What attributes must something possess to qualify as a god?

[Conscious Z]

An omnipotent being would be able to make choices. An omniscient being would know what choices it will make before it makes them. Therefore, an omniscient being couldn't be omnipotent as it can't choose something in conflict with what its omniscience says it will choose. And if it does choose something in conflict with what its omniscience says it will choose, then it isn't omniscient.

That's a weak argument. An omnipotent being is defined as a being that can do anything logically possible. An omniscient being knows what it will want to do at all future points, and can thus know what it will do in the future. Thus, the being can do whatever it wants in the future, and because it knows what it will want, it is omniscient.

 

[talquin]

There is no logical impossibility. The terms "omniscience" and "omnipotence" are assumed to exclude that which is logically impossible, such as God making a rock so heavy that he can't lift it.

Taking the most common definitions for those words, meaning that omnipotence is being able to do everything that is logically possible and omniscience is knowing everything that is logically possible, there is no logical contradiction.

You're incorrect. There is a logical conflict. From Iron Chariots Wiki

God is said to be omniscient, and this poses a special problem for free will: if God knows the future, that means that the future is predictable and immutable. This, in turn, means that our actions are predetermined. We may have pondered long and hard over which action to take, but the very act of pondering is as predictable as the execution of a complex computer program.
Note that this reasoning also applies to God: if God is omniscient, then he knows what he will do, and must inevitably do what he already knows he will do.
Some apologists argue that since God exists outside of time, he can have knowledge of everything that has and will be done without predetermination. An apologist might explain the situation in this way: Suppose Tom knows Susy quite well — so well that he knows if she sees a homeless man by the bus station, she will give him any change she has in her purse. However, even though Tom knows Susy will do this, she doesn't do it because Tom knows she will do it, but because she was going to do it anyway. Tom simply had the knowledge that she would do it. The difference between Tom and God, they say, is that God knows people better than they know themselves (being their creator), and so he knows, on a deeper level than Tom, just what Susy will decide to do in a given situation--again, not that Susy does it because God knows she will do it, but she does it regardless because that's what she decided to do.
Nevertheless, God's omnipotence causes the analogy to break down. If God has perfect knowledge of what will happen without his intervention, and his intervention is guaranteed to bring about a different result, then God has absolute control over what will happen. By refusing to intervene, God has effectively chosen the course of action. Also, Christian doctrine implies that God created both Tom and Susy while knowing everything that they would do in advance.

 

[GenetoJean]

An omnipotent being would be able to make choices. An omniscient being would know what choices it will make before it makes them. Therefore, an omniscient being couldn't be omnipotent as it can't choose something in conflict with what its omniscience says it will choose. And if it does choose something in conflict with what its omniscience says it will choose, then it isn't omniscient.

So the being just always makes the choice that it knows it is going to make because it knows that that choice is always the right choice so therefore there is no reason to make another choice.

 

[talquin]

That's a weak argument. An omnipotent being is defined as a being that can do anything logically possible. An omniscient being knows what it will want to do at all future points, and can thus know what it will do in the future. Thus, the being can do whatever it wants in the future, and because it knows what it will want, it is omniscient.

Can an omnipotent being make choices? If it can't, then it's not omnipotent.

Does an omniscient being know everything about all events which haven't yet occurred? If not, then it's not omniscient.

 

[talquin]

So the being just always makes the choice that it knows it is going to make because it knows that that choice is always the right choice so therefore there is no reason to make another choice.

What if it exercises its omnipotence and chooses 'B' instead of 'A'?

 

[Conscious Z]

