What is consciousness?

[Lord Emsworth]

Consciousness is big. It is bigger than you could possibly imagine. It's just not tangible or measurable.

No, I can't agree with that. I don't think that what you are trying to point to is necessarily consciousness, i.e. this intangible, immeasurably something.

Consciousness is a part of us. But it is not this, this, or that. Within whatever you are left with you'd find consciousness. And not somewhere else.

(^^^^ Sorry, I hope that is not too tricky to follow.)

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

Nope, it's a logical fallacy even when you find the results important.

Who is KCfromNC? Let's say he is a student - a student in mathematics - for instance. Now, say he spent too much time during the night watching TV instead of studying. He struggles during the test and one moment finally thinks "what if I cheat" (forget for a moment just how he would accomplish this in the middle of his test). Now, he has a choice whether to follow through on this course or not. What prevents him? There's fear of getting caught of course. But is there anything else? I would say, his identity as student would make it incumbent on him not to cheat because that wholesome decision would maintain his sense of identity, and that is who he is. Else, he ceases to be a student. But this is inconsistent with his acting just as a student in all different respects such as attending University and being assigned grades. So to avoid this inner contradiction within oneself it becomes necessary to endorse or deny certain willings.

In this cases consequences directly reflect on the identity of a person. And a person's identity is not some loose thing that can be easily compromised. Society etches out very definite categories which cannot be eroded by ethical mishap. A doctor can't at the same time be a poisoner, and a therapist can't at the same time be a philanderer as it touches his practice. This is where, I suspect, moral indictments find their force.

Fair enough - the fact that you are an amoral sociopath except for your belief is a good reason to keep believing for all our sakes, but it doesn't make your beliefs true.

How unpresumptuous of you to say so!

But really, you actually miss the point of both my argument as well as what morality really consists of for me. It isn't about belief, but rather identity. The types of identity we all operate under. It is not about me, either. Keep in mind that. I don't know how exactly I would act ethically if I did not have a given practical identity. Chances are I would look more or less normal, the difference being that I would practice what is ethical from the pure standpoint of benefits and "common sense." Ethical propositions would not have any moral force. They would just be rules of thumb or "good advice." My whole point is that morality surpasses "common sense" but is not necessarily in collision with it.

The consequences of those actions. You know, physical harm, being removed from society, death, those kind of things. Humans don't survive all that well in isolation - we need the help of others to really thrive. If we don't follow basic rules of morality, other people aren't going to find it in their interest to help you and you're going to find life difficult.

So let's say that what underlies all moral impetus is the fact of fear, pure and simple. It is out of cowardice that we follow the moral law. Now, is that enough to furnish the moral law - or give ethical weight to ethical propositions? That is what I am arguing against. There is something else. There is an obliging force which accompanies moral propositions and differs wholly and completely from any 'common sense' directives.

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

Choice-worthy has nothing to do with desire. If something is worthy of choice, it is something that is good for oneself. In other words, it is not merely chosen (or desired), it is worthy of choice (or desirable). I'm an ethical naturalist, not a moral subjectivist.

I think we are on complete opposite poles of the spectrum, then. I suspect that morality is something completely subjective - springing from the legislating will of an authority who is qualified to administer the moral law in his identity as perfect Law-giver. All other concerns of the "good" or "desirable" are merely peripheral matters that do not touch on the inherent force of what morality truly consists of.... Of course, I'm not saying that these peripheral matters should be dispensed with, or that morality should be shorn of all content. What I think is that if you want actual law instead of simply "rules" you need the will of a subjective being backing it.

You don't buy it? Or you don't understand it?
Human maturation is an example of the actualization of human potentials. Children have the potential to become adults. The actualization of the child's potential for adulthood could be called "growth". This is just an obvious example. We may grow in many ways, not just physically.

I understand that we change as humans. There is a sort of goal-directedness most of us take to exist. Though whether that is merely the outcome of contingency and no real “purpose” exists (as I suspect) or the actual template of an eternal Telos or universal end which various beings attend to, I can’t say for certain. In any case, I don’t see how or why anyone would be interested in grounding ethics by hooking it to this actualization of potential. What if my actualization of potential consists of becoming a punk rocker who snorts cocaine and abuses groupies?

That, and the fact that it is individuals that actualize their potentials. IOWs, flourishing as a process pertains to individuals.

Why should you side with flourishing as opposed to non-flourishing?

We benefit from the uniqueness of others. If I have a talent for physics, and you have a talent for engineering, together we may achieve what either of us alone cannot. Generally speaking, our respective efforts to live a good life do not require conflict. Our human capacity to use reason and language to coordinate our activities mean that we can cooperate, trade, share, or agree to leave each other alone.

All that sounds very exciting but I just do not see what any of it has to do with morality in the sense (not that it is bereft of such content as ‘benefiting&#8217 but that it does not have obliging force or demands of us that we live moral lives instead of just counsels us that we do so, us taking that counsel as it pleases us.

That's a very odd thing to say. Morality has nothing to do with identifying what is worthy of choice? Or ethical standards? You must have a very odd view of morality.

Yes, this is where I find myself in a bit of a conundrum as to where I can say the source of my morality really comes from. It can’t be strictly speaking from what is “good” out there. It has to spring from the subjective will of a law-giver, preferably God. But at the same time, God is not arbitrary and follows some kind of 'natural law.'

Though I would have to look the video over some more, I have the sense that I am more of subjectivist than a naturalist. But I do believe ethical propositions are real and not merely the effects of our emotions, so I would be a cognitivist.

 

[KCfromNC]

...

Again, none of this has anything to do with the idea of "I wouldn't be happy if X were true therefore X must be true" not being a logical fallacy. All it means is that despite your claims, there are very good reason to act ethically even if there's no magical soul which survives death - namely the real world consequences of our actions.

