What is Knowledge?

[Tree of Life]

This conversation comes up a lot in different places - most recently in some discussion on the science forum. There seems to be some significant disagreement about the nature of knowledge. People get especially up in arms at the suggestion that knowledge is a kind of belief.

It seems that some folks, particularly scientific types, want to completely separate knowledge from belief and it seems wrong to them that the two are fundamentally related.

But herein I'll put forth a fairly uncontroversial argument about the nature of knowledge - namely that knowledge is justified, true belief. An article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy summarizes this nicely in this way:

There are three components to the traditional (“tripartite”) analysis of knowledge. According to this analysis, justified, true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge.​

The Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge:
S knows that p iff​

1. p is true;
2. S believes that p;
3. S is justified in believing that p.

The tripartite analysis of knowledge is often abbreviated as the “JTB” analysis, for “justified true belief”.​

Source

Following this definition, here would be an example of knowledge and an example of a belief that doesn't amount to knowledge:

Knowledge - Fire is hot because it burns me when I touch it.

In the example above we have proposition p - fire is hot. p is true. Furthermore S believes p. And further still S has a sound justification for her belief - namely empirical data.

Not knowledge - Fire is hot because all red things are hot.

The above example is not knowledge. p is still true. Fire is hot. And S believes p. But S does not have a proper justification. So while S holds a true belief, this belief does not amount to knowledge.

One could also imagine a scenario in which S believes that p; S is justified in believing that p, but that p is false. And this, of course, could not amount to knowledge.

This would go to show that knowledge is a kind of belief. What problems do you have with this definition of knowledge?

 

[Loudmouth]

1. God says all things that are red are hot.
2. That thing is red.
3. Therefore, it is hot.

Is that justified knowledge?

 

[Tree of Life]

1. God says all things that are red are hot.
2. That thing is red.
3. Therefore, it is hot.

Is that justified knowledge?

Not exactly. In your hypothetical situation it would have to be more like this:

Let p represent the proposition: the red thing is hot.
I know p iff

1. p is true
2. I believe p
3. I have a good reason for believing p.

Let's suppose that God truly said all red things are hot and let's let this be justification j. Let's furthermore suppose that I believe p because j. Supposing that p is true then it could be said that I know p.

But if p is not true and I still believe p because j then my belief does not amount to knowledge. p must be true.

 

[Loudmouth]

Not exactly. In your hypothetical situation it would have to be more like this:

Let p represent the proposition: the red thing is hot.
I know p iff

1. p is true
2. I believe p
3. I have a good reason for believing p.

Let's suppose that God truly said all red things are hot and let's let this be justification j. Let's furthermore suppose that I believe p because j. Supposing that p is true then it could be said that I know p.

But if p is not true and I still believe p because j then my belief does not amount to knowledge. p must be true.

Let's say that you believe God said all red things are hot. Would that make it true?

 

[Tree of Life]

Let's say that you believe God said all red things are hot. Would that make it true?

No.

 

[Loudmouth]

No.

Then it seems your basic creationist argument has a rather serious problem. The premise of the whole argument doesn't stand up. Proclaiming "God says so" does not make something true.

 

[quatona]

This conversation comes up a lot in different places - most recently in some discussion on the science forum. There seems to be some significant disagreement about the nature of knowledge. People get especially up in arms at the suggestion that knowledge is a kind of belief.

It seems that some folks, particularly scientific types, want to completely separate knowledge from belief and it seems wrong to them that the two are fundamentally related.

But herein I'll put forth a fairly uncontroversial argument about the nature of knowledge - namely that knowledge is justified, true belief. An article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy summarizes this nicely in this way:

There are three components to the traditional (“tripartite”) analysis of knowledge. According to this analysis, justified, true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge.​

The Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge:
S knows that p iff​

1. p is true;
2. S believes that p;
3. S is justified in believing that p.

The tripartite analysis of knowledge is often abbreviated as the “JTB” analysis, for “justified true belief”.​

Source

Following this definition, here would be an example of knowledge and an example of a belief that doesn't amount to knowledge:

Knowledge - Fire is hot because it burns me when I touch it.

In the example above we have proposition p - fire is hot. p is true. Furthermore S believes p. And further still S has a sound justification for her belief - namely empirical data.

Not knowledge - Fire is hot because all red things are hot.

The above example is not knowledge. p is still true. Fire is hot. And S believes p. But S does not have a proper justification. So while S holds a true belief, this belief does not amount to knowledge.

I´m not sure what you mean by "proper justification". Do you mean "true/accurate justification" - which would render the whole thing circular (it´s true when it´s true)?

 

[Tree of Life]

Here's another way to put it:

There are subjective, objective, and normative aspects to knowledge.

Subjective - In order for us to know p we must subjectively accept p. P must become part of our belief system. If we do not believe p, how can we know p?

Objective - In order for us to know p, p must correspond accurately with reality. If p has no relationship with reality we may well believe it, but it cannot be said that we know it. How can we know something that's not true?

