I don't think this is fair. A Christian who thinks that the search for meaning is a transcendental endeavor is no more being nihilistic towards this life than a virtue ethicist would be by claiming that hedonism is ultimately an empty end goal.
To be completely clear, I'm
not accusing
all Christians of nihilism, and I'm not certain how the percentages play out. I'm just saying that if a Christian insists that "the universe is meaningless" and sees this-life as having no meaning without an appeal to heaven or God, then there is your Christian nihilist. I think that I'm being perfectly fair here.
If you want anti-life, I actually share the ancient Greek revulsion towards physical embodiment. The idea of an individuated afterlife makes me deeply uncomfortable because I would prefer the pseudo-oblivion of a world-soul: not precisely annihilation, but certainly not continuity either. I will be the first to admit that this makes life look completely pointless, but as far as I can tell, the only worldview that genuinely seems to escape this is Christianity. And aside from my anti-naturalism, I am pretty agnostic.
I see. Yes, there were certainly people in the classical world who weren't comfortable with "physical embodiment". I don't share that, personally.
I would like to know how life can be an end in itself, though. Either that is subjectivism and therefore useless to anyone who feels differently, or teleological, in which case we have to worry if Aquinas's analysis of final causes is valid.
What I'm talking about is not subjectivism, and while certainly Aquinas's views should be carefully weighed, genius that he was, I don't see Aquinas as the final authority here.
Aristotle seems to locate
eudaimonia within life, that is, as something one says about someone's life, a description of a life that has been successful (or happy, or flourishing), and
eudaimonia is the final end (or collection of finals ends, or the fulfillment) of someone's life. That makes life an end-in-itself in that view.
I'm not suggesting that Aristotle is the final authority on these matters, and he does have some odd views on some issues, but if we are going to "worry" about Aquinas, we might as well "worry" (or be encouraged) by Aristotle.
My view is that life has its own sort of natural teleology -- that is, potentials to be actualized and for which we have the natural biological powers and function to achieve. It is difficult to even understand just what a human being is without understanding how various natural capacities contribute to the maturation of the individual. We find our good in this process of self-actualization, which is basically the successful use of our natural function. It all aims our ourselves, at living successfully as a human individual, with no "higher" or "broader" aim.
It is entirely possible to see life as meaningful without making appeals to God, or even "the Universe", using this perspective, because there is no need to go outside of ourselves to find meaning. It is in being human and having human needs that require our chosen actions to fulfill that we can identify values that are good for us and that matter to our existence, making those values choice-worthy in the context of this-life.
I can agree with the existentialists to the extent that we choose our values, however, the key is to choose those values that are worthy of being chosen. IOWs, not merely to follow one's desires, but to follow
right desire. I'm not certain, but I suspect that the existentialist view of existence preceding essence may possibly trip the existentialist up, because it may seem that the only way in which any particular desire would matter is if it were preprogrammed into oneself like an instinct, which I hardly think is a requirement. Sure, we can choose our goals in life, but we can't choose how choiceworthy they are given what we are and how we function.
eudaimonia,
Mark