What is the basis of ethics?

[Received]

Nietzsche would say that badness is weakness; this is because his value standard was power. But a person can equally come along and say that badness is whatever inhibits the economy, or leads to pain, or bad cooking skills. Bad action is interpreted through one's values; in this way it's understood essentially. This isn't to deny a universal value, particularly power -- I'd say that power is certainly in the process somewhere, but not as an intrinsic goal. Meaning could very well be the universal, and the gateway to meaning is power. It could be the other way around, but I'll go for the former.

Value can be interpreted two ways: according to conscious preference, or preconsciously -- that is, related to human nature, whether or not one realizes it. One can, preferetially qualified, hold cooking skills as a value; but preconsciously it doesn't matter what one holds. Preconsciously, it's probably one of three things: pleasure, power, or meaning. Freud, Adler, Frankl. Epicurius, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard. I, need, sunlight.

 

[funyun]

Nietzsche would say that badness is weakness; this is because his value standard was power. But a person can equally come along and say that badness is whatever inhibits the economy, or leads to pain, or bad cooking skills. Bad action is interpreted through one's values; in this way it's understood essentially. This isn't to deny a universal value, particularly power -- I'd say that power is certainly in the process somewhere, but not as an intrinsic goal. Meaning could very well be the universal, and the gateway to meaning is power. It could be the other way around, but I'll go for the former.

Value can be interpreted two ways: according to conscious preference, or preconsciously -- that is, related to human nature, whether or not one realizes it. One can, preferetially qualified, hold cooking skills as a value; but preconsciously it doesn't matter what one holds. Preconsciously, it's probably one of three things: pleasure, power, or meaning. Freud, Adler, Frankl. Epicurius, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard. I, need, sunlight.

What Nietzsche means by power is subtle. Personally I don't equate it with might, and if his definition of power equals might then I respectfully disagree with him. My view of power (both personally and as an analysis of what Nietzsche also means by power) is related to force of will or what I guess you could call will-power. That would in part include the complete subjugation of one's own actions to the will as a meaningful and virtuous goal. Whether or not this is actually achievable by human beings is debatable. I see someone who completely achieves this (though I know of no one personally or historically who has) as equivalent to Aristotle's "magnanimous man", and someone who desires this and works to attain it as equivalent to Nietzsche's "ubermensch".

Now how do we determine value, and therefore, good and bad action? I'm a straightforward Aristotelean in that sense: humanity's most fulfilling kind of action is reasonable action because humanity's most unique feature is reasoning capability. However I actually extend this farther than "human nature"-- because I believe in little inherent human nature other than the capability to reason-- to more like "sapient nature". The nature of value for me is related to, and intertwined with, sapience itself. The intrinsic goal is simply eudaimonia, which is best achieved through arete, which is best achieved through direct and active will-power. Since I see will-power as life-affirming, and as a means towards fulfillment, I actually see fulfillment as life itself. That is, to biologically live and not be fulfilled, or work toward fulfillment in some "transcendental" way, is to in fact not be living in any existentially meaningful manner; to be a nihilist.

 

[Received]

Have you read (the first hundred or so pages of) The Will to Power? He defines the will pretty interestingly: if I can remember correctly, integratively. The will is strong if its impulses follow one another, weak if the impulses are fragmented and cause a breakdown for the oraganism (the weak person is one who "can't help himself"). He defines will according to impulses because the will is only a metaphor; Nietzsche was an ideal biological determinist. I don't equate it with might at all; I think your understanding hits it perfectly. Nietzsche was all for the person who excelled physically or mentally, but if you can't acheive self-overcoming, it's really only of peripheral value.

To me, nihilism can occur in one of two ways: abstractly, by pushing off one's ideals to an unattainable state (as religion typically does with salvation as a post-mortem pushoff), or immanently, where value is buried under the unconscious and the self only at times has an implicit understanding of it. I think value is interesting. It's man's way of grabbing happiness, rather than having it happen to him. If this is true, value is interpretive as well as objective; the ideal is to have intepretive value jive perfectly with objective value, or to know the machinery of happiness precisely. One can be a nihilist and still be happy -- the world still may happen to him in such a way that's conducive to happiness, though the broader and longer this feeling of happiness lasts the more statistically improbable it is. Nihilism is negated through an interpretion of the universe in a way that leads to happiness (the process of value), and it's not surprising that nihilism contradicts itself because so many claim themselves nihilists for attention.

