What We Talk About When We Talk About Me

[Received]

I really dig Eastern philosophy, although I haven't read too much of it. Take Jiddu Krishnamurti. He holds that conceptualization really misses the reality of what conceptualization attempts to hold, and that there is freedom in not knowing things, because the moment we know something, we have frozen it in a sense. And because reality is in flux, ever-changing, the moment we attempt to freeze something by conceptualizing it, we've lost the thing beyond the concept.

At the same time, knowledge is very useful. More than anything, I think, it gives us power. The value of science isn't so much in finding truth (technically science must necessarily be open to the possibility of non-truth via falsifiability at every moment or else it really isn't science) as it is in knocking down stuff that's bad for us (like bad religion and snake oil) and allowing us to do things that are really cool (like curing diseases and snipping through the universe). And then you have reason, which really goes further in a sense.

But despite all we know, there's still a mystery beyond knowing. With everything, even you and me. The moment I attempt to describe you in terms of specific qualities, no matter how specific and plentiful, there is always 1) a huge number of "gaps" between what I have described and what I could describe if I only knew more, and 2) the "freezing up" of who you are in the moment of my conceptualization of you, and by this freezing a sort of death to who you experientially, organically are in this very one-and-only living moment.

And I like knowing this -- knowing that my knowing doesn't know, negating my knowing, which allows me to be comfortable beyond knowledge (when possible), an area previously very scary to me and most people alive. I've come to realize that the end of life isn't really to know lots of cool stuff (although that's something I like to do) as it is to be content with the moment. And this means really seeing things for as they are. According to one study, we're "in our heads" around 47% of the time. Which means we're really not experiencing what's here in front of us. You know, reality.

So lately I've been trying meditation and moment-by-moment mindfulness. Because that's where reality really is -- over there, in that stuff I can't really describe without freezing and thereby killing it. Which isn't to dismiss the utility of thought and representative truth (I think truth is more than concept-fits-referent). But I think the deepest intelligence or wisdom comes in (quoting Krishnaumurti) "freedom from the known."

Any thoughts on this?

 

[Paradoxum]

I agree that we can't know anything. We can only think something is more or less likely true. I think we can accept this without disregarding truth or understanding. We simply have to accept our fallibility.

 

[Eudaimonist]

Because that's where reality really is -- over there, in that stuff I can't really describe without freezing and thereby killing it. Which isn't to dismiss the utility of thought and representative truth (I think truth is more than concept-fits-referent). But I think the deepest intelligence or wisdom comes in (quoting Krishnaumurti) "freedom from the known."

Any thoughts on this?

Sure, I disagree with Eastern thought on this.

I'll agree with them that human conceptual knowledge is imprecise, but it's the only form of intelligence and wisdom we as human beings have. There is no intelligence or wisdom whatsoever to be found outside of conceptual knowledge. While a "Zen" experience might spark an insight, it only becomes intelligence or wisdom once that is conceptualized.

Furthermore, the thing that really turned me off to Zen in particular is the realization that they wanted human beings to live like frogs -- not thinking, just acting. Perhaps they think that frogs have a kind of wisdom, and the thoughtless frog may be an excellent frog -- but a human being isn't an excellent human being by trying to live in the manner of a frog. That strikes me as massively unwise.

So, a big thumbs down for Eastern mysticism on this count.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Received]

I agree that we can't know anything. We can only think something is more or less likely true. I think we can accept this without disregarding truth or understanding. We simply have to accept our fallibility.

I think we can know things, even very precisely (well...), but what I'm thinking about is how the moment we attempt to know something, by conceptualizing it we "freeze it", and so negate its living, breathing existence. This living is in a constant state of flux. It's like when we take a photo of a person and say "whoops, there you are!" Well, there you *were* (in a sense)...

 

[Paradoxum]

I think we can know things, even very precisely (well...), but what I'm thinking about is how the moment we attempt to know something, by conceptualizing it we "freeze it", and so negate its living, breathing existence. This living is in a constant state of flux. It's like when we take a photo of a person and say "whoops, there you are!" Well, there you *were* (in a sense)...