Ethical propositions would not have any moral force. They would just be rules of thumb or "good advice." My whole point is that morality surpasses "common sense" but is not necessarily in collision with it.

Yep, so we both agree that you're better off believing that there's some magic about consciousness in order to keep your behavior in line. That's cool, we'll both be happier if you behave yourself, but it doesn't make the magic any more real.

So let's say that what underlies all moral impetus is the fact of fear, pure and simple. It is out of cowardice that we follow the moral law. Now, is that enough to furnish the moral law - or give ethical weight to ethical propositions?

Sure, at least for Christianity where fear of going to hell and eternal punishement is the stick motivating good behavior.

That is what I am arguing against. There is something else. There is an obliging force which accompanies moral propositions and differs wholly and completely from any 'common sense' directives.

Proof of this claim?

 

[TScott]

The red you see may be a secondary property insofar as the external object is concerned, but it is a primary property of your brain.

Actually if you read the wiki article you cited you will find that primary and secondary properties are similar to the dual aspects discussed up thread. the article concludes:

"Primary qualities are measurable aspects of physical reality. Secondary qualities are subjective."

Wouldn't you agree that this is similar to the dual aspects of physical properties and experiential properties?

 

[TScott]

Consciousness is a part of us. But it is not this, this, or that. Within whatever you are left with you'd find consciousness. And not somewhere else.

(^^^^ Sorry, I hope that is not too tricky to follow.)

I don't follow.

 

[Eudaimonist]

In any case, I don’t see how or why anyone would be interested in grounding ethics by hooking it to this actualization of potential.

There is a long tradition of this in virtue ethics.

What if my actualization of potential consists of becoming a punk rocker who snorts cocaine and abuses groupies?

What you are describing is a self-destructive lifestyle, not something that would be beneficial for human beings.

Why should you side with flourishing as opposed to non-flourishing?

There are many ways I can answer such a question. I side with flourishing because it is in one's best-interests as a human being. Flourishing basically refers to the excellent and complete achievement of good values for a human being. So, I'm siding with success instead of failure.

All that sounds very exciting but I just do not see what any of it has to do with morality in the sense (not that it is bereft of such content as ‘benefiting’) but that it does not have obliging force or demands of us that we live moral lives instead of just counsels us that we do so, us taking that counsel as it pleases us.

Anyone can take anything casually -- even demands. But this is besides the point. The point is that if you misprioritize your values, you are acting in a way that isn't justified. You have no excuse. You are failing to do what you ought to do.

Yes, this is where I find myself in a bit of a conundrum as to where I can say the source of my morality really comes from. It can’t be strictly speaking from what is “good” out there. It has to spring from the subjective will of a law-giver, preferably God. But at the same time, God is not arbitrary and follows some kind of 'natural law.'

I fail to see why I should take the subjective will of any being as anything other than "counsel". What does it matter if God follows some kind of natural law? What does that add to the situation?


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

Again, none of this has anything to do with the idea of "I wouldn't be happy if X were true therefore X must be true" not being a logical fallacy. All it means is that despite your claims, there are very good reason to act ethically even if there's no magical soul which survives death - namely the real world consequences of our actions.

Oh, sure. There might be "good reasons" to do one thing over another. But that's simply not what I think of when I think of morality. What about if a psychopath dispenses with "common sense" reasons because they don't suit him? What would you say to him to bring him back "to reality." Nothing, I suppose. There's nothing you can say to psychopaths to change them. Well, how about just a hardened criminal? He wants to go back to prison so he commits a petty crime. How do you dissuade? And, if you can't dissuade, what right do you have to, what sanction in particular, that he should be moral?

Yep, so we both agree that you're better off believing that there's some magic about consciousness in order to keep your behavior in line. That's cool, we'll both be happier if you behave yourself, but it doesn't make the magic any more real.

The "magic" of consciousness, would only be one reason, stemming from one's practical identity, as to how he should act. Another would be various sanctions placed on morality such that it has the force that it does, and not just because it gives us good advice we may take or deny at our leisure.

Sure, at least for Christianity where fear of going to hell and eternal punishement is the stick motivating good behavior.

Proof of this claim?

Those would be a type of sanction. But there are other types of sanctions which don't have anything to do with punishment but rather the degree of authoritativeness they spring from.

This is hard to explain, but I feel confident that I've made a start.

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

What you are describing is a self-destructive lifestyle, not something that would be beneficial for human beings.

That's exactly my point. Who cares if it is beneficial for humans? What if we just are not gifted with those altruistic sentiments? Why isn't a self-destructive lifestyle moral just because I hurt myself and potentially others? People get hurt all the time.

There are many ways I can answer such a question. I side with flourishing because it is in one's best-interests as a human being. Flourishing basically refers to the excellent and complete achievement of good values for a human being. So, I'm siding with success instead of failure.

So why should success be correlated with morality? Isn't the most ruthless and uncompromising person who forgets ethics the most successful? I just don't see the bridge being made here: yes, morality does lead to good things but why should those same good things serve as a prop for morality? You can say the same thing for any 'good' things human beings judge to be good that really aren't. Since there is no substantive difference between your project and theirs, what is the "extra ingredient" in your argument that makes your ends, goals, actualizations any better than the extreme individualist's?

Anyone can take anything casually -- even demands. But this is besides the point. The point is that if you misprioritize your values, you are acting in a way that isn't justified. You have no excuse. You are failing to do what you ought to do.

Why should I heed anything you say? Are you an authoritative individual who has the right, the sanction, to enunciate such propositions? Why should I take them as true? This is not obvious. As far as I can tell, I have infinite excuses, because it has not been demonstrated to me why I am failing to do what I ought to do.