You're incorrect. There is a logical conflict. From Iron Chariots Wiki

God is said to be omniscient, and this poses a special problem for free will: if God knows the future, that means that the future is predictable and immutable. This, in turn, means that our actions are predetermined. We may have pondered long and hard over which action to take, but the very act of pondering is as predictable as the execution of a complex computer program.
Note that this reasoning also applies to God: if God is omniscient, then he knows what he will do, and must inevitably do what he already knows he will do.
Some apologists argue that since God exists outside of time, he can have knowledge of everything that has and will be done without predetermination. An apologist might explain the situation in this way: Suppose Tom knows Susy quite well — so well that he knows if she sees a homeless man by the bus station, she will give him any change she has in her purse. However, even though Tom knows Susy will do this, she doesn't do it because Tom knows she will do it, but because she was going to do it anyway. Tom simply had the knowledge that she would do it. The difference between Tom and God, they say, is that God knows people better than they know themselves (being their creator), and so he knows, on a deeper level than Tom, just what Susy will decide to do in a given situation--again, not that Susy does it because God knows she will do it, but she does it regardless because that's what she decided to do.
Nevertheless, God's omnipotence causes the analogy to break down. If God has perfect knowledge of what will happen without his intervention, and his intervention is guaranteed to bring about a different result, then God has absolute control over what will happen. By refusing to intervene, God has effectively chosen the course of action. Also, Christian doctrine implies that God created both Tom and Susy while knowing everything that they would do in advance.

Actually, there is no conflict. The paragraph you copied and pasted might be an argument against the libertarian view of free will, but it provided little in the way of demonstrating a paradox in omniscience and omnipotence. It is entirely possible that God can do anything, but he knows what he will want to do, thus he knows what will happen. Knowing his own desires well enough to know his actions doesn't seem to limit his actions. He is still acting in accordance to his desires, and if his desires were different, his knowledge would be different.

 

[Conscious Z]

What if it exercises its omnipotence and chooses 'B' instead of 'A'?

Then it would have known it was going to want to choose B beforehand.

 

[Conscious Z]

Can an omnipotent being make choices? If it can't, then it's not omnipotent.

Does an omniscient being know everything about all events which haven't yet occurred? If not, then it's not omniscient.

Yes, but it knows what it will choose at all points in the future. It can still do what it wants, but it knows what it will want to do.

 

[GenetoJean]

What if it exercises its omnipotence and chooses 'B' instead of 'A'?

It would be wiser than that because of it being omniscient.

 

[talquin]

Then it would have known it was going to want to choose B beforehand.

You're not going to win by changing the presuppositions. Let's say it knows it will choose A (omniscience); It then exercises its omnipotence to choose B.

Read more at Morality

 

[Conscious Z]

You're not going to win by changing the presuppositions. Let's say it knows it will choose A (omniscience); It then exercises its omnipotence to choose B.

Read more at Morality

Then it didn't know it was going to choose A. In order to have knowledge, a belief must be true. It can't know it's going to choose A, only to choose B. That's not what knowledge is.

 

[talquin]

Then it didn't know it was going to choose A. In order to have knowledge, a belief must be true. It can't know it's going to choose A, only to choose B. That's not what knowledge is.

This would be more appropriately discussed in The Problem of Free Will thread at http://www.christianforums.com/t7853681/

Christians often make the claim that God knows everything. If asked for specifics, they’ll say this includes knowledge about the future (foreknowledge) and that such knowledge is infallible. Christians also often make the claim that man has free will. Upon being asked for specifics, they’ll agree that free will entails the ability to freely make a choice. At quick glance, these claims may not appear to be in conflict. However, if we dig a little deeper into each of these claims, we’ll see that they are.

Let’s say Fred is faced with a free choice of A or B. He is due to make this choice on Tuesday (day 2). We’ll call Fred’s day 2 A/B choice variable Y. This means prior to day 2, variable Y has no value (or the choice lies in an unmade state), and on day 2, variable Y will acquire a value of either A or B – to be decided freely by Fred.

Given the Christian claim that God has infallible foreknowledge, this would mean God knows infallibly what A/B choice Fred will make when the choice still lies in an unmade state. To gain further clarity on this, it can be asked, “if it were asked on day 1 does God know infallibly what Fred’s day 2 A/B choice will be, would the answer be YES?”. Christians would typically agree.
If asked for further specifics, such as what if Fred chooses something in conflict with what God knows he will choose, Christians will respond with the assertion that Fred will choose whatever God knows he will choose.

So we’ll call God’s day 1 knowledge of Fred’s day 2 A/B choice variable X. If as of day 1, God knows infallibly what Fred’s day 2 A/B choice will be, then it follows that X has a static or fixed value of either A or B as of day 1.

We now have three conditions:

1) X (or God's knowledge as of day 1 of Fred's day 2 A/B choice) has a value of either A or B on day 1 and this value is fixed and cannot change. If it is A, it will remain A. If it is B, it will remain B. This follows the assertion that God has infallible knowledge of future events.