I'm not sure I agree, especially if you accept that your beliefs are incomplete. If I say that the thing I'm sitting on is a chair, it doesn't suddenly become not a chair after I say that. Any tiny changes that happen don't change that it's a chair.

If your point is that things constantly change, so we can never have perfect and complete knowledge of the thing over time, I'd agree. Are you trying to say more than that though?

 

[Received]

I'm not sure I agree, especially if you accept that your beliefs are incomplete. If I say that the thing I'm sitting on is a chair, it doesn't suddenly become not a chair after I say that. Any tiny changes that happen don't change that it's a chair.

If your point is that things constantly change, so we can never have perfect and complete knowledge of the thing over time, I'd agree. Are you trying to say more than that though?

A bit, yes. If I'm sitting on a chair, my concept "chair" (the concept I have of a chair: the "signified") is limited given that the different parts that constitute this concept regarding this actual chair are incomplete: there's always more to the chair than can be represented by the concept or idea "chair". Also, and maybe more importantly to me, all concepts are "frozen" in time, whereas the actual existence of anything is subject to flux (as you say); simply given that we're trying to project a timeless sort of thing on a constantly changing entity means that we're missing it. The thing itself obviously isn't changing; therefore, to project a "timeless" concept onto it is, in a sense, "missing" the chair. Both points go for anything that "really exists" in the world out there.

So the point is that, basically, the world of experience is more fundamental, more earthy, more in touch with things as they really are. The world of knowledge, OTOH, is very useful and we couldn't live without it, but it's a frozen, timeless world, and a very limited one, analogous in the latter sense to a person with three senses who tries to describe how we experience things with five.

And I'm a little romantic with this. I believe reason is a very powerful thing, but if the reasoning above holds some type of water, we could say that, well, reason is subordinate to experience. This means that the eighty-year-old woman with dementia, high school dropout, kind-hearted recovering alcoholic, etc., are all in a sense as close to reality in the most important and fundamental sense. But, like reason and intellectual discipline, there's a discipline to seeing things and really experiencing them as well. And that's where concepts can actually *get in the way*: if we're too busy in the clouds of our own abstractions when we could otherwise be richly experiencing the world around us (stars, skies, smiles), we're really missing out, aren't we?

 

[nebulaJP]

Any thoughts on this?

What I try to do is refrain from making useless distinctions. Practical distinctions are useful while others are unnecessary, harmful or as you indicated decrease ones sense of wonder. Making a distinction is the same as have a thought but using the word distinction helps me to remember what it is specifically that I'm trying to avoid. If I am having an unwanted thought the solution is to make no distinctions pertaining to the subject.

 

[quatona]

I find it very useful to occasionally remind myself that things don´t exist until I conceptualize them as such.

 

[quatona]

A bit, yes. If I'm sitting on a chair, my concept "chair" (the concept I have of a chair: the "signified") is limited given that the different parts that constitute this concept regarding this actual chair are incomplete: there's always more to the chair than can be represented by the concept or idea "chair".

Certainly. However, when I conceptually isolate a part of *that which is* as a "chair" I am not intending to limit it to the properties that I makes me think of it as a "chair". It´s just what I want it to be at that particular moment.

Also, and maybe more importantly to me, all concepts are "frozen" in time, whereas the actual existence of anything is subject to flux (as you say); simply given that we're trying to project a timeless sort of thing on a constantly changing entity means that we're missing it.

This is not necessarily so. As far as I can tell, my concepts are in flux. With every particular part of *that which is* that I conceptually isolate as a "chair" my concept "chair" changes.

The thing itself obviously isn't changing;

Huh?

So the point is that, basically, the world of experience is more fundamental, more earthy, more in touch with things as they really are.

Maybe, but then again I have no interest in experiencing "things as they really are". I have an interest in categorizing, ordering, structuring *that which is* in a useful manner. I have an interest in ignoring that which doesn´t appear to be relevant (and, thankfully, my brain does that all the time by itself). Etc. I don´t think that I could handle *that which is" without conceptually structuring it in a useful manner.
(Which is not to say that I believe that a "chair" exists, in the first place. I am aware that when saying/thinking "chair" I am looking at a concept of mine, not at an object.)