I fail to see why I should take the subjective will of any being as anything other than "counsel". What does it matter if God follows some kind of natural law? What does that add to the situation?

eudaimonia,

Mark

Well, God following a form of natural law would not make his decrees arbitrary. They would be given a content you and I could agree upon. However, when it comes to behaving as you "ought" to behave a subjective will is necessary because in all instances of law-giving there is a command present. Imperatives can only spring from the 'I' of a person. Even state laws are ratified by judges and so on. Now, it comes to the point at which one is disillusioned by human authorities. One questions whether they have the right, the sanction, to order and command people in a law-like way. This is similarly the case with yourself. You say that I should follow the moral law. But I do not believe in your imperatives; they lack real authority. So I look to other sources of authority which are more authoritative; namely, God's.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Actually if you read the wiki article you cited you will find that primary and secondary properties are similar to the dual aspects discussed up thread. the article concludes:

"Primary qualities are measurable aspects of physical reality. Secondary qualities are subjective."

Wouldn't you agree that this is similar to the dual aspects of physical properties and experiential properties?

There is an overlap though, for instance we might experience primary properties such as extention in space.

Also experiential properties are physical properties, assuming that the mind is physical.

 

[Eudaimonist]

That's exactly my point. Who cares if it is beneficial for humans?

You don't have to care, but you should. It's in your own best interests.

This is the only reason that can be given, and it is enough. It's like the following discussion between a mother and child:

Child: But why should I eat my broccoli?
Mother: Because it is good for you.

There is no deeper prescriptive ethical answer that can be given, or need be given. This is precisely the point of why one should do anything.

Of course, the mother can provide nutritional facts, and biological facts regarding nutrition, but these aren't prescriptive statements, but rather statements of fact. Having identified that broccoli is beneficial for human life, the statement "because it is good for you" is precisely the correct prescriptive answer for the child.

What if we just are not gifted with those altruistic sentiments?

I never mentioned sentiments.

Why isn't a self-destructive lifestyle moral just because I hurt myself and potentially others? People get hurt all the time.

I can't take this kind of question seriously.

So why should success be correlated with morality?

By success, I don't mean conventional cultural notions of success, such as success at a profession. I mean success at achieving one's good.

You can say the same thing for any 'good' things human beings judge to be good that really aren't.

Why would I say any such thing? I'm talking about real goods, not fake ones.

Since there is no substantive difference between your project and theirs

You are confusing me for a moral subjectivist. There is a substantive difference between my "project" and moral subjectivism.

what is the "extra ingredient" in your argument that makes your ends, goals, actualizations any better than the extreme individualist's?

Mine is based on the reality of human nature, in particular our social nature.

Why should I heed anything you say?

Why should you heed anything someone else has to say? Please ponder that.

Are you an authoritative individual who has the right, the sanction, to enunciate such propositions?

You are just being silly here. It doesn't matter who I am, and you are certainly free to disagree with my understanding of what is good for human beings. But this isn't the point. You don't have to believe that I have everything correct in order to see that some form of moral realism is true.

Why should I take them as true? This is not obvious.

Of course not, since a complete explanation and defense would take an entire book. However, I do think that if you try, you may have an insight into the matter.

As far as I can tell, I have infinite excuses

You apparently do!

Well, God following a form of natural law would not make his decrees arbitrary. They would be given a content you and I could agree upon.

What would we be agreeing on?

However, when it comes to behaving as you "ought" to behave a subjective will is necessary because in all instances of law-giving there is a command present.

You sound like a noncognitivist. What you describe here sounds like some sort of prescriptivism. No wonder we aren't connecting in this discussion!

In my view, commands are entirely irrelevant to ethics. Why should I heed any command? What does a command add to the situation? A loud booming voice?

You say that I should follow the moral law. But I do not believe in your imperatives; they lack real authority. So I look to other sources of authority which are more authoritative; namely, God's.

What makes God's authority more "authoritative"? Authoritative about what?


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

You don't have to care, but you should. It's in your own best interests.

That is contradictory.

This is the only reason that can be given, and it is enough. It's like the following discussion between a mother and child:

Child: But why should I eat my broccoli?
Mother: Because it is good for you.

There is no deeper prescriptive ethical answer that can be given, or need be given. This is precisely the point of why one should do anything.

That is your own viewpoint. My view differs. I think there is a deeper prescriptive ethical answer on the basis that imperatives spring from the will of a law-bringer. That's why they are actually 'prescriptive' and not merely 'descriptive' of certain affairs such as do A and B will happen, or something to that effect.

Of course, the mother can provide nutritional facts, and biological facts regarding nutrition, but these aren't prescriptive statements, but rather statements of fact. Having identified that broccoli is beneficial for human life, the statement "because it is good for you" is precisely the correct prescriptive answer for the child.

You can't get an ought out of an is, unfortunately. So your project is fundamentally doomed here. You can't say there is a real prescriptive answer here. Only that it is common sense to eat the broccoli.

I never mentioned sentiments.

You didn't have to. Your entire so-called prescriptive enterprise is built from the ground up of certain sentiments, which apparently reveal the truth or falsity of moral claims. So it is not good or moral for me to grow up to become a gangster, even though that is exactly where my life tends, but it is good and moral for me to grow up to be a lawyer, or something. What discriminates the two projects is merely sentiment, nothing more. You presuppose it, at the least.

I can't take this kind of question seriously.

Then you skirt the issue, unfortunately.

By success, I don't mean conventional cultural notions of success, such as success at a profession. I mean success at achieving one's good.

And here is verily the crux of the matter. How does the 'good' substantially differ from mere "cultural notions of success." Why is being healthy (which some cultures applaud) anymore absolute a measure of the 'true good' rather than a culture which practices self-mutilation? All you have to tell me is one is a 'fake' good and the other is a true one, but that is a nonsense answer and you know it!

