not adjust their beliefs according to the evidence?

I should think that even non-skeptics adjust their beliefs according so long as there is no impact on their religious beliefs.

How does one go about quantifying the quality of experience?

 

[DataPacRat]

Would it be your expectation that most people do not adjust their beliefs according to the evidence?

I should think that even non-skeptics adjust their beliefs according so long as there is no impact on their religious beliefs.

From what I've been able to tell, a majority of people believe in at least one of: "alternative" non-evidence-based medicine, astrology, chiropractic, curses, dowsing, feng shui, ghosts, holocaust denial, homeopathy, moon landing denial, multi-level marketing as a viable income, numerology, psychics, UFOs containing probing aliens, voodoo, and/or vaccine denial... all of which have a very notable amount of evidence leaning in the other direction. (List selected from whatstheharm .net .)

How does one go about quantifying the quality of experience?

That depends on what experience you're trying to quantify - what predictions you're trying to make. But for making an initial estimate (with which to modify later as further evidence is accumulated), then the simplest way to estimate the reliability of a proposition is to count up the number of times it's already been tested, and the number of times that test has been a success; and to divide the number of successes plus one by the number of tests plus two. So, for example, if someone were to grab a handful of poker chips out of a pile of blue and white chips and stick the handful in a bag, then without knowing what was grabbed, we could guess that the odds of the first chip being drawn out being white to be successes(0)+1 / tests(0)+2 = 1/2 = 50%. After the first draw, if it's white, we would estimate the odds of the next one being white to be 1+1/1+2=2/3=66%. If the first draw is blue, the odds of the next being white would be 0+1/1+2=1/3=33%.

Once that initial estimate is made, Bayes' Theorem (given a relatively simple introduction at yudkowsky .net/rational/bayes ) can help figure things out when the evidence is more complicated.

 

[SaintPhotios]

what techniques are useful in /figuring out/ what is true and false, especially given are finite minds, and the limited experiences and evidence we have available to us.

So by what standard can we say something is true or false. Many Christians are uncomfortable with empiricism, but I think it's fine to use the powers of observation to determine truth. However, epistemology is important because before we can rely on our powers of observation, we must first justify the proposition "Our powers of observation are reliable for determining truth value."

Now how do justify this proposition. We obviously can't justify the proposition about our powers of observation by using our powers of observation. It's completely circular. So there must be some other criterion for knowledge other than by empirical means. This requires us to examine metaphysics. And as soon as we do that, we're forced to admit that empiricism cannot be the only means of determining truth value. We must first uncover the non-empirical means of justifying empiricism.

 

[DataPacRat]

So by what standard can we say something is true or false. Many Christians are uncomfortable with empiricism, but I think it's fine to use the powers of observation to determine truth. However, epistemology is important because before we can rely on our powers of observation, we must first justify the proposition "Our powers of observation are reliable for determining truth value."

Now how do justify this proposition. We obviously can't justify the proposition about our powers of observation by using our powers of observation. It's completely circular. So there must be some other criterion for knowledge other than by empirical means. This requires us to examine metaphysics. And as soon as we do that, we're forced to admit that empiricism cannot be the only means of determining truth value. We must first uncover the non-empirical means of justifying empiricism.

I am /very/ happy that you brought up this issue, because it allows me to bring up one of my favorite philosophical techniques. I use it whenever somebody starts questioning the basis of rationality to the degree that they are taking solipsism seriously, or most forms of post-modernism. I call it the "Stick Test", and it's very simple: I start whapping them on the head with a stick until they can give me a reason to stop.

In this case, since you're questioning whether empiricism is justifiable, then if it isn't, you cannot make any empirical claims about whether or not you are, in fact, being repeatedly whapped on the head with a stick, and so there is no reason for you to ask me to stop, or even to try to duck; I could simply claim that I /have/ stopped, and without any empirical data to refer to, that my claim that I have stopped is just as valid as your claim that I'm still whapping your head with a stick.

It only takes a single axiom (or, depending on who you ask, two or three) to get out of the circular definition of observation. The axiom I use is "Applying reason to the evidence of my senses can allow me to make useful predictions". (Another set of axioms runs, roughly, "An objective universe exists", "Other minds exist", and "Logic works".) I don't like the sensation of getting whapped on the head with a stick, and reasoning from earlier evidence from my senses suggests that ducking out of the way of such a stick will help reduce such sensations.

There are, of course, certain limitations to what conclusions can be drawn from a given set of sense-evidence... and those limitations are a central part of what I have been studying.