The world of knowledge, OTOH, is very useful and we couldn't live without it, but it's a frozen, timeless world

I don´t agree with that - because in my experience I am easily able to recategorize, restructure *that which is* whenever I feel the need to. I am doing it all the time, every second. The world of concepts can be very vivid, very exciting, very much in flux - and the flux we feel we observe in the world out there is but a reflection of the inner flux.

(Recently, around children, I have been pondering the idea to consistently answer the question "What is this?" not with "This is..." but with "Right now I´d call this...".)

 

[Received]

I find it very useful to occasionally remind myself that things don´t exist until I conceptualize them as such.

I guess you'd call that constructivism? If I'm hearing you correctly, you're saying that there's no thing-in-itself beyond our conceptualization of a thing. All we have is the concept-thing, and it's nonsense to think (or intuit) any thing-in-itself.

And that's a fundamental divide, an incommensurate gap. Which is cool.

 

[quatona]

I guess you'd call that constructivism?

Yes, we can agree to use that term. Although "constructivism" is relatively recent philosophy, and these thoughts aren´t exclusive to it (If I´m not mistaken, e.g. certain branches of Buddhism hold similar tenets.)

If I'm hearing you correctly, you're saying that there's no thing-in-itself beyond our conceptualization of a thing.

Yep.

All we have is the concept-thing, and it's nonsense to think (or intuit) any thing-in-itself.

Well, I wouldn´t say "nonsense" - simply because thinking in terms of "things" is the inevitable consequence (and actually purpose) of conceptualization. It´s useful, it´s helpful, it´s cool.
But, yes, from a philosophical meta-view it´s nonsense.

 

[Received]

Yes, we can agree to use that term. Although "constructivism" is relatively recent philosophy, and these thoughts aren´t exclusive to it (If I´m not mistaken, e.g. certain branches of Buddhism hold similar tenets.)

Yep.

Well, I wouldn´t say "nonsense" - simply because thinking in terms of "things" is the inevitable consequence (and actually purpose) of conceptualization. It´s useful, it´s helpful, it´s cool.
But, yes, from a philosophical meta-view it´s nonsense.

I've struggled with this. I can't help but use "thing" (or some other general term) to talk about the "reality" (there it is again) beyond our concepts. All I can think is that we intuit this reality, and the moment we speak about it we're enchained by language. So it's literally impossible to argue against constructivism or people who deny a "reality out there", because by so arguing we're using concepts. And saying "you just gotta feel it" is problematic for lots of people.

 

[Received]

Sure, I disagree with Eastern thought on this.

I'll agree with them that human conceptual knowledge is imprecise, but it's the only form of intelligence and wisdom we as human beings have. There is no intelligence or wisdom whatsoever to be found outside of conceptual knowledge. While a "Zen" experience might spark an insight, it only becomes intelligence or wisdom once that is conceptualized.

Well, to be fair, nobody has a monopoly on the definition of intelligence. Your concept is more popular in the West, his more (maybe) in the East. I do think there can be a loose case made for his concept as more fundamental: e.g., intelligence is the ability to solve problems; if you realize that concepts are illusive, etc., then you've solved the most fundamental problem relating to conceptualization per se rather than a particular concept-related problem. But, you know, that's a hard case to make to the end. I just think there are multiple forms of intelligence, of which JK's might be the most fundamental, especially if experience is more fundamental than conceptualization when speaking about reality. IOW, our understandings of intelligence are going to fitting with the broader epistemology we hold (whether concepts are most fundamental or experience of the world "out there" in a pre-conceptual sense is most fundamental).

Furthermore, the thing that really turned me off to Zen in particular is the realization that they wanted human beings to live like frogs -- not thinking, just acting. Perhaps they think that frogs have a kind of wisdom, and the thoughtless frog may be an excellent frog -- but a human being isn't an excellent human being by trying to live in the manner of a frog. That strikes me as massively unwise.

