This is a quote from jmverville (in the "atheist ethics, atheist values" thread), but I have seen similar statements quite a few times here, and on top this argument seems to meander implicitly through a lot of theists´ posts. It´s an argument I have never understood.
If I understand it correctly, it points out that someone who doesn´t believe in a god is left with his subjectivity (with the implication "as opposed to a believer").
What I don´t understand: How exactly would subjectively determining which god I believe in (and whose alleged morals to adopt) do away with the problem of subjectivity? Would believing that a god has authored my moral stances make them more objective?
Of course, jmersville has hidden a couple of premises in the introductory description of atheists: "In rejecting God...".
These premises are:
If there is a God
If this God has authored a moral code
If the believers' (that jmersville distinguishes atheists from) god concepts are accurate
If the moral code that believers believe to be authored by the god of their concepts is indeed authored by this God
(Of course these are premises that not only beg the question, but also appear to be a strange argument from consequence - in which the premise from which the consequence is drawn isn´t even correctly identified: It´s not "If you don´t believe in a god" (as the argument suggests), but "If a God exists and you can´t be certain about its existence and the moral code it possibly has edicted". With the latter being our factual condition, even by admission of most believers - else we wouldn´t see all the appeals to faith).
IOW: If there is a God and if this God has authored a moral code, a lot of moral codes (held by theists as well as atheists) are not congruent with this code.
So far this is logical and undisputed.
The part I would like to see explained, though, is how - even if accepting these huge premises for purposes of this discussion - they allow the conclusion that atheists are left with subjectivity more than theists are.
Personally, even if I would agree with the idea that there being God that has edicted a moral code for us, even if I would agree that aligning my moral code with this God´s moral code would be advantageous, even if I would draw the conclusion that it´s time for me to become a theist in order to do that, I have no idea how I could possibly proceed other than by subjectively determining which of the available god concepts (along with their moral codes) to adopt. I fail to see how becoming a theist and adopting a god concept would get me rid of the necessity to determine my beliefs "for myself".
In rejecting God, it [atheism] has huge moral ramifications as it requires the person to now essentially determine for themselves what is and what isn't moral.
If I understand it correctly, it points out that someone who doesn´t believe in a god is left with his subjectivity (with the implication "as opposed to a believer").
What I don´t understand: How exactly would subjectively determining which god I believe in (and whose alleged morals to adopt) do away with the problem of subjectivity? Would believing that a god has authored my moral stances make them more objective?
Of course, jmersville has hidden a couple of premises in the introductory description of atheists: "In rejecting God...".
These premises are:
If there is a God
If this God has authored a moral code
If the believers' (that jmersville distinguishes atheists from) god concepts are accurate
If the moral code that believers believe to be authored by the god of their concepts is indeed authored by this God
(Of course these are premises that not only beg the question, but also appear to be a strange argument from consequence - in which the premise from which the consequence is drawn isn´t even correctly identified: It´s not "If you don´t believe in a god" (as the argument suggests), but "If a God exists and you can´t be certain about its existence and the moral code it possibly has edicted". With the latter being our factual condition, even by admission of most believers - else we wouldn´t see all the appeals to faith).
IOW: If there is a God and if this God has authored a moral code, a lot of moral codes (held by theists as well as atheists) are not congruent with this code.
So far this is logical and undisputed.
The part I would like to see explained, though, is how - even if accepting these huge premises for purposes of this discussion - they allow the conclusion that atheists are left with subjectivity more than theists are.
Personally, even if I would agree with the idea that there being God that has edicted a moral code for us, even if I would agree that aligning my moral code with this God´s moral code would be advantageous, even if I would draw the conclusion that it´s time for me to become a theist in order to do that, I have no idea how I could possibly proceed other than by subjectively determining which of the available god concepts (along with their moral codes) to adopt. I fail to see how becoming a theist and adopting a god concept would get me rid of the necessity to determine my beliefs "for myself".