On the other hand, if there is an actual imperative such that it springs from the will of a law-giver, then arbitrariness is curbed, because the law-giver does not assent to all kinds of actions but, as judge, gives his willing assent to only one sort of 'good' and thus actualizes it as good. Commands are then ratified as laws and not merely as good advice.

Why would I say any such thing? I'm talking about real goods, not fake ones.

Again, how do you differentiate?

You are confusing me for a moral subjectivist. There is a substantive difference between my "project" and moral subjectivism.

I know, you stake your claim on the nature of the world, or inherent values. But that is not enough, as I can see, for establishing the normative, prescriptive claim of morality.

Mine is based on the reality of human nature, in particular our social nature.

And there is nothing wrong with that, as far as I can see. I don't think we should abandon the facts of human nature or neglect them. But in order to give added force and meaning to claims, we need to pass beyond mere "is" and find an "ought." And an "ought" can only be found in the subjective will of an agent. Preferably someone omnscient, who knows and understands nature top-to-bottom. Someone in a position to really know the truth.

Why should you heed anything someone else has to say? Please ponder that.

Because they have some degree of authoritativeness we should pay heed to on the very basis that people listen to them. The example of high school is one I always like to give. Why did we heed our teachers? Because they knew better than we did and on that basis had a degree of authority which trumped our own. They also have the sanction to punish us, which is the proof of their own power.

Just so, when it comes to the highest possible authority, we should take heed because His knowledge trumps our own.

You are just being silly here. It doesn't matter who I am, and you are certainly free to disagree with my understanding of what is good for human beings. But this isn't the point. You don't have to believe that I have everything correct in order to see that some form of moral realism is true.

Excuse me? I shouldn't care about who you are? Well, what if you are someone not interested in the truth but to lead me astray? A perfect authority would also be a perfect source of knowledge. And if he were omniscient that would include ethical propositions. On the other hand, someone else would not be in the same qualitative position.

As for moral realism, I do not believe there is such a thing. To smuggle in moral 'oughts' in terms of natural 'isses' is not sufficient to establish the truth of morality because one could always either a) show that the interpretation is faulty and that the type of teleology in question is an illusion, or b) show that even if there is a certain teleological connection between actions and their goals, this does nothing to absolutely furnish grounds for doing said actions.

Of course not, since a complete explanation and defense would take an entire book. However, I do think that if you try, you may have an insight into the matter.

Of course, that's why we debate!

You apparently do!

Actually, I don't. But not for the reasons you think. It's because there is a higher authority over and above my head who gives me moral prescriptives because he knows what is best for me and all the rest of us, thus being in a position to make his commands laws, and not merely commands.

What would we be agreeing on?

The particular moral rightness or wrongness of certain actions. Not using the same criteria of course, but agreeing all the same as to their wrongness in commission.

You sound like a noncognitivist. What you describe here sounds like some sort of prescriptivism. No wonder we aren't connecting in this discussion!

Not at all. Murder is wrong. Not because my emotions tell me, but because that statement is true. Now, why it is true is the question. And the answer is, a subjective will causes it to be true.

In my view, commands are entirely irrelevant to ethics. Why should I heed any command? What does a command add to the situation? A loud booming voice?

What makes God's authority more "authoritative"? Authoritative about what?

eudaimonia,

Mark

Ultimately, it all boils down to authoritativeness. Why do you assent to the laws of the state? Is it merely because you are frightened of them? Or do you accept their authority and on that basis lead a legal, as opposed to illegal, existence? The same way you listen to your teachers, your mentors and your peers. You do the things they tell you, even when it may seem beside the point, because they have a certain sanction over you. Not only that, but you have a certain sanction over YOURSELF. You will certain things, according to your own will. When you decide upon a certain thing, that becomes inviolable because you willed it. You might also say "because it's right!" But that's beside the point of your willing its specifically moral good. It's good because it ought to be willed as moral good, ultimately. The will is paramount. It is like a highlighter which enlightens certain words. The words don't change. But they are brought to moral power. They are made true or false on that basis.

 

[Eudaimonist]

That is contradictory.

No, what I meant by saying that you don't have to care is that nothing is forcing you to care. If you are resolutely apathetic, no ethical argument can force you to care. You, however, should care because it is in your best interests to care.

That is your own viewpoint.

Actually, this example of the brocolli is what I was told by Douglas Rasmussen, a neo-Aristotlian philosopher, in a private email communication. You could say that it is his viewpoint, although I think it is a great insight.

My view differs.

Obviously, or we would share far more similar views.

I think there is a deeper prescriptive ethical answer on the basis that imperatives spring from the will of a law-bringer.

That's utterly bizarre to me. But noted.

You can't get an ought out of an is, unfortunately.

Yes, you can. Fortunately.

David Hume (the source of this mantra) only showed that one can't justify an ought from an is using purely deductive logic. He never showed that it couldn't be done in any way.

You can't say there is a real prescriptive answer here. Only that it is common sense to eat the broccoli.

It's more than commonsense. It's good for you.

I don't intend to beat a dead horse, so I will leave this issue for now.

So it is not good or moral for me to grow up to become a gangster, even though that is exactly where my life tends, but it is good and moral for me to grow up to be a lawyer, or something. What discriminates the two projects is merely sentiment, nothing more.

No, not sentiment. The nature of the values involved. Do those values nourish your life? Or are they fundamentally self-destructive?

Sentiment has nothing to do with it.

Then you skirt the issue, unfortunately.

What issue? Saying that "people get hurt all the time" says nothing about the desirability of hurting others. There is no serious issue present.