Normative - In order for us to know p, we must have arrived at our belief that p using the proper method. If I believe p by a lucky guess and p happens to be true then I may have a true belief, but how can it be said that I know p? An example would be knowing the number of jelly beans in a jar. Say there are 3,000 jelly beans in a jar. Say I take a lucky guess and believe that there are 3,000 in the jar. My belief is true, but it is not knowledge because it's based on a lucky guess - not a proper justification. But lets say I count the beans and then believe that there are 3000 in the jar. This belief is knowledge because it's based on a proper justification (counting).

 

[Tree of Life]

Then it seems your basic creationist argument has a rather serious problem. The premise of the whole argument doesn't stand up. Proclaiming "God says so" does not make something true.

This is correct. Unless, of course, God really did say it.

 

[Tree of Life]

I´m not sure what you mean by "proper justification". Do you mean "true/accurate justification" - which would render the whole thing circular (it´s true when it´s true)?

This is one of the big questions in epistemology. What is a proper justification? In general, a justification is the method by which you arrived at the belief. Empiricism is often considered a proper justification whereas lucky guesses or astrology are not.

 

[Loudmouth]

This is correct. Unless, of course, God really did say it.

Even if God really did say it, that still doesn't make it true.

 

[Tree of Life]

Even if God really did say it, that still doesn't make it true.

Technically you could be right but this would depend on your conception of God. If God is truth and the most important determiner of truth then God's word would have to be true. His word would therefore make something true and would be a proper justification for knowledge.

 

[Loudmouth]

This is one of the big questions in epistemology. What is a proper justification? In general, a justification is the method by which you arrived at the belief. Empiricism is often considered a proper justification whereas lucky guesses or astrology are not.

That is why we often look for an epistemology where the axioms can be agreed upon as a place to start. With empiricism, we can usually find broad agreement. Empiricism uses some very basic assumptions that we all use almost every second of the day, such as the universe acts in a consistent and rational manner. When we step on the brake pedal in our cars, we don't expect the laws of nature to suddenly change, turning our brake pedal into something with the tensile strength of wet spaghetti. When we walk down the street, we don't expect oxygen to suddenly not follow the laws of even distribution and create an oxygen-less atmosphere around us.

We also have a long history demonstrating the empiricism's success at explaining the world around us.

That's why empiricism is considered a valid justification. It works and it is successful.

 

[Loudmouth]

Technically you could be right but this would depend on your conception of God.

How I conceive God has no bearing on how God actually is.

 

[Tree of Life]

That is why we often look for an epistemology where the axioms can be agreed upon as a place to start. With empiricism, we can usually find broad agreement. Empiricism uses some very basic assumptions that we all use almost every second of the day, such as the universe acts in a consistent and rational manner. When we step on the brake pedal in our cars, we don't expect the laws of nature to suddenly change, turning our brake pedal into something with the tensile strength of wet spaghetti. When we walk down the street, we don't expect oxygen to suddenly not follow the laws of even distribution and create an oxygen-less atmosphere around us.

We also have a long history demonstrating the empiricism's success at explaining the world around us.

That's why empiricism is considered a valid justification. It works and it is successful.

I agree. I think that empiricism is a strong justification.

 

[Tree of Life]

Well. I should say that empiricism can be a strong justification. There are many instances where empiricism fails us. For example (this comes from Hume):

p = The sun will rise tomorrow (colloquially speaking).

We all believe p. But do we know p? What's our justification? Empiricism is an invalid justification because just because the sun has risen everyday for the past who-knows-how-long does not mean that the sun will certainly rise tomorrow. So no one knows that the sun will rise tomorrow because there is no justification for this belief.

 

[Loudmouth]

I agree. I think that empiricism is a strong justification.

When the empirical facts don't agree with a sacred text, how is one justified in saying that the empirical facts were faked by a deity?

 

[quatona]

This is one of the big questions in epistemology.

Yes, and unless "How do we know that a justification is proper?" is answered (with a proper justification ) there is little use for your approach - it just (self-referentially) carries the problem to another level.

What is a proper justification? In general, a justification is the method by which you arrived at the belief.

Sure, but the problematic term here isn´t "justification" but "proper".

Empiricism is often considered a proper justification whereas lucky guesses or astrology are not.

When you say "is often considered" - are you asking me to follow this consideration? Or are you asking me to question it?
For a person who has never experienced a red thing that wasn´t hot, "it´s hot because all things red are hot" would be a proper empirical justification.

 

[quatona]

Well. I should say that empiricism can be a strong justification.There are many instances where empiricism fails us.

This (you don´t provide a means of distinguishing between instances when the empirical method is and when it isn´t) poses a significant problem to your idea of "proper justification" being a progress towards defining "knowledge".
It may be useful for a couple of things, but apparently not for defining "knowledge".

 

[Tree of Life]

This (you don´t provide a means of distinguishing between instances when the empirical method is and when it isn´t) poses a significant problem to your idea of "proper justification" being a progress towards defining "knowledge".
It may be useful for a couple of things, but apparently not for defining "knowledge".

So you seem to think that JTB is a bad definition of knowledge. How would you amend it?