2) Y (or Fred’s day 2 A/B choice) receives its value on day 2. Once Y receives its value, it becomes locked. Prior to receiving its value, it could potentially become A or B, as Fred freely chooses A or B. This follows the assertion that Fred has free will or can freely make choices.

3) X is equal to Y. This follows the assertion that whatever Fred chooses is precisely the same as what God knew he would choose.
Not all three of these conditions can be true.

If #1 & #2 are true, then #3 can’t be true, as X wouldn’t be equal to Y, nor would Y be equal to X. Not only would X receive a value at a different point in time than Y, but Y could be assigned a value in conflict with the static value of X.

If #1 & #3 are true, then #2 can’t be true. Fred wouldn’t be able to freely choose A or B, as variable Y would already be defined as being equal to variable X. Christians will often argue that God's knowledge of Fred’s future choice is a function of Fred’s day 2 choice. But this doesn’t hold true if the answer to the question “if asked on day 1, does God know what Fred’s day 2 A/B choice will be?” is YES.

If #2 & #3 are true, then #1 can’t be true. What this means is if variable Y gets its value on day 2, then variable X also gets its value on day 2 and gets the same value as variable Y. It then follows that God can’t have infallible knowledge on day 1 of Fred’s day 2 A/B choice.

Therefore, it is logically impossible for God (or anyone) to have infallible foreknowledge of a yet to be made free choice.

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I've presented this scenario to several theists and non-theists and most of the responses I get involve them reconciling it by changing the claims which I'm responding to. Among them:

1) Instead of man being able to freely choose A or B, they'll assert that a free choice doesn't actually occur or that everything is pre-determined (I think the word is deterministic). This would mean that we are all actually robots. However, their claim is flawed, because upon my asking the question "up until the time you choose A out of an A/B choice, could you still have chosen B?", they will always say YES.

2) God is outside of time and doesn't have knowledge "as of day 1". It then follows that it would be irresponsible and a misrepresentation to say that on day 1, God has knowledge of day 2 events, as their claim is God doesn't have his knowledge on day 1. This claim is also flawed, as upon asking them if X (or what God knows as of day 1) has a value on day 1, they will agree it does. Furthermore, if one asks a question about the status of something without mentioning a particular point in time, the assumed point in time is the present. For example, if I say, "I own 12 cats", this doesn't mean I always own 12 cats, nor does it mean I own 12 cats at some point in the future and nor does it mean I owned 12 cats yesterday. It means I own 12 cats at the moment I made the statement - unless specified otherwise, such as "I owned 12 cats a week ago" or "I always own 12 cats". Similarly, if one were to say, "God knows what Fred will choose tomorrow", it means as of the moment the statement is made.

 

[Conscious Z]

This would be more appropriately discussed in The Problem of Free Will thread at http://www.christianforums.com/t7853681/

Christians often make the claim that God knows everything. If asked for specifics, they’ll say this includes knowledge about the future (foreknowledge) and that such knowledge is infallible. Christians also often make the claim that man has free will. Upon being asked for specifics, they’ll agree that free will entails the ability to freely make a choice. At quick glance, these claims may not appear to be in conflict. However, if we dig a little deeper into each of these claims, we’ll see that they are.

Let’s say Fred is faced with a free choice of A or B. He is due to make this choice on Tuesday (day 2). We’ll call Fred’s day 2 A/B choice variable Y. This means prior to day 2, variable Y has no value (or the choice lies in an unmade state), and on day 2, variable Y will acquire a value of either A or B – to be decided freely by Fred.

Given the Christian claim that God has infallible foreknowledge, this would mean God knows infallibly what A/B choice Fred will make when the choice still lies in an unmade state. To gain further clarity on this, it can be asked, “if it were asked on day 1 does God know infallibly what Fred’s day 2 A/B choice will be, would the answer be YES?”. Christians would typically agree.
If asked for further specifics, such as what if Fred chooses something in conflict with what God knows he will choose, Christians will respond with the assertion that Fred will choose whatever God knows he will choose.

So we’ll call God’s day 1 knowledge of Fred’s day 2 A/B choice variable X. If as of day 1, God knows infallibly what Fred’s day 2 A/B choice will be, then it follows that X has a static or fixed value of either A or B as of day 1.