And here is verily the crux of the matter. How does the 'good' substantially differ from mere "cultural notions of success." Why is being healthy (which some cultures applaud) anymore absolute a measure of the 'true good' rather than a culture which practices self-mutilation? All you have to tell me is one is a 'fake' good and the other is a true one, but that is a nonsense answer and you know it!

You are the one speaking nonsense. What does it matter what a culture happens to practice? What matters is what there is such a thing as human well-being that transcends cultural opinion, just as there is such a thing as physical health that transcends cultural opinion. That is the insight you need to make.

On the other hand, if there is an actual imperative such that it springs from the will of a law-giver, then arbitrariness is curbed, because the law-giver does not assent to all kinds of actions but, as judge, gives his willing assent to only one sort of 'good' and thus actualizes it as good. Commands are then ratified as laws and not merely as good advice.

Law-givers don't make anything good. Laws are at best good advice that happen to be backed by guns and threats. The guns and threats don't add anything. Without them, the laws (if they are good laws) are just as beneficial and therefore just as desirable and deserving of our support.

And there is nothing wrong with that, as far as I can see. I don't think we should abandon the facts of human nature or neglect them. But in order to give added force and meaning to claims, we need to pass beyond mere "is" and find an "ought." And an "ought" can only be found in the subjective will of an agent. Preferably someone omnscient, who knows and understands nature top-to-bottom. Someone in a position to really know the truth.

The truth about... what?

If your problem with ethical naturalism is the issue of knowledge alone, then you could actually be an ethical naturalist who tries to put God in the place of a human philosopher who relates what is nourishing for human life. God simply becomes an uber-philosopher. But is he advising human beings on that is good for them by nature, or is he simply SHOUTING REALLY LOUDLY?

Because they have some degree of authoritativeness we should pay heed to on the very basis that people listen to them. The example of high school is one I always like to give. Why did we heed our teachers? Because they knew better than we did and on that basis had a degree of authority which trumped our own.

Okay, so they "know more". That would be helpful, but it doesn't explain what a divine ethicist knows that should matter to us as human beings.

They also have the sanction to punish us, which is the proof of their own power.

Power never proves anything about ethics, or else Big Brother really would have more moral authority than Winston Smith.

Just so, when it comes to the highest possible authority, we should take heed because His knowledge trumps our own.

Knowledge of what?

Excuse me? I shouldn't care about who you are? Well, what if you are someone not interested in the truth but to lead me astray?

Then don't talk with me. The only reason I'm talking with you is because I know that I'm interested in the truth, and I believe that you are (until proven otherwise), and so it is worthwhile to have a philosophical discussion. Even though your ideas are bizarre to me, I accept that as normal in philosophical discussion, and so I have no reason to doubt your sincerity.

Ask yourself this: Does it matter who I am if I were to tell you that the Earth is round instead of flat like a pancake? What does it matter who I am? What matters is that there are reasons to think that the Earth is round instead of flat like a pancake.

What if I were a flat-earther who tried to lead you astray by trying to convince you that the Earth was round? Would that make me wrong? The reasons are what matters, not the person.

Actually, I don't. But not for the reasons you think. It's because there is a higher authority over and above my head who gives me moral prescriptives because he knows what is best for me and all the rest of us, thus being in a position to make his commands laws, and not merely commands.

Hold on! What does that bolded part mean? And after you criticized my views about ethical prescription being ultimately based on what is in people's best interests?

Not at all. Murder is wrong. Not because my emotions tell me, but because that statement is true.

Same with me. I am a cognitivist, like you, I suppose.

Now, why it is true is the question. And the answer is, a subjective will causes it to be true.

Causes it to be true? Why does truth need to be "caused"? Why isn't it simply true?

Ultimately, it all boils down to authoritativeness. Why do you assent to the laws of the state? Is it merely because you are frightened of them? Or do you accept their authority and on that basis lead a legal, as opposed to illegal, existence?

Why? Because of my ethical naturalism, and only because I have lived in reasonably free nations that are still based to some extent on natural rights that stem from my ethical views.

If I were to live in Big Brother's totalitarian nation, I would either assent to laws of the State because I was frightened of Big Brother, or I would be brave (or foolish) like Winston Smith and seek to undermine the State.

Authoritativeness means nothing here. I do not see myself as a passive victim of authority.

The same way you listen to your teachers, your mentors and your peers.

Do I listen to them? No, I consider what they have to say, but I want to know for myself why I should independently come to the same conclusions as they, and why it is that those conclusions should influence my actions in life. I don't assume that they have any authority. Only my own judgment has authority, and only to the extent to which my judgment involves clear reasoning about the facts of reality. The ultimate ethical authority, if authority is the right word, is my nature as a human being.

You do the things they tell you

LOL! No, I use my own judgment about what to do or not do.

Not only that, but you have a certain sanction over YOURSELF. You will certain things, according to your own will. When you decide upon a certain thing, that becomes inviolable because you willed it. You might also say "because it's right!" But that's beside the point of your willing its specifically moral good.

I have no idea what you are talking about. What does it mean to say that something willed becomes "inviolable"? It is very violable, even by myself. For instance, I could change my mind and do something else, even to undo the effects of what I had done in some fashion. And will does not justify my actions -- only a moral good can do so.

It's good because it ought to be willed as moral good, ultimately. The will is paramount.

As far as I can tell, will is only a means, not an end or a justification. Are you at all influenced by Nietzsche's views on will, incidentally?

It is like a highlighter which enlightens certain words. The words don't change. But they are brought to moral power. They are made true or false on that basis.

Made true or false? By an act of will? I can't make any sense of this argument.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

No, what I meant by saying that you don't have to care is that nothing is forcing you to care. If you are resolutely apathetic, no ethical argument can force you to care. You, however, should care because it is in your best interests to care.