 

[SaintPhotios]

In this case, since you're questioning whether empiricism is justifiable

I'm not questioning whether or not empirical methods are justifiable... I'm simply saying they can't be justified using empirical methods, lest we fall into the fallacy of circular reasoning.

then if it isn't, you cannot make any empirical claims about whether or not you are, in fact, being repeatedly whapped on the head with a stick, and so there is no reason for you to ask me to stop, or even to try to duck; I could simply claim that I /have/ stopped, and without any empirical data to refer to, that my claim that I have stopped is just as valid as your claim that I'm still whapping your head with a stick.

I'm not saying you can't make empirical claims. I'm simply saying making empirical claims as fact requires us to justify empiricism. If I'm to ask for a justification (which for any claim, I think is reasonable), then automatically using empirical methods to do so is disqualified on the basis of circular reasoning.

The axiom I use is "Applying reason to the evidence of my senses can allow me to make useful predictions"

The usefulness of our predictions can only be determined using our powers of observation. So again, circular.

(Another set of axioms runs, roughly, "An objective universe exists", "Other minds exist", and "Logic works".)

All of these things are inferred by using our empirical faculties, so they can't be axioms. Logic, on the other hand... that's a problem for strict empiricists. We can't observe the law of non-contradiction, etc... According to the strict empiricism/materialist, logic must be purely relative.

I'm not discarding empirical methods... I'm simply saying they can't be used of proof of themselves.

 

[DataPacRat]

I'm not discarding empirical methods... I'm simply saying they can't be used of proof of themselves.

Of course they can't - and anyone who tries falls into the trap so many navel-gazing philosophers have. Any rational examination of the universe depends on a certain amount of structure in philosophy - a few basic axioms (preferably ones which are effectively impossible to do without anyway, such as 'solipsism is useless'), upon which are based a metaphysics, upon which is based an epistemology - and, usually, upon which is based an ethical system, upon which is built positions on particular political issues. Trying to use the level of epistemology to justify itself is a category error.

As Eliezer Yudkowsky wrote:

The roots of knowledge are in observation and its fruit is prediction. What tree grows without roots? What tree nourishes us without fruit? If a tree falls in a forest and no one hears it, does it make a sound? One says, “Yes it does, for it makes vibrations in the air.” Another says, “No it does not, for there is no auditory processing in any brain.” Though they argue, one saying “Yes”, and one saying “No”, the two do not anticipate any different experience of the forest. Do not ask which beliefs to profess, but which experiences to anticipate. Always know which difference of experience you argue about.

 

[SaintPhotios]

So the fact remains, some worldview must exist that justifies reliance upon empirical faculties. Whatever that is, we know it can't logically be empiricism. Once we accept this, materialism can no longer be a viable option.

 

[DataPacRat]

So the fact remains, some worldview must exist that justifies reliance upon empirical faculties. Whatever that is, we know it can't logically be empiricism.

Provisionally accepted, as described in my previous post.

Once we accept this, materialism can no longer be a viable option.

Non sequitur - this conclusion does not seem to follow from your premises. Why does the fact that empiricism requires axioms necessarily mean that 'materialism' is an invalid conclusion from the available evidence?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

So how do you define knowledge? What about the Gettier cases?

 

[DataPacRat]

So how do you define knowledge?

Usually, I don't even bother trying to /define/ it; I'm too busy gathering new evidence from as many reliable sources as I can, and trying to update my levels of confidence in various ideas thereby, so that I can better make predictions of what experiences I can expect.

What about the Gettier cases?

Simple. Gettier assumed that a 100% belief in something is possible, and called such a belief "knowledge". I don't use that assumption.

I've developed my math skills in the subject to where I try to measure evidence logarithmically, in decibels of evidence; rounding those to the nearest whole number, I can add and subtract evidence with simple integers rather than trying to multiply probabilities, allowing for me to deal with the whole matter much more easily than I used to be able to. In fact, here's my cheatsheet table, allowing me to convert between decibels of probability (which I've called Jaynes, after the mathematician who came up with the idea) and other ways of describing such levels of belief:

