What is substance?.

[JimR-OCDS]

I am not debating or even challenging Transubstantiation.

My question remains, "What is substance"? For most things it is the basic essence of something that can have many accidental changes. But usually essence or substance is intrinsic to the accidental possibilities. How much can the accidentals of water change before it is no longer water? How much can a rock change before it is no longer a rock. What is it that makes it water or a rock and not something else?

But the definition of "substance," is that it is a particular form of matter.

Essence and substance are two different things. Essence is the nature of a thing.
In the case of God, essence is the nature of a Divine Being. For us humans, essence is
the nature of "being."

 

[Akita Suggagaki]

But the definition of "substance," is that it is a particular form of matter.

Essence and substance are two different things. Essence is the nature of a thing.
In the case of God, essence is the nature of a Divine Being. For us humans, essence is
the nature of "being."

So in transubstantiation of the Sacrament. Are not both the substance and essence also changed?

 

[Mark Quayle]

I think some of these philosophers decry common sense.

If three people look at a 3 dimensional box from 3 different positions, they will visualise the box as they see it.

If they then change one place, they'll see the same box but from a different perspective.

And if they change position again, the same thing will happen, but it will still be the same box.

Unless somebody is bunging on a massive illusionist act for every object which can be perceived by nearly 8 billion people, many of them looking at the same object simultaneously, then it's a fair bet the objects exist in themselves.

That we may only perceive the objects in our mind might be a fact, but so what? If train is coming downt the tracks, and we wonder "Is that object real or is it only a perception in my mind?" all we have to do to find out is step onto the tracks and wait.

Geisler and Feinberg in "Introduction to Philosophy - A Christian Perspective" commented at one point "... Analytic thinking is as essential to good philosophy as good instruments and clean hands are to a surgical operation. On the other hand, some analytic philosophers seem to spend so much time on the tool-sharpening and hand-washing they never get around to the operation! In their preoccupation with meaning, they forget about truth."

Each to his own, I guess!

One problem that seems consistent is the time spent on mere definition of terms.

Some of them want the terms as concise and accurate as possible, so the arguments can proceed. Some make it their life's work! But some of them (myself included) seem to mistake definition for proof.

 

[Akita Suggagaki]

Each to his own, I guess!

One problem that seems consistent is the time spent on mere definition of terms.

Some of them want the terms as concise and accurate as possible, so the arguments can proceed. Some make it their life's work! But some of them (myself included) seem to mistake definition for proof.

Currently we don't seem to have a much agreement on definition. 'Substance" for example.

It seems, in summary, that there are at least six overlapping ideas that contribute to the philosophical concept of substance. Substances are typified as:

1. being ontologically basic—substances are the things from which everything else is made or by which it is metaphysically sustained;
2. being, at least compared to other things, relatively independent and durable, and, perhaps, absolutely so;
3. being the paradigm subjects of predication and bearers of properties;
4. being, at least for the more ordinary kinds of substance, the subjects of change;
5. being typified by those things we normally classify as objects, or kinds of objects;
6. being typified by kinds of stuff.

Metaphysically sustaining, independent, durable, bearer of properties, subject of change, and my favorite, "stuff".

So the stuff of a rock is different than the stuff of water. Does that mean that substance should be observable? or only the accidents of stuff?

 

[Mark Quayle]

Currently we don't seem to have a much agreement on definition. 'Substance" for example.

It seems, in summary, that there are at least six overlapping ideas that contribute to the philosophical concept of substance. Substances are typified as:

1. being ontologically basic—substances are the things from which everything else is made or by which it is metaphysically sustained;
2. being, at least compared to other things, relatively independent and durable, and, perhaps, absolutely so;
3. being the paradigm subjects of predication and bearers of properties;
4. being, at least for the more ordinary kinds of substance, the subjects of change;
5. being typified by those things we normally classify as objects, or kinds of objects;
6. being typified by kinds of stuff.

Metaphysically sustaining, independent, durable, bearer of properties, subject of change, and my favorite, "stuff".

So the stuff of a rock is different than the stuff of water. Does that mean that substance should be observable? or only the accidents of stuff?

Well done —that you thus return this to the point of the OP. I had gotten sidetracked (as usual).

Here you deal with the OP in two ways, which I'm not sure you meant to. 'Substance' is one thing, being a reference to the the principle, "substance". But substances are examples of the principle in action.

The use of the notion "change" to me is distracting, though it may apply to one use of 'substance', or since it applies to some substances; I don't think it is universally part of the definition.