Very well. If you mean by "forcing" someone holding a gun to my head, then of course ethical arguments don't do that. If, on the other hand, you are saying that ethical arguments lack force, and that they don't indeed obligate, I would disagree and say that some in fact do...

Actually, this example of the brocolli is what I was told by Douglas Rasmussen, a neo-Aristotlian philosopher, in a private email communication. You could say that it is his viewpoint, although I think it is a great insight.

I don't see what's so profound about it, personally. But, then again, you probably don't see what's so interesting about my moral voluntarism.

Obviously, or we would share far more similar views.

Yes, and I actually hope not to draw any bad blood between us (I think that's the right expression...) I hope in disagreement we can argue without quarrelloing.

That's utterly bizarre to me. But noted.

The idea has a long lineage, actually. See Hobbes and Pufendorf.

Yes, you can. Fortunately.

David Hume (the source of this mantra) only showed that one can't justify an ought from an is using purely deductive logic. He never showed that it couldn't be done in any way.

Hmm. Let's see. If I continue walking in a straight line I can have, assurance?, that the next step will be solid ground on the basis of inductive reasoning?

How would you apply this to moral thought?

It's more than commonsense. It's good for you.

I don't intend to beat a dead horse, so I will leave this issue for now.

It is good for you. But then, a lot of things are good for you. Being a health-nut is good for you. Others would say that that's a bit imbalanced. I still think we are dealing firmly in the realm of opinion here.

No, not sentiment. The nature of the values involved. Do those values nourish your life? Or are they fundamentally self-destructive?

Sentiment has nothing to do with it.

But "nourish your life" is left vague here. People's ideas of what values nourish their lives differ, as you must know. People are drawn to different things based on their preferences and psycho-physical constitution. Which are driven by, guess what, sentiments!

I suppose in your concrete example of brocolli, this is more easily analyzable. Yes, the brocolli will further one's bodily and even mental well-being. In that case I suppose it is "moral" to ingest the brocolli as opposed to a bunch of skittles. But down the road, if one is a teen say, and wants to make lunch for his friends, and he decides to pack it with junk food instead of carrots and radishes because that will "nourish" his social life, who are you to say one form of nourishment is better than any other?

The point is, we devolve into opinion and sentiment REALLY fast here.

What issue? Saying that "people get hurt all the time" says nothing about the desirability of hurting others. There is no serious issue present.

But there is a serious issue present here regarding how I decide to live my life. I may not desire to hurt anyone, but it may so happen that I may choose a lifestyle in which the hurting of others becomes a real possibility. Say, if I chose to become a vigilante, or if I chose to race cars on the high way. You may say that those activities are not conducive to the "flourishing" of the human race, but I may retort that it is conducive to the flourishing of my career, my social milieu, the good of a small community, or that it sets a worthy cultural precedent.

These are all factors you can't fit into your fundamentalistic view of "flourishing."

You are the one speaking nonsense. What does it matter what a culture happens to practice? What matters is what there is such a thing as human well-being that transcends cultural opinion, just as there is such a thing as physical health that transcends cultural opinion. That is the insight you need to make.

The insight is made and forthwith dispensed with. There is "universal" human well-being but also "particularistic" human well-being. There are of course things we may agree on as flourishing or not-flourishing in concrete real examples (health as you say comes to mind). But this is just one example, others being far more indeterminate regarding what "flourishing" really entails. And even with health things are not so clear cut. My uncle smokes. I tell him he's wrecking his health. But on the plus side he tells me it resolves his sinuses like no other thing and also helps with his depression immensely. Not only that but all his friends smoke and without that social mileu he would simply be on his butt watching tv all day instead of, I don't know, bowling and playing pool.

I will get to the rest of what you wrote in a bit.

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

Law-givers don't make anything good. Laws are at best good advice that happen to be backed by guns and threats. The guns and threats don't add anything. Without them, the laws (if they are good laws) are just as beneficial and therefore just as desirable and deserving of our support.

Actually, they wouldn't be. Deserving of our support, that is. For though they might be beneficial, since there is no sanction, no backing behind the laws, that means there is no law-giver with the authority to make those laws effective or enforceable. Thus, the laws are no longer laws, properly speaking. If laws do not exist, then the categories "good" and "bad" are bereft of any prescriptive meaning.

The truth about... what?

Now here is where I become something of a Divine-Command Theorist. The truth I am referring to here is roughly ethical truth, ethical propositions... I say so roughly though because of course ethics is a complicated affair which must take various factors into consideration... This is in spite of the fact that what is ethical stems solely from the will of God judging certain actions to be moral as opposed to immoral. God's own will is informed by facts, but those facts do not themselves bear on morality.

If your problem with ethical naturalism is the issue of knowledge alone, then you could actually be an ethical naturalist who tries to put God in the place of a human philosopher who relates what is nourishing for human life. God simply becomes an uber-philosopher. But is he advising human beings on that is good for them by nature, or is he simply SHOUTING REALLY LOUDLY?

Neither. He judges reality a certain way because he sees it better than you or I. And on that basis he is in possession of the authority to judge certain things as bad or good, thus making them bad or good. Now, an ambiguity might here arise as to how God exactly judges. What makes a moral proposition true is the will of God causing it to be true by virtue of his assent. Why he assents though, is in my view a subsidiary matter. What is primary is his action of assent. That's it.

Okay, so they "know more". That would be helpful, but it doesn't explain what a divine ethicist knows that should matter to us as human beings.

What matters is morality. And morality has its source in one thing and one thing only: the will of an agent. I have already maintained this, that what makes anything moral is its being willed by a certain other who has the authority to do so. Sanctions (like the ability to punish) are an indicator of this authority but are by no means the only kind. I would also say omniscience is another. As well as omnibenevolence.

