What are some good Christian philosophers with a strong Biblical backbone?

Fervent said:

Russell's teapot-like arguments, the common canard of "you can't prove a negative", and arguments along those lines. Basically the assertion that the one making the "positive" claim bears the burden. My main point of contention is that in ordinary discourse we don't routinely accept skepticism as the appropriate response to every claim, we require some kind of reason for skepticism. If my neighbor tells me about their friend from work Mark, whom I have never met, my first response is not to demand that my neighbor prove to me Mark exists because I have never met him. I have to have a reason to not believe Mark exists.

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If you're epistemic goal is to address more common truth claim structures, then it wouldn't be Russell's teapot-like arguments. Why do I say this? mainly because Russell's analogy in his infamous teapot argument was directed at the religious claims of religious (mainly Christian) people, not so much to everyday occurrences or situations relying upon human report.

So, it isn't really the Russell's teapot form of argument you'll be wanting to crack apart. And this remaining state leaves you in the more general position that I already inhabit and by which I make inroads into the truth claims of skeptics about the suppose 'nature' of the universe in which we live. In general discourse, a small amount of incredulity is justified. The problem these days is that folks often have so little in the way of training in Critical Thinking (i.e. Logic/ Epistemology / Critical Study) along with prohibitory situations in life that douse the more normal range of human interest in 'fact.'

No, I think you probably need to take on Anti-Realism rather than Russell's strained, positivistic realism. (And I say this as someone who not only studied Russell in my undergraduate studies, but also read his 'Why I am not a Christian' essay/book over thirty years ago, wherein is found his teapot analogy. It's not that serious.

Fervent said:

My skepticism is more a rhetorical matter, because I am more of a pragmatist in that I see "knowledge" as an unattainable goal and instead rely on a tentative model-based epistemology.

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I'd say all of the forms of epistemology are 'model' based, but some of them are concentrated on the more cerebral and abstract ideas of what the Greeks called 'Episteme' and they often get replaced by, or confused these days with, 'Techne.' There's a whole lot more here in this overall problem. In fact, you're looking at a dozen or two problems to sort out, not merely a burden of proof problem or a synthetic-analytic distinction problem.

What do I mean by this? I simply mean that surveying Epistemology as a comparative field is probably going to do more for you than focusing on only the one or two problem that you're thinking are central. I would say that while they are important, they're not in and of themselves decisive.

Fervent said:

I don't think skepticism is tenable to live by, but I do think that the skeptical position isn't given enough weight in most discussions of "truth"...we are far too quick to accept that because it is necessary to adopt either a circular justification or a dogmatic one in order to escape infinite regress that we let whatever it is that we think is the right fit for an axiom off and accept assertion as a valid grounds for acceptance. So I maintain that I am a skeptic, but recognize that skepticism is fundmentally untenable. My point is simply to reverse the question from "why should I believe?" to "why shouldn't I believe?"

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And in this general posture, I concur with you that there is too much dogmatism in the general assumptions that run among today's public mind, even if for slightly different reasons as your own. You and I have a similar disposition here and a similar awareness that there are limitations to all epistemic claims that are out there.

While I'm not a big supporter of the position that 'we can't prove a negative,' I know that William Lane Craig has averred against this, saying that we can prove a negative, as has atheist, Stephen Law.

In doing a little digging, I've also come across a brief article by Stephen D. Hales who aligns with this point. I'm still reading and digesting it to see to what extent I think it's applicable beyond mere deduction or as to how decisive it is in holding skepticism at bay----I think there are other problems in the mix that make reliance upon the argument below tenuous. But, maybe I'm wrong:

2PhiloVoid said:

If you're epistemic goal is to address more common truth claim structures, then it wouldn't be Russell's teapot-like arguments. Why do I say this? mainly because Russell's analogy in his infamous teapot argument was directed at the religious claims of religious (mainly Christian) people, not so much to everyday occurrences or situations relying upon human report.

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I disagree, just because Russell's argument is aimed at supernatural claims its "point" was to establish a burden of proof, and the force of it depends on the initial plausibility of the item in question. I don't see any reason to separate "supernatural" claims from any other claim, as doing so to me seems to reek of special pleading.

2PhiloVoid said:

So, it isn't really the Russell's teapot form of argument you'll be wanting to crack apart. And this remaining state leaves you in the more general position that I already inhabit and by which I make inroads into the truth claims of skeptics about the suppose 'nature' of the universe in which we live. In general discourse, a small amount of incredulity is justified. The problem these days is that folks often have so little in the way of training in Critical Thinking (i.e. Logic/ Epistemology / Critical Study) along with prohibitory situations in life that douse the more normal range of human interest in 'fact.'

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I disagree that incredulity is justified without some specific justification, unless you simply mean to say that the threshold for iincredulty should be lower than that of credulity. I'm a believer in the maxim "if it's fair for everyday life, it's fair for philosophy" and in everyday life we don't regard claims with suspicion for no reason, I accept my neighbors claims about his co-worker without the slightest suspicion unless I have some cause. I see two ways of addressing such a threshold, primarily an argument from silence.