We now have three conditions:

1) X (or God's knowledge as of day 1 of Fred's day 2 A/B choice) has a value of either A or B on day 1 and this value is fixed and cannot change. If it is A, it will remain A. If it is B, it will remain B. This follows the assertion that God has infallible knowledge of future events.

2) Y (or Fred’s day 2 A/B choice) receives its value on day 2. Once Y receives its value, it becomes locked. Prior to receiving its value, it could potentially become A or B, as Fred freely chooses A or B. This follows the assertion that Fred has free will or can freely make choices.

3) X is equal to Y. This follows the assertion that whatever Fred chooses is precisely the same as what God knew he would choose.
Not all three of these conditions can be true.

If #1 & #2 are true, then #3 can’t be true, as X wouldn’t be equal to Y, nor would Y be equal to X. Not only would X receive a value at a different point in time than Y, but Y could be assigned a value in conflict with the static value of X.

If #1 & #3 are true, then #2 can’t be true. Fred wouldn’t be able to freely choose A or B, as variable Y would already be defined as being equal to variable X. Christians will often argue that God's knowledge of Fred’s future choice is a function of Fred’s day 2 choice. But this doesn’t hold true if the answer to the question “if asked on day 1, does God know what Fred’s day 2 A/B choice will be?” is YES.

If #2 & #3 are true, then #1 can’t be true. What this means is if variable Y gets its value on day 2, then variable X also gets its value on day 2 and gets the same value as variable Y. It then follows that God can’t have infallible knowledge on day 1 of Fred’s day 2 A/B choice.

Therefore, it is logically impossible for God (or anyone) to have infallible foreknowledge of a yet to be made free choice.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I've presented this scenario to several theists and non-theists and most of the responses I get involve them reconciling it by changing the claims which I'm responding to. Among them:

1) Instead of man being able to freely choose A or B, they'll assert that a free choice doesn't actually occur or that everything is pre-determined (I think the word is deterministic). This would mean that we are all actually robots. However, their claim is flawed, because upon my asking the question "up until the time you choose A out of an A/B choice, could you still have chosen B?", they will always say YES.

2) God is outside of time and doesn't have knowledge "as of day 1". It then follows that it would be irresponsible and a misrepresentation to say that on day 1, God has knowledge of day 2 events, as their claim is God doesn't have his knowledge on day 1. This claim is also flawed, as upon asking them if X (or what God knows as of day 1) has a value on day 1, they will agree it does. Furthermore, if one asks a question about the status of something without mentioning a particular point in time, the assumed point in time is the present. For example, if I say, "I own 12 cats", this doesn't mean I always own 12 cats, nor does it mean I own 12 cats at some point in the future and nor does it mean I owned 12 cats yesterday. It means I own 12 cats at the moment I made the statement - unless specified otherwise, such as "I owned 12 cats a week ago" or "I always own 12 cats". Similarly, if one were to say, "God knows what Fred will choose tomorrow", it means as of the moment the statement is made.

But we aren't discussing free will. We are discussing whether there is any logical incompatibility with a being who is both omniscient and omnipotent. That is an entirely different issue altogether. I will comment on your free will issue briefly, however, as you've completely neglected the most common view held by philosophers today, compatibilism. You said:

"1) Instead of man being able to freely choose A or B, they'll assert that a free choice doesn't actually occur or that everything is pre-determined (I think the word is deterministic). This would mean that we are all actually robots. However, their claim is flawed, because upon my asking the question "up until the time you choose A out of an A/B choice, could you still have chosen B?", they will always say YES."

I would say unequivocally NO, assuming that nothing about my physical being or environment changed.

Free will is simply a being being able to do what it wants. Its desires, or what it wants, may very well be determined, but it is still capable of doing what it wants. Don't confuse the notion of having the freedom to act as you want with the idea that what you want isn't determined. It very much is.

But again, we aren't discussing free will. We are discussing whether there is a logical conflict with a being who is both omnipotent and omniscient.