I do understand though, why this might be difficult to grasp. I will try to explain why shortly.

Power never proves anything about ethics, or else Big Brother really would have more moral authority than Winston Smith.

Power is an essential ingredient. But it would be a mistake to assume that just anyone with power has the right to ground the moral law. That is not what I am saying, and I will get to why briefly.

 

[Forge3]

awareness including our senses and our intellect.

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

Continuing...

Knowledge of what?

Like I said, the understanding that goes into judging certain cases right or wrong. We can't judge as well as God can. Hence, he is the ultimate judge.

Then don't talk with me. The only reason I'm talking with you is because I know that I'm interested in the truth, and I believe that you are (until proven otherwise), and so it is worthwhile to have a philosophical discussion. Even though your ideas are bizarre to me, I accept that as normal in philosophical discussion, and so I have no reason to doubt your sincerity.

Thank you for not doubting my sincerity and also please do not take it personally that I don't "trust" you or something. I was simply pointing out that it's relevant where you get your facts from because someone, anyone, can be in possession of false information whether they know it or not. That's why the issue of authority is again crucial.

Ask yourself this: Does it matter who I am if I were to tell you that the Earth is round instead of flat like a pancake? What does it matter who I am? What matters is that there are reasons to think that the Earth is round instead of flat like a pancake.

Well, yes, actually. I'm bad at math, say. I've never calculated myself that the earth is round instead of flat. And let's say all the authorities who are supposed to know these matters have lied to me; they were in fact, false authorities. If someone came to me who I otherwise respected and whispered into my ear that there was this conspiracy, and gave me convincing proofs of why he thought the way he did, I would at least begin to pay attention.

Besides, this is a fairly clear-cut example of what we take to be "common sense." It in no way touches subjects which are far more complex and ambiguous in scope, such as say morality...

What if I were a flat-earther who tried to lead you astray by trying to convince you that the Earth was round? Would that make me wrong? The reasons are what matters, not the person.

Reasons do matter. But, given the plethora of competing claims and ambiguous answers which are out there, we naturally first look to authorities. A professor in biology who's written hundreds of articles to scholarly journals is a much greater authority on evolution than some smarmy cynic who lampoons creationism simply on the basis that it's unpopular. The problem with human beings is that we have a poor fund of facts. Thus, it makes the most sense to us to go to those sources of facts which are least fallible; ergo, most authoritative.

I postulate that the Highest authority is God, and the He is vital in explaining morality. This is because even the highest human authority doesn't know what to think or do in the worst of situations. Nor can he be proven right, that his own pet moral theory is the "correct" one among many, many different kinds of competing ones.

Hold on! What does that bolded part mean? what is best for me and all the rest of us And after you criticized my views about ethical prescription being ultimately based on what is in people's best interests?

What I meant is something quite different in kind from your own view to what is 'best.' In my view what is 'best' is not what enhances or adds to anyone or anything's flourishing (though that may very well be an accidental feature in consequence of the best). Rather, what I meant by "best" is that the moral status of the good, which is actualized in people's right conduct, is preserved and not compromised.

For example, let's say that God knows that sacrificing an infant on the altar of Moloch is wrong. The high priest of the Moloch sect thinks differently, and goes against that prescriptive. Since the good is what God wills, the priest can't possibly be in the right. But let's say that someone comes along and tries to justify the sacrifice by saying that it will lead to much needed rain for crops, thus saving the Moloch nation. Well now, we have a cogent reason to resume the sacrifice! Unfortunately, God knows better, in fact he knows best, and so scraps this justifying reason as illegitimate. On the opposite side there is reason not to sacrifice the child, too. Namely, because the child's parents will be distraught. That reason is preserved as legitimate, in consequence of God's will. But it is not the determining moral factor; God's will is.

Same with me. I am a cognitivist, like you, I suppose.

Murder is wrong is true. And all attending reasons and implications stemming from that proposition are vouchsafed, thanks to its truth.

Causes it to be true? Why does truth need to be "caused"? Why isn't it simply true?

This certainly deserves a well-thought out reply, but here I haven't figured it out completely. One fruitful way of looking at it is, nothing self-subsists in and of itself. Truthful propositions find their source of truth in something higher and not exhaustive of themselves. In the same way that you might hold a marble in your hand, just so God maintains the truth of certain propositions due to his assenting will.

This is true enough when it comes to the correspondence theory of truth. "A cat is on the mat" is then dependent on an actual referent that matches said description. Well, in the same way "Murder is wrong" depends on an agent willing this fact as true.

Why? Because of my ethical naturalism, and only because I have lived in reasonably free nations that are still based to some extent on natural rights that stem from my ethical views.

If I were to live in Big Brother's totalitarian nation, I would either assent to laws of the State because I was frightened of Big Brother, or I would be brave (or foolish) like Winston Smith and seek to undermine the State.

Authoritativeness means nothing here. I do not see myself as a passive victim of authority.

And this all just goes to show how widely different our respective views to morality are. I see your ethic as one which is provisional, on the basis of certain facts of nature. Mine is absolute, and accustoms itself to nature.

Do I listen to them? No, I consider what they have to say, but I want to know for myself why I should independently come to the same conclusions as they, and why it is that those conclusions should influence my actions in life. I don't assume that they have any authority. Only my own judgment has authority, and only to the extent to which my judgment involves clear reasoning about the facts of reality. The ultimate ethical authority, if authority is the right word, is my nature as a human being.

Let's say someone yells to you on the street: "Stop!" Why do you stop? Think about it carefully. Is it because you went through a monologue reasoning as to why you stopped, or did you do it simply on the basis that it was asked of you to do so? My view is that, the human mind sees reasons for action as public, not private. It is only after the reflective stages of questioning that human beings start to doubt this state of affairs, various authorities, that they lose this inherent appreciation for public reasons and go off "on their own" so to say.