Anyhow, I very much enjoyed your post. Got me thinking.

But it doesn't deal with what is probably the core substance, or essence, of what exists, which I'm guessing is what the OP is looking for (even if you didn't realize it).

That is, this may be part of what I think of as "the huge pun or play-on-words" that God has for us to be amazed at when we see him as he is. In the end, 'first cause' theory and 'omnipotence' suggest, God himself is our essence, (though he is by no means comprised of us, or of his creation), and there may reside the answer to the matter of Transubstantiation.

'Consubstantial' is a different question, but a quick (not complete) comment: it is only a reference to being of the same essence. (When used concerning the Trinity it is rather unsatisfying to me, as it seems to lack definition, but I understand the necessity to not only be concise there; but to me it is like saying 'chance' determines a thing, when what we mean is, that we don't know what caused a thing. 'Being of one essence' means, we don't know how to explain how they are one. Feels like an excuse, but I can do no better, haha).

 

[Akita Suggagaki]

Mark, thanks for responding and hanging in there with me and the question.

Concerning the Trinity, I am ok with leaving it at same "Divine stuff" which is ultimately mystery but we do believe also person. I also like your comment

God himself is our essence

We do share in God's being or else we would not exist. But now what are your thought on the relationship between "substance' and "essence"/ Same thing? Reading the philosophy I find it hard to understand.

One guys says:

1. Substance: the fundamental kinds of things. It comes up in Philosophy of Mind, for instance, when we speak of Substance Monists (who believe in only a single sort of substance, most commonly physical substance) or Substance Dualists (who believe in two sorts of substance, most commonly mental and physical substance; Descartes is commonly taken to be a substance dualist).
   
   
2. Essence: often brought up in discussion of essential properties see Plantinga's Nature of Necessity for a contemporary discussion of essences. Kit Fine also has some articles on essentialism. An essential property is (at least) one that an object possesses necessarily. It will sometimes be said to be definitional of that object. To give a plausible example, it is an essential property of a chair that it be able to be sat upon.
   
   
   https://philosophy.stackexchange.co...-essence-substance-being-existence-and-entity

That makes me think we are talking apples and oranges. Substance is a material thing while essence is more abstract.


More to read:
A "substance" has certain characteristics. It is durable, separable, and identical. An "essence" is that which makes something what it is. The definitions of substance and essence may both be said to express what it is that makes them what they are, i.e. their essences, if the essences are themselves durable, etc.

Substance and Essence

 

[JimR-OCDS]

So in transubstantiation of the Sacrament. Are not both the substance and essence also changed?

The essence changed to the body and blood of Christ, but the substance remained bread and wine. In other words, if you put the bread and wine under a microscope, it would still be the same as bread and wine as before the transubstantiation.

That being said, there have been miracles where the consecrated host has changed into actual flesh and blood. I've never seen it personally, but there have been stories with pictures of it taking place.

 

[JimR-OCDS]

I suppose the original teachings on Taoism which I read about years ago from a book on Taoism which was written in 1922 by an Englishman who lived in China for many years studying Taoism before it got polluted made sense to me.

He wrote that yin, was the essence of our beliefs, where yang was the physical practice of those beliefs. In other words to me this meant yin is the soul, the being, where yang is the physical embodiment of the soul. In our life we try to harmonize the essence of our beliefs through the practice of those beliefs. When the two are in harmony, we have the Tao, or the way in both essence and substance, but the two are now one.

Of course Jesus told us that He is the way, so our essence is to be like God and our substance is to live as we believe.

 

[Akita Suggagaki]

The essence changed to the body and blood of Christ, but the substance remained bread and wine.

Then it sounds misnamed, should be transessencialism or something.

 

[JimR-OCDS]

Then it sounds misnamed, should be transessencialism or something.

And I didn't explain it properly.

Both the essence and substance become the body and blood of Christ, yet the
appearance remains bread and wine.

 

[Akita Suggagaki]

It seems, in summary, that there are at least six overlapping ideas that contribute to the philosophical concept of substance. Substances are typified as:

1. being ontologically basic—substances are the things from which everything else is made or by which it is metaphysically sustained;
2. being, at least compared to other things, relatively independent and durable, and, perhaps, absolutely so;
3. being the paradigm subjects of predication and bearers of properties;
4. being, at least for the more ordinary kinds of substance, the subjects of change;
5. being typified by those things we normally classify as objects, or kinds of objects;
6. being typified by kinds of stuff.

