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Discussion and Debate
Discussion and Debate
Ethics & Morality
Where is the Objective Morality?
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<blockquote data-quote="stevevw" data-source="post: 76490896" data-attributes="member: 342064"><p>Then you haven’t understood the articles argument. They are talking about prudential oughts. You can use an “If” when speaking about prudential or hypothetical imperatives because they are factual predictions about the world. As the article mentions</p><p></p><p><em><span style="color: #00b3b3">For instance, “the streets ought to be wet because it is raining” is a descriptive statement because it predicts that the streets will be wet. Conversely, “If you do not want to get wet, you ought to carry an umbrella,” is a deontic statement because it prescribes what you should do.</span></em></p><p></p><p> Yes this seems to be a valid argument. But you know I am not good at this.</p><p></p><p>From what I understand from the article as it states that there is an implicit desire in the premise that the person wants/desires to do well in the exam. </p><p></p><p><em><span style="color: #00b3b3">Unless I want to do well in the exam, there is no reason for me to study - it would no longer be true that I "ought" to.</span></em></p><p></p><p>So it’s the persons desire is an important part of this arguement as it links peoples behaviour to psychology which then grounds the "ought/should" in fact. In the example you used the desire/want to do well in the exam is linked to what should be done. If the desire/want is removed then the "should"/"ought" no longer applies. </p><p></p><p>So it would go like this</p><p></p><p>P1 I have a big exam tomorrow</p><p>P2 I want/desire to do well </p><p>C therefore I should study.</p><p></p><p> Yes but logic as in deductive inference is a particular kind of reasoning. It relies solely on deductive thinking. Whereas the second article I linked was arguing that as people’s behaviour is psychologically based is better understood by defeasible inferences rather than deductive ones. Defeasible arguments can be logically false because they are reasoned. So long as they stand up rationally they are true. They have the benefit of changing if new information comes to light.</p><p></p><p><span style="color: #00b3b3"><em>These examples lead us to conclude that IOI's in the cognitive sciences are better interpreted as defeasible inferences than as deductive inferences. As a consequence, their deductive validity and soundness is not at stake. We therefore suggest that, instead of referring to Hume or Moore, critics of is/ought inferences apply evaluation criteria for defeasible inferences. </em></span></p><p><span style="color: #00b3b3"></span></p><p><span style="color: #00b3b3"><em>This conclusion supplements previous work on the is/ought problem. Schurz (in <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00503/full#B7" target="_blank">Pigden, 2010</a>; p. 216), for instance, suggests that defeasible conditional norms might provide plausible bridge principles in ethical is/ought inferences. Other authors suggest that defeasible reasoning can solve problems and paradoxes occurring in monotonic deontic logic (e.g., <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00503/full#B5" target="_blank">Nute, 1997</a>).</em></span></p><p><a href="https://www.philosophyetc.net/2004/04/bridging-isought-gap.html" target="_blank">Philosophy, et cetera: Bridging the IS/OUGHT gap</a></p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="stevevw, post: 76490896, member: 342064"] Then you haven’t understood the articles argument. They are talking about prudential oughts. You can use an “If” when speaking about prudential or hypothetical imperatives because they are factual predictions about the world. As the article mentions [I][COLOR=#00b3b3]For instance, “the streets ought to be wet because it is raining” is a descriptive statement because it predicts that the streets will be wet. Conversely, “If you do not want to get wet, you ought to carry an umbrella,” is a deontic statement because it prescribes what you should do.[/COLOR][/I] Yes this seems to be a valid argument. But you know I am not good at this. From what I understand from the article as it states that there is an implicit desire in the premise that the person wants/desires to do well in the exam. [I][COLOR=#00b3b3]Unless I want to do well in the exam, there is no reason for me to study - it would no longer be true that I "ought" to.[/COLOR][/I] So it’s the persons desire is an important part of this arguement as it links peoples behaviour to psychology which then grounds the "ought/should" in fact. In the example you used the desire/want to do well in the exam is linked to what should be done. If the desire/want is removed then the "should"/"ought" no longer applies. So it would go like this P1 I have a big exam tomorrow P2 I want/desire to do well C therefore I should study. Yes but logic as in deductive inference is a particular kind of reasoning. It relies solely on deductive thinking. Whereas the second article I linked was arguing that as people’s behaviour is psychologically based is better understood by defeasible inferences rather than deductive ones. Defeasible arguments can be logically false because they are reasoned. So long as they stand up rationally they are true. They have the benefit of changing if new information comes to light. [COLOR=#00b3b3][I]These examples lead us to conclude that IOI's in the cognitive sciences are better interpreted as defeasible inferences than as deductive inferences. As a consequence, their deductive validity and soundness is not at stake. We therefore suggest that, instead of referring to Hume or Moore, critics of is/ought inferences apply evaluation criteria for defeasible inferences. [/I] [I][/I] [I]This conclusion supplements previous work on the is/ought problem. Schurz (in [URL='https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00503/full#B7']Pigden, 2010[/URL]; p. 216), for instance, suggests that defeasible conditional norms might provide plausible bridge principles in ethical is/ought inferences. Other authors suggest that defeasible reasoning can solve problems and paradoxes occurring in monotonic deontic logic (e.g., [URL='https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00503/full#B5']Nute, 1997[/URL]).[/I][/COLOR] [URL="https://www.philosophyetc.net/2004/04/bridging-isought-gap.html"]Philosophy, et cetera: Bridging the IS/OUGHT gap[/URL] [/QUOTE]
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