LOL! No, I use my own judgment about what to do or not do.

I highly doubt you do so on a continuous basis in every instance of judgement. Actually, I can bet good money that you don't.

I have no idea what you are talking about. What does it mean to say that something willed becomes "inviolable"? It is very violable, even by myself. For instance, I could change my mind and do something else, even to undo the effects of what I had done in some fashion. And will does not justify my actions -- only a moral good can do so.

You cannot change your mind in the same instance, only after reflexively "changing" your mind. Once you will something in a given state of mind that assents to that course, that action is inviolable. It's only when you literally do change your mind (meaning your own relationship to the thing you willed) that it becomes different.

A moral good is synonymous with will, because you will the moral good. You cannot do anything but will the moral good. The moral good has to do with the will and whether your will accepts it or refuses it on the basis that it (the will) finds it despicable or praiseworthy. Even as an ethical naturalist you must admit this, because judgments always redound back to one thing: the will.

As far as I can tell, will is only a means, not an end or a justification. Are you at all influenced by Nietzsche's views on will, incidentally?

The will is its own end and justification. On the contrary, Nature is but a means for the will's end. We have it reversed.

As for Nietzsche, well, he's interesting but I don't know what to make of him as of now.

Made true or false? By an act of will? I can't make any sense of this argument.


eudaimonia,

Mark

Why do you judge that something, like crime, is despicable?

Because your will is repulsed by it, right?

Your will judges, not nature. Nor can you pull out a judgement out of nature without falling back upon will.

 

[DisingenuousChristian]

Power is an essential ingredient. But it would be a mistake to assume that just anyone with power has the right to ground the moral law. That is not what I am saying, and I will get to why briefly.

What would you think of someone, a parent say, who laid down "laws" but hadn't the power to exercise dominion over those laws? Would those laws even be laws?

Or what would you think of a hypocrite, who prescribes a course of action but he himself doesn't do such and even does the complete opposite?

In both cases I think we can safely say, we do not take the "morals" these people give seriously. Oh sure, we may see some trace of "wisdom" or "common sense" in them, but they do not oblige us because we see that the source from which they spring is not an authoritative "I want you to do this" but a measly, compulsory "do this!"

It's akin to the "stop" example I gave. You would pay attention to someone telling you to stop who, for all intents and purposes, looked normal and acted in a normal fashion towards you. On the other hand, what if it was a crazy person telling you to stop? Since you can't have respect for where the command came from, it does not have the force of law.

Now if you grew up as a standard teenager than of course you know a lot of people become disillusioned with their elders. There is no more shame when one refuses to do a certain thing. Why? Because respect has been forsaken, and authority has been lost.

Now, when it comes to the highest possible authority, who is omnimaximal in all his qualities, with power and dominion over the entirety of existence, and who is perfectly just, is there any room to deny such an authority as that? Think about it carefully. Is it not only your own cynicism about standard human authorities which prevents you from accepting Him as the source of all truth, (including moral imperatives)? Or would you still deny his authority, and fall back to "nature" to your own metaphysical speculation. One is public and exteriorized. The other is private, and one might even say opinion-laden and egotistical. The choice is yours, but one is I believe firmly rooted in knowledge, the other in ignorance.

 

[KCfromNC]

Oh, sure. There might be "good reasons" to do one thing over another. But that's simply not what I think of when I think of morality. What about if a psychopath dispenses with "common sense" reasons because they don't suit him? What would you say to him to bring him back "to reality." Nothing, I suppose. There's nothing you can say to psychopaths to change them. Well, how about just a hardened criminal? He wants to go back to prison so he commits a petty crime. How do you dissuade? And, if you can't dissuade, what right do you have to, what sanction in particular, that he should be moral?

How does your approach solve these problems any better than any others?

The "magic" of consciousness, would only be one reason, stemming from one's practical identity, as to how he should act. Another would be various sanctions placed on morality such that it has the force that it does, and not just because it gives us good advice we may take or deny at our leisure.

I'm not sure how your source of morality makes it any more or less undeniable than any other.

Those would be a type of sanction. But there are other types of sanctions which don't have anything to do with punishment but rather the degree of authoritativeness they spring from.

This is hard to explain, but I feel confident that I've made a start.

Nope, I have no idea what this means.

 

[TScott]

There is an overlap though, for instance we might experience primary properties such as extention in space.

Also experiential properties are physical properties, assuming that the mind is physical.

Please explain "extention (sic) in space".
As to experiential properties being physical properties because they are caused by physical phenomena (the mind), this is a distinct possibility or even probability, and kind of gets us to the root of the question. Is consciousness then just an illusion caused by the functioning of our brain?
What I mean is difficult to explain, to say the least since nobody really knows. Many neuroscientists believe that an experiential memory is represented in our brain as a sequence of certain synapses firing , and that a strong memory is formed as the same sequence of synapses are fired multiple times. In this sense we can see that as we become familiar with certain experiences we can grow to have preferences based on this familiarity. Seemingly subjective preferences, both positive or negative, are actually just experiences that we are more familiar with. Perhaps that is all our consciousness really is, is the mind jumping around to all these different memories-but that still doesn't explain everything, does it?

For example, I'm sitting here at my keyboard, I read what you have written, I form a response as I scan my memory for things associated with what you wrote in order to form that response. Somewhere in this the act of reasoning takes place. The weighing of information, and collating it into a coherent paradigm. I'm searching for an answer, it will have to be based on either data I already have or will gain; i.e. experiential information, which is the result of me experiencing physical information through my neural system. But it is the actual act of putting it all together, the reasoning that has me somewhat baffled.