Agree. But I think it's more a matter of reaching an unattainable ideal than actually expecting people to do it each moment. I think there might always be a sliver of conceptualization or language when we experience things. But I do think that it's depressing that we live in our heads 47% of the time worrying about the past or future. That most certainly is indicative that we have room to improve toward a present-focus, and lots of studies indicate that this is very much associated with lower inclinations to depression and higher rates of happiness in general.

 

[quatona]

I've struggled with this. I can't help but use "thing" (or some other general term) to talk about the "reality" (there it is again) beyond our concepts. All I can think is that we intuit this reality, and the moment we speak about it we're enchained by language. So it's literally impossible to argue against constructivism or people who deny a "reality out there",

Just to clarify: I am not necessarily denying there is a reality out there, and I see no problem with calling this totality "reality (out there)" (personally I prefer to say "that which is", though.) After all, this usage of the term
1. doesn´t try to distinguish "reality" from something else and
2. doesn´t try to make a statement about this reality.
Whereas "thing" or "object" are signifying concepts that are attempting to describe this "reality", to structure it, to create categories etc.
Thus, I wouldn´t call "reality" (as used above) a "thing" or "object". Strictly speaking, I´d even doubt that it is a concept.

Let there be a "reality", "that which is" in its immediacy (i.e. independent of my attempts to explore it on my terms). And that´s that. Nothing more can be said about it.
To me this reality in its immediacy is completely irrelevant. Not until I try to cognitively relate to it it is of any interest whatsoever. What I don´t seem to understand is the - to me absurd - wish to become able to "understand"/"know" this reality for what it is if it weren´t for me trying to cognitively relate to it.
That´s analogous to wanting to know what, say, this surface there feels like when I don´t touch it. It´s nonsense.
What we want when we want to "understand"/"know" reality is exactly the opposite: we want a relationship, we want to make reality accessible on our terms, to our inner structures, according to our needs.
IOW: We want it to become meaningful to us. And what´s meaningful to us is not determined by "reality out there", but by our minds.

As to language: I tend to think that not only our concepts (phylogenetically) shape our language, but to the same degree language (ontogenetically) limits the range of our conceptualizations.
Our (western?) languages seem to be object-orientated. You literally are unable to build a sentence without mentioning or implying there to be an object. Every learner of our languages immediately is taught (and, may I say?, indoctrinated) to speak (and consequently conceptualize) in terms of "objects".

Regarding the impossibility to argue against "constructivism": Yes, it seems to be sheltered well against our traditional ways of tackling ideas. The question "Is constructivism true?" doesn´t even affect "constructivism", since it doesn´t deal in "truths", to begin with. The question superimposes a paradigm/criterium on "constructivism" which "constructivism" itself rejects.

And saying "you just gotta feel it" is problematic for lots of people.

I am not sure I understand fully what you mean by that, just like I had problems understanding what exactly you meant by the verb "intuit (reality)" above. Maybe you can elaborate on that a bit?

 

[Received]

I am not sure I understand fully what you mean by that, just like I had problems understanding what exactly you meant by the verb "intuit (reality)" above. Maybe you can elaborate on that a bit?

I'll try. Reality in its immediacy (as you say) can't be talked about, because the moment you do talk about it, you've encapsulated it in language. So the only way you can really speak about reality in its immediacy is to use language and simultaneously imply that your language has no use; a sort of linguistic reductio ad absurdum, which points to something beyond itself. "I'm talking about reality in its immediacy, but this is the reality beyond my use of the word 'reality', just trust me on this, you know what I mean." It's this contradiction inherent to language in trying to represent reality in its immediacy that implies we can only "intuit" "reality in its immediacy" (gah, language again). Well, you intuit it and also experience it; you just can't speak about any "reality beyond words" without contradicting yourself in a sense.

 

[quatona]

I'll try. Reality in its immediacy (as you say) can't be talked about, because the moment you do talk about it, you've encapsulated it in language. So the only way you can really speak about reality in its immediacy is to use language and simultaneously imply that your language has no use; a sort of linguistic reductio ad absurdum, which points to something beyond itself. "I'm talking about reality in its immediacy, but this is the reality beyond my use of the word 'reality', just trust me on this, you know what I mean." It's this contradiction inherent to language in trying to represent reality in its immediacy that implies we can only "intuit" "reality in its immediacy" (gah, language again). Well, you intuit it and also experience it; you just can't speak about any "reality beyond words" without contradicting yourself in a sense.

