What is ethics?

[brightlights]

I think there are three live options. If you don't like my options you can introduce your own.

Is ethics about self-realization?
Is ethics about duty?
Is ethics about achieving some good in the world?

Are these opposed to one another? Or is it all three at once?

 

[Paradoxum]

I'd say that morality is about considering another's benefit and harm from their perspective, and then being considerate in one's actions. ie: avoiding violating people, and trying to help them (I'd say the formed it more of a duty than the latter).

I suppose you could say that is doing our duty (not to violate), and trying to be charitable? I think improving one's character can come into it, but that is secondary to the actions we take.

More generally, morality is about universal good and bad.

 

[Eudaimonist]

Is ethics about self-realization?

I'm not certain what you mean by self-realization, but given popular meanings that is closest to my view.

Ethics is properly for the sake of personal flourishing, which can be described as self-realization or self-actualization, since it involves realizing (or actualizing) human potentials. Ethics in this sense is about self-creation -- creating your best self.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[juvenissun]

I think there are three live options. If you don't like my options you can introduce your own.

Is ethics about self-realization?
Is ethics about duty?
Is ethics about achieving some good in the world?

Are these opposed to one another? Or is it all three at once?

How much is the overlap between ethics and moral? For the success of this thread, I wish it is the minimum. Otherwise, no one is going to understand what others are talking about.

 

[Received]

I think the etymology could be useful when distinguishing ethics from morals. Ethics comes from "ethos", meaning character, whereas morals comes from "mos", meaning custom. Ethics can include the study of right and wrong (whether or not this sense of right and wrong is mediated by custom or that-which-is-handed-down), but (especially in the classical, Aristotelean sense) ethics refers to character development, potentially to the level of happiness as Eudaimonia, as that guy with the similar name above said.

 

[brightlights]

By ethics I mean the study of how we should live.

Paradoxum is a deontologist (ethics is about duty).
Mark is an existentialist (ethics is about self-actualization).

 

[Eudaimonist]

Mark is an existentialist (ethics is about self-actualization).

I am not an existentialist.

I may agree with existentialists on a few issues, but I wouldn't agree wholeheartedly that "existence precedes essence", which is the closest I can get to naming an essential position in existentialist philosophy.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Received]

Look, he's quoting Camus. He must totally be an existentialist.

 

[Paradoxum]

By ethics I mean the study of how we should live.

Paradoxum is a deontologist (ethics is about duty).
Mark is an existentialist (ethics is about self-actualization).

I find it hard to know if I am a deontologist or consequentialist. I'd think utilitarians (classic consequentialists) would talk of duty to do the greatest good for the greatest number.

I'd say murder is wrong because it severely violates someone's will over their sphere of sovereignty. Is that consequentialist because the consequence of unnecessary killing is violation? Or is that deontologist because it is one's duty not to violate another in that way? I don't think an act is wrong in itself, it depends on the will of others, so I suppose that is consequentialist.

As far as I know Mark is a virtue ethicist?

 

[Eudaimonist]

As far as I know Mark is a virtue ethicist?

Yes, that's right.

I'd say murder is wrong because it severely violates someone's will over their sphere of sovereignty. Is that consequentialist because the consequence of unnecessary killing is violation? Or is that deontologist because it is one's duty not to violate another in that way? I don't think an act is wrong in itself, it depends on the will of others, so I suppose that is consequentialist.

I would ask you this: why is violating someone's will over their sphere of sovereignty wrong?


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Paradoxum]

Yes, that's right.

I would ask you this: why is violating someone's will over their sphere of sovereignty wrong?


eudaimonia,

Mark

I suppose it might be argued in a few different ways (eg: consider the net individual bads for all involved, and this will show you what is wrong for all involved).

You could say that if I kill someone unnecessarily, it means I act as if my will is more important than theirs, and that is false. False action is wrong. So this explanation would attempt to merge factual wrong with moral wrong. But perhaps this is just mental gymnastics with words. I do quite like this explanation though.

 

[Eudaimonist]

You could say that if I kill someone unnecessarily, it means I act as if my will is more important than theirs, and that is false. False action is wrong. So this explanation would attempt to merge factual wrong with moral wrong. But perhaps this is just mental gymnastics with words. I do quite like this explanation though.

IMO, that sounds deontological.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Paradoxum]

IMO, that sounds deontological.


eudaimonia,

Mark

I have no idea which my ethics is.

 

[Received]

I'm going to appeal to authority here and say that it took something like over 2200 years for deontology (in Kant's view) and consequentialism (John Stuart Mill) to arrive. That's a very long time for the world to writhe on nonexistent ethics. Virtue ethics takes the cake.

