I have written the following in another forum; tell me what you think.
Before I begin...
[I have omitted a brief tutorial on propositional and predicate logic. It will be posted below]
Back on topic
This is known as the problem of theological fatalism, that God's omniscience or omnipotence deprives creaturely free will. We can analyze two different forms of fatalism: one from omnipotence and one from omniscience:
... [I have left out the one from omnipotence for relevancy]
From omniscience
A more well-known version of problems with God and free will is that of God's omniscience and free will. It holds that God's infallible knowledge restricts a person from doing otherwise, hence depriving a person of their free will. This problem is an ancient one, deriving from musings on logical determinism by Aristotle and those before Him. St. Augustine once said:
And with respect to all His creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, He does not know them because they are, but they are because He knows them. For He was not ignorant of what He was about to create; therefore He created because He knew; He did not know because He created.
Saint Augustine of Hippo,
On the Trinity, Book XV, Chapter 13
Theological fatalism is the thesis that God’s omniscience contradicts the free will of His creatures. To get an idea of what the argument revolves around, consider the following example:
God knows that tomorrow you will wear a blue-striped pair of socks amidst the one hundred pairs of socks you have. Now, can you pick something else instead, perhaps that black-and-white pair of socks?
It seems that if you can, God can be mistaken. But, if God can't be mistaken you must pick the blue-striped pair. But, if you
must pick something with no other possibility, what happened to your free will? This is what the issue is like.
The argument can be stated in the following way.
- If a person has free will, then if a person does a particular action, then it can be that a person does not do that particular action.
- If God is omniscient, then God's knowledge is infallible concerning all states of affairs.
- If God's knowledge is infallible concerning all states of affairs, then God knows that a person does a particular action.
- If God knows that a person does a particular action, then it is false that it can be that a person does not do that particular action.
- It is false that it can be that a person does not do that particular action and it is false that it can be that a person does not do that particular action.
- Therefore, either it is false that God is omniscient or it is false that a person has free will.
Formally:
- ((∀xy Fx → (Ax → Dxy)) ∧ Fp) → (Ap → Dpa)
- ((∀z Sz → Iz) ∧ Sg) → Ig
- Ig → Kgp
- Kgp → ¬Dpa
- ¬(Dpa ∧ ¬Dpa)
- ¬(Fp ∧ Sg)
Fx = x has free will
Ax = x does a particular action
Dxy = x could have done y
Sz = z is omniscient
Iz = z is infalliblly knowledgeable about all states of affairs
Fp = a person has free will
Ap = a person freely does a particular action
Dpa = a person could have refrained from that particular action
Sg = God is omniscient
Ig = God is infalliblly knowledgeable about all states of affairs
Kgp = God knows that a person does a particular action
- Modus ponens, universal instantiation
- MP, UI
- 2
- 3
- law of non-contradiction, law of excluded middle
- reductio ad absurdum
(1) follows from that the ability to do otherwise is a necessary condition of free will. If one cannot do otherwise, then one cannot be said to have free will since free will implies a multiplicity of possible outcomes, as opposed to merely one.
(2) follows from the definition of omniscience, which requires infallible foreknowledge.
(3) trivially follows since knowledge of a person's actions is a state of affairs and thus God has infallible foreknowledge of it.
(4) is true since it cannot be that God knows that a person does a particular action and a person actually refrains from it. So, given God's foreknowledge, the ability to do otherwise is impossible.
(5) follows from the law of non-contradiction. It cannot be that one can do otherwise and at the same time that is false.
(6) follows by reductio ad absurdum. If our premises derive a contradiction, then the conjunction of our premises are false.
There are various responses. I will entertain four of them.
The Psychologist Response
One common objection is that essential omniscient observation does not constitute compulsion, in other words, arguing against (5). I disagree for the very reason that essential omniscience
compels such actions since it cannot be that God knows that a person does do a particular action and that a person does not do that particular action. Choice requires multiple possibilities, due to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Omniscience denies this. This objection is completely ignoring the very logic set down in the argument. Often, analogies to psychologists are drawn. Some may argue that psychologists frequently predict human behavior, but this does not mean they compel such behavior. These analogies are fatally flawed from the fallacy of
false analogy. God, unlike the psychologist, is
essentially omniscient,
essentially omnipotent,
essentially omnibenevolent, and
essentially the creator of the universe. The psychologist is of limited knowledge, is of limited power, is of limited good, and is not the creator of the universe.