Thank you.
I see.
That´s where we possible disagree.
Firstly I´d like to point out that the problem - in my view - doesn´t start when we speak but already when we think in language.
But more importantly:
Intuiting and experiencing comes with the same problems that I have described in my previous posts. As long as I experience and as long as I intuit there´s still the absurdity between trying to have a relationship with "reality" and wishing to know it "as it is" (in its immediacy), i.e. trying to know how something feels when you don´t touch it.

It appears to me that the latter can only be reached if it´s possible to dissolve the (concept of) "me" (as an object), to lose the status of an observer/experiencer/intuitor and to simply be "that which is".
Which brings to mind the thread title.

 

[Received]

quatona, I've talked to hundreds of people way up there in the thoughtful arena, and I think you might be the very top. Thank you for such valuable insights, and I'm very humbled by them.

Thank you.
I see.
That´s where we possible disagree.
Firstly I´d like to point out that the problem - in my view - doesn´t start when we speak but already when we think in language.

True! But I struggle with the idea (and I don't see you saying this in the above sentence) that all thinking is linguistic. I think we think in images, which are interpreted via symbols/language.

But more importantly:
Intuiting and experiencing comes with the same problems that I have described in my previous posts. As long as I experience and as long as I intuit there´s still the absurdity between trying to have a relationship with "reality" and wishing to know it "as it is" (in its immediacy), i.e. trying to know how something feels when you don´t touch it.

I think we experience it as it is, but conceptualization (and language) in a sense prevents us from purely experiencing it. This is a great and bad thing: great because we've got to make sense of what we experience, and putting things into concepts and language makes things recognizable; if we didn't think "that's a chair", the chair in our pure experience might not be distinguishable from non-chairs, i.e., it would all be sensory noise. Bad because the moment we view something under the rubric of its "signified" (speaking of semiotics along the lines of signifier, signified, referent), which is basically the "picture" of have of a thing in an abstract sense -- when we do this, we "lose" the reality of the thing-in-itself (or thing-in-itself-modified-by-us) because we're in the clouds of our own conceptual or "signifier" abstraction. All chairs really seem alike; all leaves are apparently the same. But no, they're not, not in their immediacy. To conceptualize or signify is, in a sense, to destroy the particularity of something in its immediacy. If that makes any sense at all.

It appears to me that the latter can only be reached if it´s possible to dissolve the (concept of) "me" (as an object), to lose the status of an observer/experiencer/intuitor and to simply be "that which is".
Which brings to mind the thread title.

Maybe we have this Platonic, soul-based sort of world where we can experience things "as they are" without being mediated by our brains and bodies; another world where we completely construct things because of our brains and bodies; and the world I think is along the lines of truth where what really exists in its immediacy is in fact directly perceivable by us, even if we, by being who we are (brains and bodies), filter out what's really there in a unique way. Something Aquinas, I think, said: reality is experienced in the mode of the observer.

If THAT makes any sense at all.

 

[Received]

Maybe this:

Thing-in-itself (Platonic and Kantian voodooism),

Thing-is-constructed-entirely-by-us (Constructivism),

Thing-in-itself-modified-by-us (Thomist ontology?),

Man-I-like-hyphens (coolism)

 

[quatona]

quatona, I've talked to hundreds of people way up there in the thoughtful arena, and I think you might be the very top. Thank you for such valuable insights, and I'm very humbled by them.

Well, it takes two to tango.

True! But I struggle with the idea (and I don't see you saying this in the above sentence) that all thinking is linguistic.

Yes, I am not saying this.
I guess at this point we would have to get more precise and find out what we include in our concepts of "thinking". In my understanding "thinking" is always conceptual (as opposed to, say, "experiencing", which can go without concepts).

I think we think in images, which are interpreted via symbols/language.

Yes, but I don´t that´s all there´s to it. We not only think in images, we also think in e.g. purposes and functions.