 

[talquin]

But we aren't discussing free will. We are discussing whether there is any logical incompatibility with a being who is both omniscient and omnipotent. That is an entirely different issue altogether. I will comment on your free will issue briefly, however, as you've completely neglected the most common view held by philosophers today, compatibilism. You said:

"1) Instead of man being able to freely choose A or B, they'll assert that a free choice doesn't actually occur or that everything is pre-determined (I think the word is deterministic). This would mean that we are all actually robots. However, their claim is flawed, because upon my asking the question "up until the time you choose A out of an A/B choice, could you still have chosen B?", they will always say YES."

I would say unequivocally NO, assuming that nothing about my physical being or environment changed.

Free will is simply a being being able to do what it wants. Its desires, or what it wants, may very well be determined, but it is still capable of doing what it wants. Don't confuse the notion of having the freedom to act as you want with the idea that what you want isn't determined. It very much is.

But again, we aren't discussing free will. We are discussing whether there is a logical conflict with a being who is both omnipotent and omniscient.

Let's assign variable X to God's day 1 knowledge of God's day 2 A/B choice. If God knows everything, then as of day 1, God would know what his day 2 A/B choice is. This means that variable X has a static/fixed/truth value at point in time of day 1.

Let's assign variable Y to God's day 2 choice. Since God's day 2 choice is freely made on day 2, then variable Y receives its value on day 2 and can be A or B.

If God's day 2 choice will always be equal to God's day 1 knowledge of his day 2 A/B choice, then variable X must always be equal to variable Y and vice versa. However, this is logically impossible due to variable X having a static/truth value at a point in time prior to when variable Y is freely assigned a value.

 

[talquin]

It would be wiser than that because of it being omniscient.

Let's assign variable X to God's day 1 knowledge of God's day 2 A/B choice. If God knows everything, then as of day 1, God would know what his day 2 A/B choice is. This means that variable X has a static/fixed/truth value at point in time of day 1.

Let's assign variable Y to God's day 2 choice. Since God's day 2 choice is freely made on day 2, then variable Y receives its value on day 2 and can be A or B.

If God's day 2 choice will always be equal to God's day 1 knowledge of his day 2 A/B choice, then variable X must always be equal to variable Y and vice versa. However, this is logically impossible due to variable X having a static/truth value at a point in time prior to when variable Y is freely assigned a value.

 

[Conscious Z]

Let's assign variable X to God's day 1 knowledge of God's day 2 A/B choice. If God knows everything, then as of day 1, God would know what his day 2 A/B choice is. This means that variable X has a static/fixed/truth value at point in time of day 1.

Let's assign variable Y to God's day 2 choice. Since God's day 2 choice is freely made on day 2, then variable Y receives its value on day 2 and can be A or B.

If God's day 2 choice will always be equal to God's day 1 knowledge of his day 2 A/B choice, then variable X must always be equal to variable Y and vice versa. However, this is logically impossible due to variable X having a static/truth value at a point in time prior to when variable Y is freely assigned a value.

That's faulty logic. There's nothing logically impossible about X being equal to Y. Every compatibilist in philosophy would disagree with you on this.

 

[talquin]

That's faulty logic. There's nothing logically impossible about X being equal to Y. Every compatibilist in philosophy would disagree with you on this.

If you're correct, then how could X be equal to Y if X is B and Y later becomes A?

 

[Conscious Z]

If you're correct, then how could X be equal to Y if X is B and Y later becomes A?

If Y was going to later be "A," then X would never have been "B."

You are not properly understanding what it means to have actual foreknowledge.

 

[ananda]

What attributes must something possess to qualify as a god?

The ability to persuade others that it/he/she is a god

 

[GenetoJean]

Let's assign variable X to God's day 1 knowledge of God's day 2 A/B choice. If God knows everything, then as of day 1, God would know what his day 2 A/B choice is. This means that variable X has a static/fixed/truth value at point in time of day 1.

Let's assign variable Y to God's day 2 choice. Since God's day 2 choice is freely made on day 2, then variable Y receives its value on day 2 and can be A or B.

If God's day 2 choice will always be equal to God's day 1 knowledge of his day 2 A/B choice, then variable X must always be equal to variable Y and vice versa. However, this is logically impossible due to variable X having a static/truth value at a point in time prior to when variable Y is freely assigned a value.

This above is way too convoluted. This god had two choices; he chose choice A because it is the right choice. He would never choose choice B because it is the wrong choice. It's that simple.