I take virtue ethics as character development according to the different ideals for action that each virtue involves, which necessarily involves plenty of thinking in the moment for determining whether such-and-such an action lines up with such-and-such a virtue. We call this practical reasoning. I read somewhere that a virtue ethicist chooses an action by asking himself, "is this what a virtuous person would do?" Which for me was a meaningless statement for a long time, until I understood Aristotle's notion of character development along the lines of what we would basically call neuroplasticity today: the more you practice something, the more you learn it. What is right action? That action which lines up with the virtues. How does a person become virtuous? By practicing the virtue in question through an application of practical reasoning to the specific situation they are in, attempting to fit how they should act with what they believe is an action on the road to virtue. Why ultimately should we aim to be virtuous?

Well, here's where the virtue ethicists have the win over deontologists and consequentialists. Whereas the latter would say we do such-and-such in proportion to how much happiness is brought about externally as a result of our action (presumably the former would say that duty and happiness are potentially independent things, such that a person *should* act in certain ways *regardless of* whether or not these duties coincide with happiness), VE folks emphasize how happiness is a potentially permanent and accreting state for the virtue-practicing soul. Virtue (arete) is excellence, and the more excellent you are (dude) in terms of the assimilation of your choices and actions with the different virtues, the happier you are. So the answer to, "why be virtuous?" is, "because you want to be happy." "Happiness" here is, of course, much different than the vague and arbitrary conceptions of happiness (which is usually superficially designated according to pleasure), and more along the lines of "flourishing", which Aristotle ultimately associated with a life of virtue, but also a bit further with the contemplative or rational soul -- the latter stuff I disagree with a good deal on, but I don't think that's too important.

And a bit more, because in the Aristotelean sense, you not only get happiness, but also beauty by acting in a virtuous way. To my understanding, a virtue is beautiful insofar as it is excellence, and beauty (here I might really be slipping in a Kierkegaardian conception instead of an Aristotelean one) is that which is appreciated for its own sake. When someone says (as they too often don't, unfortunately), "that was a beautiful thing you did," you're referring to the virtue associated with the person's action, as opposed to the sensuous beauty associated with something made up of matter out there in the world. To become virtuous is, in a sense, to become a beautiful person, not in the superficial sensate sense, but in the deeper character sense.

VE also has, to my mind, very strong associations with orthodox Christianity; cf. Thomas Aquinas, or in more contemporary speak those who espouse the spiritual disciplines (e.g., prayer, study, solitude, etc.), which are really spiritually applied virtues, which, just like with the (non-exclusively) "secular" virtues, are brought about into one's character through practice, and the more you have these spiritual disciplines assimilated into your life, the more Christlike you are.

Whatever the case, and however many different times I misrepresented his philosophy, Aristotle was a shining star for his incredible brilliance. Virtue ethics is also a great wedding of ethics and *psychology*, and brilliant because it gives us a solid reason for why we should be ethical, including why we should treat other people in good ways: because doing so is associated with happiness. To be a good person both to oneself and other people both earns and is the outcome of a happiness as flourishing.

 

[Received]

I have no idea how that ended up that long.

Oh wait, it's because I'm at work.

 

[quatona]

I think there are three live options. If you don't like my options you can introduce your own.

Is ethics about self-realization?
Is ethics about duty?
Is ethics about achieving some good in the world?

Are these opposed to one another? Or is it all three at once?

All I can tell you is what is important to me: 1+3. They are interdependent.
2 is opposed to them, in my view.

 

[Paradoxum]

I'm going to appeal to authority here and say that it took something like over 2200 years for deontology (in Kant's view) and consequentialism (John Stuart Mill) to arrive. That's a very long time for the world to writhe on nonexistent ethics. Virtue ethics takes the cake.

Virtue ethics wasn't the only ethical theory around before Kant and Mill. I'd think that divine command theory would have been around (and very important in various places) for many millennium. Consequentialist thinking was also around before Mill. You can't just randomly choose to only count Kant and Mill as the first oppositions to virtue ethics.

I'm not quite sure what point you are trying to make. Without a very good, or perfect, ethical theory everything would fall apart? Even a flawed ethical theory can tell you enough to keep society going. Also, humans existed thousands and thousands of years before Aristotle. So the same argument could be used against virtue ethics being true.

I take virtue ethics as character development according to the different ideals for action that each virtue involves, which necessarily involves plenty of thinking in the moment for determining whether such-and-such an action lines up with such-and-such a virtue. We call this practical reasoning. I read somewhere that a virtue ethicist chooses an action by asking himself, "is this what a virtuous person would do?" Which for me was a meaningless statement for a long time, until I understood Aristotle's notion of character development along the lines of what we would basically call neuroplasticity today: the more you practice something, the more you learn it. What is right action? That action which lines up with the virtues. How does a person become virtuous? By practicing the virtue in question through an application of practical reasoning to the specific situation they are in, attempting to fit how they should act with what they believe is an action on the road to virtue. Why ultimately should we aim to be virtuous?