Aristotle analyses substance in terms of form and matter. The form is what kind of thing the object is, and the matter is what it is made of. The term ‘matter’ as used by Aristotle is not the name for a particular kind of stuff, nor for some ultimate constituents of bodies, such as atoms (Aristotle rejects atomism). ‘Matter’ is rather the name for whatever, for a given kind of object, meets a certain role or function, namely that of being that from which the object is constituted. Relative to the human body, matter is flesh and blood. The matter of an axehead is the iron from which it is made. Relative to the elements, earth, fire, air, and water, matter is an intrinsically characterless ‘prime matter’ that underlies the qualities of them all.

Aristotle acknowledges that there are three candidates for being called substance, and that all three are substance in some sense or to some degree. First, there is matter, second, form and third, the composite of form and matter.
Substance (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

I posted all that because I think we are usually not careful in understanding the terms we use. When we talk about substance we are pretty much talking more about sense #1 rather than Sense #6, an underlying ontological basis rather than a material stuff.

Jim, you seem to want to continue to use Transubstantiaion as the practical example. Before we get to that I though we needed to better understand what we mean by "substance" .Otherwise Trans-substance makes little sense. What do you mean by essence and substance if the outward appearance and everything we can sensible know about the "matter" appears to remains bread and wine. What is it that has changed. In my mind it is nothing material since we do not hold cells and corpuscles in our hands (stuff). Instead we hold a new thing from which the matter is sustained (ontological basis). Does that make sense?

And essence, I don't know about that yet. I do not think it is interchangeable with substance. Although we see that "substance" can mean at least 6 different things. I think essence is a way of describing substance.

 

[Akita Suggagaki]

"Some simple definitions are in order.
A "substance" has certain characteristics. It is durable, separable, and identical.

An "essence" is that which makes something what it is.

The definitions of substance and essence may both be said to express what it is that makes them what they are, i.e. their essences, if the essences are themselves durable, etc."

Aristotle's terminology in these matters now looks a little confusing. The Greek word for "substance" was ousía. Thus, the word looks more like Latin essentia, "essence," which is from the infinite of "to be," esse. Terminologically, Aristotle does not seem to have clearly distinguished between substance and essence. On the other hand, as substantia in Latin appears to mean "stand" (stare) "under" (sub), there is a word corresponding in meaning in Greek: hypokeímenon (as a neuter passive participle), "lie" (keîmai) "under" (hypó). Aristotle uses this to mean "matter" in his sense, which is not substance, precisely because it is not separable

Substance and Essence

 

[Akita Suggagaki]

I think we are talking about "Substance theory"

Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself. Substances are particulars that are ontologically independent: they are able to exist all by themselves. Another defining feature often attributed to substances is their ability to undergo changes. Changes involve something existing before, during and after the change. They can be described in terms of a persisting substance gaining or losing properties. Attributes or properties, on the other hand, are entities that can be exemplified by substances. Properties characterize their bearers, they express what their bearer is like.

"According to Thomas Aquinas, beings may possess substance in three different modes. Together with other Medieval philosophers, he interpreted God's epithet "El Shaddai" (Genesis 17:1) as self-sufficient and concluded that God's essence was identical with existence. Aquinas also deemed the substance of spiritual creatures identical with their essence (or form); therefore he considered each angel to belong to its own distinct species. In Aquinas' view, composite substances consist of form and matter. Human substantial form, i.e. soul, receives its individuality from body."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory

 

[JimR-OCDS]

It seems, in summary, that there are at least six overlapping ideas that contribute to the philosophical concept of substance. Substances are typified as:

1. being ontologically basic—substances are the things from which everything else is made or by which it is metaphysically sustained;
2. being, at least compared to other things, relatively independent and durable, and, perhaps, absolutely so;
3. being the paradigm subjects of predication and bearers of properties;
4. being, at least for the more ordinary kinds of substance, the subjects of change;
5. being typified by those things we normally classify as objects, or kinds of objects;
6. being typified by kinds of stuff.

Aristotle analyses substance in terms of form and matter. The form is what kind of thing the object is, and the matter is what it is made of. The term ‘matter’ as used by Aristotle is not the name for a particular kind of stuff, nor for some ultimate constituents of bodies, such as atoms (Aristotle rejects atomism). ‘Matter’ is rather the name for whatever, for a given kind of object, meets a certain role or function, namely that of being that from which the object is constituted. Relative to the human body, matter is flesh and blood. The matter of an axehead is the iron from which it is made. Relative to the elements, earth, fire, air, and water, matter is an intrinsically characterless ‘prime matter’ that underlies the qualities of them all.