Jaynes / Level of belief / Rough Odds / notes

-oo / 0% / 1: oo / complete disbelief, unachievable save for paradoxes

-6 / 20.0% / 1:4 /
-5 / 24.0% / 1:3 /
-4 / 28.5% / 2:5 / a reasonable doubt
-3 / 33.3% / 1:2 /
-2 / 38.7% / 2:3 / probable cause
-1 / 44.3% / 4:5 /
0 / 50.0% / 1:1 / neither belief nor disbelief; agnosticism
1 / 55.7% / 5:4 / preponderance of the evidence
2 / 61.3% / 3:2 /
3 / 66.6% / 2:1 / clear and convincing evidence
4 / 71.5% / 5:2 /
5 / 76.0% / 3:1 / beyond a reasonable doubt
6 / 80.0% / 4:1 /
7 / 83.3% / 5:1 /
8 / 86.3% / 6:1 /
9 / 88.8% / 8:1 /
10 / 90.9% / 10:1 / one nine

13 / 95.2% / 20:1 / lone studies with p=0.05
20 / 99.0% / 100:1 / two nines, lone studies with p=0.01
26 / 99.7% / 400:1 / confirmed studies with p=0.05
30 / 99.9% / 1,000:1 / three nines
40 / 99.99% / 10,000:1 / four nines, confirmed studies with p=0.01
42 / 99.993% / 16,000:1 / 4 standard deviations
50 / 99.999% / 100,000:1 / five nines
60 / 99.9999% / 1 million:1 / six nines
62 / 99.99994% / 1.5 million:1 / 5 standard deviations
87 / 99.9999998% / 500 million:1 / 6 standard deviations
116 / 99.9999999997% / 390 billion:1 / 7 standard deviations
127 / 99.99999999998% / 5 trillion:1 / max belief storable in one signed byte

oo / 100% / oo:1 / complete certainty, unachievable save for tautologies


Where LevelOfBelief is measured between 0 and 1 (eg, 0.5 or 50%):
Jaynes = 10 * log(10) (LevelOfBelief / (1 - LevelOfBelief))
10 ^ (Jaynes/10) = LevelOfBelief / (1-LevelOfBelief)

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Certain people hare believe that the "God hypothesis" is of the same nature as the "matrix" and "evil genius" (of Descartes) hypotheses. I.e. it is much like a skeptical alternative to realism or common sense which cannot be verified or falsified, but remains a possibility all the same. What does your (or Bayes) theorem say about this. How do you calculate probabilities or weigh evidence in regards to such beliefs? I suppose it comes down to Occam's Razor?

 

[variant]

So the fact remains, some worldview must exist that justifies reliance upon empirical faculties. Whatever that is, we know it can't logically be empiricism. Once we accept this, materialism can no longer be a viable option.

Empirical faculties are self justified because they give us consistent and useful results.

 

[DataPacRat]

Certain people hare believe that the "God hypothesis" is of the same nature as the "matrix" and "evil genius" (of Descartes) hypotheses. I.e. it is much like a skeptical alternative to realism or common sense which cannot be verified or falsified, but remains a possibility all the same. What does your (or Bayes) theorem say about this. How do you calculate probabilities or weigh evidence in regards to such beliefs? I suppose it comes down to Occam's Razor?

That is a very good question - and Occam's Razor doesn't quite come into play yet. Here's a quicky relevant quote:

The roots of knowledge are in observation and its fruit is prediction. What tree grows without roots? What tree nourishes us without fruit? If a tree falls in a forest and no one hears it, does it make a sound? One says, “Yes it does, for it makes vibrations in the air.” Another says, “No it does not, for there is no auditory processing in any brain.” Though they argue, one saying “Yes”, and one saying “No”, the two do not anticipate any different experience of the forest. Do not ask which beliefs to profess, but which experiences to anticipate. Always know which difference of experience you argue about.

The point of the scientific process is to make /predictions/ (about what evidence will be found, what experiences to anticipate). The main reason "The world is really the Matrix!" style suggestions aren't scientific is that they don't offer any basis to make new predictions. The other reason is that when such philosophies are phrased in ways that they /do/ make predictions, such as "We should be able to find bugs in the code that break the laws of physics", the evidence that is then gathered fails to support such predictions.

/Then/ is when Occam's Razor kicks in - "a difference which makes no difference is no difference", and given the choice between "the universe runs according to these observed physical laws" or "the universe runs according to these observed physical laws, and they're the result of the universe being the Matrix", we use the simpler theory that's consistent with the observable evidence.

 

[Tielec]

It is unfortunate that we must rely on axioms, there's something distasteful about it.

 

[DataPacRat]

It is unfortunate that we must rely on axioms, there's something distasteful about it.

When the only other game in town is either solipsism, or irrationality leading to paradox... is having axioms really so bad? Or is the distaste more on the level going from BASIC to C and having to start declaring all your variables?