It seems to me that we are contemplating on two different issues here:
1. reality <-> concepts
2. concepts <-> words.
I have brought up the latter, but I think it´s the minor issue in regards to the topic. Maybe we needn´t go deeper into it at this point - although I personally find it highly interesting.
We seem to agree that words signify concepts (which includes images, purposes etc), and we seem to agree that for to have a concept we don´t need a word for it.

I think we experience it as it is, but conceptualization (and language) in a sense prevents us from purely experiencing it. This is a great and bad thing: great because we've got to make sense of what we experience, and putting things into concepts and language makes things recognizable; if we didn't think "that's a chair", the chair in our pure experience might not be distinguishable from non-chairs, i.e., it would all be sensory noise. Bad because the moment we view something under the rubric of its "signified" (speaking of semiotics along the lines of signifier, signified, referent), which is basically the "picture" of have of a thing in an abstract sense -- when we do this, we "lose" the reality of the thing-in-itself (or thing-in-itself-modified-by-us) because we're in the clouds of our own conceptual or "signifier" abstraction. All chairs really seem alike; all leaves are apparently the same. But no, they're not, not in their immediacy. To conceptualize or signify is, in a sense, to destroy the particularity of something in its immediacy. If that makes any sense at all.

A lot of it makes sense to me. There´s just one obstacle:
While I have no problem with "reality as it is", I simply can´t make sense of "things-in-themselves". You´d need me to convince that things exist first, and I am afraid you won´t succeed in doing so.
The premise that things (and things-in-themselves) shows up several times in this paragraph of yours and it always makes me shrug.
I´m also not sure I agree that experiencing without conceptualizing produces "sensory noise" (actually, I am not even sure you yourself agree with that ). It may appear as noise to the intellect, but the senses are quite ok with it.

At this point, allow me throw a new categorization into the arena, which admittedly I have just made up as I walked along (and which, scientifically and semantically might be questionable), but it might be helpful:

analogous <-> digital.

Hypothesis: We experience analogously, we conceptualize digitally. Concepts always try to distinguish, they try to separate, they suggest that something "is x" (and not "not x").
Reality isn´t digital. Our thinking is digital. Objects (things) are products of our digitalization.

Taking a walk and experiencing analogously doesn´t require me to distinguish between "leaves", "trunks", "trees", "forest"; between "sun", "light" and "reflection" - it doesn´t require me to employ concepts. It doesn´t require me to divide reality-as-I-experience-it (which, of course, still isn´t reality-as-it-is) into conceptual objects. I can enjoy this fully, it is anything but "sensory noise".
I guess that´s why I hate taking walks with self-appointed "nature-lovers" who at every turn tell me "Look, there´s a [insert plant-name, bird-name, insect-name]!". Heck, I am in analogous mode, I am just trying to put my concepts to rest. Don´t get digital on me!

Maybe we have this Platonic, soul-based sort of world where we can experience things "as they are" without being mediated by our brains and bodies; another world where we completely construct things because of our brains and bodies; and the world I think is along the lines of truth where what really exists in its immediacy is in fact directly perceivable by us, even if we, by being who we are (brains and bodies), filter out what's really there in a unique way. Something Aquinas, I think, said: reality is experienced in the mode of the observer.

I think I would have agreed with all of this hadn´t you said "things 'as they are'", but "reality 'as it is'". There aren´t any things. Experiencing that which is in terms of objects is already a (very intrusive, I may add) "mode of the observer" - the digital mode.

What I hope to achieve by these new categories:
Eleminating the (inescapable) contradiction between "experiencing..." and "...as it really is" from the discussion, yet allowing for a distinction between an observer-mode that is experiencing immediately (analogously) and an observer-mode that is trying to impose something on "that which is" which actually is generated in the observer (digitalization).

 

[Received]

Well, it takes two to tango.




Yes, I am not saying this.
I guess at this point we would have to get more precise and find out what we include in our concepts of "thinking". In my understanding "thinking" is always conceptual (as opposed to, say, "experiencing", which can go without concepts).

Yes, but I don´t that´s all there´s to it. We not only think in images, we also think in e.g. purposes and functions.