I disagree with this because I think we should be concerned about others. I fear that such a self-centred ethical theory would justify apathy towards others.

To me seems to lose sight of the problem. The problem with torture isn't that it will make the torturer a bad person, the problem is the victim being forced to scream in agony.

Well, here's where the virtue ethicists have the win over deontologists and consequentialists. Whereas the latter would say we do such-and-such in proportion to how much happiness is brought about externally as a result of our action (presumably the former would say that duty and happiness are potentially independent things, such that a person *should* act in certain ways *regardless of* whether or not these duties coincide with happiness), VE folks emphasize how happiness is a potentially permanent and accreting state for the virtue-practicing soul. Virtue (arete) is excellence, and the more excellent you are (dude) in terms of the assimilation of your choices and actions with the different virtues, the happier you are. So the answer to, "why be virtuous?" is, "because you want to be happy." "Happiness" here is, of course, much different than the vague and arbitrary conceptions of happiness (which is usually superficially designated according to pleasure), and more along the lines of "flourishing", which Aristotle ultimately associated with a life of virtue, but also a bit further with the contemplative or rational soul -- the latter stuff I disagree with a good deal on, but I don't think that's too important.

If morality really makes people happier then such happiness could be given as a reason to be consequentialist or a deontologist too. Considering these two are less self-centred, perhaps they give more happiness.

And a bit more, because in the Aristotelean sense, you not only get happiness, but also beauty by acting in a virtuous way. To my understanding, a virtue is beautiful insofar as it is excellence, and beauty (here I might really be slipping in a Kierkegaardian conception instead of an Aristotelean one) is that which is appreciated for its own sake. When someone says (as they too often don't, unfortunately), "that was a beautiful thing you did," you're referring to the virtue associated with the person's action, as opposed to the sensuous beauty associated with something made up of matter out there in the world. To become virtuous is, in a sense, to become a beautiful person, not in the superficial sensate sense, but in the deeper character sense.

And you could equally say a consequentialist or deontologist is a beautiful person.

Whatever the case, and however many different times I misrepresented his philosophy, Aristotle was a shining star for his incredible brilliance. Virtue ethics is also a great wedding of ethics and *psychology*, and brilliant because it gives us a solid reason for why we should be ethical, including why we should treat other people in good ways: because doing so is associated with happiness. To be a good person both to oneself and other people both earns and is the outcome of a happiness as flourishing.

Be ethical because it makes you happy can be applied to almost any morality in some way (though Kant wouldn't like it).

Perhaps I am moral because it makes me happy, but I'd emphasise that concern for the suffering and violation of others also makes me moral.

 

[Received]

Virtue ethics wasn't the only ethical theory around before Kant and Mill. I'd think that divine command theory would have been around (and very important in various places) for many millennium. Consequentialist thinking was also around before Mill. You can't just randomly choose to only count Kant and Mill as the first oppositions to virtue ethics.

I hope you know I was joking. Okay, maybe that was my work humor.

I disagree with this because I think we should be concerned about others. I fear that such a self-centred ethical theory would justify apathy towards others.

Not if the good is conceived in such a sense where altruism toward another person involves (both creates and is a symptom of) virtuous character. Not sure on the relation to virtue ethics, but along the lines of Camus, doing the right thing can be attributed to beauty: I help others because it is the beautiful thing to do (okay, that actually does sound pretty Aristotelean). To be selfless brings the satisfaction of creating the other person in a beautiful way.

Now think of the alternatives: utilitarianism can perhaps be conceived of as Aristotle without virtue ethics, in that it's about maximizing happiness (which for Aristotle is related to virtuous character) without a concern for the character of the ethical person. So now we have deontology. What your position would mean is being ethical and being unhappy. Why would someone choose to act in any pattern of any way that results in their unhappiness? "Because it's the right thing to do" (duty). To me that doesn't stop there; I do the right thing not only because it's "just" the right thing to do, but because the action has a certain beauty to it, even a sort of intuitive appeal to it -- that, after all, is fitting with Aristotle's teleological view associated with virtue: virtue is excellence in the sense that it's the "end" or "goal" of whatever you're applying virtue to. Aristotle would say that any action which encapsulates this "end" or "goal" or telos is beautiful.