2PhiloVoid said:

No, I think you probably need to take on Anti-Realism rather than Russell's strained, positivistic realism. (And I say this as someone who not only studied Russell in my undergraduate studies, but also read his 'Why I am not a Christian' essay/book over thirty years ago, wherein is found his teapot analogy. It's not that serious.

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I'm not sure I understand what you are getting at with this. Why would anti-realism be a more appropriate challenge than more positivistic strains, when it is the positivistic confidence I am after? It is the false air of rationality that arguments like Russell's teapot convey to the skeptical position I want to undermine, to essentially level the playing field and bring out that skepticism and faith with respect to the existence of God rest on similar evidential grounds, which is to say they are either without a prior burden for acceptance or they possess an insurmountble burden and at best we can say that the existence of God is either a fact or impossible.

2PhiloVoid said:

I'd say all of the forms of epistemology are 'model' based, but some of them are concentrated on the more cerebral and abstract ideas of what the Greeks called 'Episteme' and they often get replaced by, or confused these days with, 'Techne.' There's a whole lot more here in this overall problem. In fact, you're looking at a dozen or two problems to sort out, not merely a burden of proof problem or a synthetic-analytic distinction problem.

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This is the kind of stuff I am interested in. I see the principal challenge as being challenging the notion of "extraordinary claims" and sussing out where and how a maxim like that might be appropriate and not simply a way to try to make special pleading respectable.

2PhiloVoid said:

What do I mean by this? I simply mean that surveying Epistemology as a comparative field is probably going to do more for you than focusing on only the one or two problem that you're thinking are central. I would say that while they are important, they're not in and of themselves decisive.

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Yes, I am looking for more indepth surveys. Especially those that attempt to avoid Cartesian skepticism in a way other than to arbitrarily adopt a metaphysical position to build on.

2PhiloVoid said:

And in this general posture, I concur with you that there is too much dogmatism in the general assumptions that run among today's public mind, even if for slightly different reasons as your own. You and I have a similar disposition here and a similar awareness that there are limitations to all epistemic claims that are out there.

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Yeah, my goal is simply to challenge the idea that naturalistic epistemology requires naturalistic metaphysics; or that the success of science is suggestive of the truth-value of naturalistic metaphysics.

2PhiloVoid said:

While I'm not a big supporter of the position that 'we can't prove a negative,' I know that William Lane Craig has averred against this, saying that we can prove a negative, as has atheist, Stephen Law.

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Thanks for the suggestions. I find it fascinating that anyone would even forward the complaint as if it were an argument in and of itself. Since if you can't prove a negative, then you can't have any sort of evidence in favor of a negative position and there is no reason to accept a negative claim. How an inability on their part is supposed to be compelling reason to adopt their position is quite the mystery to me.

2PhiloVoid said:

In doing a little digging, I've also come across a brief article by Stephen D. Hales who aligns with this point. I'm still reading and digesting it to see to what extent I think it's applicable beyond mere deduction or as to how decisive it is in holding skepticism at bay----I think there are other problems in the mix that make reliance upon the argument below tenuous. But, maybe I'm wrong:

Article: THINKING TOOLS: YOU CAN PROVE A NEGATIVE - by Stephen D. Hales [Link below]​

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https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/0BBE48877743A318F2B9CE24F873904C/S1477175600001287a.pdf/thinking_tools_you_can_prove_a_negative.pdf

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Stephen Law: You can prove a negative​

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You Can Prove a Negative

Can't prove a negative? Sure you can!

www.psychologytoday.com

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Thanks for the articles!

RDKirk said:

A story:

I was taking a logic curriculum in college that required an early survey of philosophy course that was taught by the dean of the philosophy department. I signed up for the course and quickly learned that I was the only student enrolled. That would mean the offer would be withdrawn, but it best fit my intended schedule to take it that semester so I went to the professor, Dr Goldstein, to see if I could take it by independent study and testing,

"No," Goldstein said firmly, it was a course that must be taught by lecture. So, I said something about being disappointed that it would not be taught that semester. "Oh, I'm teaching it," he said. Even if to only one student, he was going to teach it. By lecture. We held the first couple of sessions in a classroom, just him and me. Then we mutually agreed that was dumb, so I just went to his office.

In that private setting, we learned we were both Christian, which rather surprised me, given his name. As it turned out, he had been born and raised Jewish. But he'd become disillusioned by Judaism and turned to atheism. But he had found atheism philosophically unsatisfying and had spent more than a decade traveling the world and investigation all sorts of religions.

Eventually, he looked into Christianity, which he'd previously avoided because he'd "heard enough" about Christianity just being in the US. But it hadn't taken him very much study into the New Testament to realize...there it was. There it had been all along.

So, that "survey of philosophy" course actually turned into "the ways all the other philosophies get it wrong."

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It sounds like you found the right teacher. I agree and I think we can reason our way to God and the foot of the cross.

Fervent said:

Thanks for the articles!

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No problem. You're welcome!

Christian Philosophers?

There are loads..

Josef Pieper (Thomist)

Francis Schaeffer (Reformed)

Alvin Plantinga (Reformed)

John Henry Newman (Catholic)

Dallas Willard (Reformed I think)

Douglas Groothius (Reformed)