These absolute properties of God are wherein contradictions arise: one cannot construct analogies ignoring such properties. The objection can also be answered a second way. The problem here is that God is
essentially the creator of the universe. By creating a universe by which God possesses necessarily full knowledge of, He
instantiates all such things into that which cannot be otherwise. This is also what
Richard Gale has contended with regards to the free will defense.
The Boethian Response
A second objection is that God is essentially atemporal and that allows God to observe the future. It does not refute any specific premise and indeed fails to resolve the problem. All it provides is that in the timeless realm, it is
always known that a person does do any particular action. While the Boethian Response explains such essential omniscience, it does not constitute a cogent rejoinder since theological fatalism already
presumes such essential omniscience.
The Frankfurtian Response
A third objection is one raised by philosopher Harry Frankfurt. He argues against (2), citing various thought experiments to show that alternate possibilities are not necessary for the freedom of will. A typical case is given:
Black, an evil
neurosurgeon, wishes to see White dead but is unwilling to do the deed himself. Knowing that Mary Jones also despises White and will have a single good opportunity to kill him, Black inserts a mechanism into Jones's brain that enables Black to monitor and to control Jones's neurological activity. If the activity in Jones's brain suggests that she is on the verge of deciding not to kill White when the opportunity arises, Black's mechanism will intervene and cause Jones to decide to commit the murder. On the other hand, if Jones decides to murder White on her own, the mechanism will not intervene. It will merely monitor but will not affect her neurological function. Now suppose that when the occasion arises, Jones decides to kill White without any "help" from Black's mechanism. In the judgment of Frankfurt and most others, Jones is morally responsible for her act. Nonetheless, it appears that she is unable to do otherwise since if she had attempted to do so, she would have been thwarted by Black's device. (Adapted from an example by John Fischer, 1982).
As quoted in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – Foreknowledge and Free Will
Many would agree that Mary Jones acts freely. However, it is merely an illusion that there are not alternate possibilities. I think the problem with this thought experiment is quite simply that there are alternate possibilities. Let me give just two such possibilities, provided in the example itself:
- Mary Jones decides to not kill to White, the machine intervenes, and White is killed.
- Mary Jones decides to kill White, the machine does not intervene, and White is killed.
I have italicized where the difference between the two cases are. In the first, Mary Jones makes the choice
to not kill White and in the second, she makes the choice
to kill White. These choices are different. What some mistakenly paid attention to was that the
outcome was the same i.e. White is killed. But, as the argument shows, what matters is the
choice a person P makes, not whatever outcome is consequent of it. As some philosophers have noted, free will is more akin to
trying rather than
succeeding. One may have the free will to flap one's arms, but that does not mean that one will succeed at flight. Indeed, not even the
outcomes are the same. In the first instance, the machine
intervenes. And in the second instance, the machine
does not intervene. Indeed, other possible outcomes exist. White, for example,
may not die: Jones’ attempts might fail. And I instruct the reader to notice that “deciding to not kill White” is not the same as “not deciding to kill White.” Indeed, the former does not imply the latter. Perhaps Mary Jones therefore will make no attempt to either decide to kill White or decide to not kill White. She may perhaps go to the movies, or attempt to remove the machine, or so on. Thus, even Frankfurt’s example leads to alternate possibilities. I’m curious however, if indeed Frankfurt was right, how such lack of alternate possibilities would particularly apply to God and His creatures.
The Molinist Response
The fourth objection is one raised by Luis de Molina in the 16th century and now championed by philosopher William Lane Craig. Essentially, it argues that if a person P were in situation S, a person P would freely choose X. It is counterfactual in the sense that the existence of S and P are not necessary and each counterfactual of freedom corresponds to each possible person. It is unclear if it refutes any specific premise. It is worth pointing out that Molinists argue that God possesses knowledge of all such counterfactuals. I agree with this. However, the problem once again arises that God
knows which S, P, and X will obtain. All Molinism adds is the inclusion of the background surrounding the choice of a person P. God, regardless, knows that X and knows that S. Both must obtain. Indeed, God ensures S, P, and X through the act of creation, making my reply here similar in a manner to my reply to the Psychologist Response. As Gale has noted, presuming that the counterfactuals of freedom is a coherent concept, God chooses which people and situations to actualize (hence the "counterfactual" part). And I do not think that the counterfactuals of freedom constitute a coherent idea. If this counterfactuals hold, then I cannot act contrary to them. Thus, these counterfactuals of freedom constitute a type of "propositional" determinism, since I am incapable of acting otherwise of that counterfactual. Others might be interested in other objections namely the Grounding Objection. I would advise readers to go ahead and read the philosophical literature on it – it is quite interesting.