Aristotle acknowledges that there are three candidates for being called substance, and that all three are substance in some sense or to some degree. First, there is matter, second, form and third, the composite of form and matter.
Substance (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

I posted all that because I think we are usually not careful in understanding the terms we use. When we talk about substance we are pretty much talking more about sense #1 rather than Sense #6, an underlying ontological basis rather than a material stuff.

Jim, you seem to want to continue to use Transubstantiaion as the practical example. Before we get to that I though we needed to better understand what we mean by "substance" .Otherwise Trans-substance makes little sense. What do you mean by essence and substance if the outward appearance and everything we can sensible know about the "matter" appears to remains bread and wine. What is it that has changed. In my mind it is nothing material since we do not hold cells and corpuscles in our hands (stuff). Instead we hold a new thing from which the matter is sustained (ontological basis). Does that make sense?

And essence, I don't know about that yet. I do not think it is interchangeable with substance. Although we see that "substance" can mean at least 6 different things. I think essence is a way of describing substance.

I think your trying to use the point of an inanimate object, such as bread and wine, not changing in substance and there for not in essence ? But this is the miracle of the Eucharist. The bread and wine, although remaining as the material substance of bread and wine, becomes the essence of Christ body and blood. As I posted earlier, God the Father can make the chair I'm sitting in, become the body and blood of Christ, yet the material remains in appearance, just a chair.

As the 1917 Catholic Encyclopedia states, ""the transition of one thing into another in some aspect of being". https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05573a.htm#section3

I think the fuller explanation as in the Catholic Encyclopedia at New Advent, perhaps better explains what you're seeking.

God Bless

 

[Akita Suggagaki]

I think your trying to use the point of an inanimate object, such as bread and wine, not changing in substance and there for not in essence

But the point of Transubstantiation is that it does change in substance. But we are not talking about substance as material stuff. Rather, substance in this sense is essence, or ontological basis.

So it changes in substance but not material stuff.

 

[JimR-OCDS]

But the point of Transubstantiation is that it does change in substance. But we are not talking about substance as material stuff. Rather, substance in this sense is essence, or ontological basis.

So it changes in substance but not material stuff.

It becomes the body and blood of Christ, but remains in appearance as bread and wine.
That's the best I can come up with.

 

[Akita Suggagaki]

I was reading a little Immanuel Kant and how he describes Reality or "Things in themselves" as unknowable. What we can know is "phenomena" which is how our mind interprets sense data from "Thing in themselves". I probably over simplify but it sounds a bit like substance (the reality of an object) and accidents (how our mind interprets our sense data).

 

[Akita Suggagaki]

My current thinking is that "substance" is a provisional fiction that has some practical value but is primarily a mirage as we peer into the abyss of Being.

 

[zippy2006]

It seems, in summary, that there are at least six overlapping ideas that contribute to the philosophical concept of substance. Substances are typified as:

1. being ontologically basic—substances are the things from which everything else is made or by which it is metaphysically sustained;
2. being, at least compared to other things, relatively independent and durable, and, perhaps, absolutely so;
3. being the paradigm subjects of predication and bearers of properties;
4. being, at least for the more ordinary kinds of substance, the subjects of change;
5. being typified by those things we normally classify as objects, or kinds of objects;
6. being typified by kinds of stuff.

Yes, this is accurate.

We shall see later that the Kantian tradition...

Kant's epistemology isn't really compatible with Catholicism, or even Christianity as far as I am concerned. "Substance" may be a provisional fiction for Kant, but it's not for Catholics.

 

[zippy2006]

To take just one question out of the many being raised in this thread:

So does the noumena/phenomena relationship correlate with the substance/accidentals relationship?

No, not really. Many accidents are perceptual, and an essence (substantial form) is not directly perceptible, but this is about as far as the comparison goes, and that's not very far.

Kant's whole epistemological system is a reply to Humean skepticism, and noumena/phenomena are some of the basic tools he uses in order to try to overcome those difficulties. The two pairs have little to nothing to do with one another. They are doing different work, they were coined for different purposes, and they presuppose very different philosophies. Any similarity is accidental.

Trying to understand Kant before you understand Aristotle is going to create all sorts of confusion.