It seems to me that we are contemplating on two different issues here:
1. reality <-> concepts
2. concepts <-> words.
I have brought up the latter, but I think it´s the minor issue in regards to the topic. Maybe we needn´t go deeper into it at this point - although I personally find it highly interesting.
We seem to agree that words signify concepts (which includes images, purposes etc), and we seem to agree that for to have a concept we don´t need a word for it.

Sounds intriguing. Let me chase the rabbit below before I chase this one.

A lot of it makes sense to me. There´s just one obstacle:
While I have no problem with "reality as it is", I simply can´t make sense of "things-in-themselves". You´d need me to convince that things exist first, and I am afraid you won´t succeed in doing so.
The premise that things (and things-in-themselves) shows up several times in this paragraph of yours and it always makes me shrug.
I´m also not sure I agree that experiencing without conceptualizing produces "sensory noise" (actually, I am not even sure you yourself agree with that ). It may appear as noise to the intellect, but the senses are quite ok with it.

The part of me that wrote "sensory noise" is my Wittgensteinian, language-is-connected-to-all-thinking part. You're right, I don't believe that (not right now, lol).

At this point, allow me throw a new categorization into the arena, which admittedly I have just made up as I walked along (and which, scientifically and semantically might be questionable), but it might be helpful:

analogous <-> digital.

Hypothesis: We experience analogously, we conceptualize digitally. Concepts always try to distinguish, they try to separate, they suggest that something "is x" (and not "not x").
Reality isn´t digital. Our thinking is digital. Objects (things) are products of our digitalization.

I can dig that.

Taking a walk and experiencing analogously doesn´t require me to distinguish between "leaves", "trunks", "trees", "forest"; between "sun", "light" and "reflection" - it doesn´t require me to employ concepts. It doesn´t require me to divide reality-as-I-experience-it (which, of course, still isn´t reality-as-it-is) into conceptual objects. I can enjoy this fully, it is anything but "sensory noise".
I guess that´s why I hate taking walks with self-appointed "nature-lovers" who at every turn tell me "Look, there´s a [insert plant-name, bird-name, insect-name]!". Heck, I am in analogous mode, I am just trying to put my concepts to rest. Don´t get digital on me!

I've thought the same regarding science as a whole. Scientists speak of "wonder", but they're also annoyingly prone to labeling the hell out of things, which to me minimizes wonder simply because you're too busy in the digital mode. But maybe not: maybe scientists really know how to switch between analogous and digital modes and thereby get the best of both worlds: from "whoa, that's beautiful!" to "whoa, that's an X!"

At the same time, and extending this and thereby creating another pretty rabbit for us to chase, I think that's the danger to science: objectification, which strangely (and now I'm feeling an epiphany coming) means *not* really seeing an object analogously (immediately), but negating and constraining it by its signifier. When we objectify someone or something, we're not seeing them, we're seeing our signifier or concept of them. Which is strange, because "objectify" sounds like it's referring to the object "out there", analogously.

I think I would have agreed with all of this hadn´t you said "things 'as they are'", but "reality 'as it is'". There aren´t any things. Experiencing that which is in terms of objects is already a (very intrusive, I may add) "mode of the observer" - the digital mode.

What I hope to achieve by these new categories:
Eleminating the (inescapable) contradiction between "experiencing..." and "...as it really is" from the discussion, yet allowing for a distinction between an observer-mode that is experiencing immediately (analogously) and an observer-mode that is trying to impose something on "that which is" which actually is generated in the observer (digitalization).

So it sounds like you're into the Thomist idea of in-the-mode-of-the-perceiver? I mean, the really fascinating thing is that we can't really prove any of the three worlds: I think it's possible to see things "as they are" if we're magical souls who peek through our bodies, and souls are sort of unfiltered God's eye (non) perspective of the situation; or that we're constructing everything from scratch in the act of perceiving; or that we're in the middle Thomist mode. We can't really "prove" any of these without using language and thereby constricting ourselves against the "really real reality" we're talking about. We're left with intuition, what "feels" (not emotionally) right.

As for your comment, "there aren't any things..." Gah, I'm trying to get this. You're saying that things don't exist in themselves, but only become things when we're perceiving them because this accounts for the analogous process?