I've got to push this further. Aristotle would hold a person to be of such a virtuous character where altruistic acts in a sense benefit the person committing them -- because this person sees the beauty in the altruistic act he is committing. This beauty coincides with what makes something right, therefore to deontologists what determines our duty; except the deontologists don't consider beauty as part of the equation. Perhaps the dividing difference here with a deontologist and virtue ethicist for any given action is the deontologist would say "duty for the sake of duty," whereas the virtue ethicist would say "not so much duty as a sense of beauty: this action is the better one because it is more virtuous or excellent one, which is a beautiful thing."

To me seems to lose sight of the problem. The problem with torture isn't that it will make the torturer a bad person, the problem is the victim being forced to scream in agony.

The problem with torture is that it represents unvirtuous character -- character that isn't "mature" or at the telos of its kind. It so happens that choosing the beautiful or right or virtuous thing also makes the self beautiful or right or virtuous. In a full understanding of virtue ethics, doing the good or virtuous thing is inextricably related to being a good or virtuous person (in specific instances). It's not just about what makes the person happy (which can be a version of consequentialism), or about what is right/duty (which can be a version of deontology); in the virtuous or good ethical choice in any situation, being happy is tied up with doing the right thing: the happiness of perceiving a beautiful action which is also the best action (given that the action fits the telos).

If morality really makes people happier then such happiness could be given as a reason to be consequentialist or a deontologist too. Considering these two are less self-centred, perhaps they give more happiness.

See above. I think with the consequentialist, happiness is considered too atomically -- seen for each situation without considering the continuity of the character of the self which transcends different situations. With deontology, happiness is only at best coincidental with what is right or should be dutifully done.

Perhaps I am moral because it makes me happy, but I'd emphasise that concern for the suffering and violation of others also makes me moral.

And I would say that even with compassion, I'm acting this way because it's a beautiful thing, which benefits me (if I'm ethically mature enough) and benefits the other person.

 

[Eudaimonist]

IAnd a bit more, because in the Aristotelean sense, you not only get happiness, but also beauty by acting in a virtuous way.

Beauty is a big issue lately at the Fellowship of Reason, which is a philosophical community that emphasizes virtue ethics.

When someone says (as they too often don't, unfortunately), "that was a beautiful thing you did," you're referring to the virtue associated with the person's action, as opposed to the sensuous beauty associated with something made up of matter out there in the world. To become virtuous is, in a sense, to become a beautiful person, not in the superficial sensate sense, but in the deeper character sense.

Yes, that's right. My personal conclusion is to associate beauty with proportionality of character. What is beautiful is harmoniously proportional in the fulfillment of its function. (One might think of "form follows function".) What is harmoniously proportional in the fulfillment of its function is excellent. The Golden Mean is about proportionality, performing a task in its exact measure, and will appear beautiful, at least to reasonably wise persons.

Whatever the case, and however many different times I misrepresented his philosophy, Aristotle was a shining star for his incredible brilliance. Virtue ethics is also a great wedding of ethics and *psychology*, and brilliant because it gives us a solid reason for why we should be ethical, including why we should treat other people in good ways: because doing so is associated with happiness. To be a good person both to oneself and other people both earns and is the outcome of a happiness as flourishing.

I also appreciate that emphasis is placed on the actor across a lifetime, not just analytically on the action in the moment. The retains the wholeness of the person in ethical thought, instead of trying to break things down into tiny pieces, which can miss the forest for the trees.

Great post! Aristotle's ethics is not easy to grok, and you've done a beautiful job.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Eudaimonist]

I disagree with this because I think we should be concerned about others.

Yes, we should. But why? Because that is a part of one's natural function as a human being. Aristotle made a big deal out of us being social beings by nature.

I fear that such a self-centred ethical theory would justify apathy towards others.

Any theory can be misused, including fundamentally other-oriented ones which can justify apathy towards oneself, and even towards some others. Great evil can be done by forcing people to serve some select others, or even by guilting them into it. History is filled with this evil.

One of the great things about Aristotelianism is that it is possible to talk about other-orientedness in moderation (e.g. being generous or charitable in moderation). Without the focus on self, other-orientedness easily become a moral duty to self-destructiveness and a refusal of personal happiness as a legitimate goal for oneself.

To me seems to lose sight of the problem. The problem with torture isn't that it will make the torturer a bad person, the problem is the victim being forced to scream in agony.

Is it?

I'd say that both facts are involved in understanding why torture is wrong. If they weren't both involved, there would be no compelling reason for the torturer to stop. He could simply shrug his shoulders and say: "So what if my victim is screaming in agony? Yes, I fully understand that this is a terrible evil from his perspective in that I am causing him great harm. What does that matter to me?"


eudaimonia,

Mark