I love metaethics.

 

[funyun]

Have you read (the first hundred or so pages of) The Will to Power? He defines the will pretty interestingly: if I can remember correctly, integratively. The will is strong if its impulses follow one another, weak if the impulses are fragmented and cause a breakdown for the oraganism (the weak person is one who "can't help himself"). He defines will according to impulses because the will is only a metaphor; Nietzsche was an ideal biological determinist. I don't equate it with might at all; I think your understanding hits it perfectly. Nietzsche was all for the person who excelled physically or mentally, but if you can't acheive self-overcoming, it's really only of peripheral value.

Unfortunately my secondhand knowledge of Nietzsche is broader than my firsthand knowledge. I have read select passages from and extensive analyses of almost all of his works, but I haven't read any in their entirety. I am aware of his outright rejection of free will, which I always found an interesting distinction from other existentialists like, say, Sartre?

To me, nihilism can occur in one of two ways: abstractly, by pushing off one's ideals to an unattainable state (as religion typically does with salvation as a post-mortem pushoff), or immanently, where value is buried under the unconscious and the self only at times has an implicit understanding of it. I think value is interesting. It's man's way of grabbing happiness, rather than having it happen to him. If this is true, value is interpretive as well as objective; the ideal is to have intepretive value jive perfectly with objective value, or to know the machinery of happiness precisely. One can be a nihilist and still be happy -- the world still may happen to him in such a way that's conducive to happiness, though the broader and longer this feeling of happiness lasts the more statistically improbable it is. Nihilism is negated through an interpretion of the universe in a way that leads to happiness (the process of value), and it's not surprising that nihilism contradicts itself because so many claim themselves nihilists for attention.

Right; I don't equate nihilism with unhappiness or vitalism with happiness. But I do equate nihilism with an ignorance of, an inability to, or an unwillingness to seek out or work towards self-fulfillment. An ambition to block the fulfillment of others is also nihilistic, because that itself is actually a manifestation of weakness-- one which will more than likely block one's own fulfillment (Ring of Gyges?) in the end anyway.

Can you elaborate on your view of "immanent" nihilism? I'm not sure I understand what your explanation of it means-- thought I was going to, but you definitely took a way different direction with it than I was expecting.

 

[Received]

By immanent I mean there's no transcendence to value -- consequently the self has no capacity to work towards self-fulfillment, as you said. The self has no distinct impression of value; at most, if at all, it "happens" at times when he realizes the "better" thing to do, but mostly he has no permanent struggle towards happiness -- because he has no conscious value.

 

[Received]

And if you haven't read Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I highly advise it. It's one of those rare books that has changed my life. Aim for the Kaufmann translation (incomparable notes).

 

[funyun]

By immanent I mean there's no transcendence to value -- consequently the self has no capacity to work towards self-fulfillment, as you said. The self has no distinct impression of value; at most, if at all, it "happens" at times when he realizes the "better" thing to do, but mostly he has no permanent struggle towards happiness -- because he has no conscious value.

Ah, I agree completely. Would you say that, in addition to not recognizing any value at all, a nihilistic individual can assign value to things which are, in reality, nothing more than distractions, or worse, nihilistic, themselves?

And if you haven't read Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I highly advise it. It's one of those rare books that has changed my life. Aim for the Kaufmann translation (incomparable notes).

That book has, needless to say, been on my shortlist for a very long time. I'll definitely look for that translation; thanks for the advice.

 

[Received]

To the first count, absolutely.

There are such things as false values, pseudo-values. The individual attributes something positive to a certain process in the world because it immediately benefits him. Fatty foods taste great, but using this as an absolute value leads to something that definitely outweighs good taste: getting fat, unattractive, bad health, early death, etc.

 

[AnimalMother]

According to you what is the basis of ethics? In other words, what makes something right or wrong?
..
What about you?

According to me, a real basis for ethics doesn't exist. The best I can do for myself is to find my own personal set of ethics, which would only engage me.

Right and wrong are variables that may have to be adjusted as needed, objectively they don't have a real value.