When Newton's framework for gravitation couldn't explain the anomalous orbit of Neptune, people didn't reject it; they postulated instead that there was another object, the planet Uranus, outside its orbit which was perturbing it, and indeed that was the scientifically accurate explanation.
Now you are going to get into more complicated parts of the philosophy of science. I wanted to do the simple stuff for Oncelost first before we got into the more complicated, but more realistic, details.
Yes, when a
large, previously successful theory encounters data that seems to falsify it, the first thing that is done is propose an ad hoc hypothesis. The ad hoc hypothesis saves the theory from falsification. You noted the classic example of this.
The key is that the ad hoc hypothesis must be testable
independent of the theory it is trying to save. In this case, the existence of the new planet was tested using the theories of optics (telescopes), not that of gravity.
As you noted, the same ad hoc hypothesis didn't work in explaining the precession of the orbit of Mercury.
The other classic example is the aether. When Michelson-Morely's experiments falsified the aether, the ad hoc hypothesis of the Lorentz contraction was proposed. By this hypothesis, earth shrunk just a little bit in the direction of travel in its orbit, just enough to make the speed of light coming head on be the same as the speed of light coming from behind. Notice there is no way to independently test this ad hoc hypothesis. It's
only effect on the universe is to make the speed of light constant in all directions while preserving the aether. Since it was not independently testable, the Lorentz contraction was not considered valid.
Of course, falsifiability is a good place to start when explaining how science works; but the philosophy of science has progressed beyond it.
Popper did two things:
1. Describe how science works: by falsifying hypotheses/theories.
2. Propose a demarcation criteria to tell science from non-science: scientific theories are falsifiable, non-scientific theories are not.
Popper succeeded in #1 but failed in #2. In general, science does work by falsification. This is because falsification is what you can do with deductive logic.
"To my mind the great strength of Karl Popper's conception of the scientific process is that it is realistic -- it gives a pretty fair picture of what actually goes on in real-life laboratories." "The Threat and the Glory", by P.B. Medawar (Nobel Prize winner in medicine), HarperCollins, New York, 1990 (original publication 1959). pp 96-101.
Now, if you want, we can get into testing hypotheses in bundles and the other major way that falsifiability does not work as a criteria for what is and is not scientific.
Sure, then ID would be valid! (Assuming your premises.) But that wouldn't by itself make it scientific.
The teleological argument as formulated by ID does not work because there is an unintelligent process that gives design: natural selection.
Now, teleology does not have to involve intelligence. Aristotle's original listing of causes included a teleological cause. Let's take the example of a chameleon. The teleological cause for the chameleon's ability to change colors is: to avoid predators. However, the mechanism by which chameleon's got this ability is natural selection.
Because of the way the
lawyers handled the 1982 MacLean vs Arkansas trial, we are stuck with the task of showing creationism is not science in order to keep it out of science classrooms. However, as people have noted, there is a huge problem in trying to define "science" or find criteria to know what is science and what isn't.
The best approach is to forget all that. Treat ID like it is: a scientific theory. Despite the efforts of its proponents, ID does make testable statements about the physical universe. When we test those statements, we find that they are
false. ID is a falsified scientific theory.
Notice this actually makes a statement about the truth value of ID. Saying ID is not "scientific" says nothing about the truth value.
But ponder this, and tell me what you think:
Yesterday, the meteorologist could only give me a forecast: there would be a 60% chance of rain today.
But tomorrow, given that it did rain today, the meteorologist would be able to give me a full explanation: it rained because this particular cold front met another warm front and created such-and-such a cloud which in the end precipitated.
Was the meteorologist a scientist yesterday? Would he be a scientist tomorrow? Is he ever a scientist? (But everything he does is done using physics and mathematics!)
Isn't the "60% chance of rain" a hypothesis? The forecast is a hypothesis, which is then tested against what really happens. Now, the "full explanation" is another set of hypotheses involving cold fronts, warm fronts, and precipitation.